Improving U.S. South China Sea Strategy by Addressing China’s Ideological Drivers
The MOC
July 30, 2024
As is the case with most analysis of China’s international relations, much of the discourse surrounding Beijing’s approach to the South China Sea (SCS) fails to accurately diagnose the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideological and strategic underpinnings. As the dust settles following China’s June 17 confrontation with the Philippines over Second Thomas Shoal, U.S. policymakers must understand what drives the CCP—and its approach to the SCS—in order to develop a sound strategy that advances U.S. interests in this critical body of water.
What is the SCS and Why Does It Matter?
The South China Sea is a hotly contested waterway in Southeast Asia. Six governments claim portions of the Sea: China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. Most disputes are over maritime features in the Spratly and Paracel Islands groups, which are strategically located for military and resource exploration purposes. Since four of the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members are SCS claimants, ASEAN has been engaged in a decades-long negotiation with China on implementing a Code-of-Conduct for the SCS. However, differing interests within ASEAN hamstring the organization’s unity, complicating negotiations with Beijing. The almost century-long conflict over SCS sovereignty between various stakeholders stems from the Sea’s strategic and economic significance.
The SCS is important for the United States for at least four reasons. First, it is a key battleground for the contest over the rules and norms—i.e. the standards—that structure international relations and the international order. China’s continuous aggression in pursuit of claims not validated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea weakens the legitimacy of the U.S.-led international order, enabling states to more freely act in ways that undermine global stability. Second, it is a benchmark for Washington’s security credibility. If the United States fails to resoundingly support countries against Chinese aggressiveness—like the Philippines—allies and non-allies will perceive Washington as uncredible, making them more likely to hedge by accommodating Beijing’s vision for regional and global order. Third, control of the SCS would be crucial in any potential war between the United States and China. The Sea’s geographic location within the First Island Chain that bounds Asia’s Pacific coastline enables the great power that controls it to limit access to the region. Fourth and finally, the SCS is a major conduit of global trade, carrying approximately one-third of global maritime shipping, any disruption of which would have significant ramifications for the global economy.
What Drives the CCP?
The CCP is a hierarchical and strictly goal-oriented organization that operates according to its ideology of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” This ideology directs the Party to achieve specific goals corresponding with time-bound parameters across the full scope of governance and policy measures. Yet rather than prescribing rigid guidelines, Chinese socialism instructs the CCP to be reactive to change. In line with this guidance, the Party regularly alters its policy direction and short-term priorities, attempting to shape domestic and international conditions to benefit long-term CCP goals.
All CCP action works to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, or the restoration of China to a position of unrivalled power and privilege on the world stage. With national rejuvenation as the target, the Party sets subsidiary goals to ensure that China becomes a “great modern socialist country” by 2049.
Driven by ideology, China’s foreign policy explicitly seeks to place the country in a “leading position” across all areas of competitiveness. Specifically, the CCP aims to develop China into a “global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence”. In effect, this goal is international order leadership. Beijing employs a strategy that cultivates and applies its national power to attain two prerequisite goals for order leadership: a favorable balance of power and an international order architecture that benefits Chinese interests.
Due to its important geopolitical status, control of the SCS is a principal aspect of China’s push for order leadership. Beijing pursues control of the Sea to bolster its security, expand its territory, increase its international prestige, promote China-friendly order standards, and guarantee maritime trade and natural resource extraction. These intermediate objectives advance China’s two prerequisite goals and therefore its overall strategy.
China claims over 90 percent of the SCS under the so-called Nine-Dash Line, which is based on questionable historical assertions and was ruled illegitimate by a 2016 arbitral tribunal. To control its claims, Beijing uses a combination of gray-zone tactics, diplomacy, lawfare, and economic coercion. Specifically, China physically coerces challengers, erects trade barriers, militarizes artificial islands, operates in disputed areas, attempts to negotiate favorable agreements, and applies domestic law in international disputes.
How Does the United States Approach the SCS?
The United States’ approach to the SCS is an extension of its 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, which seeks to create a “free and open” Indo-Pacific. Regarding China, the strategy aims for a “balance of influence” that is “maximally favorable” to Washington. To achieve these goals, the strategy prescribes enhanced international cooperation, deepened regional ties, and economic integration. However, both the strategy’s goals and means are too broad to protect U.S. interests in the SCS against a determined adversary. Further, this strategy does not account for the CCP’s ideological drivers, calling instead for the United States to “shape the strategic environment in which it [China] operates.” By failing to address the ideological drivers of China’s strategy, the United States will merely be creating temporary conditions to which the CCP can readily adapt.
How Should the U.S. Change Its Approach to the SCS?
To optimally apply the Indo-Pacific Strategy in the SCS, the United States must establish specific objectives and employ deliberate means that respond to China’s ideological pursuit of SCS control. Accordingly, Washington’s primary objectives in the Sea should be to reinforce the legitimacy of key international order standards (equal sovereignty, non-aggression, territorial integrity, and rule of law) and to prevent China’s expansion of territorial control.
The United States’ principal barriers to achieving these objectives are an insufficient diplomatic approach and a toothless military response to Chinese aggressiveness. Current U.S. policy fails to marshal sufficient support for the U.S.-led international order from the range of states important to the SCS, and Washington’s reluctance to respond more forcefully to China’s provocations invites further aggression. A better approach to the SCS requires two key changes:
First, Washington should create and lead a regional coordination forum (RCF)—based on the aforementioned U.S.-led order standards—to align international responses to Indo-Pacific issues. This forum should include as many likeminded states as possible to expand the range and collective impact of RCF actions. Over time, the RCF will institutionalize support for the U.S.-led order and commit Washington’s relationships to the region through its formal structure and U.S. leadership.
Second, the United States should be more proactive in the SCS and respond proportionally to China’s assertive actions there. These measures would aim to deter China by raising the costs for aggressive and provocative behavior. Possible U.S. actions include escorting Philippine vessels in disputed waters, conducting more frequent freedom of navigation operations, physically blocking Chinese vessels, and blasting water cannons in response to the same. All these actions should be paired with statements that emphasize adherence to order standards.
By properly addressing China’s ideological goals through these two recommendations, the United States and its allies will better facilitate peace and stability in the South China Sea and protect their interests in the region.
Reece Breaux is a Research Intern with the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. He is also pursuing a M.A. of International Affairs at The George Washington University, specializing in Indo-Pacific security.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
As is the case with most analysis of China’s international relations, much of the discourse surrounding Beijing’s approach to the South China Sea (SCS) fails to accurately diagnose the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideological and strategic underpinnings. As the dust settles following China’s June 17 confrontation with the Philippines over Second Thomas Shoal, U.S. policymakers must understand what drives the CCP—and its approach to the SCS—in order to develop a sound strategy that advances U.S. interests in this critical body of water.
What is the SCS and Why Does It Matter?
The South China Sea is a hotly contested waterway in Southeast Asia. Six governments claim portions of the Sea: China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. Most disputes are over maritime features in the Spratly and Paracel Islands groups, which are strategically located for military and resource exploration purposes. Since four of the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members are SCS claimants, ASEAN has been engaged in a decades-long negotiation with China on implementing a Code-of-Conduct for the SCS. However, differing interests within ASEAN hamstring the organization’s unity, complicating negotiations with Beijing. The almost century-long conflict over SCS sovereignty between various stakeholders stems from the Sea’s strategic and economic significance.
The SCS is important for the United States for at least four reasons. First, it is a key battleground for the contest over the rules and norms—i.e. the standards—that structure international relations and the international order. China’s continuous aggression in pursuit of claims not validated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea weakens the legitimacy of the U.S.-led international order, enabling states to more freely act in ways that undermine global stability. Second, it is a benchmark for Washington’s security credibility. If the United States fails to resoundingly support countries against Chinese aggressiveness—like the Philippines—allies and non-allies will perceive Washington as uncredible, making them more likely to hedge by accommodating Beijing’s vision for regional and global order. Third, control of the SCS would be crucial in any potential war between the United States and China. The Sea’s geographic location within the First Island Chain that bounds Asia’s Pacific coastline enables the great power that controls it to limit access to the region. Fourth and finally, the SCS is a major conduit of global trade, carrying approximately one-third of global maritime shipping, any disruption of which would have significant ramifications for the global economy.
What Drives the CCP?
The CCP is a hierarchical and strictly goal-oriented organization that operates according to its ideology of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” This ideology directs the Party to achieve specific goals corresponding with time-bound parameters across the full scope of governance and policy measures. Yet rather than prescribing rigid guidelines, Chinese socialism instructs the CCP to be reactive to change. In line with this guidance, the Party regularly alters its policy direction and short-term priorities, attempting to shape domestic and international conditions to benefit long-term CCP goals.
All CCP action works to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, or the restoration of China to a position of unrivalled power and privilege on the world stage. With national rejuvenation as the target, the Party sets subsidiary goals to ensure that China becomes a “great modern socialist country” by 2049.
Driven by ideology, China’s foreign policy explicitly seeks to place the country in a “leading position” across all areas of competitiveness. Specifically, the CCP aims to develop China into a “global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence”. In effect, this goal is international order leadership. Beijing employs a strategy that cultivates and applies its national power to attain two prerequisite goals for order leadership: a favorable balance of power and an international order architecture that benefits Chinese interests.
Due to its important geopolitical status, control of the SCS is a principal aspect of China’s push for order leadership. Beijing pursues control of the Sea to bolster its security, expand its territory, increase its international prestige, promote China-friendly order standards, and guarantee maritime trade and natural resource extraction. These intermediate objectives advance China’s two prerequisite goals and therefore its overall strategy.
China claims over 90 percent of the SCS under the so-called Nine-Dash Line, which is based on questionable historical assertions and was ruled illegitimate by a 2016 arbitral tribunal. To control its claims, Beijing uses a combination of gray-zone tactics, diplomacy, lawfare, and economic coercion. Specifically, China physically coerces challengers, erects trade barriers, militarizes artificial islands, operates in disputed areas, attempts to negotiate favorable agreements, and applies domestic law in international disputes.
How Does the United States Approach the SCS?
The United States’ approach to the SCS is an extension of its 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, which seeks to create a “free and open” Indo-Pacific. Regarding China, the strategy aims for a “balance of influence” that is “maximally favorable” to Washington. To achieve these goals, the strategy prescribes enhanced international cooperation, deepened regional ties, and economic integration. However, both the strategy’s goals and means are too broad to protect U.S. interests in the SCS against a determined adversary. Further, this strategy does not account for the CCP’s ideological drivers, calling instead for the United States to “shape the strategic environment in which it [China] operates.” By failing to address the ideological drivers of China’s strategy, the United States will merely be creating temporary conditions to which the CCP can readily adapt.
How Should the U.S. Change Its Approach to the SCS?
To optimally apply the Indo-Pacific Strategy in the SCS, the United States must establish specific objectives and employ deliberate means that respond to China’s ideological pursuit of SCS control. Accordingly, Washington’s primary objectives in the Sea should be to reinforce the legitimacy of key international order standards (equal sovereignty, non-aggression, territorial integrity, and rule of law) and to prevent China’s expansion of territorial control.
The United States’ principal barriers to achieving these objectives are an insufficient diplomatic approach and a toothless military response to Chinese aggressiveness. Current U.S. policy fails to marshal sufficient support for the U.S.-led international order from the range of states important to the SCS, and Washington’s reluctance to respond more forcefully to China’s provocations invites further aggression. A better approach to the SCS requires two key changes:
First, Washington should create and lead a regional coordination forum (RCF)—based on the aforementioned U.S.-led order standards—to align international responses to Indo-Pacific issues. This forum should include as many likeminded states as possible to expand the range and collective impact of RCF actions. Over time, the RCF will institutionalize support for the U.S.-led order and commit Washington’s relationships to the region through its formal structure and U.S. leadership.
Second, the United States should be more proactive in the SCS and respond proportionally to China’s assertive actions there. These measures would aim to deter China by raising the costs for aggressive and provocative behavior. Possible U.S. actions include escorting Philippine vessels in disputed waters, conducting more frequent freedom of navigation operations, physically blocking Chinese vessels, and blasting water cannons in response to the same. All these actions should be paired with statements that emphasize adherence to order standards.
By properly addressing China’s ideological goals through these two recommendations, the United States and its allies will better facilitate peace and stability in the South China Sea and protect their interests in the region.
Reece Breaux is a Research Intern with the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. He is also pursuing a M.A. of International Affairs at The George Washington University, specializing in Indo-Pacific security.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.