The Changing Characteristics of War in Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD): Generating “Panopticon and Blunt Effects” in Japan’s Maritime Zones
The MOC
By
MAJ Young K. Youn
July 5, 2023
Geopolitical tensions in the Asia-Pacific region have been rising to unprecedented levels since World War II. Japan today is situated on the front lines among hostile and revisionist neighbors.[1] Reaffirming Japan’s threat perception is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korea’s frequent testing of ballistic missiles which often land in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), and China’s unilateral and militaristic challenges to the status quo in the East China Sea (“ECS”) and South China Sea (“SCS”). Most importantly, tensions developing around the Taiwan Strait could draw Japan into the conflict, given its proximity to the island nation. According to U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns, President Xi ordered his military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.[2] While enhancing one’s readiness does not constitute a declaration of war, nevertheless, President Xi’s ambition should be taken seriously.
The United States, in tandem with its allies, should prepare according to this time horizon. Consequently, these trendlines require a review of the current defense posture of the United States and Japan vis-à-vis China’s military capabilities to identify the capability gaps and develop creative solutions to the problem. The changing characteristics of today’s war require the right balance between (1) signaling effective deterrence to prevent an invasion and (2) providing reassurances to the potential adversary, to prevent a spiraling out effect of escalation. In the Indo-Pacific region, the security problem set that consists predominately of the air and sea domains requires an enabler that is often underestimated in maritime security: drone and coastal missile capabilities. In consideration of the operational tempo, endurance, and range, a commensurate emphasis should be placed on building coastal missile and combat drone capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAV”) and unmanned surface vessels (“USV”), as it is on traditional maritime capabilities of the U.S. military and Japan Self-Defense Forces (“JSDF”).
Causes and Costs of the Problem
After two decades of small-scale counter-insurgency operations during the Global War On Terrorism (“GWOT”), the U.S. military shifted to Large-Scale Combat Operations (“LSCO”) to deal with today’s security challenges in the Strategic Competition era. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the U.S. “war machine” has not received the proper training, structuring, and defense capability developments for LSCO conflicts against a formidable opponent.[3] The complexity of today’s security challenges complicates the qualitative and quantitative assessments of current U.S. defense capabilities. U.S. military resources are stretched out across multiple geographical regions, causing overreach effects and preventing the critical mass of personnel and capabilities required for a conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.
The war in Ukraine has “exposed vulnerabilities in the U.S. defense industry,” which has been experiencing challenges with shifting from peacetime production levels of ammunition to rates at which Ukraine has been expending in the war.[4] According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the “U.S. defense industrial base is not adequately prepared” for a protracted conflict in a competitive security environment that would require a surge in capacity for a major war.”[5] Moreover, the war has revealed that U.S. allies and partners in the European region have defense industrial bases that are not only unprepared but also underfunded and heavily dependent on the U.S. military for their security. The reliance on U.S. security guarantees from allies and partners in the European region is similar to the Asia-Pacific region. Given the deficiencies of munitions and other weapon systems evident in the U.S. defense industry, these conditions undermine effective deterrence.
External to the United States, the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) has been “investing in munitions and acquiring high-end weapons systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States.”[6] China’s defense budget is the highest in the Indo-Pacific region at $209 billion, followed by India at $64.8 billion, and then Japan at $55 billion.[7] With this funding, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (“PLAN”) has already surpassed the U.S. Navy in battle ships and is projected to grow to 440 ships by the end of FY 2030, compared to the U.S. Navy’s 291 ships.[8] China has enhanced its Anti-Access/Area Denial (“A2/AD”) maritime capabilities via the development of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (“ASBM”), hypersonic weapons, coastal defense cruise missiles, and strategic/long-range bombers.[9] Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (“PLAAF”) is currently “the largest aviation forces in the Pacific” and is projected to overcome U.S. air superiority by 2035, according to the top U.S. Air Force officer, Chief of Staff General Charles Brown, Jr.[10] Complicating matters further, China’s “home turf” advantage provides close proximity to targets of interests in the Asia-Pacific region in comparison to the United States’ challenge vis-à-vis the tyranny of distance.
Drawing Lessons from the Russo-Ukraine War
The United States and its allies have an opportunity to extract lessons from the Russo-Ukraine War and import them into the Asia-Pacific region. A combination of coastal missile systems and drone capabilities have proven to produce lethal effects against Russian naval forces. On April 13, 2022, Ukrainian forces used two Neptune anti-ship missiles (similar specifications as U.S. Harpoon missiles) to sink Russia’s flagship Black Sea missile cruiser, Moskva.[11] On May 2, 2022, Ukrainian UAVs destroyed two Russian Raptor boats.[12] Then, on October 29, 2022, Ukraine reportedly carried out kamikaze attacks with its USVs on the Russian Black Fleet’s Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate and a mine countermeasure ship, further complicating Russia’s maritime operations.[13] Moreover, drones can be produced faster and at higher capacity than naval vessels and aircrafts. Two Australian defense innovation groups, for instance, have been able to take a paper design of a UAV and had it flying in about two months.[14] For precision weapons, like the Harpoon anti-ship missiles, the production timeline takes about two years.[15]
Integrating these drone capabilities with current joint and combined forces capabilities will act as a force multiplier and enable operations across multiple domains. With these ubiquitous shooters and sensors, drones can offset the imbalance between PRC and U.S.-Japan military capability. The integrated capabilities can create pockets of A2/AD resistance that is low-cost, scalable, capable of precision strikes, lower risk of injury or death to U.S. military personnel, and lower damage to critical naval, air, and ground assets. Essentially, drones can operate as a buffer between the enemy and critical capabilities, generating a “panopticon” effect of shooters and sensors at the tactical level and a “blunt” effect at the strategic level with high payoffs in shaping the battlespace. The 360-degree panopticon of shooters and sensors, integrated with land, sea, and air elements, will be able to detect and neutralize pockets of threats in the operating environment.[16] The combination of coastal missile defense capabilities, like a ground-launched anti-ship cruise missile, and combat drones will be capable of delivering both near and distant stand-off effects against the opposing force. Operational tempo and endurance concerns can be mitigated through combat drones that can operate at the “speed of war” and reduce military casualties and costs, which tend to reduce public support for war and for political and military leaders.[17] However, many political leaders and the domestic public are skeptical of drone use because of humanitarian concerns, namely International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”) principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in drone attacks.[18] In operational terms, this translates to concerns with civilian casualties from collateral damage due to indiscriminate attacks. Some critics also believe that “drone warfare will make political leaders too willing to authorize wars,” weakening the restraints on the use of force.[19] To address this concern, the establishment of appropriate military policies, doctrines, and field manuals would aid in regulating the utilization of combat drones to enhance accountability, transparency, and accuracy.
Today’s flashpoints in the East and South China Seas require a coalition response and a look at military tactics, techniques, and procedures proven on the battlefield. The United States and Japan have an opportunity to learn lessons from the Russo-Ukraine War and import those lessons into the Asia-Pacific. These lessons offer a window into a possible future in the region vis-à-vis use of drone warfare and coastal missile defense capabilities in the maritime zones. These capabilities can provide an asymmetrical and formidable A2/AD maritime security architecture for the U.S. military and its Allies and partners, especially when integrated with other defense capabilities across the multiple domains of operations. With the proper standard operating procedures, safeguards, and institutional foundations in place, these force multiplying capabilities will greatly enhance the U.S.-Japan maritime security posture.
MAJ Young K. Youn is a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer (“FAO”). His overseas assignments include Afghanistan, Germany, South Korea, and the Philippines. He holds a masters degree in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a masters degree in public management from the Development Academy of the Philippines Graduate School of Public Management.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army or U.S. Department of Defense.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Endnotes:
[1] Ministry of Defense. “2022 National Defense Strategy.” Japan Ministry of Defense, December 16, 2022, p. 3. Accessed March 4, 2023.
[2] Martina, Michael and Brunnstrom, David. “CIA Chief Warns Against Underestimating Xi’s Ambitions toward Taiwan.” Reuters, February 2, 2023. Accessed March 6, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-chief-says-chinas-xi-little-sobered-by-ukraine-war-2023-02-02/
[3] King, James. “Large-Scale Combat Operations: How the Army Can Get its Groove Back.” Modern War Institute at West Point, June 19, 2018. Accessed March 5, 2023. https://mwi.usma.edu/large-scale-combat-operations-army-can-get-groove-back/
[4] Schwartz, Felicia. “Ukraine war pushes US to review arms stockpiles.” Financial Times, February 16, 2023. Accessed March 5, 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/a3c943e9-9071-49b8-9f6d-2b82e1f8167b
[5] Jones, Seth G. “Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2023. Accessed March 5, 2023. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-01/230119_Jones_Empty_Bins.pdf?VersionId=mW3OOngwul8V2nR2EHKBYxkpiOzMiS88
[7] U.S. Department of Defense. “Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2022.” Department of Defense, November 29, 2022. Accessed March 6, 2023.
[8] Congressional Research Service. “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, December 1, 2023. Accessed March 6, 2023. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf
[9] Burns, Daniel. “Given China’s A2/AD Capabilities, How Would the United States Defend Taiwan?” U.S. Naval Institute, September 16, 2022. Accessed March 6, 2023. https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/16/given-chinas-a2ad-capabilities-how-would-the-united-states-defend-taiwan
[10] Mahshie, Abraham. “News about Chinese Silos Highlights Need for USAF to Accelerate Change, Brown Says.” Air and Space Forces Magazine, August 6, 2021. Accessed March 6, 2023. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/chinese-missile-silos-air-force-accelerate-change-brown/
[11] Sands, Leo. “Sunken Russian warship Moskva: What do we know?” BBC, April 18, 2022. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61103927
[12] Vavasseur, Xavier. “Watch Ukrainian TB2 Striking Two Russian Raptor Assault Boats.” Naval News, May 2, 2022. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/05/watch-ukrainian-tb2-striking-two-russian-raptor-assault-boats/
[13] Ozberk, Tayfun. “Analysis: Ukraine Strikes with Kamikaze USVs – Russian Bases are not Safe Anymore.” Naval News, October 30, 202. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/10/analysis-ukraine-strikes-with-kamikaze-usvs-russian-bases-are-not-safe-anymore/
[14] Magnuson, Stew. “AVALON NEWS: Australian Air Force Takes Drone from ‘Paper’ to Flight in Two Months.” National Defense, February 27, 2023. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/2/27/australian-air-force-takes-drone-from-paper-to-flight-in-two-months
[15] The Maritime Executive. “Study: U.S. Will Run Out of Anti-Ship Missiles in a Fight with China.” Maritime Executive, January 25, 2023. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://maritime-executive.com/article/study-u-s-will-run-out-of-anti-ship-missiles-in-a-fight-with-china
[16] According to Christian Bose, the kill chain is defined by artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and other emerging technologies that are revolutionizing global industries and are now poised to overturn the model of American defense. Brose, Christian. The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare. Hachette Books, April 21, 2020. Accessed March 9, 2023.
[17] Walsh, James I. and Schulzke, Marcus. “Drones and Support for the Use of Force.” University of Michigan Press, 2018. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://www.press.umich.edu/9946611/drones_and_support_for_the_use_offorce
[18] Krahenmann, Sandra and Dvaladze, George. “Humanitarian Concerns raised by the Use of Armed Drones.” Geneval Call, June 16, 2020. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://www.genevacall.org/humanitarian-concerns-raised-by-the-use-of-armed-drones/
Center for Maritime Strategy
By MAJ Young K. Youn
Geopolitical tensions in the Asia-Pacific region have been rising to unprecedented levels since World War II. Japan today is situated on the front lines among hostile and revisionist neighbors.[1] Reaffirming Japan’s threat perception is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korea’s frequent testing of ballistic missiles which often land in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), and China’s unilateral and militaristic challenges to the status quo in the East China Sea (“ECS”) and South China Sea (“SCS”). Most importantly, tensions developing around the Taiwan Strait could draw Japan into the conflict, given its proximity to the island nation. According to U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns, President Xi ordered his military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.[2] While enhancing one’s readiness does not constitute a declaration of war, nevertheless, President Xi’s ambition should be taken seriously.
The United States, in tandem with its allies, should prepare according to this time horizon. Consequently, these trendlines require a review of the current defense posture of the United States and Japan vis-à-vis China’s military capabilities to identify the capability gaps and develop creative solutions to the problem. The changing characteristics of today’s war require the right balance between (1) signaling effective deterrence to prevent an invasion and (2) providing reassurances to the potential adversary, to prevent a spiraling out effect of escalation. In the Indo-Pacific region, the security problem set that consists predominately of the air and sea domains requires an enabler that is often underestimated in maritime security: drone and coastal missile capabilities. In consideration of the operational tempo, endurance, and range, a commensurate emphasis should be placed on building coastal missile and combat drone capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAV”) and unmanned surface vessels (“USV”), as it is on traditional maritime capabilities of the U.S. military and Japan Self-Defense Forces (“JSDF”).
Causes and Costs of the Problem
After two decades of small-scale counter-insurgency operations during the Global War On Terrorism (“GWOT”), the U.S. military shifted to Large-Scale Combat Operations (“LSCO”) to deal with today’s security challenges in the Strategic Competition era. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the U.S. “war machine” has not received the proper training, structuring, and defense capability developments for LSCO conflicts against a formidable opponent.[3] The complexity of today’s security challenges complicates the qualitative and quantitative assessments of current U.S. defense capabilities. U.S. military resources are stretched out across multiple geographical regions, causing overreach effects and preventing the critical mass of personnel and capabilities required for a conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.
The war in Ukraine has “exposed vulnerabilities in the U.S. defense industry,” which has been experiencing challenges with shifting from peacetime production levels of ammunition to rates at which Ukraine has been expending in the war.[4] According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the “U.S. defense industrial base is not adequately prepared” for a protracted conflict in a competitive security environment that would require a surge in capacity for a major war.”[5] Moreover, the war has revealed that U.S. allies and partners in the European region have defense industrial bases that are not only unprepared but also underfunded and heavily dependent on the U.S. military for their security. The reliance on U.S. security guarantees from allies and partners in the European region is similar to the Asia-Pacific region. Given the deficiencies of munitions and other weapon systems evident in the U.S. defense industry, these conditions undermine effective deterrence.
External to the United States, the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) has been “investing in munitions and acquiring high-end weapons systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States.”[6] China’s defense budget is the highest in the Indo-Pacific region at $209 billion, followed by India at $64.8 billion, and then Japan at $55 billion.[7] With this funding, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (“PLAN”) has already surpassed the U.S. Navy in battle ships and is projected to grow to 440 ships by the end of FY 2030, compared to the U.S. Navy’s 291 ships.[8] China has enhanced its Anti-Access/Area Denial (“A2/AD”) maritime capabilities via the development of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (“ASBM”), hypersonic weapons, coastal defense cruise missiles, and strategic/long-range bombers.[9] Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (“PLAAF”) is currently “the largest aviation forces in the Pacific” and is projected to overcome U.S. air superiority by 2035, according to the top U.S. Air Force officer, Chief of Staff General Charles Brown, Jr.[10] Complicating matters further, China’s “home turf” advantage provides close proximity to targets of interests in the Asia-Pacific region in comparison to the United States’ challenge vis-à-vis the tyranny of distance.
Drawing Lessons from the Russo-Ukraine War
The United States and its allies have an opportunity to extract lessons from the Russo-Ukraine War and import them into the Asia-Pacific region. A combination of coastal missile systems and drone capabilities have proven to produce lethal effects against Russian naval forces. On April 13, 2022, Ukrainian forces used two Neptune anti-ship missiles (similar specifications as U.S. Harpoon missiles) to sink Russia’s flagship Black Sea missile cruiser, Moskva.[11] On May 2, 2022, Ukrainian UAVs destroyed two Russian Raptor boats.[12] Then, on October 29, 2022, Ukraine reportedly carried out kamikaze attacks with its USVs on the Russian Black Fleet’s Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate and a mine countermeasure ship, further complicating Russia’s maritime operations.[13] Moreover, drones can be produced faster and at higher capacity than naval vessels and aircrafts. Two Australian defense innovation groups, for instance, have been able to take a paper design of a UAV and had it flying in about two months.[14] For precision weapons, like the Harpoon anti-ship missiles, the production timeline takes about two years.[15]
Integrating these drone capabilities with current joint and combined forces capabilities will act as a force multiplier and enable operations across multiple domains. With these ubiquitous shooters and sensors, drones can offset the imbalance between PRC and U.S.-Japan military capability. The integrated capabilities can create pockets of A2/AD resistance that is low-cost, scalable, capable of precision strikes, lower risk of injury or death to U.S. military personnel, and lower damage to critical naval, air, and ground assets. Essentially, drones can operate as a buffer between the enemy and critical capabilities, generating a “panopticon” effect of shooters and sensors at the tactical level and a “blunt” effect at the strategic level with high payoffs in shaping the battlespace. The 360-degree panopticon of shooters and sensors, integrated with land, sea, and air elements, will be able to detect and neutralize pockets of threats in the operating environment.[16] The combination of coastal missile defense capabilities, like a ground-launched anti-ship cruise missile, and combat drones will be capable of delivering both near and distant stand-off effects against the opposing force. Operational tempo and endurance concerns can be mitigated through combat drones that can operate at the “speed of war” and reduce military casualties and costs, which tend to reduce public support for war and for political and military leaders.[17] However, many political leaders and the domestic public are skeptical of drone use because of humanitarian concerns, namely International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”) principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in drone attacks.[18] In operational terms, this translates to concerns with civilian casualties from collateral damage due to indiscriminate attacks. Some critics also believe that “drone warfare will make political leaders too willing to authorize wars,” weakening the restraints on the use of force.[19] To address this concern, the establishment of appropriate military policies, doctrines, and field manuals would aid in regulating the utilization of combat drones to enhance accountability, transparency, and accuracy.
Today’s flashpoints in the East and South China Seas require a coalition response and a look at military tactics, techniques, and procedures proven on the battlefield. The United States and Japan have an opportunity to learn lessons from the Russo-Ukraine War and import those lessons into the Asia-Pacific. These lessons offer a window into a possible future in the region vis-à-vis use of drone warfare and coastal missile defense capabilities in the maritime zones. These capabilities can provide an asymmetrical and formidable A2/AD maritime security architecture for the U.S. military and its Allies and partners, especially when integrated with other defense capabilities across the multiple domains of operations. With the proper standard operating procedures, safeguards, and institutional foundations in place, these force multiplying capabilities will greatly enhance the U.S.-Japan maritime security posture.
MAJ Young K. Youn is a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer (“FAO”). His overseas assignments include Afghanistan, Germany, South Korea, and the Philippines. He holds a masters degree in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a masters degree in public management from the Development Academy of the Philippines Graduate School of Public Management.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army or U.S. Department of Defense.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Endnotes:
[1] Ministry of Defense. “2022 National Defense Strategy.” Japan Ministry of Defense, December 16, 2022, p. 3. Accessed March 4, 2023.
[2] Martina, Michael and Brunnstrom, David. “CIA Chief Warns Against Underestimating Xi’s Ambitions toward Taiwan.” Reuters, February 2, 2023. Accessed March 6, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-chief-says-chinas-xi-little-sobered-by-ukraine-war-2023-02-02/
[3] King, James. “Large-Scale Combat Operations: How the Army Can Get its Groove Back.” Modern War Institute at West Point, June 19, 2018. Accessed March 5, 2023. https://mwi.usma.edu/large-scale-combat-operations-army-can-get-groove-back/
[4] Schwartz, Felicia. “Ukraine war pushes US to review arms stockpiles.” Financial Times, February 16, 2023. Accessed March 5, 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/a3c943e9-9071-49b8-9f6d-2b82e1f8167b
[5] Jones, Seth G. “Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2023. Accessed March 5, 2023. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-01/230119_Jones_Empty_Bins.pdf?VersionId=mW3OOngwul8V2nR2EHKBYxkpiOzMiS88
[6] Ibid., CSIS, 2023.
[7] U.S. Department of Defense. “Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2022.” Department of Defense, November 29, 2022. Accessed March 6, 2023.
[8] Congressional Research Service. “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, December 1, 2023. Accessed March 6, 2023. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf
[9] Burns, Daniel. “Given China’s A2/AD Capabilities, How Would the United States Defend Taiwan?” U.S. Naval Institute, September 16, 2022. Accessed March 6, 2023. https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/16/given-chinas-a2ad-capabilities-how-would-the-united-states-defend-taiwan
[10] Mahshie, Abraham. “News about Chinese Silos Highlights Need for USAF to Accelerate Change, Brown Says.” Air and Space Forces Magazine, August 6, 2021. Accessed March 6, 2023. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/chinese-missile-silos-air-force-accelerate-change-brown/
[11] Sands, Leo. “Sunken Russian warship Moskva: What do we know?” BBC, April 18, 2022. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61103927
[12] Vavasseur, Xavier. “Watch Ukrainian TB2 Striking Two Russian Raptor Assault Boats.” Naval News, May 2, 2022. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/05/watch-ukrainian-tb2-striking-two-russian-raptor-assault-boats/
[13] Ozberk, Tayfun. “Analysis: Ukraine Strikes with Kamikaze USVs – Russian Bases are not Safe Anymore.” Naval News, October 30, 202. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/10/analysis-ukraine-strikes-with-kamikaze-usvs-russian-bases-are-not-safe-anymore/
[14] Magnuson, Stew. “AVALON NEWS: Australian Air Force Takes Drone from ‘Paper’ to Flight in Two Months.” National Defense, February 27, 2023. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/2/27/australian-air-force-takes-drone-from-paper-to-flight-in-two-months
[15] The Maritime Executive. “Study: U.S. Will Run Out of Anti-Ship Missiles in a Fight with China.” Maritime Executive, January 25, 2023. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://maritime-executive.com/article/study-u-s-will-run-out-of-anti-ship-missiles-in-a-fight-with-china
[16] According to Christian Bose, the kill chain is defined by artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and other emerging technologies that are revolutionizing global industries and are now poised to overturn the model of American defense. Brose, Christian. The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare. Hachette Books, April 21, 2020. Accessed March 9, 2023.
[17] Walsh, James I. and Schulzke, Marcus. “Drones and Support for the Use of Force.” University of Michigan Press, 2018. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://www.press.umich.edu/9946611/drones_and_support_for_the_use_offorce
[18] Krahenmann, Sandra and Dvaladze, George. “Humanitarian Concerns raised by the Use of Armed Drones.” Geneval Call, June 16, 2020. Accessed March 7, 2023. https://www.genevacall.org/humanitarian-concerns-raised-by-the-use-of-armed-drones/
[19] Ibid., Walsh, 2023.