Washington Must Carefully Establish Standing Indo-Pacific Maritime Group​

By Andrew I. Park | LT Morgan Thomas

The strategic advantage of the U.S. and its allies in the South China Sea (SCS) is diminishing against China’s burgeoning maritime prowess. Images from Fall 2022 highlight China’s strategic “gray zone” tactics, signified by significant infrastructural developments on artificial islands, indicative of a push to reduce American and allied influence. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the irregular People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) wield early warning systems, warships, and logistics to project power. To mitigate the growing PLA capabilities and bolster U.S. and allied preparedness, Washington needs to establish a steady Indo-Pacific Maritime Group through deliberate, incremental steps.

Over the past decade, China has fortified key SCS locations, like Subi and Mischief Reefs. These sites now provide comprehensive intelligence, electronic warfare capabilities, and diverse radar competencies. They also host offensive and defensive capabilities, including YJ-12B anti-ship cruise missiles and HQ-9B surface-to-air missile systems. Recent enhancements to airfields, hangars, and maritime infrastructure underscore China’s strategic progression. These facilities can support diverse aircraft and maritime vessels, enabling both military and civil operations. The deployment of Type 022 Houbei-class patrol vessels and formidable PLA Navy warships like Luyang III DDG accentuates China’s comprehensive power projection in the SCS.

China’s PLA presence in the region is not transient but permanent and expanding. Their robust detection capabilities significantly challenge U.S. and allied maneuverability, and their evolving air and surface capabilities may attempt to restrict the U.S. military’s operational access during conflicts. To counter this, Washington must amplify its maritime presence in the region.

Reinstating the First Fleet is Ideal but Unattainable

The Pacific Fleet counters the rapidly expanding presence of PLA in the SCS, commanding 200 ships across the Third and Seventh Fleets, constituting approximately sixty percent of the entire U.S. Navy (USN). The Pacific Fleet commands several Carrier Strike Groups, rotating through the Indo-Pacific region to carry out peacetime operations and remain prepared for any PLA aggression. However, it should be noted that China now boasts the world’s largest navy. Despite the PLA’s lack of battle experience and somewhat underdeveloped maritime capabilities in comparison to the formidable prowess of its U.S. counterparts, the sheer size of its fleet is a significant factor. By 2030, it is projected that China will operate 440 ships. Furthermore, China is strategically utilizing its 9,000-mile coastline to redefine sea warfare norms. Beijing’s substantial investment in long-range precision-guided weapons, including the Dong Feng 21 and 26, have the potential to target USN ships, particularly carriers. The PLA Rocket Force presents a serious threat to the USN presence deployed in the region. During a recent war game, the USN managed to defeat the PLA in multiple iterations of a simulated Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but not without substantial losses, including two carriers and over a dozen warships and submarines.

In a worst-case scenario, the U.S. military may be forced to manage two distinct campaigns in a contingency scenario involving both the SCS and the Korean Peninsula. Beijing could potentially leverage Pyongyang to instigate a series of provocations simultaneously with a PLA invasion against Taiwan. In the event of North Korean provocations coinciding with a Chinese invasion, not just the U.S. Forces Korea and the South Korean military, but also the Japan-based Seventh Fleet, U.S. Forces Japan, and the Japanese military would be embroiled in conflict in Northeast Asia. Given that eleven Essex-class USN carriers played a critical role throughout the Korean War, the current USN presence in Northeast Asia may be insufficient to prepare for a potential full-scale conflict with North Korea. This would leave only a fraction of the Pacific Fleet available to confront the PLA in the SCS.

Former Secretary of the Navy Kenneth Braithwaite suggested that the revival of the First Fleet in the Indian Ocean could alleviate the burden on the stretched-thin USN, which is responsible for covering the vast global maritime expanse. If reinstated, the First Fleet would incorporate elements from the existing fleets in the Pacific Fleet along with the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and may be further reinforced with new elements. As former INDOPACOM Commander Admiral (ret.) Philip Davidson highlighted, the need for naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region is likely to increase due to China’s growing threat.

However, the USN is expected to dwindle in size as it will be retiring more ships than it will be building, which may drop down to approximately 250 ships. There are a number of statutory issues that may deter reinstatement of the First Fleet at the Congressional level, as there are not enough personnel including the flag officers needed for a new numbered fleet. Furthermore, the USN has been challenged in maintaining the readiness of the ships deployed to the existing numbered fleets including the Seventh, Sixth, and Fifth. Hence, an additional numbered fleet would mean further stress on USN readiness. Additionally, other military services’ desire to recapitalize their forces, and would be opposed to a new USN three-star command.Establishing a Standing Indo-Pacific Maritime Group

Instead of acting independently, Washington should collaborate with like-minded allies and partners to establish a Standing Indo-Pacific Maritime Group (SIPMG), following the example of the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG). A standing maritime group, unified under a centralized command-and-control structure, and comprising multinational maritime, space, and cyber assets, would allow the coalition of liberal democratic states to not only deter Chinese aggression in the SCS but also potential aggression of North Korea. However, the formation of the SIPMG should not be rushed to immediately function as an Indo-Pacific counterpart to the SNMG and should not be built atop existing security groupings, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the AUKUS. As Admiral (ret.) Gary Roughead suggested, establishing the SIPMG with the Quad participating nations (Australia, Japan, and India) would be optimal. But this could deter Southeast Asian nations from joining the Group due to their concern about weakening the emphasis on “ASEAN-centrality” and the potential for an arms race spurred by the Quad and AUKUS. Importantly, the SCS is crucial to Southeast Asian nations and their consent would be vital for legitimizing the SIPMG. Moreover, New Delhi may hesitate to join the Group due to its continuing policy of non-alignment and indirect approach to “balancing” China.

The SIPMG should initially be a non-permanent assembly of less high-profile yet effective maritime forces, such as the coast guards. Compared to the USN, which eclipses most of the world’s navies combined, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is perceived as a more relatable maritime service by international counterparts. The USCG not only carries out law enforcement duties in partnership with others, but also serves as an extended arm of maritime diplomacy, securing information-sharing and training agreements with the global community.

If the SIPMG is launched as a grouping of coast guards performing “non-provocative” maritime missions, including Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions, environmental protection, anti-piracy, and sanctions enforcement, Southeast Asian nations might be more inclined to join. Furthermore, although the USCG might be the de facto leader of the Group, a Southeast Asian nation’s coast guard should be designated as the de jure leader to emphasize legitimacy. Another consideration is to assign “frenemies” such as Japan and South Korea into different rotations to avoid potential diplomatic feud. Once a broader consensus and trust are established among the participating nations, they could gradually expand the group’s missions and capabilities by incorporating naval elements and conducting presence operations to deter China’s gray zone activities in the region. This would significantly strengthen Taiwan and Southeast Asian nations’ territorial and sovereignty interests against China. Ultimately, through frequent multinational exercises and rotation-based deployments, the SIPMG could evolve into a fully functional maritime group, inclusive of the navies, operating as an immediate reaction force and serving as an interim solution in lieu of the First Fleet.

While the revival of the First Fleet would ideally address the escalating Chinese threat and presence in the Indo-Pacific region, it is not a feasible solution in the immediate future. This delay might lead to a missed opportunity for Washington to form a robust, permanent coalition backed by more capable allies and partners in the region. Therefore, Congress should mandate the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to establish an inter-departmental task force dedicated to the creation of the SIPMG. Congressional oversight and budgetary support can effectively curb any potential efforts to reduce maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

Andrew Park is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy and an Intelligence Officer of the U.S. Navy Reserve. He previously served as a translator/interpreter at the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command / U.S. Forces Korea (CFC/USFK) and holds M.A. in Asian Studies from the Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.

LT Morgan Thomas is an active-duty Naval Officer with multiple deployments supporting Joint SOF in the INDOPACOM AO as a Cross-Strait SME. He is currently in a Department of Commerce Technology Fellowship with Thomson Reuters Special Services DOD Team. He holds an M.A. in Political Science from the University of British Columbia and a B.A. in History and Chinese Language from Christopher Newport University. He was also a Fulbright Scholar in Taiwan.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.