Is the EU already speaking the “language of power?” An analysis of the updated EU Maritime Security Strategy​

The MOC
The European Parliament in Strasbourg votes to name Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism on November 23, 2022. Photo By Frederick Florin/Getty.

By Veronika Hornyák, Captain Mariann Vecsey

The Transatlantic community has been holding its breath anticipating the upcoming renewal of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) in spring 2023, a renewal to the first document adopted in almost a decade ago in 2014. After the shortcomings of the EU’s first de facto maritime defense strategy, the EU Strategic Compass in 2022, the new strategy was expected to represent the EU’s aspirations becoming a global power. But does this updated version offer something new, or is it still just “naval gazing?”

Scope and the EU’s strategic interest in the maritime domain

The number of incidents on and above European waters has increased significantly since 2014,  a trend which pushed the EU slowly, but steadily in the direction to develop its maritime capabilities and policies. Incidents in the maritime domain are particularly sensitive for the EU, since 75% of goods reach its market by sea. The main cause of disruption in maritime security is the result of the altered security situation on the Eastern flank of Europe, the Russian annexation of the Crimea, and since 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale war against Ukraine. These events and their consequences contributed to the formulation, and update, of the EUMSS.

Both the original strategy and its action plan of 2014 – with its revised version of 2018 – and the new updated strategy work with similar guiding principles, such as maritime multilateralism, cross-sector approach, and functional integrity. The original, first strategy and the current update equally states that the EU’s strategic interest in the maritime domain is global, while EUMSS 2023 seems to implement more practical steps to fill in the gap between having global interest and global presence.

The scope of the new strategy is in line with the previous one, listing the Mediterranean, the Black and the Baltic Seas, the North Sea, the Arctic waters, the Atlantic Ocean, and the outermost regions as particularly important strategic interest of the EU. However, demonstrating the global scope, maritime security of the EU is also concerned with the security of other maritime areas of interest (MAIs), such as the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Strait of Hormuz. Building on the argument of increased geopolitical competition, the protection of the EU’s outermost regions and key seaboard trading corridors and shipping routes, the updated EU Maritime Security Strategy pointing to the Indo-Pacific, as a pivotal maritime area of interest of the EU.

Threats and objectives

The strategy draws from the conducted threat assessment, the EU Threat Analysis, which shows that the major challenges in the maritime domain remained mainly unchanged, but their nature has become more complex, more hybrid, with special focus on cyber-related threats due to the digital interconnectedness of different sectors, such as maritime, economic, climate and energy security. Conventional threats such as use of force and violating the sovereign territory of states, marine pollution, organized crime, as well as increasing geopolitical competition is listed between the main risks to EU security on the maritime domain. However, in the updated EUMSS, hybrid and cyber threats, especially endangering critical infrastructure at sea and maritime capabilities, gained a heightened focus than in the first strategy.

To tackle these threats, the EU slightly broadened the list of strategic objectives in the updated EUMSS, and these additional elements provide room for both quantitative and qualitative progress for the EU in the maritime domain. The five main, relatively permanent objectives – international cooperation; research and education; maritime awareness and intelligence; risk and crisis management; capability building and interoperability – was complemented with a more deterrence and power projection focused set of strategic objectives. These doesn’t only provide a never-seen reliance of military capabilities and EU maritime presence, but also a more coordinated effort to conduct EU naval exercises.

Tools and capabilities

While the relatively short updated strategic document itself lists some of the most important tools and capabilities allowing the implementation of the objectives, the action plan jointly adopted by the EUMSS updates as an annex allows us to foresee some more operative steps taken by the EU to secure its waters and outermost areas. Missions and operations in the framework of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), such as EUNAVFOR Operation Irini in the Mediterranean, and Operation Atalanta in the Horn of Africa, remains one of the main tools supporting security in the maritime domain in and around the EU. A more comprehensive tool functioning since 2021 further strengthened by the updated strategy is the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP). The CMP intends to pool different naval and aerial assets under EU or individual member state command regardless of their military, law enforcement, or civilian/humanitarian nature to protect a designated maritime area of interest. This tool may in fact be used and deployed in multiple areas in the future in addition of the currently existing two, one in the Gulf of Guinea and another in the Northwestern Indian Ocean.

In terms of capabilities, the goal of the updated strategy remained unchanged since the first one in 2014, namely, developing dual-use and multipurpose capabilities – as an old-new objective – being a top priority, with particular focus on maritime awareness and intelligence. In this regard, the expectations were mainly fulfilled with several new maritime situational awareness, intelligence and surveillance bodies, and information sharing capacities developed and strengthened during the last few years. The need for these developments were also indicated as one of the key elements of the EU Strategic Compass published in 2022. The increased importance of maritime security, however, was shown already in the European Union’s Global Strategy of 2016, after which the capability building effectively started. An example being  that out of the 60 defense capacity and capability building projects working in the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) since its launch in 2017, eight specifically focuses on the maritime domain, such as the Maritime Unmanned Anti-Submarine System (MUSAS), or the European Patrol Corvette (EPC), projects.

What to expect

The EUMSS update clearly demonstrates that the EU wants to pursue the statement of High Representative Josep Borrell on the EU’s need of learning to speak the language of power. EUMSS 2023 is part of this agenda, with which the EU has changed its strategy towards maritime issues from a mainly reactive to a more proactive and practical approach; and defines the EU as a leader in maritime awareness. Activities described in the updated action plan focus more attention and resources on maritime presence, as a form of power projection and deterrence, such as annual naval exercises or expanding maritime presence to (new) MAIs through the CMP. Enhanced presence is a key element in the updates, including military liaisons in partner countries, or further joint cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific. This partnership can manifest in very different forms, opening EU military training or assistance missions in the new MAIs, such as the Indo-Pacific, to support the capacity development of coast guard or navy personnel.

The EU is already explicitly forming its maritime security policies and capabilities around the principles of enhanced digitalization and green solutions integrating its expertise on sustainability and climate policies into the maritime domain. This rather unique approach and leadership in maritime security could offer applicable sustainable best practices for other maritime actors worldwide for preserving marine environment.

 

Veronika Hornyák is a PhD candidate at the Doctoral School of Military Sciences of the University of Public Service – Ludovika. She is also a Doctoral Fellow of the Doctoral School on Common Security and Defense Policy at the European Security and Defense College. Her area of expertise is European security and defense, and her PhD research focuses on gender mainstreaming in EU-led military missions. Alongside her doctoral studies, Veronika works as a consultant on capacity building projects in the fields of internationalization, education, and gender equality.

Captain Mariann Vecsey started her military career as a platoon commander at the 25th György Klapka Infantry Brigade, and currently works at the Ludovika – University of Public Service, Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training, Department of International Security Studies as an assistant lecturer. She concluded her PhD studies at the Doctoral School of Military Science and the Doctoral School on CSDP of the European Security and Defence College.


The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.