NATO’s Standing Naval Forces at the Crossroads: Towards Regionalization and Specialization?
The MOC
By
Gonzalo Vazquez
October 26, 2023
After struggling to protect maritime commerce in the Black Sea for several months following Russia’s suspension of the United Nations Black Sea Grain Initiative in late July 2023, NATO finally announced that it will establish a joint mine-sweeping naval force in the Black Sea region to clear its waters from large numbers of naval mines. The new naval force, independent from the four existing Standing Maritime Groups (“SNMGs”), is set to be constituted by the three Black Sea navies in NATO: Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. Shortly after, NATO also announced the decision to step up Baltic Sea patrols after two incidents with critical undersea infrastructure were reported near Estonia and Sweden. Whether successful or not, the situation in both the Baltic and Black seas showcases the need to modernize the current structure of the SNMGs in a way that NATO allies can avoid wasting more resources across additional groups.
The Future of the SNMGs
Both initiatives are worth applauding. But beyond what they may be able to achieve over the following weeks and months, they have undoubtedly made a compelling point in the discussion over the current structure and purpose of the SNMGs. In light of these decisions, NATO should consider going back to a more regionalized and specialized structure, with standing maritime groups assigned to each maritime region on a more permanent basis and with more specific tasks – as was the case with the original groups several decades ago.
The current situation requires NATO Member states to find a balance between the demand for U.S. support and the need for further presence in several maritime regions. Discussing the future of the SNMGs in an article for War on the Rocks, naval analyst at CNA and U.S. Navy advisor Joshua Tallis stresses the similarities between the current situation and that in which the SNMGs were created in the 1960s. “The return of a revanchist Russia makes NATO’s previous maritime structure a good source of wisdom for the alliance’s future,” argues Tallis. “With global demands weighing on U.S. force obligations, both NATO and the United States stand to gain from a deeper reassessment of how the alliance organizes and employs the naval forces under its command,” he adds.
Indeed, NATO’s permanent naval groups are valuable assets for its members, providing a relatively balanced presence across all maritime areas of interest without the need to make major investments. However, their current structure is heavily influenced by two decades of a low-threat maritime environment and – more importantly – a gradual decline in European naval power. With the impressive evolution that the maritime environment has experienced during the past decade, threats to critical undersea infrastructure, or the challenge posed by crises such as the ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, call for a careful assessment of NATO’s maritime posture.
Looking back at the history of these groups, as Tallis suggests, and particularly to the main motivations behind their establishment almost six decades ago, could offer valuable insights as to how to adapt them to the current strategic environment and the defense requirements within. Recent events and decisions taken by NATO suggest that a more regionalized and specialized approach to SNMGs would benefit the Alliance’s overall maritime posture for the upcoming future.
Towards Regional and Specialized SNMGs?
The Russo-Ukraine War has showcased the problems derived from the current design of NATO’s SNMGs, which are no longer based on the Alliance’s maritime geography, as were the original STANAVFORLANT, STANAVFORCHAN, and STANAVFORMED. Most bodies of water surrounding the European continent are guarded by tight straits – the Dardanelles/Bosphorus in the Black Sea, the Danish Straits in the Baltic, and both the Gibraltar and Messina straits in the Mediterranean. In the case of the Baltic and Black seas, their only entrance is subject to regulations limiting the transit of ships through them – especially if a crisis breaks out in any of them.
These restrictions have particularly affected the Black Sea region since February 2022. After Russian decision to pull out from the grain deal and attack Ukrainian port infrastructure and vessels, none of the SNMGs were sent to ensure the safety of commercial routes. The upcoming establishment of a joint mine countermeasures naval force in the Black Sea to help commerce in the region is a solid demonstration of the need for a more regionalized approach. This will provide a balanced and permanent presence in all relevant bodies of water. This scheme would avoid the complications caused by the Montreux Convention since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Furthermore, as Tallis puts it, “scoped missions tailored to geography would help alleviate the evergreen concern among national leaders of their forces being used for reasons beyond their approval.”
Similarly, this applies to other regions beyond the Black Sea. In the Baltic and the North seas, especially, NATO must pay attention to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure and the seabed. Following the September 2022 Nord Stream pipeline sabotage and several undersea cable disruptions in late 2022, two incidents were reported in October 2023 almost simultaneously: disruptions in an undersea pipeline and a telecommunications cable connecting Finland and Estonia, and another telecommunications cable connecting between Sweden and Estonia.
Such threats underscore why Dr. Sebastian Bruns, from the ISPK’s Center for Maritime Strategy and Security, has argued on several occasions: the Baltic is by no means a “NATO lake,” as some may claim. It remains a contested maritime environment. By incorporating both Finnish and Swedish naval capabilities (if Sweden accedes to NATO), a permanent naval force in the region could yield positive results at an acceptable cost for the Alliance. This is particularly true for maritime domain awareness.
These incidents against critical infrastructure and the decision to establish maritime patrols in the Baltic are both symptoms of the need for further specialization of the maritime groups. This includes a standing naval force dedicated to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure and the development of seabed warfare capabilities. Linking naval capabilities with a specific task, a more specialized structure for the SNMGs could allow for the maximization of the capabilities that each of navy can provide. “The forcing function of scoping can breed excellence through concision,” concludes Tallis.
In conclusion, NATO is now facing an increasingly complex and competitive maritime environment. The emergence of multifaceted threats is slowly showing the current structure of its SNMGs needs an update. The establishment of both a Black Sea MCM force and additional maritime patrols in the Baltic Sea, independent from the four SNMGs, are clear examples of this. They have highlighted the need for a more regionalized and specialized structure of the groups to alleviate the geographical limitations imposed on them, which will in turn allow them to more effectively address all emerging threats to Allied maritime security.
Gonzalo Vazquez is a junior analyst at the Spanish Naval War College’s Center for Naval Thought. The views expressed in this article are his own.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Gonzalo Vazquez
After struggling to protect maritime commerce in the Black Sea for several months following Russia’s suspension of the United Nations Black Sea Grain Initiative in late July 2023, NATO finally announced that it will establish a joint mine-sweeping naval force in the Black Sea region to clear its waters from large numbers of naval mines. The new naval force, independent from the four existing Standing Maritime Groups (“SNMGs”), is set to be constituted by the three Black Sea navies in NATO: Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. Shortly after, NATO also announced the decision to step up Baltic Sea patrols after two incidents with critical undersea infrastructure were reported near Estonia and Sweden. Whether successful or not, the situation in both the Baltic and Black seas showcases the need to modernize the current structure of the SNMGs in a way that NATO allies can avoid wasting more resources across additional groups.
The Future of the SNMGs
Both initiatives are worth applauding. But beyond what they may be able to achieve over the following weeks and months, they have undoubtedly made a compelling point in the discussion over the current structure and purpose of the SNMGs. In light of these decisions, NATO should consider going back to a more regionalized and specialized structure, with standing maritime groups assigned to each maritime region on a more permanent basis and with more specific tasks – as was the case with the original groups several decades ago.
The current situation requires NATO Member states to find a balance between the demand for U.S. support and the need for further presence in several maritime regions. Discussing the future of the SNMGs in an article for War on the Rocks, naval analyst at CNA and U.S. Navy advisor Joshua Tallis stresses the similarities between the current situation and that in which the SNMGs were created in the 1960s. “The return of a revanchist Russia makes NATO’s previous maritime structure a good source of wisdom for the alliance’s future,” argues Tallis. “With global demands weighing on U.S. force obligations, both NATO and the United States stand to gain from a deeper reassessment of how the alliance organizes and employs the naval forces under its command,” he adds.
Indeed, NATO’s permanent naval groups are valuable assets for its members, providing a relatively balanced presence across all maritime areas of interest without the need to make major investments. However, their current structure is heavily influenced by two decades of a low-threat maritime environment and – more importantly – a gradual decline in European naval power. With the impressive evolution that the maritime environment has experienced during the past decade, threats to critical undersea infrastructure, or the challenge posed by crises such as the ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, call for a careful assessment of NATO’s maritime posture.
Looking back at the history of these groups, as Tallis suggests, and particularly to the main motivations behind their establishment almost six decades ago, could offer valuable insights as to how to adapt them to the current strategic environment and the defense requirements within. Recent events and decisions taken by NATO suggest that a more regionalized and specialized approach to SNMGs would benefit the Alliance’s overall maritime posture for the upcoming future.
Towards Regional and Specialized SNMGs?
The Russo-Ukraine War has showcased the problems derived from the current design of NATO’s SNMGs, which are no longer based on the Alliance’s maritime geography, as were the original STANAVFORLANT, STANAVFORCHAN, and STANAVFORMED. Most bodies of water surrounding the European continent are guarded by tight straits – the Dardanelles/Bosphorus in the Black Sea, the Danish Straits in the Baltic, and both the Gibraltar and Messina straits in the Mediterranean. In the case of the Baltic and Black seas, their only entrance is subject to regulations limiting the transit of ships through them – especially if a crisis breaks out in any of them.
These restrictions have particularly affected the Black Sea region since February 2022. After Russian decision to pull out from the grain deal and attack Ukrainian port infrastructure and vessels, none of the SNMGs were sent to ensure the safety of commercial routes. The upcoming establishment of a joint mine countermeasures naval force in the Black Sea to help commerce in the region is a solid demonstration of the need for a more regionalized approach. This will provide a balanced and permanent presence in all relevant bodies of water. This scheme would avoid the complications caused by the Montreux Convention since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Furthermore, as Tallis puts it, “scoped missions tailored to geography would help alleviate the evergreen concern among national leaders of their forces being used for reasons beyond their approval.”
Similarly, this applies to other regions beyond the Black Sea. In the Baltic and the North seas, especially, NATO must pay attention to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure and the seabed. Following the September 2022 Nord Stream pipeline sabotage and several undersea cable disruptions in late 2022, two incidents were reported in October 2023 almost simultaneously: disruptions in an undersea pipeline and a telecommunications cable connecting Finland and Estonia, and another telecommunications cable connecting between Sweden and Estonia.
Such threats underscore why Dr. Sebastian Bruns, from the ISPK’s Center for Maritime Strategy and Security, has argued on several occasions: the Baltic is by no means a “NATO lake,” as some may claim. It remains a contested maritime environment. By incorporating both Finnish and Swedish naval capabilities (if Sweden accedes to NATO), a permanent naval force in the region could yield positive results at an acceptable cost for the Alliance. This is particularly true for maritime domain awareness.
These incidents against critical infrastructure and the decision to establish maritime patrols in the Baltic are both symptoms of the need for further specialization of the maritime groups. This includes a standing naval force dedicated to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure and the development of seabed warfare capabilities. Linking naval capabilities with a specific task, a more specialized structure for the SNMGs could allow for the maximization of the capabilities that each of navy can provide. “The forcing function of scoping can breed excellence through concision,” concludes Tallis.
In conclusion, NATO is now facing an increasingly complex and competitive maritime environment. The emergence of multifaceted threats is slowly showing the current structure of its SNMGs needs an update. The establishment of both a Black Sea MCM force and additional maritime patrols in the Baltic Sea, independent from the four SNMGs, are clear examples of this. They have highlighted the need for a more regionalized and specialized structure of the groups to alleviate the geographical limitations imposed on them, which will in turn allow them to more effectively address all emerging threats to Allied maritime security.
Gonzalo Vazquez is a junior analyst at the Spanish Naval War College’s Center for Naval Thought. The views expressed in this article are his own.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.