The Black Sea Grain Initiative has become a Game of Chicken, and We can’t let Russia Win​

By Dr. Ian Ralby

Russia is playing chicken with the food supplies for hundreds of millions of people. Thinking it still has the upper hand, and the power to make demands, the Russian Federation has threatened to leave the Black Sea Grain Initiative this Thursday if the United Nations does not offer opportunities to sell its own grain and fertilizer. If the deal is not extended, Ukraine’s significant amounts of grain will have no immediate access to the global market. The question is this: which is the lesser evil – to acquiesce to Russian manipulation and decrease some of the pressure on global food supplies, or to stand firm and not embolden a nefarious actor that has been working to weaponize hunger?

The immediate answer may point to reducing the tensions on global food supplies. The world has a growing hunger problem, as last year’s food price crisis turns into a food availability crisis. Feeding people, therefore, seems like the obvious answer to this quandary. But the cost of that option would, under the current circumstances, likely require allowing Russia some relief from the heavy sanctions imposed on it, such that it can export both grain and fertilizer – a key commodity for boosting agricultural production to meet some of the shortfalls emanating from the crisis.  That brings up three problems: 1. It bolsters Russia’s confidence that it can play chicken with the world and win, 2. It bolsters Russia’s economy at a time when it is struggling to meet the intensity of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, and 3. It bolsters Russia’s ability to weaponize food supply chains at its discretion and to its benefit. Russia is not a good faith actor, so meeting Russian demands come at a heavy price.

So what of the other option, to let the Grain Initiative meet the sunset and return to last year’s conundrum of how to get the grain out of Ukraine. A year ago, the world was already stunned by Ukraine’s steadfast resolve to repel the Russian invasion. But Russia still seemed the superior power. A year later, it is worth questioning whether Russia is as critical a component to the export of Ukrainian grain as it once was.  If the Black Sea Grain Initiative ends this week, does that automatically translate into pockets of famine around the world? Maybe not. In fact, markets have already adjusted to the slow trickle of grain such that it is unlikely that grain prices would even be affected.

As all attention has been focused on extending the status quo, the imminent demise of the initiative should revive critical and creative thinking on what the goals are, and therefore, what the options may be. If the goal is to get grain out to meet food demands around the world, it is worth noting that the most successful period of the Grain Initiative was actually when Russia temporarily backed out of it last autumn. Russia has been slow walking grain inspections throughout the program and was always hindering the movement of the grain, even when begrudgingly participating in the Initiative. The only reason they were involved was that as a belligerent occupying power with superior naval control in the Black Sea, they had the de facto ability to allow ships in and out of Ukraine.  The time has come to reassess that position.

Naval analysis of the war cannot but come to the conclusion that Ukraine has exceeded all expectations in mustering extremely limited naval capacity against a seemingly powerful Russian Black Sea Fleet. Russia has sustained heavy losses and has, in a grand strategic sense, been shown to be somewhat of a paper tiger. That said, despite all the losses and the downward trajectory of its naval power, Russia could still be an on-the-water spoiler for any efforts to export Ukrainian grain without its involvement and consent.

Perhaps, therefore, the time has come to look to other partners – outside of NATO – who could help establish a Black Sea Maritime Security Initiative. Countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, and Malaysia have all relied heavily on Ukrainian grain supplies prior to the war. Their collective effort to secure sustained exports out of the Black Sea – involving a rotating flotilla of deployed vessels – could, particularly if supported by Turkey, neutralize the threat of Russian interference and actually allow for a more robust flow of grain out of Ukraine.

At a time when Ukraine is ramping up a counter-offensive against Russia, and when Turkey’s political future is uncertain as the presidential election heads to a run-off, it is likely that this week will end without an extension to the Black Sea Grain Initiative.  Rather than either letting Russia win its game of chicken, or sinking into depression about an inevitable food crisis, we should welcome this opportunity to reassess the options and seek new initiatives to simultaneously support Ukraine’s sovereignty and economy while also moving Ukrainian grain to the states that need it most.  We must continue to preclude Russia from wielding one of its age-old favorite weapons – hunger – as a means of gaining global strategic advantage.

Dr. Ian Ralby is CEO of the consultancy I.R. Consilium, President of the charitable nonprofit Auxilium Worldwide and a Fellow at the Center for Maritime Strategy. He is a recognized expert in maritime law and security, and works with states on building the legal and operational capacity to combat a wide spectrum of threats including the emerging and evolving tactics of unlawfare.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.