Why Maritime Chokepoints Continue to Strangle the Global Economy
The MOC
By
Matthew Reisener
June 18, 2026
The Iran War significantly disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil and one third of its fertilizer supply has historically transited. The now-frozen conflict amplified inflation by making it more expensive, time-consuming, and dangerous to transport essential commodities by sea. Gas prices in the United States have risen by over 40% since the conflict began, and American households are spending an average of $447.19 more than usual on energy because of the war. Even with an agreement in place to reopen the Strait, it will take months for the Middle East’s oil production to return to pre-war levels, highlighting the dangers of geopolitical events that can disrupt the world’s most critical maritime corridors.
The Strait of Hormuz is far from the only vulnerable maritime chokepoint capable of impacting global shipping. For instance, between 2023-2025, the Houthis launched nearly 200 attacks on ships in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandab Strait, which significantly disrupted global supply chains and increased the price of goods due to elevated shipping insurance costs. Other chokepoints are similarly vulnerable to disruption: trillions of dollars worth of goods pass through maritime corridors such as the Taiwan, Korea, Malacca, and Bohai Straits annually, all of which could be disrupted by a naval conflict between China and America or its partners in the Western Pacific.
Given the economic damage caused by the disruption of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and the potential for similar disruptions elsewhere, it’s worth asking why the global economy remains so dependent on a handful of maritime chokepoints. Notably, several countries have sought workarounds to reduce their dependence on these waterways. For example, China conceived of its Belt and Road Initiative partly as a response to its concerns about the effect shipping disruptions in the Strait of Malacca could have on its economy, investing heavily in a series of overland and alternative maritime trade routes to offset this dependence.
Many pipelines and land routes have already been developed to try and reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia’s Petroline, which was constructed in the 1980s in response to the disruption of Persian Gulf maritime traffic during the Tanker War, can deliver as much as 7 million barrels of oil per day from Abqaiq near the Persian Gulf to Yanbu on the country’s Red Sea Coast. The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) avoids the Persian Gulf and allows the UAE to transport as much as 2 million barrels per day from its oil and gas fields in Habshan to the port city of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. Meanwhile, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline carries as much as 1.6 million barrels per day from Iraq to Turkey, which allows oil to bypass the Persian Gulf entirely and be exported from the Mediterranean. Even Iran developed its own pipeline to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, envisioning a scenario in which it might attempt to close this waterway. The Goreh-Jask pipeline can carry as much as 300,000 barrels per day, although roughly 90% of Iran’s pre-war oil shipments still departed from Kharg Island, which necessitated them transiting the Strait. Yet none of these pipelines can offset the sheer volume of oil and gas that can be transported by ship. Operating at maximum capacity, the Petroline, ADCOP, and Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipelines combined can transport only about half as much oil (10.6 million barrels per day) as transited the Strait of Hormuz before the conflict (20 million barrels per day).
Naturally, the Iran War only accelerated proposals to develop additional alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz. While some countries like Egypt have proposed rerouting more oil and gas through existing infrastructure such as its Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline, several new pipeline projects have also been proposed. Pipelines running from Basra in Iraq to Duqm in Oman or Aqaba in Jordan have been floated as alternatives to reduce the reliance on the Strait of Hormuz, as have new economic corridors connecting the Persian Gulf to the Red and Mediterranean Seas. One recent proposal even suggested reviving the long-discarded idea to build a pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Yemen’s Hadramawt region, which would allow oil and gas to be exported from ports along the Arabian Sea.
However, the overwhelming majority of these proposals are rendered infeasible by the geographic, economic, and security realities which have long dissuaded the financing of similarly ambitious plans. Many of the proposed infrastructure projects to bypass the Strait of Hormuz involve building hundreds of miles of pipeline across unforgiving deserts and mountainous terrain, which poses significant financial and logistical challenges to construct and maintain them. Given the relatively small amount of oil and gas that can be moved through any given pipeline compared to what can be shipped using tankers, experts believe it would “cost hundreds of billions of US dollars and a decade of construction” to assemble an energy infrastructure capable of replacing this single maritime chokepoint.
Perhaps most importantly, oil pipelines are no less vulnerable to wartime disruptions than are the waterways they are designed to replace. Both Iran and the Houthis have successfully attacked oil and gas infrastructure in recent conflicts. Iran even succeeded in damaging the Petroline, even though most of this pipeline was built underground specifically to reduce its vulnerability. Even when such attacks fail to completely knock pipelines out of commission, they can still cause enough damage to force this infrastructure to operate below maximum capacity, as was the case with the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline after it was attacked by Iranian proxies and subsequently became embroiled in a diplomatic disagreement between Iraq and Turkey. Many of the proposed pipeline projects would bisect also historically conflict-prone territories such as Yemen and the Iraq’s Kurdish Region, and even those which would be built in more stable parts of the region could be targeted by Iranian missiles and drones. Finally, many pipelines and economic corridors such as the Petroline and the proposed Saudi-Egyptian land bridge simply substitute reliance on vulnerable maritime corridor for another, offsetting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in favor of the Red Sea, the latter of which was the site of several successful maritime attacks by the Houthis.
While it is worthwhile to consider alternatives to vulnerable maritime corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz, most of these projects are unlikely to meaningfully offset the global economy’s reliance on these chokepoints in the foreseeable future. While some pipelines and economic corridors can help reroute a portion of the supplies that might otherwise be transported by ship, many of the same geographic, economic, and security challenges that complicate such projects in the Middle East have similarly scuttled proposals to bypass other maritime chokepoints across the globe. Future technological advancements may well create new, more feasible opportunities to eliminate global dependence on maritime chokepoints. However, these waterways are poised to remain critically important to international trade for decades to come, underscoring the enduring importance of securing the universal right to free passage through these bodies of water.
Matthew Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Matthew Reisener
The Iran War significantly disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil and one third of its fertilizer supply has historically transited. The now-frozen conflict amplified inflation by making it more expensive, time-consuming, and dangerous to transport essential commodities by sea. Gas prices in the United States have risen by over 40% since the conflict began, and American households are spending an average of $447.19 more than usual on energy because of the war. Even with an agreement in place to reopen the Strait, it will take months for the Middle East’s oil production to return to pre-war levels, highlighting the dangers of geopolitical events that can disrupt the world’s most critical maritime corridors.
The Strait of Hormuz is far from the only vulnerable maritime chokepoint capable of impacting global shipping. For instance, between 2023-2025, the Houthis launched nearly 200 attacks on ships in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandab Strait, which significantly disrupted global supply chains and increased the price of goods due to elevated shipping insurance costs. Other chokepoints are similarly vulnerable to disruption: trillions of dollars worth of goods pass through maritime corridors such as the Taiwan, Korea, Malacca, and Bohai Straits annually, all of which could be disrupted by a naval conflict between China and America or its partners in the Western Pacific.
Given the economic damage caused by the disruption of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and the potential for similar disruptions elsewhere, it’s worth asking why the global economy remains so dependent on a handful of maritime chokepoints. Notably, several countries have sought workarounds to reduce their dependence on these waterways. For example, China conceived of its Belt and Road Initiative partly as a response to its concerns about the effect shipping disruptions in the Strait of Malacca could have on its economy, investing heavily in a series of overland and alternative maritime trade routes to offset this dependence.
Many pipelines and land routes have already been developed to try and reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia’s Petroline, which was constructed in the 1980s in response to the disruption of Persian Gulf maritime traffic during the Tanker War, can deliver as much as 7 million barrels of oil per day from Abqaiq near the Persian Gulf to Yanbu on the country’s Red Sea Coast. The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) avoids the Persian Gulf and allows the UAE to transport as much as 2 million barrels per day from its oil and gas fields in Habshan to the port city of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. Meanwhile, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline carries as much as 1.6 million barrels per day from Iraq to Turkey, which allows oil to bypass the Persian Gulf entirely and be exported from the Mediterranean. Even Iran developed its own pipeline to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, envisioning a scenario in which it might attempt to close this waterway. The Goreh-Jask pipeline can carry as much as 300,000 barrels per day, although roughly 90% of Iran’s pre-war oil shipments still departed from Kharg Island, which necessitated them transiting the Strait. Yet none of these pipelines can offset the sheer volume of oil and gas that can be transported by ship. Operating at maximum capacity, the Petroline, ADCOP, and Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipelines combined can transport only about half as much oil (10.6 million barrels per day) as transited the Strait of Hormuz before the conflict (20 million barrels per day).
Naturally, the Iran War only accelerated proposals to develop additional alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz. While some countries like Egypt have proposed rerouting more oil and gas through existing infrastructure such as its Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline, several new pipeline projects have also been proposed. Pipelines running from Basra in Iraq to Duqm in Oman or Aqaba in Jordan have been floated as alternatives to reduce the reliance on the Strait of Hormuz, as have new economic corridors connecting the Persian Gulf to the Red and Mediterranean Seas. One recent proposal even suggested reviving the long-discarded idea to build a pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Yemen’s Hadramawt region, which would allow oil and gas to be exported from ports along the Arabian Sea.
However, the overwhelming majority of these proposals are rendered infeasible by the geographic, economic, and security realities which have long dissuaded the financing of similarly ambitious plans. Many of the proposed infrastructure projects to bypass the Strait of Hormuz involve building hundreds of miles of pipeline across unforgiving deserts and mountainous terrain, which poses significant financial and logistical challenges to construct and maintain them. Given the relatively small amount of oil and gas that can be moved through any given pipeline compared to what can be shipped using tankers, experts believe it would “cost hundreds of billions of US dollars and a decade of construction” to assemble an energy infrastructure capable of replacing this single maritime chokepoint.
Perhaps most importantly, oil pipelines are no less vulnerable to wartime disruptions than are the waterways they are designed to replace. Both Iran and the Houthis have successfully attacked oil and gas infrastructure in recent conflicts. Iran even succeeded in damaging the Petroline, even though most of this pipeline was built underground specifically to reduce its vulnerability. Even when such attacks fail to completely knock pipelines out of commission, they can still cause enough damage to force this infrastructure to operate below maximum capacity, as was the case with the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline after it was attacked by Iranian proxies and subsequently became embroiled in a diplomatic disagreement between Iraq and Turkey. Many of the proposed pipeline projects would bisect also historically conflict-prone territories such as Yemen and the Iraq’s Kurdish Region, and even those which would be built in more stable parts of the region could be targeted by Iranian missiles and drones. Finally, many pipelines and economic corridors such as the Petroline and the proposed Saudi-Egyptian land bridge simply substitute reliance on vulnerable maritime corridor for another, offsetting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in favor of the Red Sea, the latter of which was the site of several successful maritime attacks by the Houthis.
While it is worthwhile to consider alternatives to vulnerable maritime corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz, most of these projects are unlikely to meaningfully offset the global economy’s reliance on these chokepoints in the foreseeable future. While some pipelines and economic corridors can help reroute a portion of the supplies that might otherwise be transported by ship, many of the same geographic, economic, and security challenges that complicate such projects in the Middle East have similarly scuttled proposals to bypass other maritime chokepoints across the globe. Future technological advancements may well create new, more feasible opportunities to eliminate global dependence on maritime chokepoints. However, these waterways are poised to remain critically important to international trade for decades to come, underscoring the enduring importance of securing the universal right to free passage through these bodies of water.
Matthew Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.