China and Russia in the Black Sea Region: Moving towards Pax Sinica?
The MOC
By
Thea Dunlevie
December 5, 2023
China’s interests favor a more stable Black Sea Region (“BSR”), so Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine complicates China’s regional, maritime-based interests. This conundrum reflects a broader struggle between China and Russia for influence in the BSR, protecting China’s regional infrastructure projects and investments, and ensuring uninterrupted shipping access throughout the Black Sea. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has complicated China-Russian relations in the BSR and beyond, indicated by China’s abstention in the 2023 United Nations resolution to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Some say that Russia has become a “junior partner” to China, especially after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine revealed a degree of Russian dependency on China for supplies, equipment, and technology. Today, China positions itself to exert greater regional influence in waters historically dominated by Russia and other regional powers, according to Michael Cecire of the U.S. Helsinki Commission. Russia now fears being drafted into Pax Sinica, the Chinese sphere of influence, according to Dr. Deborah Sanders of King’s College London – within Russia’s historic sphere of influence. As the Ukrainian military continuously degrades the Russian Black Sea fleet, “dominance” over the BSR – often attributed to Russia for its naval prowess – becomes less obvious. And as China’s regional political and economic interests remain compelling, space for Chinese influence increases during Russia’s war.
China’s Military Presence in the BSR
The Chinese Navy has made guest appearances in the BSR over the years through joint exercises with the Russian Navy, like deploying two People’s Liberation Army frigates in a 2015 exercise following Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian Crimea. More recently, naval cooperation has continued outside of the BSR, like in the Indo-Pacific. Such exercises could impact the Black Sea Fleet’s operations, while China keeps a physical distance, such as the remarkable February 2023 China-Russia-South Africa naval exercise held in the Indian Ocean to test “joint tactical maneuvering.” Newsweek cited a former People’s Liberation Army instructor who believes this exercise was “meant to test the Russian frigate’s long-range deployment capacity for a possible attack on Western air defense systems in the Black Sea.” This exercise occurred amid U.S. warnings to China against supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine. China has played all sides, however, when it comes to defense cooperation, including purchasing the Soviet aircraft carrier Liaoning, from Ukraine and importing arms from Ukraine.
China’s Economic Interests in the BSR
Regional cooperation with the Russian navy appears to be less of a national interest than China’s economic interests in the geopolitically significant connection point that is the Black Sea. Those interests value regional stability to facilitate secure Chinese investments in infrastructure and increased trade that are by products of China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”). Michael Cecire describes the BSR, particularly, as “well primed” to accept BRI offers.
Between 2004 and 2021, China completed 24 acquisition deals and announced 13 investment projects in European maritime infrastructure. Chinese state-owned firms also maintain stakes in 15 European ports and, in the BSR, has expressed interest to support operations of a Georgian deep-water port. Others have called China an “increasingly important actor” in the BSR, to a degree that threatens U.S. influence within the region. Despite some European Union efforts to increase transparency surrounding Chinese investments, China continues to invest. Some countries, like Georgia, are more receptive than others, like Romania. Even if more skeptical, the Romanian Port of Constanta’s 2022 annual report immediately highlighted the importance of the port’s connection to China on its first page.
How Russia’s War complicates Chinese Interests
China holds noteworthy stakes in Ukrainian maritime infrastructure. For example, in 2016, Chinese state-owned agricultural conglomerate COFCO Group financed a $75 million dollar grain and oil terminal at the Ukrainian port of Mykolaiv. And in 2019, China would provide “hundreds of millions of dollars in investments and loans” for the Ukrainian port of Mariupol to develop infrastructure and construct a grain terminal and a handling facility for food cargo. Russia’s intensifying bombing campaign against Ukrainian maritime infrastructure is costing China, too, and further complicating Chinese-Russian relations.
Chinese investments in Ukrainian maritime infrastructure facilitate more exports to China. China wants Ukrainian — and other Black Sea states’ — grain and ore, especially. In 2019, China became Ukraine’s top trading partner. Ukraine primarily exported barley, ore, and corn to China, and those exports are continuing during wartime. In fact, among the first ships to use Ukraine’s recent, temporary humanitarian corridor exported ore to China. But Russia’s war halts, delays, or makes more expensive Chinese imports from the BSR.
Further, mines laid by and other destabilizing activities from the Russian military have prevented, delayed, or added exceptional costs to regional shipping. Yet Statista data suggest China was the world’s largest recipient of Ukrainian grain under the UN Black Sea Grain Initiative. China’s interests in Ukrainian exports were so demonstrated that a major media outlet even published an article questioning if China could save the now-defunct United Nations Black Sea Grain Initiative.
China, Russia, and U.S. Competition in the Black Sea
China’s interests to establish more regional influence, the benefits of regional trade, and its tricky relationship with Russia may inform more future Chinese government and military activity in the Black Sea Region. Perhaps China will take an increasingly large role in rebuilding Ukraine. We might expect Chinese companies to consider supporting reconstruction of Ukrainian maritime infrastructure in the Black Sea, especially, which may compete with Western projects to reconstruct Ukraine. Acute concerns remain about how China can exploit national civil-military fusion to extract intelligence, and ports and other maritime infrastructure in the Black Sea and beyond are no exception.
In this vein, the Black Sea Security bill proposed by Senators Shaheen and Romney seeks to mitigate “the impact of economic coercion by the Russian Federation and the P[eople’s]R[epublic of]C[hina] on Black Sea states.” Given China’s unfaltering interest in the Black Sea Region, it becomes increasingly urgent for the U.S. to officialize a Black Sea Strategy which can counter Chinese influence by clarifying U.S. security interests and catalyzing private investments to Ukraine and other Black Sea states, providing alternative options to China’s helping hand. Better than Russia’s absorption into the Pax Sinica is a stronger American and allied presence in the Black Sea Region.
Thea Dunlevie is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy where she researches and writes about transatlantic maritime security issues.
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Center for Maritime Strategy
By Thea Dunlevie
China’s interests favor a more stable Black Sea Region (“BSR”), so Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine complicates China’s regional, maritime-based interests. This conundrum reflects a broader struggle between China and Russia for influence in the BSR, protecting China’s regional infrastructure projects and investments, and ensuring uninterrupted shipping access throughout the Black Sea. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has complicated China-Russian relations in the BSR and beyond, indicated by China’s abstention in the 2023 United Nations resolution to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Some say that Russia has become a “junior partner” to China, especially after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine revealed a degree of Russian dependency on China for supplies, equipment, and technology. Today, China positions itself to exert greater regional influence in waters historically dominated by Russia and other regional powers, according to Michael Cecire of the U.S. Helsinki Commission. Russia now fears being drafted into Pax Sinica, the Chinese sphere of influence, according to Dr. Deborah Sanders of King’s College London – within Russia’s historic sphere of influence. As the Ukrainian military continuously degrades the Russian Black Sea fleet, “dominance” over the BSR – often attributed to Russia for its naval prowess – becomes less obvious. And as China’s regional political and economic interests remain compelling, space for Chinese influence increases during Russia’s war.
China’s Military Presence in the BSR
The Chinese Navy has made guest appearances in the BSR over the years through joint exercises with the Russian Navy, like deploying two People’s Liberation Army frigates in a 2015 exercise following Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian Crimea. More recently, naval cooperation has continued outside of the BSR, like in the Indo-Pacific. Such exercises could impact the Black Sea Fleet’s operations, while China keeps a physical distance, such as the remarkable February 2023 China-Russia-South Africa naval exercise held in the Indian Ocean to test “joint tactical maneuvering.” Newsweek cited a former People’s Liberation Army instructor who believes this exercise was “meant to test the Russian frigate’s long-range deployment capacity for a possible attack on Western air defense systems in the Black Sea.” This exercise occurred amid U.S. warnings to China against supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine. China has played all sides, however, when it comes to defense cooperation, including purchasing the Soviet aircraft carrier Liaoning, from Ukraine and importing arms from Ukraine.
China’s Economic Interests in the BSR
Regional cooperation with the Russian navy appears to be less of a national interest than China’s economic interests in the geopolitically significant connection point that is the Black Sea. Those interests value regional stability to facilitate secure Chinese investments in infrastructure and increased trade that are by products of China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”). Michael Cecire describes the BSR, particularly, as “well primed” to accept BRI offers.
Between 2004 and 2021, China completed 24 acquisition deals and announced 13 investment projects in European maritime infrastructure. Chinese state-owned firms also maintain stakes in 15 European ports and, in the BSR, has expressed interest to support operations of a Georgian deep-water port. Others have called China an “increasingly important actor” in the BSR, to a degree that threatens U.S. influence within the region. Despite some European Union efforts to increase transparency surrounding Chinese investments, China continues to invest. Some countries, like Georgia, are more receptive than others, like Romania. Even if more skeptical, the Romanian Port of Constanta’s 2022 annual report immediately highlighted the importance of the port’s connection to China on its first page.
How Russia’s War complicates Chinese Interests
China holds noteworthy stakes in Ukrainian maritime infrastructure. For example, in 2016, Chinese state-owned agricultural conglomerate COFCO Group financed a $75 million dollar grain and oil terminal at the Ukrainian port of Mykolaiv. And in 2019, China would provide “hundreds of millions of dollars in investments and loans” for the Ukrainian port of Mariupol to develop infrastructure and construct a grain terminal and a handling facility for food cargo. Russia’s intensifying bombing campaign against Ukrainian maritime infrastructure is costing China, too, and further complicating Chinese-Russian relations.
Chinese investments in Ukrainian maritime infrastructure facilitate more exports to China. China wants Ukrainian — and other Black Sea states’ — grain and ore, especially. In 2019, China became Ukraine’s top trading partner. Ukraine primarily exported barley, ore, and corn to China, and those exports are continuing during wartime. In fact, among the first ships to use Ukraine’s recent, temporary humanitarian corridor exported ore to China. But Russia’s war halts, delays, or makes more expensive Chinese imports from the BSR.
Further, mines laid by and other destabilizing activities from the Russian military have prevented, delayed, or added exceptional costs to regional shipping. Yet Statista data suggest China was the world’s largest recipient of Ukrainian grain under the UN Black Sea Grain Initiative. China’s interests in Ukrainian exports were so demonstrated that a major media outlet even published an article questioning if China could save the now-defunct United Nations Black Sea Grain Initiative.
China, Russia, and U.S. Competition in the Black Sea
China’s interests to establish more regional influence, the benefits of regional trade, and its tricky relationship with Russia may inform more future Chinese government and military activity in the Black Sea Region. Perhaps China will take an increasingly large role in rebuilding Ukraine. We might expect Chinese companies to consider supporting reconstruction of Ukrainian maritime infrastructure in the Black Sea, especially, which may compete with Western projects to reconstruct Ukraine. Acute concerns remain about how China can exploit national civil-military fusion to extract intelligence, and ports and other maritime infrastructure in the Black Sea and beyond are no exception.
In this vein, the Black Sea Security bill proposed by Senators Shaheen and Romney seeks to mitigate “the impact of economic coercion by the Russian Federation and the P[eople’s]R[epublic of]C[hina] on Black Sea states.” Given China’s unfaltering interest in the Black Sea Region, it becomes increasingly urgent for the U.S. to officialize a Black Sea Strategy which can counter Chinese influence by clarifying U.S. security interests and catalyzing private investments to Ukraine and other Black Sea states, providing alternative options to China’s helping hand. Better than Russia’s absorption into the Pax Sinica is a stronger American and allied presence in the Black Sea Region.
Thea Dunlevie is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy where she researches and writes about transatlantic maritime security issues.