The European Union as a Maritime Security Provider—What Is the EU Doing in the Red Sea?
The MOC
July 9, 2024
The European Union (EU) launched its newest maritime operation in the Red Sea, Operation Aspides, in 2024. This operation is further evidence of the EU’s growing reliance on its own capabilities for defense and increasing commitment to engage militarily abroad to protect its interests. Nevertheless, it is unclear if and when this trend will lead to substantial dialogue on EU-NATO burden-sharing or an agreement on where and how the EU can contribute to Transatlantic security in the maritime domain.
The EU began deploying forces to conduct crisis and conflict management operations in the early 2000’s. Alongside the first civilian interventions, the EU deployed several small-scale, short-term land operations in the Balkans and in Africa. These endeavors were part of a larger effort under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and proved to be stepping stones to the Union taking a more assertive role in international politics. With the adoption of the EU’s latest de facto constitution, the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, Brussels started to further consolidate and institutionalize its external action. In parallel with the post-Lisbon changes, in 2008 the Union deployed its first maritime operation in the Horn of Africa. EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta has been ongoing since 2008, focusing on protection, prevention, and deterrence vis-à-vis illicit trafficking and piracy in the vicinity of Somalia.
EU Maritime Operations Today
The EU has demonstrated a growing interest in the maritime domain over the past 15 years. In line with the EU’s goal—laid down in the 2016 EU Global Strategy—to elevate its profile as an international security provider, the Union has maintained a sustained maritime presence in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Red Sea region. Most visibly, the EU has launched four maritime operations as tools of power projection, deterrence, and crisis management, three of which are still ongoing.
EU Maritime Crisis Management Operations as of 2024
– Protect and accompany vessels transiting the Red Sea
These operations also demonstrate the overall shift in EU foreign and security policy from previous, largely value-based approaches to a more interest-based model and Brussels’ growing willingness to intervene militarily to protect European economic interests. Maritime operations are an increasingly important instrument in the EU’s CSFP toolbox and the Union has launched other initiatives to ensure the protection of its interest vis-à-vis blue economy. Examples include the in the North-Western Indian Ocean and most recently Operation Aspides.
Operation Aspides
The EU officially launched EUNAVFOR Aspides on February 19th, 2024 to safeguard important international shipping routes and to protect commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea from Houthi drone and missile attacks. Aspides was one of the fastest EU interventions, becoming operational just two months after the official decision to act in accordance with with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2722 (2024). Several EU members states have contributed naval assets to the operation, including France, Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Greece.
Protection and deterrence through the combination of different naval and aerial assets have been in the toolbox of the EU since the launch of Atalanta in 2008. However, previous EU maritime operations addressed predominantly non-kinetic threats—such as organized crime—and have not engaged in conventional surface warfare or air defense. In contrast with previous EU maritime interventions, the mandate of Aspides goes beyond mere deterrence and policing. Operation Aspides is a de facto naval air defense operation. Protection and deterrence are achieved through kinetic means, directly interdicting the Houthi’s cheap UAVs fired at ships in the Bab el-Mandeb. Aspides is the first EU maritime operation where the Union has used its ‘firepower’, in the first three months of operations. While this kind of surface warfare is a new phenomenon in EU’s maritime operations, it should not come as a surprise in the light of the 2023 Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS), which clearly demonstrates the Union’s willingness “to take further action to safeguard its interests at sea”, including strengthening readiness and capabilities to respond traditional threats.
Over the past 15 years, the EU has learned how to respond to different threats to its maritime security interests. It has also substantially developed its by enhancing the collection and exchange of information through its common information-sharing environment (CISE), which involves more than 300 national and EU civilian and military agencies with maritime surveillance authorities During this period, the EU has established a small but enduring maritime presence in the Mediterranean Sea and the Horn of Africa, including in the Red Sea. Operation Aspides is the latest example of the EU’s growing focus on maritime security as well as power projection as a regional maritime power. However, the different nature of the threat posed by UAVs and missiles launched by the Houthis in the Red Sea required different mandate and rules of engagement for Aspides in contrast to previous EU maritime operations, which could rely on presence and deterrence to achieve their goals.
Conclusion
Both the European Union and the Transatlantic community should consider how to take advantage of the EU’s growing maritime capabilities. While the EU has grown to join the strategic competition over its maritime areas of interest, strategic cooperation between EU and NATO countries could further enhance the security of all parties against outside threats. EUNAVFOR Operation Aspides, for example works in parallel and in cooperation with the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian to which some EU member states have also individually contributed. As a result, currently, EU and NATO countries work together in different formations in the Red Sea.
Finally, the question of the quantity and quality of deployable naval assets from countries which are both EU member states and NATO allies should be on the table. With two EU maritime nations, Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, DC and future discussions on EU-NATO synergies need to address several important questions: Does NATO want the EU to step up in the European theatre? If yes, then in what domains and with what geopolitical and geographical limitations? More specifically to the maritime domain: how can European navies—especially smaller states—keep up with their increasingly demanding responsibilities to NATO as well as contribute to EU structures? Lacking clear answers to these questions, Operation Aspides and Operation Prosperity Guardian continue to work in parallel in the Red Sea with Aspides primarily relying on the contribution of NATO ally EU member states, which showcases the lack of Transatlantic unity in the face of external threats.
Veronika Hornyák Gracza is a PhD candidate at the Doctoral School of Military Sciences of the University of Public Service and a Doctoral Fellow of the Doctoral School on Common Security and Defence Policy within the European Security and Defence College. Her area of expertise is European security and defence policy, with special focus on EU-led peacebuilding and crisis management missions.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
The European Union (EU) launched its newest maritime operation in the Red Sea, Operation Aspides, in 2024. This operation is further evidence of the EU’s growing reliance on its own capabilities for defense and increasing commitment to engage militarily abroad to protect its interests. Nevertheless, it is unclear if and when this trend will lead to substantial dialogue on EU-NATO burden-sharing or an agreement on where and how the EU can contribute to Transatlantic security in the maritime domain.
The EU began deploying forces to conduct crisis and conflict management operations in the early 2000’s. Alongside the first civilian interventions, the EU deployed several small-scale, short-term land operations in the Balkans and in Africa. These endeavors were part of a larger effort under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and proved to be stepping stones to the Union taking a more assertive role in international politics. With the adoption of the EU’s latest de facto constitution, the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, Brussels started to further consolidate and institutionalize its external action. In parallel with the post-Lisbon changes, in 2008 the Union deployed its first maritime operation in the Horn of Africa. EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta has been ongoing since 2008, focusing on protection, prevention, and deterrence vis-à-vis illicit trafficking and piracy in the vicinity of Somalia.
EU Maritime Operations Today
The EU has demonstrated a growing interest in the maritime domain over the past 15 years. In line with the EU’s goal—laid down in the 2016 EU Global Strategy—to elevate its profile as an international security provider, the Union has maintained a sustained maritime presence in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Red Sea region. Most visibly, the EU has launched four maritime operations as tools of power projection, deterrence, and crisis management, three of which are still ongoing.
EU Maritime Crisis Management Operations as of 2024
– Deter piracy through maritime presence
– Contribute to the enforcement of the United Nations arms embargo on Libya
These operations also demonstrate the overall shift in EU foreign and security policy from previous, largely value-based approaches to a more interest-based model and Brussels’ growing willingness to intervene militarily to protect European economic interests. Maritime operations are an increasingly important instrument in the EU’s CSFP toolbox and the Union has launched other initiatives to ensure the protection of its interest vis-à-vis blue economy. Examples include the in the North-Western Indian Ocean and most recently Operation Aspides.
Operation Aspides
The EU officially launched EUNAVFOR Aspides on February 19th, 2024 to safeguard important international shipping routes and to protect commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea from Houthi drone and missile attacks. Aspides was one of the fastest EU interventions, becoming operational just two months after the official decision to act in accordance with with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2722 (2024). Several EU members states have contributed naval assets to the operation, including France, Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Greece.
Protection and deterrence through the combination of different naval and aerial assets have been in the toolbox of the EU since the launch of Atalanta in 2008. However, previous EU maritime operations addressed predominantly non-kinetic threats—such as organized crime—and have not engaged in conventional surface warfare or air defense. In contrast with previous EU maritime interventions, the mandate of Aspides goes beyond mere deterrence and policing. Operation Aspides is a de facto naval air defense operation. Protection and deterrence are achieved through kinetic means, directly interdicting the Houthi’s cheap UAVs fired at ships in the Bab el-Mandeb. Aspides is the first EU maritime operation where the Union has used its ‘firepower’, in the first three months of operations. While this kind of surface warfare is a new phenomenon in EU’s maritime operations, it should not come as a surprise in the light of the 2023 Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS), which clearly demonstrates the Union’s willingness “to take further action to safeguard its interests at sea”, including strengthening readiness and capabilities to respond traditional threats.
Over the past 15 years, the EU has learned how to respond to different threats to its maritime security interests. It has also substantially developed its by enhancing the collection and exchange of information through its common information-sharing environment (CISE), which involves more than 300 national and EU civilian and military agencies with maritime surveillance authorities During this period, the EU has established a small but enduring maritime presence in the Mediterranean Sea and the Horn of Africa, including in the Red Sea. Operation Aspides is the latest example of the EU’s growing focus on maritime security as well as power projection as a regional maritime power. However, the different nature of the threat posed by UAVs and missiles launched by the Houthis in the Red Sea required different mandate and rules of engagement for Aspides in contrast to previous EU maritime operations, which could rely on presence and deterrence to achieve their goals.
Conclusion
Both the European Union and the Transatlantic community should consider how to take advantage of the EU’s growing maritime capabilities. While the EU has grown to join the strategic competition over its maritime areas of interest, strategic cooperation between EU and NATO countries could further enhance the security of all parties against outside threats. EUNAVFOR Operation Aspides, for example works in parallel and in cooperation with the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian to which some EU member states have also individually contributed. As a result, currently, EU and NATO countries work together in different formations in the Red Sea.
Finally, the question of the quantity and quality of deployable naval assets from countries which are both EU member states and NATO allies should be on the table. With two EU maritime nations, Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, DC and future discussions on EU-NATO synergies need to address several important questions: Does NATO want the EU to step up in the European theatre? If yes, then in what domains and with what geopolitical and geographical limitations? More specifically to the maritime domain: how can European navies—especially smaller states—keep up with their increasingly demanding responsibilities to NATO as well as contribute to EU structures? Lacking clear answers to these questions, Operation Aspides and Operation Prosperity Guardian continue to work in parallel in the Red Sea with Aspides primarily relying on the contribution of NATO ally EU member states, which showcases the lack of Transatlantic unity in the face of external threats.
Veronika Hornyák Gracza is a PhD candidate at the Doctoral School of Military Sciences of the University of Public Service and a Doctoral Fellow of the Doctoral School on Common Security and Defence Policy within the European Security and Defence College. Her area of expertise is European security and defence policy, with special focus on EU-led peacebuilding and crisis management missions.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.