While Sweden is not yet a NATO member, its impending entry to the alliance brings with it strong naval capabilities as well as new strategic geographic advantage in both the Baltic Sea and in the High North Arctic region. Sweden’s desire to grow its military spending percentage of its gross domestic product to 2% and a 30% overall increase this year offers opportunities to expand its Navy and Marine Corps to support new strategic requirements. The Baltic Sea nation previously focused on national defense at the water’s edge against intruders throughout its period of neutrality. Now, Sweden’s naval forces are now being bolstered to expand support for the NATO alliance, in both the Baltic Sea region and further afield. Sweden is increasing the size of its submarine forces, and surface combatant fleet, and in the Swedish Marine Corps which will be necessary to fully support Sweden’s new role in NATO. Sweden will also contribute its unique “total defense” concept once geared for Swedish defense alone to the NATO alliance.
Change from Homeland Defense to Alliance Deployed Missions
For most of Sweden’s historic neutrality period, Sweden focused on defense of the homeland at its borders. The nation maintained a coast defense navy with emphasis on mine laying, coastal radar, and defense guns and missiles, in addition to a large, conscript army organized to fight and repel invaders inside Sweden. While homeland defense remains an important mission for all members of the alliance, the ability to deploy and operate forces in other member states for both deterrence and actual combat is a shared responsibility among NATO members. Sweden’s strategic geography and unique, central position within the Baltic and near-Arctic region support new missions for its naval forces that significantly improve deterrence against Russian military action across the region. Sweden has been moving past its historic coastal defense posture and is now taking a more active, forward defense in support of forthcoming NATO responsibilities.
Figure 1. Distance of 1003 km from Gulf of Bothnia to Severomorsk. Image from Google Maps.
Four other missions might also be supported:
1. Deterrence and Surveillance Patrol in the Gulf of Bothnia
The accession of Finland and likely soon of Sweden moves the borders of the NATO alliance much closer to the main bases of Russia’s powerful Northern fleet in Severomorsk and Polyarny. With less than 625 miles between the center of the Gulf of Bothnia and Severomorsk, the Northern Fleet base could be threatened by long range, submarine launched cruise missiles in a sea zone far from any Russian antisubmarine warfare units. A regular submarine patrol in the Gulf of Bothnia could be another arm of deterrence against Russian aggression in the Arctic “High North” region. Ice is a problem for many months of the year in that region, but ice-hardened submarine sails can be built. Further, Russian submarines are known to operate in the Gulf of Bothnia. New Swedish submarines might fill that role in addition to their sea surveillance and combat tasks.
2. Escort missions to support the Baltic states
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are in effect “islands” surrounded by the Baltic Sea and hostile Russian territory, linked only to the rest of the NATO alliance by the very narrow Suwalki gap and a sea line of communication through the Baltic. The Kaliningrad oblast may have been stripped of some of its naval infantry and troops for the Ukraine war, but the city and its bases remain a formidable air and missile bastion on the Baltic. In the event of conflict with Russia, NATO will need significant naval and air forces to escort reinforcements and supplies to the Baltic states “under the guns” of Kaliningrad. Much of those reinforcements may assemble at the Swedish port of Gothenburg, the largest port in Scandinavia that handles 30% of all Swedish trade and 50% of its active fuel refining capacity. A strong escort force of NATO nation vessels will be needed to protect the resupply of the Baltic states. The new Swedish Lulea-class corvettes with improved anti-air and anti-missile capabilities will be needed to support that mission plus upgraded existing corvettes to meet those air and missile threats.
Sweden possesses two Marine regiments of about 1200 personnel (each) that provide monitoring and defense of Sweden’s vast Baltic archipelago of over 33,000 islands. Swedish Marines have for years operated in small, expeditionary teams, armed with heavy weapons to control key islands and chokepoints; much as the U.S. Marine Corps now desires through Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (“EABO”). The familiarity of Swedish Marines with the Baltic operating environment and their expeditionary operating concepts make them ideal forces for deployment to the Baltic states as part of the current, rotating NATO ground forces assigned to those members to deter Russian aggression. Sweden should raise another Marine Regiment in order to support the rotational deployment of forces to the Baltic states.
4. Seabed Warfare
From the sabotage of the Nordstream pipeline in September 2022, to this week’s probable attack against the Estonia/Finland gas pipeline, seabed warfare is a new and expanding issue that NATO will need to engage. The Baltic Sea presents a number of challenges in the underwater domain with its brackish water and unusual sound channel structures that make antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasures difficult. Sweden’s extensive knowledge of the Baltic Sea environment can help NATO to rapidly develop and field seabed warfare systems including uncrewed vehicles. The Swedish Defense University and business/research organizations, like AI Sweden, working in tandem with Swedish defense companies like Saab, can continue create new uncrewed systems that can patrol the Baltic seabed.
Sweden Well-Positioned to Support NATO Maritime Operations
Sweden’s entry into NATO will give Alliance maritime capabilities a significant boost in the Baltic Sea area and High North regions upon its formal ascension. The Swedish navy’s mine countermeasures force is ready today to step into roles within the NATO Standing Mine Countermeasures Group (“SNMCMG”) force. Its offshore patrol vessel Carlskrona would be an excellent command vessel for SNMCMG operations when it would be Sweden’s turn to command the mine warfare formation. Its CB90 combat boats already provide Swedish Marines with expeditionary support and could be used immediately to support other NATO nations in developing expeditionary advanced base operations.
Other aspects of the Swedish Navy need more forces. Its current four submarines, ten corvettes/larger patrol ships, and other smaller vessels, as well as its current two Marine regiments are not enough to support its new, projected NATO requirements. Specifically:
Sweden should have at least six submarines to support both surveillance/sea control in the Baltic, and a cruise missile deterrence patrol in the Gulf of Bothnia. Sweden is moving in this direction with new submarine construction.
Sweden needs upwards of twelve modern corvettes to support sea surveillance and sea control in the Baltic, potential escort missions to the Baltic states, and support to the NATO Standing Maritime groups (“SNMGs”) Its new Lulea-class corvettes appear very capable and could be employed in SNMG operations. All Swedish corvette-sized vessels should be equipped with antiair, and anti-missile systems given Russian threats within the Baltic Sea region.
Sweden needs another Marine regiment in order to support deployable troop rotations to the Baltic states as part of the rotational NATO ground combat formations already deploying to those exposed NATO member states.
Sweden should develop a robust network of uncrewed maritime systems to support seabed warfare missions. Crewed submarines and mines are not enough on their own to protect an expanding undersea domain of pipelines, internet transmission cables, and other infrastructure. Sweden seeks the re-integration of its defense industries under its total defense concept, and that union may help to further speed defense industry contributions to seabed warfare systems.
Sweden is one of the most capable nations to seek alliance membership since NATO was formed in 1949. Its Navy and Marine Corps team is exceptionally well-led by Rear Admiral Ewa Skoog-Haslum and Brigadier General Jan Patrik Gardesten, and ready to assume multiple NATO responsibilities when Sweden is approved for membership. Sweden’s planned defense budget expansion toward 2% of its gross domestic product should allow it to meet these expanded Navy and Marine goals, provided the nation can overcome its previous, ground-force centric organization and move its first line of defense to sea with its Navy and Marines.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
Your investment in the Center for Maritime Strategy supports the U.S. Sea Services by empowering policy-driven maritime security research, advocacy, and education.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
While Sweden is not yet a NATO member, its impending entry to the alliance brings with it strong naval capabilities as well as new strategic geographic advantage in both the Baltic Sea and in the High North Arctic region. Sweden’s desire to grow its military spending percentage of its gross domestic product to 2% and a 30% overall increase this year offers opportunities to expand its Navy and Marine Corps to support new strategic requirements. The Baltic Sea nation previously focused on national defense at the water’s edge against intruders throughout its period of neutrality. Now, Sweden’s naval forces are now being bolstered to expand support for the NATO alliance, in both the Baltic Sea region and further afield. Sweden is increasing the size of its submarine forces, and surface combatant fleet, and in the Swedish Marine Corps which will be necessary to fully support Sweden’s new role in NATO. Sweden will also contribute its unique “total defense” concept once geared for Swedish defense alone to the NATO alliance.
Change from Homeland Defense to Alliance Deployed Missions
For most of Sweden’s historic neutrality period, Sweden focused on defense of the homeland at its borders. The nation maintained a coast defense navy with emphasis on mine laying, coastal radar, and defense guns and missiles, in addition to a large, conscript army organized to fight and repel invaders inside Sweden. While homeland defense remains an important mission for all members of the alliance, the ability to deploy and operate forces in other member states for both deterrence and actual combat is a shared responsibility among NATO members. Sweden’s strategic geography and unique, central position within the Baltic and near-Arctic region support new missions for its naval forces that significantly improve deterrence against Russian military action across the region. Sweden has been moving past its historic coastal defense posture and is now taking a more active, forward defense in support of forthcoming NATO responsibilities.
Figure 1. Distance of 1003 km from Gulf of Bothnia to Severomorsk. Image from Google Maps.
Four other missions might also be supported:
1. Deterrence and Surveillance Patrol in the Gulf of Bothnia
The accession of Finland and likely soon of Sweden moves the borders of the NATO alliance much closer to the main bases of Russia’s powerful Northern fleet in Severomorsk and Polyarny. With less than 625 miles between the center of the Gulf of Bothnia and Severomorsk, the Northern Fleet base could be threatened by long range, submarine launched cruise missiles in a sea zone far from any Russian antisubmarine warfare units. A regular submarine patrol in the Gulf of Bothnia could be another arm of deterrence against Russian aggression in the Arctic “High North” region. Ice is a problem for many months of the year in that region, but ice-hardened submarine sails can be built. Further, Russian submarines are known to operate in the Gulf of Bothnia. New Swedish submarines might fill that role in addition to their sea surveillance and combat tasks.
2. Escort missions to support the Baltic states
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are in effect “islands” surrounded by the Baltic Sea and hostile Russian territory, linked only to the rest of the NATO alliance by the very narrow Suwalki gap and a sea line of communication through the Baltic. The Kaliningrad oblast may have been stripped of some of its naval infantry and troops for the Ukraine war, but the city and its bases remain a formidable air and missile bastion on the Baltic. In the event of conflict with Russia, NATO will need significant naval and air forces to escort reinforcements and supplies to the Baltic states “under the guns” of Kaliningrad. Much of those reinforcements may assemble at the Swedish port of Gothenburg, the largest port in Scandinavia that handles 30% of all Swedish trade and 50% of its active fuel refining capacity. A strong escort force of NATO nation vessels will be needed to protect the resupply of the Baltic states. The new Swedish Lulea-class corvettes with improved anti-air and anti-missile capabilities will be needed to support that mission plus upgraded existing corvettes to meet those air and missile threats.
Figure 2. Swedish Marines prepare a mobile Hellfire Missile. Image from Fredrik Sandberg/TT.
3. Expeditionary Operations
Sweden possesses two Marine regiments of about 1200 personnel (each) that provide monitoring and defense of Sweden’s vast Baltic archipelago of over 33,000 islands. Swedish Marines have for years operated in small, expeditionary teams, armed with heavy weapons to control key islands and chokepoints; much as the U.S. Marine Corps now desires through Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (“EABO”). The familiarity of Swedish Marines with the Baltic operating environment and their expeditionary operating concepts make them ideal forces for deployment to the Baltic states as part of the current, rotating NATO ground forces assigned to those members to deter Russian aggression. Sweden should raise another Marine Regiment in order to support the rotational deployment of forces to the Baltic states.
4. Seabed Warfare
From the sabotage of the Nordstream pipeline in September 2022, to this week’s probable attack against the Estonia/Finland gas pipeline, seabed warfare is a new and expanding issue that NATO will need to engage. The Baltic Sea presents a number of challenges in the underwater domain with its brackish water and unusual sound channel structures that make antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasures difficult. Sweden’s extensive knowledge of the Baltic Sea environment can help NATO to rapidly develop and field seabed warfare systems including uncrewed vehicles. The Swedish Defense University and business/research organizations, like AI Sweden, working in tandem with Swedish defense companies like Saab, can continue create new uncrewed systems that can patrol the Baltic seabed.
Sweden Well-Positioned to Support NATO Maritime Operations
Sweden’s entry into NATO will give Alliance maritime capabilities a significant boost in the Baltic Sea area and High North regions upon its formal ascension. The Swedish navy’s mine countermeasures force is ready today to step into roles within the NATO Standing Mine Countermeasures Group (“SNMCMG”) force. Its offshore patrol vessel Carlskrona would be an excellent command vessel for SNMCMG operations when it would be Sweden’s turn to command the mine warfare formation. Its CB90 combat boats already provide Swedish Marines with expeditionary support and could be used immediately to support other NATO nations in developing expeditionary advanced base operations.
Figure 4. Swedish Navy Chief RADM Ewa Skoog-Haslum. Photo from Naval News.
Other aspects of the Swedish Navy need more forces. Its current four submarines, ten corvettes/larger patrol ships, and other smaller vessels, as well as its current two Marine regiments are not enough to support its new, projected NATO requirements. Specifically:
Sweden is one of the most capable nations to seek alliance membership since NATO was formed in 1949. Its Navy and Marine Corps team is exceptionally well-led by Rear Admiral Ewa Skoog-Haslum and Brigadier General Jan Patrik Gardesten, and ready to assume multiple NATO responsibilities when Sweden is approved for membership. Sweden’s planned defense budget expansion toward 2% of its gross domestic product should allow it to meet these expanded Navy and Marine goals, provided the nation can overcome its previous, ground-force centric organization and move its first line of defense to sea with its Navy and Marines.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.