Shifting Warfare Paradigms: Establishing Effective Targeting Strategies in the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain​

By Andrew I. Park | LT Morgan Thomas

Washington must clarify its definition of what constitutes a combatant in the Indo-Pacific maritime theater and must acquire an integrated system to detect anomalies to effectively counter escalating threats, such as the People’s Republic of China’s (“PRC”) illegal development of long-range cruise missiles that can be launched from a civilian container vessel. Prominent American adversaries, primarily PRC, persistently leverage irregular warfare tactics in the information and cyber realms. This strategic maneuvering, centered on plausible deniability and flexibility, aims to undermine American conventional security forces without escalating to overt armed conflict. Such strategies are often categorized as “gray zone” tactics, powered by a “whole of government” war machine. Yet, there remains a significant lack of clarification and integration of an effective targeting methodology for combatants in the maritime domain within this contemporary security landscape. This need becomes even more pressing when considering how this definition may evolve during times of conflict.

In particular, the PRC utilizes a range of state-sponsored entities and civilians as intermediate forces. These elements are active within Chinese littoral regions and international waters, exerting influence often without the necessity for physical presence to achieve substantial effects in the maritime arena. This strategy enables the PRC to inconspicuously prepare the operational environment while simultaneously exposing potential weaknesses within U.S. and allied communication and logistics networks.

Blurring the Line between Civil and Military Activities in Maritime Domain

Several instances of ambiguity in the PRC’s combatant classification can be observed in the physical maritime domain. This primarily manifests through the integration of civil-maritime platforms, including fishing vessel fleets, sand-dredgers, and container ships, into large-scale naval exercises. These platforms are utilized for strategic purposes, such as engaging in contentious and “coercive and risky” territorial disputes. Recently, PRC has begun to experiment with modifying roll-on, roll-off (“RO-ROs”) vessels to enable them to launch armed amphibious vehicles, lending further support to amphibious operations. Transforming civilian ships into concealed naval combatants is not only illegal, but it also further blurs the already delicate boundary distinguished between civilian and military maritime vessels.

PRC’s reliance on scientific research institutions for the development of dual-use maritime equipment, along with unmanned maritime sensors and systems, has significantly enhanced its maritime domain awareness. This enables effective data relay back to shore-based processing centers. Moreover, the supply chains linked with these vessels, sensors, and infrastructure substantially augment PRC’s ability to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (“ISR”) activities, granting them a significant decision-making advantage. The dispersed nature of combatants, whether present in the physical maritime domain or influencing the maritime information sphere from a distance, raises the complex question of how to optimally prioritize the target network.

Russia has also been strategically utilizing dual-use maritime capabilities to obscure its intentions and activities in the maritime domain. The Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research of the Russian Ministry of Defense, known as Glavnoye Upravlenie Glubokovodnykh Issledovannii (“GUGI”), employs what it calls “special purpose ships” to carry out clandestine underwater operations in several maritime territories, including the Persian Gulf and the Atlantic Ocean. Masking their actions as “oceanographic research,” GUGI has been gathering intelligence on crucial undersea infrastructures, such as cable networks. It is important to highlight, however, the existence of a further layer of complexity. The Russian Navy’s Intelligence Directorate also possesses its own assets for performing similar operations, which generates uncertainty in assigning responsibility for attacks and contributes to the difficulty of constructing effective counter-strategies.

Define What constitutes a “Combatant”

Given the rapidly evolving nature of warfare, it becomes indispensable for institutions like the Department of Defense (“DoD”) and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to expand their definitions of a “combatant,” in anticipation of a crisis or conflict. This issue becomes increasingly significant considering the role of critical port infrastructures and supply chains – critical components for forward power projection – that intersect with the maritime domain. Consequently, DoD and DHS need to broaden their focus to incorporate a wider array of actors, including those involved with emerging communication and detection technologies.

In today’s world, where technology and maritime systems are becoming more intertwined due to the Internet of Things (“IoT”), it is essential to extend the definition of “combatant” to include those involved in dual-use technology and cyber activities. These actors might strategically prepare the ground to potentially obstruct U.S. and allied maritime operations within the area of responsibility of the Indo-Pacific Command.

Integrated Deterrence through Integrated Anomaly Detection

Integrated deterrence in the maritime arena necessitates a network-oriented approach to targeting, underpinned by machine learning and rich data streams. DoD should initiate comprehensive public-private partnerships with emerging tech companies to devise a targeting solution capable of detecting anomalous behavior patterns and suspicious maritime activity. Concentrating on the maritime domain nexus will yield valuable insights into adversaries’ command-and-control strategies, techniques, and procedures as informed by their strategic doctrine.

Achieving this objective could begin with government departments, agencies, and tech companies collaboratively developing an integrated anomaly detection model. This model would primarily focus on civil-maritime vessels that support military operations or engage in illicit activities. Existing automated identification system (“AIS”) anomaly detection models – which currently aid in identifying piracy and illegal fishing activity, thus enhancing Indo-Pacific maritime security – could be utilized as a starting point.

This solution could foster a relational comprehension of recognized threat actors, their command structures, and their strategic operational intents. Furthermore, joint-doctrine should incorporate irregular maritime tactics, techniques, and procedures (“TTPs”) to refine the machine learning and data-driven anomaly model. For instance, the newly established Fleet Information Warfare Command Pacific (“FIWCPAC”) could use this data to counter the PRC’s malign influence through tailored non-lethal capabilities, such as information and cyber operations (“IO/CO”). The provision of Blue open-source intelligence (“OSINT”) and shareable enriched data would also promote partner capacity building, thereby managing the vast and complex targeting environment.

Implement the Whole of Government Approach

The Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability (“JWCC”), an ambitious $9 billion endeavor succeeding the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (“JEDI”) project, embodies the concept of a “war cloud.” Its objective is to facilitate efficient data processing and establish interconnectivity across various military domains, including land, air, sea, space, and cyber. Following years of intense competition and protracted inter-agency deliberations, the DoD awarded Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Oracle to implement this contract by 2028.

To prevent the administrative and legal complications that beset the war cloud contract selection processes, Congress should create a dedicated task force responsible for validating the budgetary provisions for the contract and fostering interagency cooperation among the DoD, DHS, and Government Accountability Office (“GAO”). Under Congress’s guidance, the federal government can instigate a streamlined contract and bidding process. This will enable effective collaboration with the private sector, accelerating the procurement and deployment of essential capabilities, such as the anomaly detection model for maritime domains.

Out at sea, the operational model of the Joint Interagency Task Force (“JIATF”) South could serve as a prototype. In 1989, the DoD established the JIATF to support law enforcement and the government’s broader efforts to disrupt drug trafficking in the Caribbean. The JIATF has since transformed into a multi-service, multi-agency task force, operating under the Southern Command and headed by a Coast Guard Flag Officer. Similarly, it is critical for Washington to form a JIATF under the command of the INDOPACOM and other combatant commands. This would facilitate inter-service and inter-agency operations, providing the necessary adaptation and countermeasures to the swiftly changing nature of irregular warfare strategies employed by PRC and Russia.

To effectively confront and compete against PRC and Russia, which is steadily perfecting a “whole of government” approach, the U.S. national security apparatus must act swiftly and implement a whole of government approach, as well. Developing the ability to process and distribute finished intelligence derived from massive datasets to action officers under a JIATF model will demand considerable time and resources. Hence, Washington must promptly initiate public-private sector collaborations to address this issue.

 

Andrew I. Park is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy. Also, he serves as a reserve Intelligence Officer of the U.S. Navy and Associate Research Analyst at the CNA. He previously served as a translator/interpreter at the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command / U.S. Forces Korea (CFC/USFK. He holds M.A. in Asian Studies from the Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and B.A. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

LT Morgan Thomas is an active-duty Naval Officer with multiple deployments supporting Joint SOF in the INDOPACOM AO as a Cross-Strait SME. He is currently in a Department of Commerce Technology Fellowship with Thomson Reuters Special Services DoD Team. He holds an M.A. in Political Science from the University of British Columbia and a B.A. in History and Chinese Language from Christopher Newport University. He was also a Fulbright Scholar in Taiwan.

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The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.