Myanmar’s Junta Is Losing the War It Started: How Brutality Backfired, and Why It Matters for Asia
The MOC
By
Alexa Sohn
January 9, 2026
Nearly four years after the military seized power, Myanmar’s junta is losing the war it unleashed on its own people. The generals who once ruled through fear are watching their control collapse under the weight of the very violence they rely on. Each airstrike, arrest, and forced conscription order has strengthened the resolve of armed resistance groups. The Tatmadaw, once regarded as one of Southeast Asia’s most entrenched militaries, now governs only fragments of the country. Its repeated vows of intensified crackdowns no longer inspire compliance. Instead, they highlight a reality the generals cannot escape: brutality has become a catalyst for their undoing.
Fear as Strategy
Since the February 2021 coup, the regime has tried to stabilize its rule through overwhelming force. It faces growing resistance from the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and long-standing ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that now cooperate more closely than at any point in decades.
The junta’s message has been consistent: disobedience will be met with airstrikes, arrests, and executions. It has followed through. In 2025, an airstrike on Let Pan Hla killed at least 27 civilians and wounded 30 more, part of a pattern of bombings across Sagaing, Mandalay, and northern Shan. Citizens have been imprisoned simply for liking pro-PDF posts on Facebook. More than 1,300 people have been arrested for alleged “incitement” over the past two years, according to rights groups.
These actions make the junta’s threats credible, when it says it will bomb a village or detain a critic, few doubt it. But credible threats alone do not guarantee deterrence. In Myanmar, the cost of resisting has become indistinguishable from the cost of obeying. The regime’s violence has united groups that once distrusted each other and pushed entire regions beyond military control.
How Violence Lost Its Power
The junta’s tactics have eliminated any residual legitimacy the military once claimed. By 2024, the military’s indiscriminate attacks had radicalized even previously moderate groups. Villagers who once avoided direct confrontation began sheltering PDFs. Urban activists, facing heightened surveillance and arbitrary detention, shifted toward armed struggle.
Momentum spread quickly. In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army seized border posts and advanced toward Maungdaw despite repeated junta warnings of crushing retaliation. Rebel forces in Chin, Kachin, and Karenni States launched parallel operations. The junta’s own statements reveal the scale of the losses. Officials have acknowledged losing communication with garrisons and administrative offices. Independent assessments estimate the regime controls less than 15 percent of the country. Even in nominally held territories, its presence is thin. Each new air raid tends to precede, not prevent, a rebel advance.
A July 2024 air raid near Madaya that destroyed an entire village crystallized the shift. The strike missed PDF positions and instead killed or injured dozens of civilians. Survivors blamed the junta, not the resistance. The attack deepened resentment and helped drive new recruits to local defense units. Meanwhile, the resistance has grown increasingly coordinated. Groups that once operated along ethnic lines now share intelligence, weapons, and territory. Joint offensives span multiple regions. Decades of failed ceasefires never achieved this level of unity; the junta’s brutality did.
The military’s propaganda has failed to counter it. State media regularly labels PDFs and EAOs as terrorists and claims Western powers are fueling unrest. The junta has promised elections and constitutional reform to restore stability, but few believe the pledges. As the generals prepared for a 2025 vote, rebel groups launched new operations, dismissing the plan as a façade.
Lacking any persuasive mechanism, the regime has defaulted to punishment, cyber raids, mass surveillance, internet blackouts affecting millions, and death sentences handed down in secret. Each strike reinforces a truth widely felt across Myanmar: the junta rules only by terror, and terror alone no longer works.
A Failing State at the Crossroads
Myanmar’s unraveling is not just a domestic crisis. It is reshaping Southeast Asia’s security environment and complicating strategic competition among major powers. Border areas once loosely controlled by ethnic groups are now fully outside Naypyidaw’s reach. Insurgent sanctuaries have expanded along the Thai, Indian, and Chinese borders. Arms trafficking through Thailand has surged, and drug production in Shan State continues to rise.
China’s interests are especially exposed. Beijing has poured billions into infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, including pipelines, railways, and port facilities. To protect those assets, China is hedging, maintaining ties with the junta while quietly cooperating with certain EAOs. The strategy reflects a pragmatic calculation: no single actor can guarantee stability, so China engages them all.
Myanmar’s fragmentation threatens to create a regional security vacuum. Refugees continue to cross into India, Thailand, and China. Criminal networks, including cyber-scam syndicates that have drawn major Chinese crackdowns, have flourished. The United States and European Union have expanded sanctions, but enforcement is uneven and the junta still secures arms and jet fuel through illicit networks. The longer the conflict persists, the more space China gains to shape Myanmar’s political future and extract strategic leverage from its ports and rare-earth resources.
Lessons for the World
Myanmar’s trajectory offers clear lessons for governments confronting or observing authoritarian crises. Repression can produce short-term order, but coercion without legitimacy erodes itself. The Tatmadaw has shown it has both the will and the capability to punish. It has failed because it cannot govern.
For democratic governments, Myanmar also presents an opportunity. As the military loses territory, parallel governance structures, township administrations, local defense forces, and the National Unity Government, have stepped in to fill the void. These institutions are uneven but increasingly effective.
Targeted military, diplomatic, and humanitarian support for these networks could help shape Myanmar’s transition and prevent its disintegration from empowering China or organized crime groups. So far, most capitals have treated the conflict as a contained tragedy. It is not. Myanmar’s security vacuum is already influencing regional geopolitics and will continue to do so.
The Limits of Fear
The junta intended its campaign of intimidation to secure its rule. Instead, it has accelerated its decline. Every airstrike and arrest makes the military appear less powerful, not more. The junta’s credibility in violence, once its greatest asset, has become its most damaging liability. Myanmar is entering a decisive phase. The Tatmadaw’s authority is shrinking, the economy is collapsing, and millions of civilians are determined not to return to military rule. Fear once held Myanmar together. Now, it is driving the country toward a future the generals can no longer control, and one that will shape the region for years to come.
Alexa Sohn is a first-year student at the University of Michigan studying International Relations and Political Science. Her research interests center on global security, diplomacy, and youth civic engagement. As a former AP Research student, she completed a capstone project examining how varying levels of U.S. intervention shape territorial conflicts in Israel-Palestine, Russia-Ukraine, and China-Taiwan. She writes to make complex international issues accessible and relevant to wider audiences.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Alexa Sohn
Nearly four years after the military seized power, Myanmar’s junta is losing the war it unleashed on its own people. The generals who once ruled through fear are watching their control collapse under the weight of the very violence they rely on. Each airstrike, arrest, and forced conscription order has strengthened the resolve of armed resistance groups. The Tatmadaw, once regarded as one of Southeast Asia’s most entrenched militaries, now governs only fragments of the country. Its repeated vows of intensified crackdowns no longer inspire compliance. Instead, they highlight a reality the generals cannot escape: brutality has become a catalyst for their undoing.
Fear as Strategy
Since the February 2021 coup, the regime has tried to stabilize its rule through overwhelming force. It faces growing resistance from the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and long-standing ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that now cooperate more closely than at any point in decades.
The junta’s message has been consistent: disobedience will be met with airstrikes, arrests, and executions. It has followed through. In 2025, an airstrike on Let Pan Hla killed at least 27 civilians and wounded 30 more, part of a pattern of bombings across Sagaing, Mandalay, and northern Shan. Citizens have been imprisoned simply for liking pro-PDF posts on Facebook. More than 1,300 people have been arrested for alleged “incitement” over the past two years, according to rights groups.
These actions make the junta’s threats credible, when it says it will bomb a village or detain a critic, few doubt it. But credible threats alone do not guarantee deterrence. In Myanmar, the cost of resisting has become indistinguishable from the cost of obeying. The regime’s violence has united groups that once distrusted each other and pushed entire regions beyond military control.
How Violence Lost Its Power
The junta’s tactics have eliminated any residual legitimacy the military once claimed. By 2024, the military’s indiscriminate attacks had radicalized even previously moderate groups. Villagers who once avoided direct confrontation began sheltering PDFs. Urban activists, facing heightened surveillance and arbitrary detention, shifted toward armed struggle.
The backlash crystallized in Operation 1027, a coordinated offensive by the Three Brotherhood Alliance and allied EAOs. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army captured key positions in northern Shan State, including Lashio, a critical military and logistics hub. The victory signaled a turning point: resistance forces could defeat the Tatmadaw in conventional battles, not just guerrilla skirmishes.
Momentum spread quickly. In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army seized border posts and advanced toward Maungdaw despite repeated junta warnings of crushing retaliation. Rebel forces in Chin, Kachin, and Karenni States launched parallel operations. The junta’s own statements reveal the scale of the losses. Officials have acknowledged losing communication with garrisons and administrative offices. Independent assessments estimate the regime controls less than 15 percent of the country. Even in nominally held territories, its presence is thin. Each new air raid tends to precede, not prevent, a rebel advance.
The Erosion of Fear
The regime’s failure stems from its single-minded reliance on coercion. Repression can deter rebellion only when people believe compliance ensures safety. In today’s Myanmar, civilians face violence regardless of whether they resist. Whole communities have been displaced by shelling, home burnings, and forced recruitment.
A July 2024 air raid near Madaya that destroyed an entire village crystallized the shift. The strike missed PDF positions and instead killed or injured dozens of civilians. Survivors blamed the junta, not the resistance. The attack deepened resentment and helped drive new recruits to local defense units. Meanwhile, the resistance has grown increasingly coordinated. Groups that once operated along ethnic lines now share intelligence, weapons, and territory. Joint offensives span multiple regions. Decades of failed ceasefires never achieved this level of unity; the junta’s brutality did.
The military’s propaganda has failed to counter it. State media regularly labels PDFs and EAOs as terrorists and claims Western powers are fueling unrest. The junta has promised elections and constitutional reform to restore stability, but few believe the pledges. As the generals prepared for a 2025 vote, rebel groups launched new operations, dismissing the plan as a façade.
Lacking any persuasive mechanism, the regime has defaulted to punishment, cyber raids, mass surveillance, internet blackouts affecting millions, and death sentences handed down in secret. Each strike reinforces a truth widely felt across Myanmar: the junta rules only by terror, and terror alone no longer works.
A Failing State at the Crossroads
Myanmar’s unraveling is not just a domestic crisis. It is reshaping Southeast Asia’s security environment and complicating strategic competition among major powers. Border areas once loosely controlled by ethnic groups are now fully outside Naypyidaw’s reach. Insurgent sanctuaries have expanded along the Thai, Indian, and Chinese borders. Arms trafficking through Thailand has surged, and drug production in Shan State continues to rise.
China’s interests are especially exposed. Beijing has poured billions into infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, including pipelines, railways, and port facilities. To protect those assets, China is hedging, maintaining ties with the junta while quietly cooperating with certain EAOs. The strategy reflects a pragmatic calculation: no single actor can guarantee stability, so China engages them all.
Myanmar’s fragmentation threatens to create a regional security vacuum. Refugees continue to cross into India, Thailand, and China. Criminal networks, including cyber-scam syndicates that have drawn major Chinese crackdowns, have flourished. The United States and European Union have expanded sanctions, but enforcement is uneven and the junta still secures arms and jet fuel through illicit networks. The longer the conflict persists, the more space China gains to shape Myanmar’s political future and extract strategic leverage from its ports and rare-earth resources.
Lessons for the World
Myanmar’s trajectory offers clear lessons for governments confronting or observing authoritarian crises. Repression can produce short-term order, but coercion without legitimacy erodes itself. The Tatmadaw has shown it has both the will and the capability to punish. It has failed because it cannot govern.
For democratic governments, Myanmar also presents an opportunity. As the military loses territory, parallel governance structures, township administrations, local defense forces, and the National Unity Government, have stepped in to fill the void. These institutions are uneven but increasingly effective.
Targeted military, diplomatic, and humanitarian support for these networks could help shape Myanmar’s transition and prevent its disintegration from empowering China or organized crime groups. So far, most capitals have treated the conflict as a contained tragedy. It is not. Myanmar’s security vacuum is already influencing regional geopolitics and will continue to do so.
The Limits of Fear
The junta intended its campaign of intimidation to secure its rule. Instead, it has accelerated its decline. Every airstrike and arrest makes the military appear less powerful, not more. The junta’s credibility in violence, once its greatest asset, has become its most damaging liability. Myanmar is entering a decisive phase. The Tatmadaw’s authority is shrinking, the economy is collapsing, and millions of civilians are determined not to return to military rule. Fear once held Myanmar together. Now, it is driving the country toward a future the generals can no longer control, and one that will shape the region for years to come.
Alexa Sohn is a first-year student at the University of Michigan studying International Relations and Political Science. Her research interests center on global security, diplomacy, and youth civic engagement. As a former AP Research student, she completed a capstone project examining how varying levels of U.S. intervention shape territorial conflicts in Israel-Palestine, Russia-Ukraine, and China-Taiwan. She writes to make complex international issues accessible and relevant to wider audiences.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.