Part I: Combatting Short Term Limitations of U.S. Fisheries Enforcement in the Western Pacific
The MOC
By
LTJG Logan J. Tobias
December 7, 2023
This publication is part one of a two-part series concerning the U.S. Coast Guard’s approach to countering Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated Fishing (“IUUF”) in the Western Pacific region. In the following article, the author will discuss how, without concerted brand management efforts to combat widespread short run thinking, the U.S. Coast Guard can lose momentum and organizational buy in to what, in the long run, amounts to an important strategic objective.
Driving United States Coast Guard (“USCG”) Cutter MIDGETT (“WMSL 757”) towards a fishing vessel registered to the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) 300 nautical miles from Fiji, I, as an ensign in the USCG, marveled at our upcoming operation to counter Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (“IUUF”). Notwithstanding weeks of law enforcement training, skimming through the legal source documentation, and discussing the impending mission endlessly on the nearly two-week transit to the Western Pacific Operational Area, I struggled to wrap my head around the breadth of the USCG’s authority within Regional Fishery Management Organizations (“RFMOs”). How is it that a USCG vessel from Hawaii, crewed by American service-members, can patrol the high seas near Fiji and observe, board, and conduct a limited inspection of a Chinese fishing vessel when searching for potential IUUF violations?
Concluding the patrol, we had just a handful of Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (“commission”) boardings and zero potential violations to show for our efforts, despite robust conservation and management measures developed and regulated by the commission. Sailing home, the crew did not feel we had countered IUUF, the criminal enterprise stealing 20% of the world’s annual catch. However, fisheries patrols can be viewed from two perspectives: the short term (up to three years) and the long term (beyond three years). In the short term, such patrols can errantly be reduced to a cost-benefit analysis of time and dollars versus vessel flag state accountability. This harmful logic is most likely to discourage deck plate leaders, like myself, who are involved in tactical level decisions and will rotate from a unit/region in two to three years. Instead, success of the U.S. Coast Guard’s counter-IUUF operations should be evaluated through both short term and long-term perspectives.
RFMOs in the Short Term
Analyzing USCG RFMO involvement through a narrow lens, such counter-IUUF measures may seem unimpressive in the short run. RFMOs are “international bodies made up of countries that share a practical and/or financial interest in managing and conserving fish stocks in a particular region.” There are currently 17 different RFMOs in existence. WCPFC, active since June of 2004, figures most prominently in terms of global significance and the operations of West Coast USCG assets. Then, its focus was protecting “highly migratory fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean and ensuring the conservation and sustainable use of these species.” But since then, bolstered by near unanimous regional participation including major players like China, the European Union, and the United States, the commission has expanded its focus to enforcing labor standards within the fishing industry, as well.
To accomplish these aims, the commission instituted a “high-seas boarding and inspection (“HSBI”) regime” wherein member states can enforce “regional and national fishing regulations in the convention area and among vessels flying their flags.” Accordingly, any HSBI registered member state flying the WCPFC flag can board a fishing vessel flagged by another member state upon the high seas. Under this authority, USCGC MIDGETT’s boarding team climbed over the rail of a PRC flagged fishing vessel outside of the Fijian Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”). Through this cooperative jurisdiction, shared equally amongst all members, the commission intended to create an accountability network amongst participants. Theoretically, if all members can inspect one another’s catch, it discourages nefarious activity and encourages self-regulation.
Challenges of Accountability and Enforcement
In practice, restrictions on international law enforcement may prevent immediate transformative change in the IUUF domain. Military boarding teams’ ability to promote compliance aboard foreign fishing vessels on the high seas is significant. But upon discovering an actual violation, USCG operators are likely to be frustrated by their lack of agency. If MIDGETT discovered a nefarious actor on our most recent patrol, we could: a) inspect them for a period not to exceed 4-hours (unless a Potential Serious Violation is discovered, in which case the boarding team can extend to gather evidence) and b) file a report with their flag state and with the commission secretariat noting — but not enforcing — the potential violations. Beyond peer-to-peer “naming and shaming” at the annual commission meeting, it may take several years before bad actors face any punitive, administrative, or financial recourse.
Even though the USCG discovered the infraction, flag states must hold their citizens accountable. And it will not be until commission representatives meet that the potential violation can officially be ruled an actual violation. At the international level, the commission can take that information and add the vessel in question to the “IUU List” that members agree not to fish or conduct transactions with. This is a significant step but only if members adhere to the limitation. Accordingly, for both prosecution and adherence to the IUU list, the commission enforcement arm is only as strong as each member-state’s commitment to the organization and international rules-based order. For some members, this is decidedly un-enthusiastic. Given the innumerable instances of some associated government’s failing to acknowledge and uphold basic human rights in accordance with international law, as cited by U.S. State Department, it is difficult to imagine they would exercise more concern for fish. That is the primary reason, according to the Pew Research Center, that “[RFMOs] have failed to prevent overfishing and maintain healthy fish stocks” — their stated primary objective.
Narrowly observed over the short run, the USCG’s RFMO patrol efforts appear to be very expensive international finger wagging at bad acting fishermen who are unlikely to be held responsible by their bad acting governments. However, in the long run – the span of time in which geopolitics is played – far more variables must be considered regarding commission involvement. What are the social, political, and environmental implications of the United States not leading, or at the very least participating, in global sustainability efforts? What policies and programs, such as bilateral ship rider agreements, hinge on commission involvement? What will happen to the twenty years of steady RFMO progress without USCG involvement? The U.S. government decision making apparatus must consider commission involvement in the long run, prior to reprioritizing organizational goals, re-stationing assets, or passing judgement on this strategically imperative mission to counter IUUF.
LTJG Logan J. Tobias graduated from the United States Coast Guard Academy on 18 May 2022. He is currently a deck watch officer, boarding team member, and Combat Information Center officer aboard the USCGC Midgett (WMSL-757) in Honolulu, Hawaii. These views are his and should not be construed as the views of the U.S. Coast Guard.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
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Center for Maritime Strategy
By LTJG Logan J. Tobias
This publication is part one of a two-part series concerning the U.S. Coast Guard’s approach to countering Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated Fishing (“IUUF”) in the Western Pacific region. In the following article, the author will discuss how, without concerted brand management efforts to combat widespread short run thinking, the U.S. Coast Guard can lose momentum and organizational buy in to what, in the long run, amounts to an important strategic objective.
Driving United States Coast Guard (“USCG”) Cutter MIDGETT (“WMSL 757”) towards a fishing vessel registered to the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) 300 nautical miles from Fiji, I, as an ensign in the USCG, marveled at our upcoming operation to counter Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (“IUUF”). Notwithstanding weeks of law enforcement training, skimming through the legal source documentation, and discussing the impending mission endlessly on the nearly two-week transit to the Western Pacific Operational Area, I struggled to wrap my head around the breadth of the USCG’s authority within Regional Fishery Management Organizations (“RFMOs”). How is it that a USCG vessel from Hawaii, crewed by American service-members, can patrol the high seas near Fiji and observe, board, and conduct a limited inspection of a Chinese fishing vessel when searching for potential IUUF violations?
Concluding the patrol, we had just a handful of Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (“commission”) boardings and zero potential violations to show for our efforts, despite robust conservation and management measures developed and regulated by the commission. Sailing home, the crew did not feel we had countered IUUF, the criminal enterprise stealing 20% of the world’s annual catch. However, fisheries patrols can be viewed from two perspectives: the short term (up to three years) and the long term (beyond three years). In the short term, such patrols can errantly be reduced to a cost-benefit analysis of time and dollars versus vessel flag state accountability. This harmful logic is most likely to discourage deck plate leaders, like myself, who are involved in tactical level decisions and will rotate from a unit/region in two to three years. Instead, success of the U.S. Coast Guard’s counter-IUUF operations should be evaluated through both short term and long-term perspectives.
RFMOs in the Short Term
Analyzing USCG RFMO involvement through a narrow lens, such counter-IUUF measures may seem unimpressive in the short run. RFMOs are “international bodies made up of countries that share a practical and/or financial interest in managing and conserving fish stocks in a particular region.” There are currently 17 different RFMOs in existence. WCPFC, active since June of 2004, figures most prominently in terms of global significance and the operations of West Coast USCG assets. Then, its focus was protecting “highly migratory fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean and ensuring the conservation and sustainable use of these species.” But since then, bolstered by near unanimous regional participation including major players like China, the European Union, and the United States, the commission has expanded its focus to enforcing labor standards within the fishing industry, as well.
To accomplish these aims, the commission instituted a “high-seas boarding and inspection (“HSBI”) regime” wherein member states can enforce “regional and national fishing regulations in the convention area and among vessels flying their flags.” Accordingly, any HSBI registered member state flying the WCPFC flag can board a fishing vessel flagged by another member state upon the high seas. Under this authority, USCGC MIDGETT’s boarding team climbed over the rail of a PRC flagged fishing vessel outside of the Fijian Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”). Through this cooperative jurisdiction, shared equally amongst all members, the commission intended to create an accountability network amongst participants. Theoretically, if all members can inspect one another’s catch, it discourages nefarious activity and encourages self-regulation.
Challenges of Accountability and Enforcement
In practice, restrictions on international law enforcement may prevent immediate transformative change in the IUUF domain. Military boarding teams’ ability to promote compliance aboard foreign fishing vessels on the high seas is significant. But upon discovering an actual violation, USCG operators are likely to be frustrated by their lack of agency. If MIDGETT discovered a nefarious actor on our most recent patrol, we could: a) inspect them for a period not to exceed 4-hours (unless a Potential Serious Violation is discovered, in which case the boarding team can extend to gather evidence) and b) file a report with their flag state and with the commission secretariat noting — but not enforcing — the potential violations. Beyond peer-to-peer “naming and shaming” at the annual commission meeting, it may take several years before bad actors face any punitive, administrative, or financial recourse.
Even though the USCG discovered the infraction, flag states must hold their citizens accountable. And it will not be until commission representatives meet that the potential violation can officially be ruled an actual violation. At the international level, the commission can take that information and add the vessel in question to the “IUU List” that members agree not to fish or conduct transactions with. This is a significant step but only if members adhere to the limitation. Accordingly, for both prosecution and adherence to the IUU list, the commission enforcement arm is only as strong as each member-state’s commitment to the organization and international rules-based order. For some members, this is decidedly un-enthusiastic. Given the innumerable instances of some associated government’s failing to acknowledge and uphold basic human rights in accordance with international law, as cited by U.S. State Department, it is difficult to imagine they would exercise more concern for fish. That is the primary reason, according to the Pew Research Center, that “[RFMOs] have failed to prevent overfishing and maintain healthy fish stocks” — their stated primary objective.
Narrowly observed over the short run, the USCG’s RFMO patrol efforts appear to be very expensive international finger wagging at bad acting fishermen who are unlikely to be held responsible by their bad acting governments. However, in the long run – the span of time in which geopolitics is played – far more variables must be considered regarding commission involvement. What are the social, political, and environmental implications of the United States not leading, or at the very least participating, in global sustainability efforts? What policies and programs, such as bilateral ship rider agreements, hinge on commission involvement? What will happen to the twenty years of steady RFMO progress without USCG involvement? The U.S. government decision making apparatus must consider commission involvement in the long run, prior to reprioritizing organizational goals, re-stationing assets, or passing judgement on this strategically imperative mission to counter IUUF.
LTJG Logan J. Tobias graduated from the United States Coast Guard Academy on 18 May 2022. He is currently a deck watch officer, boarding team member, and Combat Information Center officer aboard the USCGC Midgett (WMSL-757) in Honolulu, Hawaii. These views are his and should not be construed as the views of the U.S. Coast Guard.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.