Learning from Transatlantic Allies to secure the Subsea Domain
The MOC
Subsea cable. Image from XODUS.
By
Thea Dunlevie
August 17, 2023
When French author Jules Vernes wrote Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, he dazzled the world with his deep-sea infatuation which, to early readers in the 19th century, felt more like a fantastic adventure than a domain crucial to daily life. Today, modern life depends on subsea activity. Globally, some 550 subsea cables line the ocean floor, carrying 99% of digital communications and an estimated $10 trillion dollars’ worth of financial transactions each day. As subsea cables become ever more indispensable for connectivity in the digital age, they become more attractive targets for adversaries. In the struggle to physically defend subsea critical infrastructure, offense – including grayzone warriors like Russia and China – holds the advantage because defenders cannot constantly, effectively surveil hundreds of miles of targetable maritime infrastructure at any one time. The U.S. should consider identifying and organizing its ends, ways, and means, in coordination with European Union (“EU”) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) partners, towards developing America’s own subsea strategy to 1) counter immediate, stated, hybrid threats to maritime infrastructure by adversaries like Russia and China and 2) encourage collaboration with allies towards developing and refining their own subsea defenses.
The first fiberoptic cable transmitted data between the United States and Europe in 1858, setting the tone for transatlantic subsea cooperation. Now, about 20 submarine cables connect Western Europe to the U.S. and transmit an estimated 40% of international, subsea data traffic. While these cables can transport diplomatic cables and military orders, these cables are often funded and operated commercially and by multiple owners, including household names like CISCO, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and AT&T. The submarine cables industry is valued around nearly $70 billion dollars. Companies continue to lay new cables, and governments protect and strategically support some of these projects to establish diplomatic connections. Countries and companies are coordinating to lay new subsea cables in multiple hotspots, including the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Pacific Ocean near the Philippine Sea.
Figure 1. The transatlantic subsea cable network. Photo from GCaptain.
Adversaries see the value of subsea cables, too. State-backed threats remain salient. Severing a subsea cable, which may not be thicker than a garden hose, could be weaponized and seriously disrupt international connectivity and dataflow, causing immediate consequences for governments, economies, and societies. This year, Chinese fishing vessels knocked out internet for Taiwan’s Matsu Islands by damaging several subsea cables. Many believe this was an act of Chinese hybrid warfare: plausible to deny because the culprit was a fishing vessel yet effective proof-of-concept for thwarting Taiwanese communication capabilities.
Private sector companies have diversified dataflows across multiple subsea cables so that disruption could be mitigated, and various countries have made moves to protect proximal subsea infrastructure. Since 2014, the EU has classified subsea cables as infrastructure needing protection, within its Maritime Strategy. Fast-forwarding to this year, NATO created its Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell at NATO HQ. However, the pervasive problem is that offense holds the advantage. The attack surface of the sprawling network of cables across the ocean floor is so large – and the number of cables is expanding – that consistent, effective allied defenses become nearly impossible. Likewise, it only takes an “accident” by a “fishing vessel” to sever a population’s internet connectivity, while it takes a team of trained professionals to manage the incident by rerouting data and properly repairing and fortifying damaged cables.
Improving allied surveillance, deterrence, and mitigation capabilities becomes increasingly urgent as Russia and China continue to perfect grayzone tactics and invest resources accordingly. Russia, for example, upgraded its intelligence ships capable of surveilling subsea infrastructure around 2008. Multiple incidents have been reported over the years, by the U.S. government and NATO allies, of Russian surveillance ships lingering near subsea infrastructure pathways. The threat seems especially near, given Russian President Dimitri Medvedev’s direct threat to allied infrastructure made last month: “we [Russia] have no, even moral, restrictions left to refrain from destroying the cable communications of our enemies, laid along the ocean floor.”
Given these threats, what can be done? The U.S. should consider the Italian and French subsea approaches. First, the U.S. should consider the unique threats posed within the subsea domain and participate in international partnerships towards securing subsea infrastructure. Enter Italy. Italy has categorized the subsea as a separate military domain. Italy is also leading the EU PESCO efforts marked by the Critical Seabed Infrastructure Protection program including Germany, Spain, France, Portugal, and Sweden and observed by Bulgaria and Finland. Italy’s identification and prioritization of the subsea domain drives resource allocation and motivates innovation from industry. For example, Italy seeks to deploy undersea naval drones to patrol internet cables and gas pipelines off its coast. Italian oil and gas company Saipem is testing seabed recharging stations so such vehicles could operate for months at a time, before needing to recharge and dump data. As Italy is leading and cooperating with allies, the U.S. should also continue to participate in allied efforts, such as NATO’s intelligence sharing system for identifying threats to subsea infrastructure. The U.S. should also coordinate with the Nordic Counsel, including the Faroe Islands which neighbors several transatlantic subsea cables and may not already be members of larger subsea-defense coalitions.
Secondly, the U.S. should consider creating a subsea strategy or other government document, body which can guide planning, resource allocation, and execution towards securing subsea infrastructure from physical threats. France leads here. In 2022, France became the first country to produce a national subsea strategy, the “Strategy for Seabed Warfare.” Like Italy, France believes “subsea” should be considered a separate domain, like cyber or space. Legal, military, political, and economic interests and considerations are included within the strategy, making it an effective document to guide and motivate action within the government and private sector. To execute the strategy, France will develop at least one remotely operated vehicle and one autonomous uninhabited vehicle by 2025 – demonstrating that a strategy should be executed in partnership with industry, like in this case, Thales, Naval Group, and ECA Group.
Like in France, many parties within the U.S. have stakes in the security of subsea infrastructure, including but not limited to many private sector companies and multiple government agencies: the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Federal Communications Commission, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Department of Transportation, among others. While the U.S. has launched programs to protect subsea cables, such as the two-ship Cable Ship Security Program authorized by the FY2020 NDAA, more can be done. Given the number of actors involved, variety of threats to subsea cables, and high stakes, a U.S. subsea strategy could uniquely catalyze the difficult work of aligning agency and corporation priorities and resources with national security objectives. It can address other daunting questions, like how the U.S. would nationally respond if subsea cables were attacked during wartime, for example.
By creating its own subsea strategy, the U.S. has an opportunity to coalesce and lead allies and shape the information ecosystem by innovatively securing subsea infrastructure. As Russia and China famously employ a “whole of government” approach, so can the U.S. by developing a national subsea strategy. Such a strategy could unify ends, ways, and means to more effectively protect subsea infrastructure – essential to daily life as Americans know it. Let’s learn from and continue to collaborate with our friends across the Atlantic to secure the globalized information ecosystem.
Thea Dunlevie is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy where she focuses on transatlantic affairs.
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Center for Maritime Strategy
By Thea Dunlevie
When French author Jules Vernes wrote Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, he dazzled the world with his deep-sea infatuation which, to early readers in the 19th century, felt more like a fantastic adventure than a domain crucial to daily life. Today, modern life depends on subsea activity. Globally, some 550 subsea cables line the ocean floor, carrying 99% of digital communications and an estimated $10 trillion dollars’ worth of financial transactions each day. As subsea cables become ever more indispensable for connectivity in the digital age, they become more attractive targets for adversaries. In the struggle to physically defend subsea critical infrastructure, offense – including grayzone warriors like Russia and China – holds the advantage because defenders cannot constantly, effectively surveil hundreds of miles of targetable maritime infrastructure at any one time. The U.S. should consider identifying and organizing its ends, ways, and means, in coordination with European Union (“EU”) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) partners, towards developing America’s own subsea strategy to 1) counter immediate, stated, hybrid threats to maritime infrastructure by adversaries like Russia and China and 2) encourage collaboration with allies towards developing and refining their own subsea defenses.
The first fiberoptic cable transmitted data between the United States and Europe in 1858, setting the tone for transatlantic subsea cooperation. Now, about 20 submarine cables connect Western Europe to the U.S. and transmit an estimated 40% of international, subsea data traffic. While these cables can transport diplomatic cables and military orders, these cables are often funded and operated commercially and by multiple owners, including household names like CISCO, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and AT&T. The submarine cables industry is valued around nearly $70 billion dollars. Companies continue to lay new cables, and governments protect and strategically support some of these projects to establish diplomatic connections. Countries and companies are coordinating to lay new subsea cables in multiple hotspots, including the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Pacific Ocean near the Philippine Sea.
Figure 1. The transatlantic subsea cable network. Photo from GCaptain.
Adversaries see the value of subsea cables, too. State-backed threats remain salient. Severing a subsea cable, which may not be thicker than a garden hose, could be weaponized and seriously disrupt international connectivity and dataflow, causing immediate consequences for governments, economies, and societies. This year, Chinese fishing vessels knocked out internet for Taiwan’s Matsu Islands by damaging several subsea cables. Many believe this was an act of Chinese hybrid warfare: plausible to deny because the culprit was a fishing vessel yet effective proof-of-concept for thwarting Taiwanese communication capabilities.
Private sector companies have diversified dataflows across multiple subsea cables so that disruption could be mitigated, and various countries have made moves to protect proximal subsea infrastructure. Since 2014, the EU has classified subsea cables as infrastructure needing protection, within its Maritime Strategy. Fast-forwarding to this year, NATO created its Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell at NATO HQ. However, the pervasive problem is that offense holds the advantage. The attack surface of the sprawling network of cables across the ocean floor is so large – and the number of cables is expanding – that consistent, effective allied defenses become nearly impossible. Likewise, it only takes an “accident” by a “fishing vessel” to sever a population’s internet connectivity, while it takes a team of trained professionals to manage the incident by rerouting data and properly repairing and fortifying damaged cables.
Improving allied surveillance, deterrence, and mitigation capabilities becomes increasingly urgent as Russia and China continue to perfect grayzone tactics and invest resources accordingly. Russia, for example, upgraded its intelligence ships capable of surveilling subsea infrastructure around 2008. Multiple incidents have been reported over the years, by the U.S. government and NATO allies, of Russian surveillance ships lingering near subsea infrastructure pathways. The threat seems especially near, given Russian President Dimitri Medvedev’s direct threat to allied infrastructure made last month: “we [Russia] have no, even moral, restrictions left to refrain from destroying the cable communications of our enemies, laid along the ocean floor.”
Given these threats, what can be done? The U.S. should consider the Italian and French subsea approaches. First, the U.S. should consider the unique threats posed within the subsea domain and participate in international partnerships towards securing subsea infrastructure. Enter Italy. Italy has categorized the subsea as a separate military domain. Italy is also leading the EU PESCO efforts marked by the Critical Seabed Infrastructure Protection program including Germany, Spain, France, Portugal, and Sweden and observed by Bulgaria and Finland. Italy’s identification and prioritization of the subsea domain drives resource allocation and motivates innovation from industry. For example, Italy seeks to deploy undersea naval drones to patrol internet cables and gas pipelines off its coast. Italian oil and gas company Saipem is testing seabed recharging stations so such vehicles could operate for months at a time, before needing to recharge and dump data. As Italy is leading and cooperating with allies, the U.S. should also continue to participate in allied efforts, such as NATO’s intelligence sharing system for identifying threats to subsea infrastructure. The U.S. should also coordinate with the Nordic Counsel, including the Faroe Islands which neighbors several transatlantic subsea cables and may not already be members of larger subsea-defense coalitions.
Secondly, the U.S. should consider creating a subsea strategy or other government document, body which can guide planning, resource allocation, and execution towards securing subsea infrastructure from physical threats. France leads here. In 2022, France became the first country to produce a national subsea strategy, the “Strategy for Seabed Warfare.” Like Italy, France believes “subsea” should be considered a separate domain, like cyber or space. Legal, military, political, and economic interests and considerations are included within the strategy, making it an effective document to guide and motivate action within the government and private sector. To execute the strategy, France will develop at least one remotely operated vehicle and one autonomous uninhabited vehicle by 2025 – demonstrating that a strategy should be executed in partnership with industry, like in this case, Thales, Naval Group, and ECA Group.
Like in France, many parties within the U.S. have stakes in the security of subsea infrastructure, including but not limited to many private sector companies and multiple government agencies: the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Federal Communications Commission, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Department of Transportation, among others. While the U.S. has launched programs to protect subsea cables, such as the two-ship Cable Ship Security Program authorized by the FY2020 NDAA, more can be done. Given the number of actors involved, variety of threats to subsea cables, and high stakes, a U.S. subsea strategy could uniquely catalyze the difficult work of aligning agency and corporation priorities and resources with national security objectives. It can address other daunting questions, like how the U.S. would nationally respond if subsea cables were attacked during wartime, for example.
By creating its own subsea strategy, the U.S. has an opportunity to coalesce and lead allies and shape the information ecosystem by innovatively securing subsea infrastructure. As Russia and China famously employ a “whole of government” approach, so can the U.S. by developing a national subsea strategy. Such a strategy could unify ends, ways, and means to more effectively protect subsea infrastructure – essential to daily life as Americans know it. Let’s learn from and continue to collaborate with our friends across the Atlantic to secure the globalized information ecosystem.
Thea Dunlevie is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy where she focuses on transatlantic affairs.