Ukrainian missile and drone attacks are continuing to wear down the Russian Black Sea fleet’s capability and capacity. The most recent missile attack on Sevastopol, the Black Sea Fleet’s home port, heavily damaged the amphibious ship Minsk, and more importantly, one of the Fleet’s Kilo-class diesel electric submarines Rostov-on-Don, capable of launching Kaliber cruise missiles that have caused so much damage to Ukrainian military and civilian targets. Again, the Black Sea Fleet flagship frigate Admiral Makarov was reported among the casualties, but as of yet, no evidence has emerged confirming this. Anglo-French Storm Shadow missiles are reported as the primary weapon in the attack, perhaps the first Anglo-French weapons to hit Sevastopol since the Crimean War of the 1850s.
Figure 1. What (appears to be) the heavily damaged Russian amphibious ship Minsk in dock from the September 11, 2023 missile attack on Sevastopol naval base. Photo from Sky News.
More recently, Ukrainian cruise missile attacks destroyed the Black Sea Fleet Headquarters building in Sevastopol on September 22, 2023 with potential heavy casualties although Fleet commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov, first listed among the casualties appears to have survived. These attacks clearly show excellent, operational intelligence by Ukraine at work and showcase the accuracy of the weapons being provided by Western nations to the embattled Ukrainian state.
Figure 2. Black Sea Fleet Headquarters in Sevastopol afire on September 22, 2023. Photo from NBC News.
The Black Sea Fleet’s performance in the Ukraine war, so far, appears as dismal as that of the rest of the Russian military. Its large surface ships appear to rarely venture into active combat zones because Ukraine missiles, such as those that sank the guided missile cruiser Moskva, have given the Ukrainians sea denial against Russian surface forces within the missile engagement envelope. Despite reinforcements sent to the Black Sea just before the beginning of the Russian invasion, the Black Sea fleet’s amphibious force has not been employed to land troops and has, instead, been heavily damaged by Ukrainian drone and missile attacks.
Despite these setbacks, however, Russia’s Black Sea submarine fleet has remained unscathed until this week, and even then, the attack only succeeded as the Russian sub was reportedly drydocked. Ukraine, and for that matter the NATO states in the region other than Turkey, have few antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Diesel electric submarines like the Kilo-class are very quiet and hard to detect and track. Ukraine is succeeding in its sea denial campaign against the Black Sea Fleet, even to the point of threatening Novorossiysk with drone strikes. Yet Russian Kilo-class submarines remain unimpeded at sea, and Russia retains a “fleet in being” centered on its larger and more capable surface units including frigates and corvettes, especially those that can support the Kaliber cruise missile. Ukraine has been very successful in attacking the Russian Black Sea Fleet and depriving it of operational initiative, but the Russian’s retain a significant advantage in undersea warfare for which Ukraine as yet has no countermeasure.
The Dismal Black Sea Fleet Combat Record continues
Figure 3. Russian tank landing ship clearly illuminated for Ukrainian attack. Photo from Business Insider.
Much like the rest of the Russian armed forces, the Black Sea Fleet’s surface force has not performed to expectations during the Russia-Ukraine War. Following the loss of its only dedicated air and missile defense ship, the cruiser Moskva in April 2022 at the war’s outset, Russian surface forces have rarely ventured into Ukrainian littoral waters, and only to conduct short missile attacks or raids.
The Black Sea Fleet’s reinforced amphibious force, that boasted nine tank landing ships capable of landing two naval infantry battalions and supporting vehicles, has been significantly reduced by combat casualties with at least three of these vessels out of action due to drone and missile attacks. The latest of these being the Ropucha-class amphib Minsk-class that appears to have suffered heavy damage while docked in Sevastopol in the most recent September 2023 Storm Shadow missile attack on Russian port facilities. The Russians never mounted a major amphibious operation in the Ukraine invasion, and the Black Sea Fleet’s naval infantry force, the 810 Guards Naval Infantry brigade, was reported to have suffered heavy losses as employed as a conventional infantry formation in 2022. Any meaningful Russian amphibious operation seems out of the question for the duration of the war, given these ship and trained naval infantry losses.
The Black Sea Fleet’s combat record, going back to the Crimean War, has never been stellar. More of its ships have been scuttled at their moorings than lost in combat. The Russia-Ukraine War continues the poor performance of the Russian surface fleet, against an almost non-existent Ukraine naval force with more of its assets in shore-based missiles and suicide drones than in conventional ships. While many have suggested this is a case of a revolution in naval warfare, it is more likely the product of complacency and lack of Russian effort to win.
The Moskva went to sea with many of its air and missile systems inoperative, and many video feeds from uncrewed Ukraine drone attacks show brightly-lighted ships at anchor with no lookouts in sight just before weapon impact. This lack of attention to basic levels of preparedness is the cause for many Russian naval casualties. Some of its surface ships have, however, repelled drone attacks at sea, suggesting that if prepared, that the Russian surface fleet can defeat drone attacks with small arms fire and other weapons.
Submarines Remain the Greatest Threat
Figure 4. Russian Kilo-class submarine loading a Kaliber Cruise Missile. Photo from Navy Recognition.
Figure 5. Photo purporting to show cruise missile damage inflicted on Russian Kilo-class Submarine Rostov on Don. Photo from UK Defence Journal.
While one Russian Kilo-class submarine was damaged in dock in the most recent Ukraine missile attack on Sevastopol, four other Kilo-class boats remain in the Black Sea Fleet inventory, with each likely capable of four Kaliber-class cruise missiles. As of yet, Ukraine does not posses an anti-submarine warfare (“ASW”) capability. Other than Turkey, the other NATO member states bordering the Black Sea (Romania and Bulgaria) are equally bereft of modern ASW capability. Ukraine sea denial efforts remain limited to Russian surface and air platforms. Sea control in the Black Sea will remain “up for grabs” until these conditions change and Russian submarines can be threatened at sea.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
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Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
Ukrainian missile and drone attacks are continuing to wear down the Russian Black Sea fleet’s capability and capacity. The most recent missile attack on Sevastopol, the Black Sea Fleet’s home port, heavily damaged the amphibious ship Minsk, and more importantly, one of the Fleet’s Kilo-class diesel electric submarines Rostov-on-Don, capable of launching Kaliber cruise missiles that have caused so much damage to Ukrainian military and civilian targets. Again, the Black Sea Fleet flagship frigate Admiral Makarov was reported among the casualties, but as of yet, no evidence has emerged confirming this. Anglo-French Storm Shadow missiles are reported as the primary weapon in the attack, perhaps the first Anglo-French weapons to hit Sevastopol since the Crimean War of the 1850s.
Figure 1. What (appears to be) the heavily damaged Russian amphibious ship Minsk in dock from the September 11, 2023 missile attack on Sevastopol naval base. Photo from Sky News.
More recently, Ukrainian cruise missile attacks destroyed the Black Sea Fleet Headquarters building in Sevastopol on September 22, 2023 with potential heavy casualties although Fleet commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov, first listed among the casualties appears to have survived. These attacks clearly show excellent, operational intelligence by Ukraine at work and showcase the accuracy of the weapons being provided by Western nations to the embattled Ukrainian state.
Figure 2. Black Sea Fleet Headquarters in Sevastopol afire on September 22, 2023. Photo from NBC News.
The Black Sea Fleet’s performance in the Ukraine war, so far, appears as dismal as that of the rest of the Russian military. Its large surface ships appear to rarely venture into active combat zones because Ukraine missiles, such as those that sank the guided missile cruiser Moskva, have given the Ukrainians sea denial against Russian surface forces within the missile engagement envelope. Despite reinforcements sent to the Black Sea just before the beginning of the Russian invasion, the Black Sea fleet’s amphibious force has not been employed to land troops and has, instead, been heavily damaged by Ukrainian drone and missile attacks.
Despite these setbacks, however, Russia’s Black Sea submarine fleet has remained unscathed until this week, and even then, the attack only succeeded as the Russian sub was reportedly drydocked. Ukraine, and for that matter the NATO states in the region other than Turkey, have few antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Diesel electric submarines like the Kilo-class are very quiet and hard to detect and track. Ukraine is succeeding in its sea denial campaign against the Black Sea Fleet, even to the point of threatening Novorossiysk with drone strikes. Yet Russian Kilo-class submarines remain unimpeded at sea, and Russia retains a “fleet in being” centered on its larger and more capable surface units including frigates and corvettes, especially those that can support the Kaliber cruise missile. Ukraine has been very successful in attacking the Russian Black Sea Fleet and depriving it of operational initiative, but the Russian’s retain a significant advantage in undersea warfare for which Ukraine as yet has no countermeasure.
The Dismal Black Sea Fleet Combat Record continues
Figure 3. Russian tank landing ship clearly illuminated for Ukrainian attack. Photo from Business Insider.
Much like the rest of the Russian armed forces, the Black Sea Fleet’s surface force has not performed to expectations during the Russia-Ukraine War. Following the loss of its only dedicated air and missile defense ship, the cruiser Moskva in April 2022 at the war’s outset, Russian surface forces have rarely ventured into Ukrainian littoral waters, and only to conduct short missile attacks or raids.
The Black Sea Fleet’s reinforced amphibious force, that boasted nine tank landing ships capable of landing two naval infantry battalions and supporting vehicles, has been significantly reduced by combat casualties with at least three of these vessels out of action due to drone and missile attacks. The latest of these being the Ropucha-class amphib Minsk-class that appears to have suffered heavy damage while docked in Sevastopol in the most recent September 2023 Storm Shadow missile attack on Russian port facilities. The Russians never mounted a major amphibious operation in the Ukraine invasion, and the Black Sea Fleet’s naval infantry force, the 810 Guards Naval Infantry brigade, was reported to have suffered heavy losses as employed as a conventional infantry formation in 2022. Any meaningful Russian amphibious operation seems out of the question for the duration of the war, given these ship and trained naval infantry losses.
The Black Sea Fleet’s combat record, going back to the Crimean War, has never been stellar. More of its ships have been scuttled at their moorings than lost in combat. The Russia-Ukraine War continues the poor performance of the Russian surface fleet, against an almost non-existent Ukraine naval force with more of its assets in shore-based missiles and suicide drones than in conventional ships. While many have suggested this is a case of a revolution in naval warfare, it is more likely the product of complacency and lack of Russian effort to win.
The Moskva went to sea with many of its air and missile systems inoperative, and many video feeds from uncrewed Ukraine drone attacks show brightly-lighted ships at anchor with no lookouts in sight just before weapon impact. This lack of attention to basic levels of preparedness is the cause for many Russian naval casualties. Some of its surface ships have, however, repelled drone attacks at sea, suggesting that if prepared, that the Russian surface fleet can defeat drone attacks with small arms fire and other weapons.
Submarines Remain the Greatest Threat
Figure 4. Russian Kilo-class submarine loading a Kaliber Cruise Missile. Photo from Navy Recognition.
Figure 5. Photo purporting to show cruise missile damage inflicted on Russian Kilo-class Submarine Rostov on Don. Photo from UK Defence Journal.
While one Russian Kilo-class submarine was damaged in dock in the most recent Ukraine missile attack on Sevastopol, four other Kilo-class boats remain in the Black Sea Fleet inventory, with each likely capable of four Kaliber-class cruise missiles. As of yet, Ukraine does not posses an anti-submarine warfare (“ASW”) capability. Other than Turkey, the other NATO member states bordering the Black Sea (Romania and Bulgaria) are equally bereft of modern ASW capability. Ukraine sea denial efforts remain limited to Russian surface and air platforms. Sea control in the Black Sea will remain “up for grabs” until these conditions change and Russian submarines can be threatened at sea.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.