The United Nations Black Sea Grain Initiative: What is Plan B?
The MOC
Photo from BIMCO.
By
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
May 3, 2023
A few days after Turkey and the United Nations brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative (“BSGI”) to facilitate safe Black Sea export lanes for Ukrainian food products, the Center for Maritime Strategy (“CMS”) alongside the U.S. Naval War College’s Russia Maritime Studies Institute conducted a table-top exercise examining possible “Plan B” options for sustaining Ukrainian grain exports if the deal failed. Nine months later, what have Ukrainian partner nations done to create a “Plan B”? Unfortunately, not enough.
Before February 2022 Russia’s invasion, Ukraine would export most of its food products, largely grains and oilseeds, through Ukrainian Black Sea ports. These exports were estimated to feed 400 million people around the world, and they substantially contributed to Ukraine’s economy. Early in 2022, the Russian Navy would blockade the Ukrainian coastline. Ukraine labeled this a war crime that “weaponizes hunger.” In July 2022, the BSGI effectively ended Russia’s naval blockade. It permitted export of Ukrainian grain through designated, surveilled, and protected Black Sea routes. Between the blockade and BSGI, Ukraine’s partner nations wove together various alternative supply chains by using trucks and trains to export grain across Poland and by using smaller barges to transit through the Danube, for examples.
Between these two solutions, Ukraine exceeded export expectations. But other problems mounted. Complaints by Central and Eastern European farmers – and eventually their governments – over the negative impact of Ukrainian imports on local farmers would lead the Prime Ministers of Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia to submit complaints to the EU. Sensing no response, Poland and Hungary would block imports of Ukrainian food products. This response included halting transit of grain through Poland, an essential route for thousands of tons of Ukrainian grain in 2022.
On April 28, 2023, the European Commission announced it reached an agreement “in principle” with Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia regarding import and export of Ukrainian grain products. The deal seeks resolution between both disenfranchised Central and Eastern European farmers impacted by the market’s saturation with Ukrainian grain and between the Ukrainian government seeking to export agricultural products. The EU agreement would serve as, at least, a supplement to the waning BSGI which is set to expire on May 18, 2023. Russia continues to express disinterest to re-sign the deal, renewed after March 2023, due to complaints that Western nations are not honoring their perceived commitment to permit Russian fertilizer exports. CMS and the U.S. Naval War College’s exercise predicted that “as the returns diminish (for Russia), there is good reason to believe that Moscow won’t abide by this deal for long.” Our write-up of the article observed multiple ways that Russia could imperil the grain deal, including attempting to use the deal for leverage to remove Western sanctions. And here we are.
Despite these successes to facilitate significant amounts of land-based exports, Ukraine and allied countries are now scrambling to tackle this upcoming export crisis: the impending May 18th end date for the BSGI. How will Ukraine safely export products through the Black Sea, if Russia refuses to renew the deal? The CMS and U.S. Naval War College’s Russia Maritime Studies Institute table-top exercise provided several ideas for a possible “Plan B” assembled by subject matter experts on Russia, strategy, diplomacy, and maritime law; civilian mariners; and active-duty and retired naval officers. It considered the variables such as Turkey’s role as broker, whether non-Danubian nations’ vessels could cross the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, the presence of willing civilian merchants to facilitate exports from Ukrainian ports, and vessels’ ability to gain insurance coverage through the Black Sea region, among other key issues.
If the deal falls apart, Ukraine and its allies could take several courses of action. First, to prevent another Russian blockade, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria would need to cooperate towards allowing and providing warships to transit the Straits, to secure commercial shipping routes. Second, position a U.S. carrier strike group in the Aegean Sea to deter Russian forces from further aggression, and prepare French, Italian, and British aircraft carriers to potentially provide surge forces. Third, non-Black Sea nations may provide additional support including mine counter-measures, search and rescue, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, among other functions. Fourth, allied countries could create (and Turkey could lead) an alternative to the UN Joint Coordination Centre – currently run in partnership with Russia – resembling the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain which includes 34 countries and focuses on combatting regional threats. But before executing any Plan B, Ukraine and its allies must assess the risk of escalation in the Black Sea by positioning military forces closer to Russian forces, and they must consider risk mitigation measures.
Since the beginning, I have maintained that “it is not good policy to assume that the grain agreement will hold.” This has become increasingly relevant due to Russia’s various antics to destabilize and thwart the grain deal over the past several months. It is clear that we now need a Plan B.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
A few days after Turkey and the United Nations brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative (“BSGI”) to facilitate safe Black Sea export lanes for Ukrainian food products, the Center for Maritime Strategy (“CMS”) alongside the U.S. Naval War College’s Russia Maritime Studies Institute conducted a table-top exercise examining possible “Plan B” options for sustaining Ukrainian grain exports if the deal failed. Nine months later, what have Ukrainian partner nations done to create a “Plan B”? Unfortunately, not enough.
Before February 2022 Russia’s invasion, Ukraine would export most of its food products, largely grains and oilseeds, through Ukrainian Black Sea ports. These exports were estimated to feed 400 million people around the world, and they substantially contributed to Ukraine’s economy. Early in 2022, the Russian Navy would blockade the Ukrainian coastline. Ukraine labeled this a war crime that “weaponizes hunger.” In July 2022, the BSGI effectively ended Russia’s naval blockade. It permitted export of Ukrainian grain through designated, surveilled, and protected Black Sea routes. Between the blockade and BSGI, Ukraine’s partner nations wove together various alternative supply chains by using trucks and trains to export grain across Poland and by using smaller barges to transit through the Danube, for examples.
Between these two solutions, Ukraine exceeded export expectations. But other problems mounted. Complaints by Central and Eastern European farmers – and eventually their governments – over the negative impact of Ukrainian imports on local farmers would lead the Prime Ministers of Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia to submit complaints to the EU. Sensing no response, Poland and Hungary would block imports of Ukrainian food products. This response included halting transit of grain through Poland, an essential route for thousands of tons of Ukrainian grain in 2022.
On April 28, 2023, the European Commission announced it reached an agreement “in principle” with Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia regarding import and export of Ukrainian grain products. The deal seeks resolution between both disenfranchised Central and Eastern European farmers impacted by the market’s saturation with Ukrainian grain and between the Ukrainian government seeking to export agricultural products. The EU agreement would serve as, at least, a supplement to the waning BSGI which is set to expire on May 18, 2023. Russia continues to express disinterest to re-sign the deal, renewed after March 2023, due to complaints that Western nations are not honoring their perceived commitment to permit Russian fertilizer exports. CMS and the U.S. Naval War College’s exercise predicted that “as the returns diminish (for Russia), there is good reason to believe that Moscow won’t abide by this deal for long.” Our write-up of the article observed multiple ways that Russia could imperil the grain deal, including attempting to use the deal for leverage to remove Western sanctions. And here we are.
Despite these successes to facilitate significant amounts of land-based exports, Ukraine and allied countries are now scrambling to tackle this upcoming export crisis: the impending May 18th end date for the BSGI. How will Ukraine safely export products through the Black Sea, if Russia refuses to renew the deal? The CMS and U.S. Naval War College’s Russia Maritime Studies Institute table-top exercise provided several ideas for a possible “Plan B” assembled by subject matter experts on Russia, strategy, diplomacy, and maritime law; civilian mariners; and active-duty and retired naval officers. It considered the variables such as Turkey’s role as broker, whether non-Danubian nations’ vessels could cross the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, the presence of willing civilian merchants to facilitate exports from Ukrainian ports, and vessels’ ability to gain insurance coverage through the Black Sea region, among other key issues.
If the deal falls apart, Ukraine and its allies could take several courses of action. First, to prevent another Russian blockade, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria would need to cooperate towards allowing and providing warships to transit the Straits, to secure commercial shipping routes. Second, position a U.S. carrier strike group in the Aegean Sea to deter Russian forces from further aggression, and prepare French, Italian, and British aircraft carriers to potentially provide surge forces. Third, non-Black Sea nations may provide additional support including mine counter-measures, search and rescue, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, among other functions. Fourth, allied countries could create (and Turkey could lead) an alternative to the UN Joint Coordination Centre – currently run in partnership with Russia – resembling the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain which includes 34 countries and focuses on combatting regional threats. But before executing any Plan B, Ukraine and its allies must assess the risk of escalation in the Black Sea by positioning military forces closer to Russian forces, and they must consider risk mitigation measures.
Since the beginning, I have maintained that “it is not good policy to assume that the grain agreement will hold.” This has become increasingly relevant due to Russia’s various antics to destabilize and thwart the grain deal over the past several months. It is clear that we now need a Plan B.