Replicator will Sink or Swim with the US Navy in 2024​

By Bill Rivers

To deter China, the initiative to scale autonomous systems must put to sea with a coherent strategy, procurement, and funding.

Twenty months. The upper limit of time remaining for the U.S. military to make good on Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks’s commitment to field “attritable autonomous systems at scale of multiple thousands, in multiple domains” to check the PRC. Formally unveiled last August, the Replicator initiative was further defined by Hicks in September and its potential permutations within DoD have been the subject of much thoughtful commentary since (see the Brookings Institution’s assessment of what Replicator means for Army modernization). But looking ahead, the most urgent – and consequential – expression of the initiative lies with the naval service.

Replicator’s stated purpose is to “overcome the PRC’s advantage in mass: more ships, more missiles, more forces.” Geography and decades of A2AD investments by the PLA have concentrated much of that mass in the South China Sea, where China’s land-based missiles (like the DF-21D “carrier killer”), home-based fifth-generation fighters (which will hold a 3:2 numerical advantage over the U.S. by 2025), and astonishing growth in surface and undersea assets (including submarines), have transformed the sea into Beijing’s kill box. For Replicator to be successful, then, its autonomous systems and assets must be brought to bear in these 1.4 million square miles of water, which means Replicator will sink or swim to the degree it successfully integrates with the U.S. Navy over the next twelve months.

How the Navy can best operationalize the emergent and pre-existing industry solutions that Replicator aims to accelerate is a question of incredible dimensions, but brilliance is still in the basics. Replicator and the Navy can deliver for each other if they are guided by a sharply defined strategy, coherent procurement authority, and consistent funding.

Navy leaders should weave Replicator into their strategy, not their strategy into Replicator.

Replicator is a high-profile, no-fail initiative with top cover at the highest levels of DoD. The pressure to align with commander’s intent is strong – justifiably so given the potential ROI for national security and the consequences for failure. But for the Navy – and for every service – that pressure should not distort a focus on the objective of deterring or winning a fight with the PRC in or around the Sea China Sea.

Rather than assessing how much of which systems the Navy can get within budget constraints (see below) to meet the goal of fielding “multiple thousands” of autonomous systems within the next 20 months, leaders should remain relentlessly focused on the capabilities they need to deter China – say from an attack against Taiwan or other vital U.S. national interests in the Indo-Pacific – and pursue Replicator-related systems accordingly.

For the Navy, the right mix of autonomous systems is one that most deters PLA aggression. UAVs or UUVs, short or long-range, deep or shallow water assets, deployable from surface ships or aircraft – whatever the mix, it should keep this priority paramount. They should also integrate with the fleet as it currently exists, not as planners or politicians wish it to be.

It is also worth emphasizing that the strategy determining these acquisitions should not attempt to do everything or else it is no strategy at all. Navy leaders, civilian and military, must identify, at least internally, where they will accept risk and what tradeoffs are warranted. This means those same leaders will have to say ‘no’ to some Replicator offerings which, though they may hold great promise, do not support the strategy. This may well require personal and career courage, but it is essential to the success of both Replicator and the Navy overall.

In defending hard choices, the best standard is the one Hicks herself offered: the core mission for these “all-domain, attritable autonomous systems,” is to counter “the challenge of anti-access, area-denial systems. Our ADA2 to thwart their A2AD.”

Coherent procurement authority means fast fixes are allowed.

Once the right mix has been identified, Navy leaders should harness Replicator’s top cover to further reduce – or outright waive – the red tape slowing its delivery. Here Navy leaders are likely to be pushing on an open door.

In her September follow-on remarks, Hicks hailed a history of “procurement, production and process innovations” that delivered for America’s warfighters from World War II up to the post-9/11 wars. But the history goes much deeper, and the Navy should feel confident knowing such innovation is in keeping with its oldest traditions.

During the War of 1812, for example, self-taught shipbuilder brothers Noah and Adam Brown enabled just-in-time delivery of the brigs used by Oliver Hazard Perry to defeat the British on Lake Erie. Fifty years later, General Grant’s earliest victories were made possible by privately owned, first-of-their-kind ironclads on the Tennessee River – at the time still the property of their inventor, St. Louis entrepreneur James Eads. If naval warfighters back then could buck protocol and deliver needed assets fast, so can today’s commanders if they understand the most critical process innovations occur between their ears.

A more recent example exists in the contrast between NASA and SpaceX. Launching its Falcon 9 rocket in 2010, SpaceX found cracks in the rocket’s engine skirt. Standard NASA procedure would have replaced the engine and delayed launch for weeks. Elon Musk’s team instead trimmed a few inches off the skirt and launched successfully within 24 hours.

Navy leaders and industry partners should recognize the urgency of 2024 vis-à-vis the PRC and trim equivalent skirts accordingly.

Surprise, surprise – consistent funding is key but not guaranteed.

In September, Hicks made clear where funding for Replicator would come from:

Replicator is not a new program of record. We’re not creating a new bureaucracy. And we will not be asking for new money in FY24. Not all problems need new money; we are problem-solvers, and we intend to self-solve. So, Replicator will use existing funding, existing programming lines, and existing authorities to accelerate production and delivery at scale — by exerting leadership focus and attention on a singular operational challenge and maturing solutions, because that’s what ultimately delivers.

Continuance of existing funding levels for DoD is a necessary but not sufficient condition for both Replicator and the Navy, yet neither can count on those levels remaining steady. DoD faces not just competing governmental priorities, but also diverging political tectonic plates. Better for uniformed leaders to recognize the divide and work within it where they can. Here, both the Navy and Replicator can aid their case by delivering results for less cost at speed over the next twelve months.

Early wins

In at least one key respect, Replicator is already a success: it has reinforced to DoD, Congress, and industry that the PRC is the pacing threat by acknowledging, as Hicks did, “the PRC’s asymmetric advantage in weapons capability and overwhelming numbers in all domains.” Industry is also moving to meet the demand signal. Twenty months from now, the department will be further down the path of posturing itself to better deter that threat.

This is significant, and all involved deserve much credit for it.

Speed is key, as it ever is, but there is time enough for the Navy to get Replicator right. Scaling autonomous systems on the back of a clear strategy with coherent procurement can deliver a sharper deterrent edge faster, which can unlock greater funding certainty going forward.

The next twelve months are crucial.

Bill Rivers is a fellow at the Yorktown Institute and the bestselling author of the Vietnam War era novel “Last Summer Boys. He was speechwriter to U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis from 2017-19.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.