As we move forward with the expansion of Department of War asymmetric enterprises, I would encourage a deep dive planning effort on the identification, utilization, and employment of MWD’s in war plans and defense support to civil authority operations.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, military working dogs (MWD’s) were an exclusive “force multiplier”. Patrol Explosive Detector Dogs (dual purpose), and Explosive Detector Dogs (single purpose) were in high demand. They saved lives. Every commander requested dog teams to be the tip of the spear to protect their troops.
Improvised explosive devices (IED’s) were the number one cause of casualties in the Central Command Area of responsibility. MWD’s led the way. The MWD team, handler and dog, were in front of combat foot patrols as their protective shield. Dogs remain the only rapidly deployable, “living” mobile explosive detection system on the battlefield. While the infusion of scent detection robots is a rapidly developing commodity, robots are not versatile. They are machines. MWD’s use their olfactory capability to assess and adapt. They are the only living detection system. Executing speed and agility they quickly maneuver to an explosive threat. Using their senses to detect human threats, providing a force protection shield. Integrated into the scheme of maneuver. Deployable via all methods of transportation: air, sea, and ground.
Dogs have been used to detect explosives, narcotics, electronics, disease (including COVID-19), currency, and people. They are force multipliers on steroids: quickly capturing the scent and maneuvering to the source.
As we continue to watch Operation Epic Fury in the Persian Gulf, Marines have been rapidly deployed to seize cargo vessels. I watched as the Marines fast roped onto the deck of tankers quickly organizing, establishing security, and methodically assuming operational control, searching and securing vessel compartments and cargo containers.
It was distressing to observe that explosive detection dog teams were not deployed as the first security asset onto the deck. In today’s environment, especially in maritime operations, a planning assumption should include our adversaries employing counter measures to deter and inflict maximum casualties to repel boarders. This can include IED’s and other booby traps on hatches, passageways, cargo holds, or containers.
While the nature of employing specially trained Marines to quickly interdict vessels afloat requires stealth and surprise, the element of surprise can quickly evolve into a mass casualty situation should the target be a floating IED.
Dog teams have been transported by rotary wing aircraft for years. The Coast Guard and special operations units have injected dogs directly into an operation via a hoist (search & rescue device), with the dog strapped to the handler. Same concept goes for boarding operations. They should be the tip of the spear, the first on the ground to mitigate the explosive threat.
There is no capability that possesses the olfactory capability to detect explosives besides a dog. Dogs have been proven effective in Iraq, Afghanistan, and US Secret Service National Security Special Events. A “team capability” in the opinion of my 30 years directing canine operations would protect the quick reaction boarding force. The tip of the boarding team provides two distinct capabilities: explosives detection and force protection.
During my tenure as the Chief of Law Enforcement at US CENTCOM (2006-2012) I initiated and directed the theater canine program. MWD’s were the top three force multipliers requested by maneuver unit commanders. The need overwhelmed the demand. And the demand never diminished. We had to expand our basis of allocation to include cross leveling US military service canines and including coalition and contract working dogs. The commitment exceeded over 1000 canine requirements. We met the challenges of the introduction of Home Made Explosives. And nothing has changed. The explosive threats on land or at sea remain the same. Explosive devices are more volatile and readily attainable through commercial sources.
We did a deep dive during my tenure at CENTCOM and again during my tenure as the DoD MWD Program Manager. Based on a global assessment the requirements for MWD’s as force multipliers supporting maneuver units, installation security and US Secret Service will remain in high demand. Analysis determined that MWD’s must be integrated as part of the “force packaging” methodology. As all dog teams are trained to the same standard at Lackland Air Force Base, they were able to be cross-leveled. Dog teams were integrated to support maneuver units. It is the MWD capability, not the uniform, providing the expanded force structure to the operational maneuver element.
Employment of MWD’s should be inclusive in all operational war plans, coordinated with the Joint Military Working Dog Committee, and the DOW advisory committee. Lessons learned demonstrated their effectiveness and efficiency. The unfortunate systematic problem that exists, and the lack of interoperability with DOW, is that there are no strategic MWD planners/subject matter experts are assigned to the Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, Special Operations Command, and the DOW. Canine operational inclusion may not even be part of mission planning.
LTC (ret.) Richard Vargus, PhD served in the United States Marine Corps and United States Army for almost forty years. In 2002, he assumed duties at the US Merchant Marine Academy, Global Maritime Transportation School (GMATS). Serving as the lead instructor and development of maritime security and maritime counter-terrorism/piracy courses. In his role as the theater customs program oversight, he was engaged with port security, and planning retrograde sealift movements with MSC, CBP and USDA. Col. Vargus holds a doctorate in Public Administration. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff and Air War College, and was awarded the Bronze Star. Active in the Navy League, he continues to serve as an adjunct instructor at the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By LTC (ret.) Richard Vargus, PhD
As we move forward with the expansion of Department of War asymmetric enterprises, I would encourage a deep dive planning effort on the identification, utilization, and employment of MWD’s in war plans and defense support to civil authority operations.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, military working dogs (MWD’s) were an exclusive “force multiplier”. Patrol Explosive Detector Dogs (dual purpose), and Explosive Detector Dogs (single purpose) were in high demand. They saved lives. Every commander requested dog teams to be the tip of the spear to protect their troops.
Improvised explosive devices (IED’s) were the number one cause of casualties in the Central Command Area of responsibility. MWD’s led the way. The MWD team, handler and dog, were in front of combat foot patrols as their protective shield. Dogs remain the only rapidly deployable, “living” mobile explosive detection system on the battlefield. While the infusion of scent detection robots is a rapidly developing commodity, robots are not versatile. They are machines. MWD’s use their olfactory capability to assess and adapt. They are the only living detection system. Executing speed and agility they quickly maneuver to an explosive threat. Using their senses to detect human threats, providing a force protection shield. Integrated into the scheme of maneuver. Deployable via all methods of transportation: air, sea, and ground.
Dogs have been used to detect explosives, narcotics, electronics, disease (including COVID-19), currency, and people. They are force multipliers on steroids: quickly capturing the scent and maneuvering to the source.
As we continue to watch Operation Epic Fury in the Persian Gulf, Marines have been rapidly deployed to seize cargo vessels. I watched as the Marines fast roped onto the deck of tankers quickly organizing, establishing security, and methodically assuming operational control, searching and securing vessel compartments and cargo containers.
It was distressing to observe that explosive detection dog teams were not deployed as the first security asset onto the deck. In today’s environment, especially in maritime operations, a planning assumption should include our adversaries employing counter measures to deter and inflict maximum casualties to repel boarders. This can include IED’s and other booby traps on hatches, passageways, cargo holds, or containers.
While the nature of employing specially trained Marines to quickly interdict vessels afloat requires stealth and surprise, the element of surprise can quickly evolve into a mass casualty situation should the target be a floating IED.
Dog teams have been transported by rotary wing aircraft for years. The Coast Guard and special operations units have injected dogs directly into an operation via a hoist (search & rescue device), with the dog strapped to the handler. Same concept goes for boarding operations. They should be the tip of the spear, the first on the ground to mitigate the explosive threat.
There is no capability that possesses the olfactory capability to detect explosives besides a dog. Dogs have been proven effective in Iraq, Afghanistan, and US Secret Service National Security Special Events. A “team capability” in the opinion of my 30 years directing canine operations would protect the quick reaction boarding force. The tip of the boarding team provides two distinct capabilities: explosives detection and force protection.
During my tenure as the Chief of Law Enforcement at US CENTCOM (2006-2012) I initiated and directed the theater canine program. MWD’s were the top three force multipliers requested by maneuver unit commanders. The need overwhelmed the demand. And the demand never diminished. We had to expand our basis of allocation to include cross leveling US military service canines and including coalition and contract working dogs. The commitment exceeded over 1000 canine requirements. We met the challenges of the introduction of Home Made Explosives. And nothing has changed. The explosive threats on land or at sea remain the same. Explosive devices are more volatile and readily attainable through commercial sources.
We did a deep dive during my tenure at CENTCOM and again during my tenure as the DoD MWD Program Manager. Based on a global assessment the requirements for MWD’s as force multipliers supporting maneuver units, installation security and US Secret Service will remain in high demand. Analysis determined that MWD’s must be integrated as part of the “force packaging” methodology. As all dog teams are trained to the same standard at Lackland Air Force Base, they were able to be cross-leveled. Dog teams were integrated to support maneuver units. It is the MWD capability, not the uniform, providing the expanded force structure to the operational maneuver element.
Employment of MWD’s should be inclusive in all operational war plans, coordinated with the Joint Military Working Dog Committee, and the DOW advisory committee. Lessons learned demonstrated their effectiveness and efficiency. The unfortunate systematic problem that exists, and the lack of interoperability with DOW, is that there are no strategic MWD planners/subject matter experts are assigned to the Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, Special Operations Command, and the DOW. Canine operational inclusion may not even be part of mission planning.
LTC (ret.) Richard Vargus, PhD served in the United States Marine Corps and United States Army for almost forty years. In 2002, he assumed duties at the US Merchant Marine Academy, Global Maritime Transportation School (GMATS). Serving as the lead instructor and development of maritime security and maritime counter-terrorism/piracy courses. In his role as the theater customs program oversight, he was engaged with port security, and planning retrograde sealift movements with MSC, CBP and USDA. Col. Vargus holds a doctorate in Public Administration. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff and Air War College, and was awarded the Bronze Star. Active in the Navy League, he continues to serve as an adjunct instructor at the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.