Yet these wider ambitions have prevented a proper focus on the waters closest to home, something which, paradoxically, is now more important than ever. The war in Ukraine has completely changed the strategic environment for most European nations, marking the return to confrontation with Russia and increasingly contested maritime commons. Additionally, the 2020 departure of the United Kingdom from the EU left it without one of its major naval forces. Thus, the EU now finds itself needing to strengthen its maritime presence and adapt to modern challenges, such as the protection of critical undersea infrastructure and vital sea lines of communication across its own waters. In short, “learn to speak the language of power.” And as Daniel Fiott, European Union Institute for Security Studies Security and Defence Editor, underlines “The EU and its member states will find it increasingly difficult to sustain the rules-based order and the Union’s own economic prosperity without a sizeable and consistent investment in maritime power.”
Therefore, in the process of reaching such a goal, it is worth considering whether the EU could learn something from the organization of NATO’s maritime forces, in order to provide a stronger and more cohesive approach to European maritime security.
Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), based in Northwood, currently controls NATO’s Standing Naval Forces. Such a body is responsible for different groups: Standing Maritime Groups 1 & 2 and Standing Mine Countermeasures Groups 1 & 2. With them operating across numerous regions, the alliance ensures a permanent presence across its main areas of interest, through the participation of most of its members’ naval forces. This distribution, however, is descendant from previous configurations which were focused on the different maritime theaters rather than having the current unified approach. But the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decrease in international tensions brought about “the demise of the very concept of separate maritime theaters of operation, in both the US command structure and that of the NATO alliance,” indicates Peter M. Swartz writing for The Center for Naval Analyses. In spite of this, both past and present configurations offer the EU a model to imitate.
Pushing for the transformation of the current EUROMARFOR (which is a non-standing force) into a similar model would evidently present some major challenges for the EU, but NATO’s example has shown that permanent and regionalized task forces provide durable results. As pointed out by Dr. Joshua Tallis, a research scientist and political-military analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, “the forcing function of scoping can breed excellence through concision.” This is as true for NATO as it could be for the EU, especially considering the EUMSS’ recent update discusses the intention of “organizing naval exercises at the EU level” and “designating new maritime areas of interests for the implementation of the Coordinated Maritime Presences concept.”
Yet there is a dual burden in the pursuit of such a project. First, political agreement among all 27 member states is something rare, often translating in very little room for common agreement regarding any aspect of the EU’s Common Security & Defense Policy (CSDP). And second, any proposal calling for an increase in national military spending is usually met with significant skepticism on whether it will bring tangible results for them. Following NATO’s model would undoubtedly come at a cost, but still, the case could be made for the establishment of an “EU Standing Naval Force” (EUSNF) divided according to the different regions of the European maritime environment: a “EUSNF Baltic,” “EUSNF Atlantic,” and “EUSNF Mediterranean” (for this last one, perhaps, one group would cover the Western Mediterranean region and another would cover the Eastern and Black Sea regions).
The Spanish, Italian, and French navies could provide stronger presence across the Western and central Mediterranean with their frigates and destroyers, while their Greek, Bulgarian, and Romanian counterparts could better adapt to the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean areas. In the Atlantic, Portugal, France, Belgium, and Germany could do the same, even working alongside the Royal Navy in the English Channel. As for the Baltic, Danish, Polish, and German navies, they could provide a strong presence with their bigger frigates. The Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, and Swedish navies, with their Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), minehunters, and Fast Attack Craft, would enhance coastal security and provide better surveillance capabilities for all undersea critical infrastructure in the region. Sweden’s upcoming Blekinge-class of submarines, for example, will be a firm contribution for such mission.
Each force could be under the authority of a regional command, jointly handled by the countries in each group, and with all of them controlled by a committee similar in nature to the current “High Level Inter-Ministerial Committee” of EUROMARFOR. A force with such a scheme would, first and foremost, help strengthen European deterrence efforts, something of paramount importance in the current context and achievable only with “the man on the scene with the gun.” Permanent presence that lets all potential adversaries know that, should they attempt anything against a European Member State, they will most likely fail. But more importantly, it would also help countering political skepticism towards increases in military spending. As Tallis argues for NATO, “scoped missions tailored to geography would help alleviate the evergreen concern among national leaders of their forces being used for reasons beyond their approval.” The same principle could also apply for the EU; and besides, European nations could be even more disposed to it by finding a common purpose – something in the line of deterring Russia and other potential foes from making a move against any of them.
In short, the time has come for the EU to boost its naval capabilities and maritime presence across its territorial waters. NATO’s example of maritime presence throughout its history offers a way forward and a model of stable cooperation to be followed in the years to come. Obviously, the main obstacle for any project of such nature and size to materialize will always be finding common grounds for agreement among all 27 member states; although Russian hostilities and the wider threat they pose for European maritime security in general will certainly be of much help. The permanent and regionalized presence of the proposed EU Standing Naval Forces (or any similar structure devised) would certainly lead to a better leverage of each navy´s assets, while also favoring the strengthening of the EU’s maritime presence and the ability to protect its maritime areas of interest.
Gonzalo Vázquez graduated from the University of Navarre in Spain where he studied international relations. He has contributed to the Australian Naval Review, the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Arctic Institute.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Gonzalo Vázquez
With the publication of the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) update, the European Union (“EU”) proves to be slowly advancing in the right direction towards a more cohesive and strengthened maritime presence. Underlining how much its maritime strategic environment has changed over the past few years, and especially under the consequences of war in Ukraine, the document continues to build on its 2014 predecessor; pushing for a more prominent role in faraway regions such as the Horn of Africa (where its counterpiracy mission, Operation Atalanta, has been ongoing for more than a decade) and an increased naval presence in the Indo-Pacific.
Yet these wider ambitions have prevented a proper focus on the waters closest to home, something which, paradoxically, is now more important than ever. The war in Ukraine has completely changed the strategic environment for most European nations, marking the return to confrontation with Russia and increasingly contested maritime commons. Additionally, the 2020 departure of the United Kingdom from the EU left it without one of its major naval forces. Thus, the EU now finds itself needing to strengthen its maritime presence and adapt to modern challenges, such as the protection of critical undersea infrastructure and vital sea lines of communication across its own waters. In short, “learn to speak the language of power.” And as Daniel Fiott, European Union Institute for Security Studies Security and Defence Editor, underlines “The EU and its member states will find it increasingly difficult to sustain the rules-based order and the Union’s own economic prosperity without a sizeable and consistent investment in maritime power.”
Therefore, in the process of reaching such a goal, it is worth considering whether the EU could learn something from the organization of NATO’s maritime forces, in order to provide a stronger and more cohesive approach to European maritime security.
Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), based in Northwood, currently controls NATO’s Standing Naval Forces. Such a body is responsible for different groups: Standing Maritime Groups 1 & 2 and Standing Mine Countermeasures Groups 1 & 2. With them operating across numerous regions, the alliance ensures a permanent presence across its main areas of interest, through the participation of most of its members’ naval forces. This distribution, however, is descendant from previous configurations which were focused on the different maritime theaters rather than having the current unified approach. But the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decrease in international tensions brought about “the demise of the very concept of separate maritime theaters of operation, in both the US command structure and that of the NATO alliance,” indicates Peter M. Swartz writing for The Center for Naval Analyses. In spite of this, both past and present configurations offer the EU a model to imitate.
Pushing for the transformation of the current EUROMARFOR (which is a non-standing force) into a similar model would evidently present some major challenges for the EU, but NATO’s example has shown that permanent and regionalized task forces provide durable results. As pointed out by Dr. Joshua Tallis, a research scientist and political-military analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, “the forcing function of scoping can breed excellence through concision.” This is as true for NATO as it could be for the EU, especially considering the EUMSS’ recent update discusses the intention of “organizing naval exercises at the EU level” and “designating new maritime areas of interests for the implementation of the Coordinated Maritime Presences concept.”
Yet there is a dual burden in the pursuit of such a project. First, political agreement among all 27 member states is something rare, often translating in very little room for common agreement regarding any aspect of the EU’s Common Security & Defense Policy (CSDP). And second, any proposal calling for an increase in national military spending is usually met with significant skepticism on whether it will bring tangible results for them. Following NATO’s model would undoubtedly come at a cost, but still, the case could be made for the establishment of an “EU Standing Naval Force” (EUSNF) divided according to the different regions of the European maritime environment: a “EUSNF Baltic,” “EUSNF Atlantic,” and “EUSNF Mediterranean” (for this last one, perhaps, one group would cover the Western Mediterranean region and another would cover the Eastern and Black Sea regions).
The Spanish, Italian, and French navies could provide stronger presence across the Western and central Mediterranean with their frigates and destroyers, while their Greek, Bulgarian, and Romanian counterparts could better adapt to the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean areas. In the Atlantic, Portugal, France, Belgium, and Germany could do the same, even working alongside the Royal Navy in the English Channel. As for the Baltic, Danish, Polish, and German navies, they could provide a strong presence with their bigger frigates. The Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, and Swedish navies, with their Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), minehunters, and Fast Attack Craft, would enhance coastal security and provide better surveillance capabilities for all undersea critical infrastructure in the region. Sweden’s upcoming Blekinge-class of submarines, for example, will be a firm contribution for such mission.
Each force could be under the authority of a regional command, jointly handled by the countries in each group, and with all of them controlled by a committee similar in nature to the current “High Level Inter-Ministerial Committee” of EUROMARFOR. A force with such a scheme would, first and foremost, help strengthen European deterrence efforts, something of paramount importance in the current context and achievable only with “the man on the scene with the gun.” Permanent presence that lets all potential adversaries know that, should they attempt anything against a European Member State, they will most likely fail. But more importantly, it would also help countering political skepticism towards increases in military spending. As Tallis argues for NATO, “scoped missions tailored to geography would help alleviate the evergreen concern among national leaders of their forces being used for reasons beyond their approval.” The same principle could also apply for the EU; and besides, European nations could be even more disposed to it by finding a common purpose – something in the line of deterring Russia and other potential foes from making a move against any of them.
In short, the time has come for the EU to boost its naval capabilities and maritime presence across its territorial waters. NATO’s example of maritime presence throughout its history offers a way forward and a model of stable cooperation to be followed in the years to come. Obviously, the main obstacle for any project of such nature and size to materialize will always be finding common grounds for agreement among all 27 member states; although Russian hostilities and the wider threat they pose for European maritime security in general will certainly be of much help. The permanent and regionalized presence of the proposed EU Standing Naval Forces (or any similar structure devised) would certainly lead to a better leverage of each navy´s assets, while also favoring the strengthening of the EU’s maritime presence and the ability to protect its maritime areas of interest.
Gonzalo Vázquez graduated from the University of Navarre in Spain where he studied international relations. He has contributed to the Australian Naval Review, the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Arctic Institute.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.