Sub Sunk! Two words that echoed across the radio waves of Europe and the United States whenever another German U-Boat went down in the First and Second Battle of the Atlantic have now been uttered in the Black Sea with the sinking of the Russian Kilo-class submarine Rostov-on-Don last Friday. According to Ukrainian Ministry of Defense forces, the submarine was attacked and sunk in-port Sevastopol amidst a complex raid on Russian infrastructure and S-400 air defense missile batteries.
Ironically, I recall my days as the Commander of Submarine Group EIGHT (U.S. hat) and Commander of Allied Submarines South (NATO hat) in Naples, Italy from 2010 to 2012. During this tour, I participated in NATO and the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office’s (ISMERLO) exercise “Bold Monarch” off the coast of Cartagena, Spain in 2011. Numerous nations with submarines and submarine rescue capability participated in this complex and interesting exercise. The U.S. brought a submarine rescue vehicle as did Norway, the UK, France, and Russia. In fact, the Russians brought Al Rosa, a Russian Kilo from the Black Sea Fleet for NATO navies to practice the tactics, techniques and procedures of submarine rescue operations. My how things have changed…
The sinking of the Rostov-on-Don is significant because it represents a low-density, high demand(LDHD) asset of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. During my time as Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, in 2014, Russia moved six new Kilo-class submarines to the Mediterranean and Black Sea theaters of operation. Two of the boats remained outside the Black Sea, home ported in Syria, and four of the boats entered the Black Sea to be homeported in Sevastopol, Ukraine. The Russians hedged their bets on the placement of the two boats in Syria because the Montreux Treaty only allows for the inbound/outbound transit of submarines homeported in the Black Sea for maintenance purposes that cannot be conducted in the homeport of Sevastopol. Accordingly, the Russian would have two boats available in the Mediterranean to monitor NATO naval activity, while keeping four boats in the Black Sea to support their aspirations towards Ukraine. Although the Russians have over 60 Kilo-class submarines in inventory, it is unlikely that the Turks would allow for another Kilo to enter the Bosporus at this time of heightened tension and war between Ukraine and Russia, hence my reference to the Black Sea Kilos being an LD/HD asset.
If Ukrainian claims are validated, the Russians lost a valuable asset in their war with Ukraine. It should be noted that the Ukrainians first struck the submarine in September of last year, presumably with a Storm Shadow (UK built) cruise missile. Last Friday’s attack was the coup de grace that put Rostov-on-Don on the bottom of the harbor. A Russian Kilo-class submarine is worth about $300 million, much less than Western hybrid diesel-electric submarines, but nevertheless a big blow to the Russian order of battle in the Black Sea. Furthermore, the Kilos can carry and launch a variety of weapons from six torpedo tubes, including torpedoes, mines, and Kalibr cruise missiles, the latter of which has reigned havoc on Ukrainian energy infrastructure and been responsible for attacks on non-military targets including civilian apartment buildings. The loss of Rostov-on-Don cuts 25% of the Russian targeteers capability to conduct strikes launched from under the sea. This is significant because since February 2022 and the start of the war, Ukrainian unmanned systems have damaged or sunk 26 Russian ships or approximately one-third of the Black Sea Fleet. In fact, the Black Sea Fleet has practically abandoned the port of Sevastopol for safer areas further north and east in the Black Sea such as the Russian port of Novorossiysk and/or Georgian ports in the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which the Russian occupied after their attack on Georgia in 2008.
By employing an Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) Strategy by means of an extensive network of mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, and unmanned armed drones, Ukraine has effectively created a Weapons Exclusion Zone in the Black Sea, in which the Russians do not dare operate else they will meet the same fate as the Russian Black Sea Fleet Flagship Moskva did in April 2022. Submarines however, and the Kilo-class in particular, can operate in the Ukrainian WEZ because of their dwell time (ability to remain underwater), range, and stealth. With the loss of Rostov-on-Don, the Russian planners a la carte menu of strike platforms has been diminished.
Ukrainian success in the employment of its A2AD strategy is something to be celebrated but it also raises concerns in the West. If the Ukrainians can do this, so can others. Western navies beware! Hybrid warfare may lead to the “empty ocean” theory espoused by Sir John Keegan in his classic book, The Price of Admiralty.
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (ret.), Dean
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Sub Sunk! Two words that echoed across the radio waves of Europe and the United States whenever another German U-Boat went down in the First and Second Battle of the Atlantic have now been uttered in the Black Sea with the sinking of the Russian Kilo-class submarine Rostov-on-Don last Friday. According to Ukrainian Ministry of Defense forces, the submarine was attacked and sunk in-port Sevastopol amidst a complex raid on Russian infrastructure and S-400 air defense missile batteries.
Ironically, I recall my days as the Commander of Submarine Group EIGHT (U.S. hat) and Commander of Allied Submarines South (NATO hat) in Naples, Italy from 2010 to 2012. During this tour, I participated in NATO and the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office’s (ISMERLO) exercise “Bold Monarch” off the coast of Cartagena, Spain in 2011. Numerous nations with submarines and submarine rescue capability participated in this complex and interesting exercise. The U.S. brought a submarine rescue vehicle as did Norway, the UK, France, and Russia. In fact, the Russians brought Al Rosa, a Russian Kilo from the Black Sea Fleet for NATO navies to practice the tactics, techniques and procedures of submarine rescue operations. My how things have changed…
The sinking of the Rostov-on-Don is significant because it represents a low-density, high demand(LDHD) asset of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. During my time as Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, in 2014, Russia moved six new Kilo-class submarines to the Mediterranean and Black Sea theaters of operation. Two of the boats remained outside the Black Sea, home ported in Syria, and four of the boats entered the Black Sea to be homeported in Sevastopol, Ukraine. The Russians hedged their bets on the placement of the two boats in Syria because the Montreux Treaty only allows for the inbound/outbound transit of submarines homeported in the Black Sea for maintenance purposes that cannot be conducted in the homeport of Sevastopol. Accordingly, the Russian would have two boats available in the Mediterranean to monitor NATO naval activity, while keeping four boats in the Black Sea to support their aspirations towards Ukraine. Although the Russians have over 60 Kilo-class submarines in inventory, it is unlikely that the Turks would allow for another Kilo to enter the Bosporus at this time of heightened tension and war between Ukraine and Russia, hence my reference to the Black Sea Kilos being an LD/HD asset.
If Ukrainian claims are validated, the Russians lost a valuable asset in their war with Ukraine. It should be noted that the Ukrainians first struck the submarine in September of last year, presumably with a Storm Shadow (UK built) cruise missile. Last Friday’s attack was the coup de grace that put Rostov-on-Don on the bottom of the harbor. A Russian Kilo-class submarine is worth about $300 million, much less than Western hybrid diesel-electric submarines, but nevertheless a big blow to the Russian order of battle in the Black Sea. Furthermore, the Kilos can carry and launch a variety of weapons from six torpedo tubes, including torpedoes, mines, and Kalibr cruise missiles, the latter of which has reigned havoc on Ukrainian energy infrastructure and been responsible for attacks on non-military targets including civilian apartment buildings. The loss of Rostov-on-Don cuts 25% of the Russian targeteers capability to conduct strikes launched from under the sea. This is significant because since February 2022 and the start of the war, Ukrainian unmanned systems have damaged or sunk 26 Russian ships or approximately one-third of the Black Sea Fleet. In fact, the Black Sea Fleet has practically abandoned the port of Sevastopol for safer areas further north and east in the Black Sea such as the Russian port of Novorossiysk and/or Georgian ports in the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which the Russian occupied after their attack on Georgia in 2008.
By employing an Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) Strategy by means of an extensive network of mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, and unmanned armed drones, Ukraine has effectively created a Weapons Exclusion Zone in the Black Sea, in which the Russians do not dare operate else they will meet the same fate as the Russian Black Sea Fleet Flagship Moskva did in April 2022. Submarines however, and the Kilo-class in particular, can operate in the Ukrainian WEZ because of their dwell time (ability to remain underwater), range, and stealth. With the loss of Rostov-on-Don, the Russian planners a la carte menu of strike platforms has been diminished.
Ukrainian success in the employment of its A2AD strategy is something to be celebrated but it also raises concerns in the West. If the Ukrainians can do this, so can others. Western navies beware! Hybrid warfare may lead to the “empty ocean” theory espoused by Sir John Keegan in his classic book, The Price of Admiralty.
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (ret.), Dean
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.