No Air Superiority Means No Sea Control: The Case of the Black Sea Fleet
The MOC
Photo by Alexey Pavlishak/Reuters.
By
Dr. Steven Wills
September 20, 2022
A recent Politico article on the challenges facing the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) gets at some of the problems Russian naval forces face in the war against Ukraine but stops short of identifying the real issue which is a lack of air superiority in the Black Sea littoral. Russia made a key operational error in force allocation when it diverted the bulk of its air defense warships to the Mediterranean Sea instead of keeping them in the Baltic to ensure air defense of Russian maritime resupply efforts. Air defense warships, like the sunken Moskva, play a crucial role in managing the air picture and providing early warning against raids on Russian territory such as the August attack on Saki Air base that destroyed a significant part of the Black Sea Fleet’s naval air arm (if it was indeed an air and/or missile attack, accounts vary.) The Politico article suggests that losses to Russian amphibious ships are the worst result of Black Sea Fleet impotency, but the real casualty is the ability of the Fleet itself to protect itself, which in turn affects all its other operations.
Poor Initial Force Deployment
The Russian Navy has very few, purpose-built air defense ships capable of managing the sea and air picture over wide geographic areas. Russian ship classes that conduct air and missile defense as a primary mission include the aging Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyer, the large Kirov-class cruiser with a large surface to air missile armament, and the Slava-class cruisers whose lead unit (the former Slava, renamed Moskva) was sunk on 14 April 2022 by Ukrainian Neptune cruise missiles. Given 1-2 Sovremenny’s, 1 active Kirov, and 3 Slava’s, the Russian Navy had limited choices in ship deployments in support of the Ukraine invasion. Russian leadership chose to concentrate the bulk of the serviceable air defense ships in the Mediterranean Sea facing U.S. Navy and NATO nation forces rather than assemble a more robust air defense capacity in the Black Sea. Barred from Black Sea entry by the provisions of the Montreux Convention, these warships include the remaining 2 Slava-class ships, as well as 2 Udaloy-class general purpose destroyers, amongst other smaller warships and submarines. One of the Slava’s (Marshall Ustinov) recently departed the Mediterranean enroute to a Russian home port, demonstrating either a lack of continued maintainability in the Mediterranean Sea far from any Russian base other than Tartus, and also a sense of futility in being unable to directly support Russian combat efforts in the Black Sea.
No Sea Control Without Air Superiority
The loss of the BSF’s only purpose-built, air defense ship initially forced the Russian Navy into improvisations and finally into the shadows. Following Moskva’s loss, small Russian warships of the Vasily Bykov-class appeared with an ad hoc-mounted, land-based surface-to-air missile unit (SA-N-9) strapped to its helicopter flight deck in an attempt to generate air defense for Russian naval operations. This is a desperate move given that it takes a lot of time and effort to balance electromagnetic energy sources on a warship so that they do not interfere with each other’s operation. Other Black Sea surface ships, including Admiral Essen and Krivak-class frigates that do have basic air defense systems, have largely left the Ukrainian littoral to very small combatants, such as the Raptor-class patrol boat, which have still suffered heavy casualties.
Implications for the U.S. Navy in the Indo-Pacific
Effective combat operations at sea are a joint effort, and no single platform can be the end-all, be-all of seapower. The U.S. Navy is seeking to build more small combatants, manned and unmanned, with surface-to-surface missile armaments to increase its offensive firepower and more submarines to conduct combat operations forward of the rest of the fleet. Sea control, however, requires air superiority to be effective. As such, air defense, both in terms of ship-based weapons and aircraft, cannot be pushed into a secondary status in a rush to acquire more offensive capability. The Navy needs a combination of aviation, surface, and subsurface units, manned and unmanned, to conduct both offensive operations and force protection of fleet units. The impotence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in ceding the Ukrainian littoral is a warning of what can happen when air defense is neglected in the course offensive operations at sea.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
A recent Politico article on the challenges facing the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) gets at some of the problems Russian naval forces face in the war against Ukraine but stops short of identifying the real issue which is a lack of air superiority in the Black Sea littoral. Russia made a key operational error in force allocation when it diverted the bulk of its air defense warships to the Mediterranean Sea instead of keeping them in the Baltic to ensure air defense of Russian maritime resupply efforts. Air defense warships, like the sunken Moskva, play a crucial role in managing the air picture and providing early warning against raids on Russian territory such as the August attack on Saki Air base that destroyed a significant part of the Black Sea Fleet’s naval air arm (if it was indeed an air and/or missile attack, accounts vary.) The Politico article suggests that losses to Russian amphibious ships are the worst result of Black Sea Fleet impotency, but the real casualty is the ability of the Fleet itself to protect itself, which in turn affects all its other operations.
Poor Initial Force Deployment
The Russian Navy has very few, purpose-built air defense ships capable of managing the sea and air picture over wide geographic areas. Russian ship classes that conduct air and missile defense as a primary mission include the aging Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyer, the large Kirov-class cruiser with a large surface to air missile armament, and the Slava-class cruisers whose lead unit (the former Slava, renamed Moskva) was sunk on 14 April 2022 by Ukrainian Neptune cruise missiles. Given 1-2 Sovremenny’s, 1 active Kirov, and 3 Slava’s, the Russian Navy had limited choices in ship deployments in support of the Ukraine invasion. Russian leadership chose to concentrate the bulk of the serviceable air defense ships in the Mediterranean Sea facing U.S. Navy and NATO nation forces rather than assemble a more robust air defense capacity in the Black Sea. Barred from Black Sea entry by the provisions of the Montreux Convention, these warships include the remaining 2 Slava-class ships, as well as 2 Udaloy-class general purpose destroyers, amongst other smaller warships and submarines. One of the Slava’s (Marshall Ustinov) recently departed the Mediterranean enroute to a Russian home port, demonstrating either a lack of continued maintainability in the Mediterranean Sea far from any Russian base other than Tartus, and also a sense of futility in being unable to directly support Russian combat efforts in the Black Sea.
No Sea Control Without Air Superiority
The loss of the BSF’s only purpose-built, air defense ship initially forced the Russian Navy into improvisations and finally into the shadows. Following Moskva’s loss, small Russian warships of the Vasily Bykov-class appeared with an ad hoc-mounted, land-based surface-to-air missile unit (SA-N-9) strapped to its helicopter flight deck in an attempt to generate air defense for Russian naval operations. This is a desperate move given that it takes a lot of time and effort to balance electromagnetic energy sources on a warship so that they do not interfere with each other’s operation. Other Black Sea surface ships, including Admiral Essen and Krivak-class frigates that do have basic air defense systems, have largely left the Ukrainian littoral to very small combatants, such as the Raptor-class patrol boat, which have still suffered heavy casualties.
Implications for the U.S. Navy in the Indo-Pacific
Effective combat operations at sea are a joint effort, and no single platform can be the end-all, be-all of seapower. The U.S. Navy is seeking to build more small combatants, manned and unmanned, with surface-to-surface missile armaments to increase its offensive firepower and more submarines to conduct combat operations forward of the rest of the fleet. Sea control, however, requires air superiority to be effective. As such, air defense, both in terms of ship-based weapons and aircraft, cannot be pushed into a secondary status in a rush to acquire more offensive capability. The Navy needs a combination of aviation, surface, and subsurface units, manned and unmanned, to conduct both offensive operations and force protection of fleet units. The impotence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in ceding the Ukrainian littoral is a warning of what can happen when air defense is neglected in the course offensive operations at sea.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.