Reflecting on One Year of War: Remotely Piloted Threats, Lessons from Drone Operations in Ukraine​

By Federico Borsari

In Ukraine, both the scale and scope of remotely piloted aircraft systems’ (RPAS) operations are exponentially broader than in previous conflicts. In this respect, the country has become a giant laboratory to test new (and older) systems against the demanding conditions of a high-intensity combat environment while experimenting and refining tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). There are, however, substantial differences in the way Russia and Ukraine are employing RPAS – commonly known as drones – for two main reasons.

First, the type and quantity of capabilities available to the two sides. Russia, for example, lacks the medium altitude long endurance (MALE) combat RPAS such as the popular Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 that Ukraine has deployed with remarkable success against different targets, ranging from logistic convoys and isolated air defense systems to fast boats and even helicopters in the Black Sea. While decent, Russia’s indigenous Inokhodets and Forpost-R combat drones – a licensed copy of the Israeli Searcher Mk.II – have performed under the expectations and produced a negligible operational impact due to their very limited numbers.

The same cannot be said for small and medium tactical drones. Russian forces can indeed count on a vast assortment of these systems for intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) roles, including the ubiquitous Orlan-30 and 10, the Eleron 3S, and the Zala 421 Series. Most of these models saw extensive use in the Donbas well before February 24th and form the backbone of Russia’s RPA fleet. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that Russian units are now suffering from a chronic shortage of tactical RPAs due to both high-attrition rates and a limited integration of these systems within the armed forces. Similar problems affected Ukrainian forces in the early stages of the invasion. Kyiv addressed them by quickly integrating available domestically-produced models such as the Leleka-100 and A1-SM Fury, along with very large numbers of commercial platforms such as Chinese DJI drones to satisfy a sky-rocketing demand along the frontlines. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) RPAS are now in use among Russian forces as well.

The second reason concerns the different approach towards RPAs between Ukraine and Russia. Historically, the latter has largely neglected the development of this technology only to find out the consequences in its botched invasion of Ukraine. This means not only insufficient and qualitatively modest capabilities – especially for ISTAR, deep strike missions, force protection, and engagement of time-critical targets – but also a less mature concept of operations (CONOPs). Moscow is now trying to address these problems by launching several training schemes for both career soldiers and new recruits, but tangible results take time to materialize. Still, Russia is clearly adapting and it will be a huge mistake to underestimate the evolution of its RPA capabilities.

By contrast, Ukraine – which ironically came from an overall disadvantaged position at least in quantitative terms – has shown a much stronger propensity to integrate RPAs at all echelons of the armed forces. In part, this tendency stems from the close cooperation among the military, the industry, and numerous civilian actors, both before and after the 2022 invasion. The Aerorozvidka volunteer group, established in 2014 by IT enthusiasts and Maydan volunteers and later incorporated into the armed forces, is probably the best example of how civilian-driven innovation can bridge key capability gaps and have a huge impact on the military sphere. On the policy side, a recently-passed legislation allows for a quicker acquisition of new indigenous RPAS by the Ukrainian military, drastically cutting the bureaucratic time from two years to several days.

The war in Ukraine has also shown an interesting evolution in the use of RPAs, including commercial ones. During the first weeks of the invasion, for instance, Ukraine made extensive use of its TB2 combat drones exploiting Russia’s poor deployment of its mobile air defenses, including Buk M2s, which often appeared non-functioning or too dispersed to provide effective protection. In a similar vein, Russia managed to employ its few combat RPAS during the same period, trying to compensate for the limited achievements of its air force. However, as soon as both sides adjusted their defensive countermeasures, the use of large combat drones became riskier and rarer. Ukrainian TB2s suffered severe losses – with 14 such drones already shot down – after Russia began to deploy its full electronic warfare (EW) and air defenses capabilities along the frontlines. At the same time, the failure to effectively suppress Ukrainian air defenses has severely constrained, if not entirely halted, the deployment of combat RPAS by Russia. As highlighted by a recent RUSI report, in such a highly contested airspace, most RPAS are quite vulnerable and have an averagely short operational lifespan.

That said, consumable RPAS continue to be used in large numbers, providing essential ISR, target acquisition and fire correction for artillery units, in what has become a symbiotic and deadly asset combination. At the same time, it is worth noting the progressive weaponization of commercial quadcopters in the second phase of the conflict. Whether through releasable VOG-17 grenades with 3D printed fins or attached explosive, Ukrainians have used weaponized commercial drones to destroy Russian vehicles and harass enemy defensive positions, with remarkable effects. In yet another example of creativity, Kyiv’s forces also managed to strike the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery inside Russian territory using a commercial Chinese-made Mugin 5 Pro RPA packed with explosive, highlighting the challenge of effectively countering small, low-flying drones even for one of the most sophisticated (on paper) air defenses in the world. By contrast, this “innovative” attitude is less observable among Russian forces.

Russia is having greater  success with its indigenous loitering munitions (LM), especially the Zala Lancet-3, used in conjunction with ISR drones to take out artillery pieces and radar installations thanks to its 3 kg high-explosive (HE) warhead and electro-optical (EO) guidance for increased accuracy in the terminal phase. As national stocks of cruise missiles and long-range precision munitions dwindle, Russia has also deployed Iranian-designed delta-wing Shahed LMs primarily against stationary objectives deeper into Ukrainian territory, including energy infrastructure and military barracks. Both Shahed 131 and 136 models lack EO sensors and rely on a combined GPS/GNSS – Inertial navigation that reduces their terminal precision and maneuverability necessary to engage mobile targets. For its part, Ukraine has been using US-made Switchblade (300 and 600 variants) and Polish-designed Warmate LMs, although available evidence is too fragmentary to assess their operational impact. Kyiv is also testing two domestically-built loitering munitions that may soon make their battlefield debut, the RAM-II and the ST-35 Silent Thunder, built by CDET and Athlon Avia, respectively.

Overall, the conflict in Ukraine holds important lessons regarding the role of RPAS in present and future military operations:

• Civilian-driven innovation and dual-use commercial technology can impact military dynamics and provide much needed capabilities. Yet, this hybridization pattern is also a double-edged sword, as malign actors can access cheap but potentially deadly dual use technology;
• The persistent surveillance and unprecedented situational awareness provided by RPA, including small, disposable systems, have improved target acquisition and engagement and shortened the kill-chain. On the other hand, they also reduce the chances of large-scale maneuver operations as the use of deception and surprise becomes more difficult. If integrated into an ecosystem based on multi-sensors fusion, AI based data processing and high-speed distribution capabilities, drones can open the way for extraordinary information superiority. At present, however, the access to such an ecosystem appears less “democratic” than drone technology itself;
• Small RPAS and loitering munitions deployed in large swarms can – at present – saturate and penetrate even the most advanced air defenses. As such, multi-type C-RPA capabilities should be incorporated into air-missile defense complexes at all echelons, while governments should invest massively in cost-effective C-RPA technologies, including direct energy weapons as well as soft and hard-kill effectors. Specific attention should also be paid to mobility. Albeit insufficient, in Ukraine, the combined use of man portable air defenses (MANPADs) and anti-aircraft guns offered a cheap and quite effective countermeasure to Shahed and Lancet LMs;
• As shown by the videos of drone strikes released during both the Nagorno-Karabakh war and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and even the song named after the Bayraktar TB2, RPAS can have a huge propaganda impact and play a key role in information operations;
• Despite many analyses – such as those featured in The New Yorker, Wall Street Journal, and National Review – heralding an alleged trail-blazing impact of RPAS on warfare, drones alone are not “game-changers” and have not changed the intrinsic nature of warfare. Most RPAS, especially larger ones, remain vulnerable when employed in contested airspaces. Their ultimate effectiveness revolves around a complex military ecosystem that integrates different assets and capabilities across all domains, from electronic warfare and artillery to C4, and synergically combines them in a specific concept of operations.

Federico Borsari is a member of the NATO-2030 Global Fellow professional network and a Leonardo Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, in Washington, D.C., where he focuses on defense technology and uncrewed systems. His interests also include Italian security and defense policy, and transatlantic relations. He previously worked at the European Council on Foreign Relations and the Italian Institute for International Political Studies.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.