Reflecting on One Year of War: The Power of Open-Source Intelligence​

By H.I. Sutton

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is rapidly evolving the ways navies’ movements are exposed to the enemy. And Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the first major war of the OSINT age.

OSINT itself is not new. But the ways in which it permeates the conflict and grips the world’s attention is. It is creating new opportunities and bringing new challenges. One facet of it is that, unlike most traditional forms of intelligence, it is widely accessible to the general public. Anyone with an internet connection can partake, wittingly or unwittingly, and as a source or an analyst.

Like it or not, the democratization of intelligence will surely shape warfare. We can argue that it already has.

To a large part, this is playing out to Ukraine’s advantage. But OSINT itself cuts both ways and the Russians too will benefit. A loose self-identifying OSINT community has grown up online. Naturally, these OSINT watchers are a mixed bag of skills, motivations, and attitudes. They generate a lot of noise, some nuisance for military planners and, in some cases, adds value. Professionals will be quick to point out that a lot of the so-called OSINT online is either not open source, or not intelligence. Be that as it may, a lot is. And the arguments about definitions might be moot. The proliferation of OSINT expertise is a new reality.

At the value-adding end of the spectrum it can help inform media articles which in turn shapes public awareness and opinion. This can include showing the buildup before the invasion as well as documenting and proving war crimes and showing damage to key targets after reported strikes.

It would not be proper to detail some of the aspects of this game at this time. There is no causation between how easy information is to acquire and its intelligence value. So, some sources, even obvious or easily accessible ones, need to be protected. But some examples can be explored to illustrate the wider points.

In the weeks and days before the sinking of the SLAVA class cruiser Moskva on April 13-14, OSINT showed the general operating patterns and locations of the warship. These sources included, but were not limited to, satellite images published by the European Space Agency (ESA). Their Sentinel 1 SAR (synthetic aperture radar) and Sentinel 2 imagery satellites have proven useful despite their limitations. Crucially, anyone can view them and find a warship or trench network of interest. Anyone can study Sevastopol harbor and spot dolphin pens or changes to boom defenses.

Open-source satellite imagery from Sentinel, Landsat and so on is often blended with commercial imagery. This is so prevalent online that the distinction has become blurred. And the commercial imagery is usually better quality allowing more detailed observations. People who had only a passing interest in naval matters before the war are now identifying Russian warships in ports and regularly publishing the results.

Another popular form of OSINT taking center stage is social media intelligence. This involves collecting and analyzing social media posts by military personnel or those around them, to derive intelligence. Realistically, no military is immune from this being used against them. Despite attempts to control this (the Russian government blocked access to Facebook and Twitter in March), the war has generated a huge volume of this data.

There have been several occasions where Russian forces have posted sensitive information online. Particularly the Wagner Group, Chechens, and newly mobilized troops. Casual photographs of their quarters, or work in an ammunition dump, can be geolocated. There have been several occasions where massive losses have been publicly attributed to this. And there will surely have been many more where the public remains unaware of how intelligence was obtained.

The Russian armed forces, including the Navy, have been conscious of the threat of social media to operational security for several years. A series of widely circulated posters warn soldiers against sharing their location on social media. These are analogous to the iconic ‘Loose Lips Sink Ships’ posters of the Second World War. They have been observed, via open sources, displayed prominently aboard Russian submarines.

Russia’s attempts to limit social media intelligence, and other forms of OSINT, have had a limited impact. OSINT sources have tended to be quite resilient against government attempts to close them off. Although these efforts have sometimes caused frustration among the OSINT watchers, replacement sources have been found.

In many cases the people sharing the messages, images or videos must be aware that they contain some degree of sensitive information. Videos of explosions, aircraft, trains loaded with tanks, and so on. But the desire to share, to be seen to be in the know, or to get clicks and likes, seems too strong to resist. And it is unlikely that they appreciate that, with the right analysis, this could give the other side an advantage.

Indiscrete social media postings have allowed OSINT watchers to create detailed counts of military losses. These are likely much better than official counts, and certainly to an extent not possible in previous major wars. On the naval front this has also allowed the watchers to disprove claimed losses. There have been several cases of ‘wishful sinking’ where it has been rumored or reported that certain Russian warships have been damaged or sunk. OSINT, however, has helped to quickly clear the fog of war.

The Russian Navy knows the drill and tries to limit its OSINT exposure. Yet, like every part of every armed force, it is built out of human beings. Human nature is a weak link in intelligence, and perhaps the most acute in OSINT. The lack of major action by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, while likely the result of many factors, may well be further facilitated by anxieties over the ability of its force to be tracked openly. OSINT is often about exploiting the indiscretions of others, and no navy is immune. If and how Russia can fully adapt to mitigate the impact of OSINT on its operations in Ukraine remains to be seen. As the war progresses, there may well be many more specific examples of how OSINT can impact military operations at sea to discuss.

H.I. Sutton is an independent defense analyst focusing on unconventional naval warfare. He covers submarines, naval special forces underwater vehicles, uncrewed vehicles and the changing world of underwater warfare and seabed warfare. To do this he combines the latest Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) with the traditional art and science of defense analysis. He occasionally writes non-fiction books on these topics and draws analysis-based illustration to bring the subject to life.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.