How to defeat Russia’s War on Ukrainian Grain: Navies go Small, Diplomacy goes Big​

By Bradford Dismukes, Barry Blechman

Russia has declared war on Ukrainian grain. On July 17, 2023, Russia withdrew from the United Nations (“UN”) “Black Sea Grain Initiative,” which had permitted ships carrying grain from Ukraine to pass through Russia’s blockade and reach world markets. Putin has threatened to attack any ships sailing from or to Ukraine. Since then, events have moved in surprising directions and with remarkable speed:

1. Ships serving Ukrainian Danube River ports are using an informalnear-shore corridor in the territorial waters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (“NATO”) Balkan members to skirt Russian interference. Ukraine has sent a Hong Kong-flagged ship from Odesa through an adjoining corridor within its own territorial waters to reach Romania and continue south to the Straits. Turkey let it pass without complaint, signaling Turkey’s acceptance of an alternative system for Ukrainian grain to safely pass.
2. Ukraine has imposed acounter-blockade of Russian ships in the eastern Black Sea, where it has demonstrated it can see and successfully attack both a Russian warship and tanker.
3. Ukraine’s reinvigorated diplomacy is calling for restoration of the UN initiative and has emphasized the “humanitarian” purpose of its near-shore corridor. This has resulted in strong international endorsement, as world grain prices rise and push out of reach a commodity fundamental to the well-being of millions in the global south. Ukraine has also sought international insurance on the London market, guaranteed by its own treasury, for ships using the near-shore corridor.

These three moves are Ukraine’s unilateral initiatives. The nation has shown the same remarkable creativity in defending against a stronger invader at sea that it has earlier shown on land. And now, Ukraine has on its own produced a promising military/diplomatic response to defeat President Putin’s war on its grain. Ukraine’s accomplishments at sea have been applauded at the tactical level, for example, in the sinking of the cruiser Moskva, but not properly recognized as a strategic achievement. The United States and NATO must act immediately to build on Ukraine’s strategic success with three measures that deal with the current situation. They are durable and should shape Ukraine’s and the West’s response to future changes including further Russian escalation.

First, to support Ukraine’s near-shore corridor, NATO should declare its own corridor (red hachured area in Figure 1) that connects with Ukraine’s (yellow hachured area in Figure 1) leading to Odesa. The two together provide a defensible lifeline to Odesa, whose continued operation is vital. If Odesa and adjacent ports are closed, Ukraine would likely be so weakened economically that it could not continue fighting for long.

Figure 1. Notional Near-shore Corridor (not to scale). Graphic produced by authors.

This action would be a strategic stiffening of NATO’s Balkan members in the face of Russia’s threats. It would be a sea-oriented reinforcement comparable to those NATO has taken on land in Poland and Slovakia. It would be an answer to Russia’s perennial attempt to use the Black Sea as a point d’appui in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Syria, and beyond, and, with Iran’s enthusiastic support, in the Caspian and Central Asia to the east.

NATO’s reinforcements on land and at sea would pose no threat to Russia’s territory or regime. NATO should not deploy major warships. Big ships would have no targets at sea for their offensive weapons. Their defenses would likely be overwhelmed by unrelenting, 360-degree land-based missile and air attack — a cage fight in a very small cage. Large NATO combatants would also invite and justify Russia’s demand for comparable reinforcement of its Black Sea Fleet.

Instead, NATO should provide its allies and Ukraine with minesweepers, antisubmarine mines, and patrol boats supplemented by land-based anti-surface ship missiles, and land-based air/missile defenses. Unarmed logistic ships from non-Black Sea NATO navies should deploy as well. NATO members should also become reinsurers of last resort, guaranteeing the nationally underwritten insurance that Ukraine is seeking.

Second, NATO should supply Ukraine with advanced technology to make its surface and submersible (and aerial) drones more effective and help Ukraine develop defenses against the sea and aerial drones Russia is certain to develop and deploy. NATO also should actively voice support for Ukraine’s counter-blockade of Russia’s Black Sea ports. Ukraine’s standing threat to interdict Russian exports is a powerful factor in deterring attack on the Ukraine’s near-shore corridor. Russia knows that Ukraine can answer any attacks it might make against the corridor with attacks that stop the shipments of Russian oil from Novorossiysk, through which flows over 1.2 million barrels of oil per day. There have been no attacks by either side on the other’s merchant ships at sea since Ukraine announced its counter-blockade. No one knows how long this un-negotiated bargain may last. But Putin knows that if Ukraine severs Russia’s oil exports, it will display to Russia’s populace and to the world at large that Putin is incapable of defending his nation’s sovereignty.

Independent of these actions, NATO and the U.S., particularly, should recognize that the Black Sea will become a giant petri dish for the growth of technologies for sea drones on offense and for defenses against them. Western technical and operations research cadres should be mobilized accordingly. The capabilities that emerge will affect naval warfare everywhere and help answer a deeper question of whether surface warships, especially large ones, are wasting assets that are vulnerable to vastly less expensive weapons like sea drones.

Third, Ukraine’s call for restoration of the UN initiative should be turned into a formal “International Grain Export Convention” (“IGEC”) open for signature by all nations and guaranteed by the great powers, including the United States. Under an IGEC, all Black Sea states would agree not to interfere with seaborne exports of the region’s grain, foodstuffs, and fertilizer. A proposed IGEC would mean that Ukraine and its NATO allies would be fighting not only to guarantee Ukraine’s exports, but exports from all states in the region — even Russia’s.

Proposal and pursuit of an IGEC would immediately transform the war in the Black Sea into a contest to protect the well-being of world’s poorest. Long term, an IGEC would eliminate the possibility that Russia could exploit its potential threat of blockade in negotiations to end the war. A postwar Black Sea governed by an IGEC would be a more stable and peaceful place, with Ukraine more secure and prosperous within it.

While Ukraine has unilaterally undertaken initiatives that show great promise, the game is not yet up. To check-mate Russia’s war on Ukraine’s grain, the United States/NATO must reinforce these measures: the near-shore corridor, the counter-blockade, and robust diplomacy. These three elements will define the shape of future Ukraine/US/NATO action in the Black Sea no matter what direction events take, including more escalation by Russia.

As soon as feasible, defense of the corridor should be hardened with the supply of small naval ships and their logistical support, along with land-based anti-ship missiles and air/missile defense, to Ukraine and NATO’s Balkan members. Comparable support should be given to Ukraine’s counter-blockade of Russia’s Black Sea ports. It will be a live, real-world test of new sea drone technology whose results will likely shape many navies around the world.

Immediately, the United States, in concert with Ukraine, should propose an IGEC. Its overarching humanitarian purpose inspires political support for Ukraine inside the United States and Western nations, as well as within the United Nations and the many nations that have thus far been neutral in the Russia-Ukraine war. An IGEC is the lynchpin that ties this entire undertaking together and provides the means to translate military success at sea into long-term political gain. An IGEC would cost and risk nothing and should be announced today.

Bradford Dismukes, a retired naval officer with a background in intelligence, studied Soviet/Russian naval doctrine and forces for 30 years at the Center for Naval Analyses.

Barry Blechman, co-founder of the Stimson Center, has worked for more than 50 years on questions of international security in government and in the corporate and non-profit sectors.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.