The Northwest Passage and the Limits of U.S. Maritime Leadership Part 1
The MOC
By
Celia Lawlor
October 22, 2025
The Arctic is no longer a frozen wilderness at the edge of civilization, it’s a strategic pressure point where melting ice is not just reshaping geography, but global norms. Russia is digging in with submarines and seabed claims. China is sending “research” ships to quietly gather influence. Norway is wielding law and diplomacy. And the United States? It’s stuck: present in power, absent in policy. This research examines how the unresolved U.S.-Canada dispute over the Northwest Passage exposes a deeper dilemma in American maritime strategy: how to defend freedom of navigation abroad while wavering on it at home. It also explores whether the U.S. is prepared to lead in the Arctic, or destined to follow without defining its own position.
The Arctic Awakens
As melting sea ice unlocks energy reserves and new frontiers, the Arctic becomes not just a resource-rich part of the globe, but a place for energy security disputes and geopolitical competition. The Arctic is now a theater of law-based competition, not simply climate change. The U.S. possesses Arctic geography, tech, and resources, but undermines its own influence by staying outside the legal system shaping seabed claims.
With the Arctic thawing, new shipping routes such as the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the North Sea Route (NSR) reduce travel time as well as fuel and operational costs. They also allow ships to avoid geopolitical hotspots prone to instability or even piracy. Specifically, the NWP serves as more than a shortcut between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans: it’s a legal indicator for how the U.S. balances loyalty to Canada versus freedom of navigation principles. The NWP is a mirror to the larger U.S. Arctic dilemma– strategic opportunity complicated by unresolved law and alliance contradictions.
Canada claims the NWP is a part of its internal waters according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 8. However, the U.S. insists the route is an international strait. The U.S. conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) through the passage but avoids legal escalation with Canada. To make matters even more complicated, the U.S. adheres to most of the resolutions written in UNCLOS, but has never ratified the treaty, giving it little legal standing or decision making authority.
Therefore, this paper argues the unresolved contention regarding the NWP weakens U.S. Arctic leadership and undercuts its credibility in global maritime disputes. This not only applies to its power in the Arctic, but also debilitates its claims about maritime law in the South China Sea. The U.S. must decide whether its ambiguity in the NWP with Canada is a manageable diplomatic stance, or a dangerous signal that risks emboldening rivals like China. Can a superpower shape the rules of the sea while refusing to anchor itself to them?
Energy and Power Beneath the Ice
In 2009, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that 13% of undiscovered oil and 30% of gas are located in the Arctic. The U.S. currently only holds 3 percent of the global oil reserves, while it uses 25 percent of the world’s oil. The need for more oil was clearly demonstrated by the Prudhoe Bay pipeline leak, where the U.S. was unable to get reasonably-priced oil from the Middle East, causing the price of oil to increase by more than $2 per barrel, up to $77. Access to other oil sources would prevent overreliance on other nations for oil. Key arctic chokepoints include the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, which are critical not only for enabling access to these energy reserves but also for providing shorter, cost-effective shipping routes between major global markets. They could redirect some of the traffic from the Suez Canal. In fact, transporting goods from Europe to the Far East via the NSR could be 25 percent more profitable than the Suez Canal Route, according to the Arctic Institute. Additionally, the viability for the use of the NWP is expected to extend from . The resources gained in the Arctic matter for energy diversification and resilience, as well as worldwide prestige.
How the resources and pieces of the Arctic are carved up is heavily regulated by UNCLOS. The resolution defines the basic parameters of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as 200 nautical miles from a coastline in Article 56. In addition, countries who’ve signed UNCLOS are eligible for extended continental shelf claims under Article 76. This part of UNCLOS defines continental shelf rules and outlines procedures for defining limits of internal waters. If a country claims a shelf beyond 200 miles, it must submit evidence to the CLCS. The CLCS reviews and makes recommendations, and once adopted, the limits are final and binding.
Historically, Russia has submitted claims to the Mendeleev-Alpha Rise, the Podvodnikov Basin, the Lomonosov Ridge, the Nansen Basin, the Gakkel Ridge, and many more in 2001, which it was advised to revise in 2015 and 2021. It has filed another claim in 2023, and each time the CLCS has suggested that they edit their claim and the evidence provided alongside it. In 2006, Norway submitted claims to the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea, the Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean, and the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea, recommendations which were adopted in 2009. Finally, Canada submitted a proposal in 2019 to claim more of the Arctic Ocean.
It should be noted that once the CLCS provides its recommendations, it is up to the state who filed the claim to begin diplomatic negotiations with other states in places where more than one nation claims an area. In 2023, the U.S. extended its continental shelf to overlap significantly with Canada’s. The U.S. could not submit an official claim to CLCS because it has not ratified UNCLOS. In October 2024, the U.S. and Canada established a joint task force to map the Arctic continental shelf overlaps in the Chukchi Plateau and Beaufort Sea. Luckily, the two align on many fronts and communicate frequently, and are expected to come to a conclusion soon. However, not all disputes are solved as easily.
Celia Lawlor is a student at Duke University pursuing International Relations, Computer Science, and Russian. Her research focuses on Arctic governance, maritime law, and U.S. foreign policy, examining the intersection of legal frameworks and strategic competition in global security.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Celia Lawlor
The Arctic is no longer a frozen wilderness at the edge of civilization, it’s a strategic pressure point where melting ice is not just reshaping geography, but global norms. Russia is digging in with submarines and seabed claims. China is sending “research” ships to quietly gather influence. Norway is wielding law and diplomacy. And the United States? It’s stuck: present in power, absent in policy. This research examines how the unresolved U.S.-Canada dispute over the Northwest Passage exposes a deeper dilemma in American maritime strategy: how to defend freedom of navigation abroad while wavering on it at home. It also explores whether the U.S. is prepared to lead in the Arctic, or destined to follow without defining its own position.
The Arctic Awakens
As melting sea ice unlocks energy reserves and new frontiers, the Arctic becomes not just a resource-rich part of the globe, but a place for energy security disputes and geopolitical competition. The Arctic is now a theater of law-based competition, not simply climate change. The U.S. possesses Arctic geography, tech, and resources, but undermines its own influence by staying outside the legal system shaping seabed claims.
With the Arctic thawing, new shipping routes such as the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the North Sea Route (NSR) reduce travel time as well as fuel and operational costs. They also allow ships to avoid geopolitical hotspots prone to instability or even piracy. Specifically, the NWP serves as more than a shortcut between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans: it’s a legal indicator for how the U.S. balances loyalty to Canada versus freedom of navigation principles. The NWP is a mirror to the larger U.S. Arctic dilemma– strategic opportunity complicated by unresolved law and alliance contradictions.
Canada claims the NWP is a part of its internal waters according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 8. However, the U.S. insists the route is an international strait. The U.S. conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) through the passage but avoids legal escalation with Canada. To make matters even more complicated, the U.S. adheres to most of the resolutions written in UNCLOS, but has never ratified the treaty, giving it little legal standing or decision making authority.
Therefore, this paper argues the unresolved contention regarding the NWP weakens U.S. Arctic leadership and undercuts its credibility in global maritime disputes. This not only applies to its power in the Arctic, but also debilitates its claims about maritime law in the South China Sea. The U.S. must decide whether its ambiguity in the NWP with Canada is a manageable diplomatic stance, or a dangerous signal that risks emboldening rivals like China. Can a superpower shape the rules of the sea while refusing to anchor itself to them?
Energy and Power Beneath the Ice
In 2009, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that 13% of undiscovered oil and 30% of gas are located in the Arctic. The U.S. currently only holds 3 percent of the global oil reserves, while it uses 25 percent of the world’s oil. The need for more oil was clearly demonstrated by the Prudhoe Bay pipeline leak, where the U.S. was unable to get reasonably-priced oil from the Middle East, causing the price of oil to increase by more than $2 per barrel, up to $77. Access to other oil sources would prevent overreliance on other nations for oil. Key arctic chokepoints include the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, which are critical not only for enabling access to these energy reserves but also for providing shorter, cost-effective shipping routes between major global markets. They could redirect some of the traffic from the Suez Canal. In fact, transporting goods from Europe to the Far East via the NSR could be 25 percent more profitable than the Suez Canal Route, according to the Arctic Institute. Additionally, the viability for the use of the NWP is expected to extend from . The resources gained in the Arctic matter for energy diversification and resilience, as well as worldwide prestige.
How the resources and pieces of the Arctic are carved up is heavily regulated by UNCLOS. The resolution defines the basic parameters of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as 200 nautical miles from a coastline in Article 56. In addition, countries who’ve signed UNCLOS are eligible for extended continental shelf claims under Article 76. This part of UNCLOS defines continental shelf rules and outlines procedures for defining limits of internal waters. If a country claims a shelf beyond 200 miles, it must submit evidence to the CLCS. The CLCS reviews and makes recommendations, and once adopted, the limits are final and binding.
Historically, Russia has submitted claims to the Mendeleev-Alpha Rise, the Podvodnikov Basin, the Lomonosov Ridge, the Nansen Basin, the Gakkel Ridge, and many more in 2001, which it was advised to revise in 2015 and 2021. It has filed another claim in 2023, and each time the CLCS has suggested that they edit their claim and the evidence provided alongside it. In 2006, Norway submitted claims to the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea, the Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean, and the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea, recommendations which were adopted in 2009. Finally, Canada submitted a proposal in 2019 to claim more of the Arctic Ocean.
It should be noted that once the CLCS provides its recommendations, it is up to the state who filed the claim to begin diplomatic negotiations with other states in places where more than one nation claims an area. In 2023, the U.S. extended its continental shelf to overlap significantly with Canada’s. The U.S. could not submit an official claim to CLCS because it has not ratified UNCLOS. In October 2024, the U.S. and Canada established a joint task force to map the Arctic continental shelf overlaps in the Chukchi Plateau and Beaufort Sea. Luckily, the two align on many fronts and communicate frequently, and are expected to come to a conclusion soon. However, not all disputes are solved as easily.
Celia Lawlor is a student at Duke University pursuing International Relations, Computer Science, and Russian. Her research focuses on Arctic governance, maritime law, and U.S. foreign policy, examining the intersection of legal frameworks and strategic competition in global security.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.