The Aircraft Carrier Remains Essential to U.S. Joint Warfare
The MOC
By
Dr. Steven Wills
October 3, 2025
Some would proclaim the aircraft carrier as susceptible to missile attack, vulnerable to damage and unrecoverable for operations if hit by weapons. While those assertions may be correct, the flattop remains absolutely essential for global, joint warfare as practiced by the United States now and in the future. Geography provides few safe bases from which to operate land-based aircraft in support of many missions. The advent of the M/Q-25A and hybrid manned/unmanned air wing will keep the carrier in play as a strike and air defense platform decades into this century. Finally, the strike capacity of the U.S. Air Force is quite fragile, as a former Air Force Chief of Staff recently stated in the wake of the successful B-2 strike on Iran. Carriers remain potent sources of sustained air combat capability in an increasingly fragmented and dangerous world. Traditional foes of the flattop like OSD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office might rage against the cost of the carrier, and Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) might condemn its vulnerability, but the big deck carrier remains essential for American joint warfare now and into the 21st century.
There are few if any land bases outside U.S. territory from which American aircraft can operate without susceptibility to attack. The Korean and Vietnam wars showed that any land base might be overrun or attacked by enemy forces in combat. In some theaters like the Arctic, much of the Middle East, and in wide parts of the Indo-Pacific there are few if any secure bases from which U.S. aircraft may operate. U.S. aviation strike operations in the Red Sea, and defense of Israeli in 2024 and 2025 were sustained almost exclusively by carrier-based aircraft with no less than nine carrier deployments supporting those missions due the geographic isolation and political limitations on Air Force aircraft in the region.
Land-based airfields do have advantages. Airfield runways are exceedingly difficult to damage, and concrete revetments can provide safe storage for aircraft, but these bases are fixed targets that an enemy can always locate and target with pinpoint accuracy. Expeditionary airstrips such as those proposed by the U.S. Marine Corps in their ongoing Force Design process are likely more survivable due their ability to relocate but must remain in place when conducting flight operations. Only the carrier however is a truly mobile air base for U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and some Allied nation aircraft.
Unmanned aircraft are likely to assume a greater role in all air combat organizations. The advent of the U.S. Navy’s M/Q-25A carrier based, unmanned tanking aircraft is just the first step toward a sea-based, hybrid airwing of up to 60% unmanned aircraft in the next two decades. The same mobility and freedom of operations of manned aircraft flown from carriers are conveyed to unmanned aircraft as well. Manned/unmanned teaming, as one Navy video (Sea Strike 2044,) has already portrayed, suggest a potent force of carrier-based strike, electronic warfare and supporting unmanned aircraft managed by a fewer manned fighter aircraft. While unmanned aircraft require more support and maintenance requirements now from carrier-based flight crews, successive variants of unmanned platforms will be less maintenance intensive and enable even more powerful strike capacity in future carriers. Unmanned systems only make the carrier more valuable into future decades.
As U.S. Air Force leaders have said, the long-range strike capacity of the U.S. Air Force is aging and increasingly brittle. Even the vaunted but now three decade old B-2 Stealth bomber has operational and logistical limits. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Ron Fogleman and retired Lieutenant General Dave Deptula both recently highlighted the fact that following the successful Operation Midnight Hammer strike on Iranian nuclear facilities that the U.S. B-2 bomber force was unable to sustain a continuing campaign of such strikes due to maintenance limitations on aging B-2 platforms, lack of sustained tanking capacity to support those strikes, and just too few aircraft to sustain a rolling strike campaign over weeks. The Air Force does need the new B-21 aircraft in numbers, but also more tanking and logistics support to a new bomber force that some figures have said could top $203b over thirty years. The F-47 aircraft may be in production by 2029, but it is unlikely to reach its planned 185 aircraft fleet for some time. The new Carrier-based aircraft are much shorter ranged than the B-2, but the nuclear-powered carrier’s deep magazines and aviation fuel capacity can sustain continued strikes and air defense missions over weeks rather than hours. The U.S. cannot always be expected to mount air strikes from the homeland and expend vital Air Force bomber readiness.
Yes, the carrier is expensive at $13b for the ship, and as much as $8.4b for its airwing. Not all carrier missions, however, require a Gerald R. Ford or Nimitz class carrier to execute, and some smaller carriers could be built at less cost. Carriers due to the nature of their mission as an airport at sea have always been susceptible to attack, vulnerable to damage, and difficult to recover for full operations if damaged. Carriers replaced the battleship as the primary surface combat platform, not because they were less vulnerable than the dreadnought, but because they could better deliver sustained combat power at longer ranges. Many missiles today outrange carrier-based aircraft, but that’s not a problem for the ship, but rather one to solve with longer-range aircraft (manned and unmanned) in the air wing. Missile ships and small craft, manned and unmanned still cannot be reloaded at sea in tactically significant numbers. Surface craft and submarines require air superiority to protect them from air strikes. The aircraft carrier may no longer provide the bulk of strike capacity for fleet in some cases, but the aircraft they carry are essential to winning and sustaining sea control in support of successful combat operations in support of national interests.
Aviation capacity at sea, for both strike and defense will remain an essential U.S. joint force requirement now and well into the 21st century. Carrier-based aviation may be the only air component forces in many operations, such as the recent combat missions against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. A sufficient force of carriers and component air wings must be maintained so that current and future U.S. presidents can ask the Cold War question of “where are the carriers” and expect at least one flattop to be in short sailing distance to strike.
Dr. Steve Wills, is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
Some would proclaim the aircraft carrier as susceptible to missile attack, vulnerable to damage and unrecoverable for operations if hit by weapons. While those assertions may be correct, the flattop remains absolutely essential for global, joint warfare as practiced by the United States now and in the future. Geography provides few safe bases from which to operate land-based aircraft in support of many missions. The advent of the M/Q-25A and hybrid manned/unmanned air wing will keep the carrier in play as a strike and air defense platform decades into this century. Finally, the strike capacity of the U.S. Air Force is quite fragile, as a former Air Force Chief of Staff recently stated in the wake of the successful B-2 strike on Iran. Carriers remain potent sources of sustained air combat capability in an increasingly fragmented and dangerous world. Traditional foes of the flattop like OSD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office might rage against the cost of the carrier, and Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) might condemn its vulnerability, but the big deck carrier remains essential for American joint warfare now and into the 21st century.
There are few if any land bases outside U.S. territory from which American aircraft can operate without susceptibility to attack. The Korean and Vietnam wars showed that any land base might be overrun or attacked by enemy forces in combat. In some theaters like the Arctic, much of the Middle East, and in wide parts of the Indo-Pacific there are few if any secure bases from which U.S. aircraft may operate. U.S. aviation strike operations in the Red Sea, and defense of Israeli in 2024 and 2025 were sustained almost exclusively by carrier-based aircraft with no less than nine carrier deployments supporting those missions due the geographic isolation and political limitations on Air Force aircraft in the region.
Land-based airfields do have advantages. Airfield runways are exceedingly difficult to damage, and concrete revetments can provide safe storage for aircraft, but these bases are fixed targets that an enemy can always locate and target with pinpoint accuracy. Expeditionary airstrips such as those proposed by the U.S. Marine Corps in their ongoing Force Design process are likely more survivable due their ability to relocate but must remain in place when conducting flight operations. Only the carrier however is a truly mobile air base for U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and some Allied nation aircraft.
Unmanned aircraft are likely to assume a greater role in all air combat organizations. The advent of the U.S. Navy’s M/Q-25A carrier based, unmanned tanking aircraft is just the first step toward a sea-based, hybrid airwing of up to 60% unmanned aircraft in the next two decades. The same mobility and freedom of operations of manned aircraft flown from carriers are conveyed to unmanned aircraft as well. Manned/unmanned teaming, as one Navy video (Sea Strike 2044,) has already portrayed, suggest a potent force of carrier-based strike, electronic warfare and supporting unmanned aircraft managed by a fewer manned fighter aircraft. While unmanned aircraft require more support and maintenance requirements now from carrier-based flight crews, successive variants of unmanned platforms will be less maintenance intensive and enable even more powerful strike capacity in future carriers. Unmanned systems only make the carrier more valuable into future decades.
As U.S. Air Force leaders have said, the long-range strike capacity of the U.S. Air Force is aging and increasingly brittle. Even the vaunted but now three decade old B-2 Stealth bomber has operational and logistical limits. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Ron Fogleman and retired Lieutenant General Dave Deptula both recently highlighted the fact that following the successful Operation Midnight Hammer strike on Iranian nuclear facilities that the U.S. B-2 bomber force was unable to sustain a continuing campaign of such strikes due to maintenance limitations on aging B-2 platforms, lack of sustained tanking capacity to support those strikes, and just too few aircraft to sustain a rolling strike campaign over weeks. The Air Force does need the new B-21 aircraft in numbers, but also more tanking and logistics support to a new bomber force that some figures have said could top $203b over thirty years. The F-47 aircraft may be in production by 2029, but it is unlikely to reach its planned 185 aircraft fleet for some time. The new Carrier-based aircraft are much shorter ranged than the B-2, but the nuclear-powered carrier’s deep magazines and aviation fuel capacity can sustain continued strikes and air defense missions over weeks rather than hours. The U.S. cannot always be expected to mount air strikes from the homeland and expend vital Air Force bomber readiness.
Yes, the carrier is expensive at $13b for the ship, and as much as $8.4b for its airwing. Not all carrier missions, however, require a Gerald R. Ford or Nimitz class carrier to execute, and some smaller carriers could be built at less cost. Carriers due to the nature of their mission as an airport at sea have always been susceptible to attack, vulnerable to damage, and difficult to recover for full operations if damaged. Carriers replaced the battleship as the primary surface combat platform, not because they were less vulnerable than the dreadnought, but because they could better deliver sustained combat power at longer ranges. Many missiles today outrange carrier-based aircraft, but that’s not a problem for the ship, but rather one to solve with longer-range aircraft (manned and unmanned) in the air wing. Missile ships and small craft, manned and unmanned still cannot be reloaded at sea in tactically significant numbers. Surface craft and submarines require air superiority to protect them from air strikes. The aircraft carrier may no longer provide the bulk of strike capacity for fleet in some cases, but the aircraft they carry are essential to winning and sustaining sea control in support of successful combat operations in support of national interests.
Aviation capacity at sea, for both strike and defense will remain an essential U.S. joint force requirement now and well into the 21st century. Carrier-based aviation may be the only air component forces in many operations, such as the recent combat missions against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. A sufficient force of carriers and component air wings must be maintained so that current and future U.S. presidents can ask the Cold War question of “where are the carriers” and expect at least one flattop to be in short sailing distance to strike.
Dr. Steve Wills, is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.