Why Sevastopol is Important to the Russian Black Sea Fleet​

The MOC

By Dr. Steven Wills

As the potential for naval conflict in the Black Sea looms larger than in past months, it is necessary to know some of the history of past naval conflicts in that maritime space and the centrality of Sevastopol to any Russian naval effort in the Black Sea region. Despite being captured by foreign powers multiple times since the 19th century, Sevastopol has remained central to the Russian strategic position in the Black Sea region since its founding as the Black Sea fleet base in 1783. The Black Sea has been a testing zone for mine and torpedo warfare as well as elements of blockade and littoral operations. Its waters are littered with the underwater weapons of four wars that have endangered shipping for a century or more after they were first deployed. Now, the Black Sea is the principal battle laboratory for maritime unmanned systems. In every conflict Russia has fought in the region since the 1780s, it has always fought to retain its Sevastopol base. Given its history, the Russians will not likely give up this strategic location without a tough fight.

 Russians verses the Turks: An Ongoing Black Sea Feud

Figure 1. Crimean War-era Russian forts guarding Sevastapol. Photo from James Robertson, courtesy of Russian State Archives of Film and Photo Documents.

Between the 19th and 20th centuries, the Black Sea was a battlespace for many global powers, and Crimea was essential for naval operations. Several centuries of fighting between the Russian and Turkish states culminated in the 1855-1857 Crimean War and the 1914-1918 World War. In the Crimean War, Britain and France came the aid of the Ottoman Turkish Empire, aptly named “The Sick Man of Europe,” when it was believed that the Turks (then fighting the Russians) would collapse and allow the Russians to capture the capital of Constantinople (later “Istanbul”). The Crimea was central to Anglo-French operations in the Black Sea.

Hostilities in November 1853 included naval innovation. The Russians employed shell guns for the first time in a major battle, destroying dozens of Turkish wooden ships and killing three thousand Turkish sailors at a cost of just 37 Russian sailors killed. The British and French also employed ironclad warships for the first time against the Sevastopol fortifications. The Russian fleet fled at the advance of the Anglo-French fleet, became bottled up in its base of Sevastopol, and was ultimately destroyed by shore and sea bombardment after a siege of 337 days. The British and French also employed ironclad warships for the first time against the Sevastopol fortifications. The Russian Black Sea Fleet and its base was wrecked for a generation. Peace terms in February 1856 were light, but the cost to Russian influence in the region was heavy, as Russia had to hand back areas of Turkish territory it had previously captured. Even then, naval warfare in the Black Sea was executed with innovative techniques by great powers.

World War I

Figure 2.  Sevastopol 1918 Naval Base. Photo from Wikimedia Commons.

World War I brought more fighting, mutiny, and new naval developments to the Black Sea. World War I saw a repeat of the Russo-Turkish fight — this time with Britain and France on Russia’s side verses the Ottoman Empire supported by Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Just before the 1914 conflict, the Russian battleship Potemkin was the subject of a famous 1905 mutiny and helped to kick off the abortive Russian Revolution that same year. New naval developments again appeared in the Black Sea, primarily from the Russians. Both sides laid mines in large numbers. These, in some cases, remain a threat to shipping in the 21st century. The Russians found a way to integrate multiple ships’ gunnery in an early radio-based link, a system that succeeded in driving off the better-armed German battlecruiser Goeben at the battle of Cape Sarych in 2015.

Problems including disintegrating conditions in Russia, the rise of the Bolsheviks, and the advance of Central Powers’ armies were compounded by the familiar problem of Russia being unable to export Ukrainian grain. Therefore, Russia was unable to fund its war effort which removed it from World War 1 in the 1917 Treaty of Brest Litovsk. Sevastopol was occupied by German forces in May 1918 but again returned to Russian/Soviet control in November 1918. The Russian Black Sea fleet again suffered an ignominious end, with most of its units scuttled in port or interned overseas in a ghost fleet in Bizerte manned by White Russian rebels for another decade after the war. Numerous foreign warships operated in the Black Sea between 1919-1921, evacuating civilians. Some American destroyers briefly operated out of Novorossiysk in March 1920 as part of a noncombatant evacuation operation of civilians displaced by the Russian Civil War. As was the case in the Crimean War Russia regained control of Sevastopol, but the Black Sea fleet again ended the war in ruined condition.

World War II and Beyond

Figure 3. Capsized Russian Battleship Novorossiysk. Photo from wwiiafterwwii.

The Black Sea again became a battle ground in World War II. This time, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet decamped to ports like Novorossiysk and others in the eastern Black Sea rather than risk destruction defending Sevastopol. German airpower caused severe losses, however, to those Black Sea fleet units that did attempt to defend Sevastopol. The port city again fell after another horrific siege that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and Black Sea Fleet sailors. The Soviets recaptured Sevastopol in 1944, and after the war, it resumed its position as the Black Sea Fleet base. Mines from World War I and later still menaced the Black Sea. The Soviet battleship Novorossiysk (former Italian battleship Guilio Ceasare) hit a Russian or German World War II-era mine outside Sevastopol on the night of October 28, 1955 and sank with the loss of over 600 Soviet sailors.

Figure 4. Cruiser Moskva Sinking April 14, 2022. Photo from NBC News.

Russia began leasing the Sevastopol base following the end of the Cold War and breakup of the Soviet Union. The loss of wider influence in the wake of the Soviet breakup and President Putin’s desire to re-establish it is perhaps one of the reasons that Russia forcibly annexed  Sevastopol and the rest of Crimea from Ukraine in February and March 2014. Sevastopol was one of the launching points for the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and also was the base of the ill-fated Russian cruiser Moskva sunk on April 14, 2022, by Ukrainian Neptune cruise missiles. Since her loss, Russian Black Sea Fleet warships have again been forced on the defensive due to the threat of more missile attacks and persistent attacks on Black Sea Fleet ships by Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels. Sevastopol is again “under siege,” but this time, from the threat of unmanned attacks again forcing all but the Black Sea fleet submarine force to retreat to more secure ports like Novorossiyk. Even that port has proven less than safe as the Russian amphibious ship Olenegorsky Gornyak was attacked and severely damaged near Novorossiyk on August 3 by Ukrainian drones. While subsequent Russian naval losses have not been as significant as Moskva, the Black Sea Fleet has again been dislodged from its main base and has been forced to seek shelter elsewhere in the region — and even then is not immune from attack.

Figure 5. Damaged Russian Amphibious ship enters Novorossiyk on August 4. Photo from Covert Shores.

The Russo-Ukraine Naval War into 2024

Figure 6. Sevastopol November 2022. Photo from USNI.

The recent collapse of the United Nations Black Sea Grain Initiative, to allow for Ukrainian grain to leave the Black Sea, plus Russian threats to commercial shipping throughout the Black Sea call into question the ability of the Black Sea fleet to interdict those shipments under the threat of Ukraine cruise missile attack. The Black Sea Fleet lacks a dedicated air defense ship after Moskva’s loss. Any such operation would have to be supported from Sevastopol, since it is the closest Russian naval base to Ukraine’s grain transit route. Only the Russian Black Sea Kilo-class submarine force of six boats can threaten grain shipments without fear of Ukrainian response. Undoubtedly, the base at Sevastopol would still play a key role in supporting any submarine campaign against those shipments. Sevastopol has been a Russian naval base longer than the United States has been a country, and dislodging the Russians from this part of Crimea will no doubt be very difficult — even in the face of significant Ukrainian successes.

 

Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.