The United States Should ‘Operation Paul Bunyan’ the Second Thomas Shoal
The MOC
By
Samuel Byers
June 24, 2024
Introduction
Last week, vessels of the China Coast Guard (CCG) seriously injured a Philippine sailor during a ramming attack intended to prevent the Republic of the Philippines from resupplying the Sierra Madre, a Philippine warship beached on Second Thomas Shoal inside Manila’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Philippines defense chief, General Romeo Brawner, lambasted the CCG as “pirates” operating with “no legal authority to hijack our operations and destroy Philippine vessels”. The incident is the latest in a series of one-sided escalations and provocations as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) attempts to bully its smaller neighbor out of its own waters in pursuit of Beijing’s illegitimate “nine-dash line” territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Though this confrontation occurred on the far side of the world, Washington cannot afford to ignore the PRC’s escalating provocations. The Republic of the Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States and a critical bulwark against PRC aggression in the Western Pacific. Our mutual defense agreement—which dates to 1952—recognizes that “an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the parties would be dangerous” to the peace and safety of both countries; President Ferdinand Marcos has stated that he would consider the death of Philippine servicemembers sufficient to trigger the treaty’s mutual defense clause. Nor is the Second Thomas Shoal the only maritime feature in the region whose control Beijing disputes with Manilla—or China’s other neighbors. If PRC aggression is not arrested here, it will continue to escalate.
Washington should immediately partner with Manila to stage an overwhelming show of force in the waters around Second Thomas Shoal to ward off Chinese interference in efforts to resupply the Sierra Madre garrison. Doing so would send a clear message to Beijing that its smaller neighbors do not stand alone in the face of China’s maritime aggression.
Operation Paul Bunyan
A similarly intractable conflict on land provides a model for how the United States and the Philippines can call China’s bluff in the South China Sea. Forty-eight years ago, North Korean troops killed two Americans—U.S. Army officers Arthur Boniface and Mark Barrett—who were part of a small work detail dispatched into the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to prune a tree which was obscuring the line of sight from a United Nations observation post. Much like PRC government talking heads today, North Korea was quick to project blame for the incident on the U.S. and South Korea.
Washington decided thatthe United States would not be intimidated. Three days later, a combined U.S.-South Korean force numbering over 800 men returned to the DMZ “in order to peacefully finish the work left unfinished” by the killing of Boniface and Barrett. In addition to a regiment-sized ground force, the engineers dispatched to fell the obstructive tree were backed up by massive firepower: helicopter gunships, B-52s flown in from Guam, South Korean and U.S. Air Force fighters, and a carrier battle group in the Sea of Japan.
The overwhelming show of force was successful in forcing North Korean troops to stand down and let the tree be felled. A single tree may seem to be a small thing—much like an old warship beached on a reef—but the White House understood the need to underscore American resolve. The operation sent a clear message that the United States and its allies could not be intimidated by acts of violence against their servicemen.
Second Thomas Shoal
The PRC’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea pose a similar test today. Like the U.S. and South Korea did 48 years ago, Washington and Manila should work together to plan and execute an overwhelming show of force in the vicinity of the Second Thomas Shoal. The next Philippine vessel to resupply the garrison on the Sierra Madra should be escorted by a joint task force of U.S. and Philippine warships and overflown by a carrier air wing. CCG cutters may be brazen enough to bully lone Philippine vessels in the South China Sea—tangling with an American carrier strike group is a different game entirely.
The point of Operation Paul Bunyan was not to fell an overgrown tree or avenge the deaths of two American soldiers; it was to remind Pyongyang of the sheer firepower backing each and every U.S. servicemember stationed on the DMZ. Likewise, the Sierra Madre today is just a single piece on a larger game board. The message Washington needs to send to Beijing is simple: you may send a coast guard cutter, but we will send a carrier strike group. The goal is not to provoke a confrontation with the CCG or the People’s Liberation Army Navy, but rather to raise the ante so high at a time of our choosing that Beijing is unwilling to match our bet and backs down. Doing so will undermine the PRC’s unfounded claims to the South China Sea and send a clear message to America’s allies both far and near that the United States will always back its friends against aggression.
Like the Korean DMZ 50 years ago, China’s expansive territorial claims within the “nine-dash line” are a critical fault line between the United States and its allies and the forces of an authoritarian, communist government on the other. Authoritarian leaders understand power—and they are more often swayed by displays of force and resolve than by supplication. As Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin supposedly said: “You probe with bayonets: if you find mush, you push. If you find steel, you withdraw”. This mindset is endemic to Marxist-Leninist regimes; the only way to force them to back down is to meet their bayonets with steel. The Second Thomas Shoal is but a single flashpoint in the PRC’s long-running gray zone campaign to dominate the South China Sea—if the United States does not back its treaty ally here, where is the next place China will probe?
Conclusion
Those who worry that a U.S.-led show of force would needlessly inflame the situation around Second Thomas Shoal would do well to consider China’s years-long track record of escalating aggressive behavior towards the Philippines and other South China Sea states. Planting a flag here and forcing the PRC to back down would buy leeway for Manila to maneuver going forward while simultaneously bolstering the confidence of other states in the region to stand up to Beijing’s bullying.
The current Secretary of the Navy, Carlos Del Toro, frequently invokes the concept of maritime statecraft to describe “not only naval diplomacy but a national, whole-of-government effort to build comprehensive U.S. and allied maritime power”. An overwhelming display of U.S. and Philippine naval power in defense of our ally’s maritime interests would serve as an excellent demonstration case for the value of America’s maritime partnerships in the ongoing competition with the Chinese Communist Party.
Samuel Byers, Senior National Security Advisor
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Samuel Byers
Introduction
Last week, vessels of the China Coast Guard (CCG) seriously injured a Philippine sailor during a ramming attack intended to prevent the Republic of the Philippines from resupplying the Sierra Madre, a Philippine warship beached on Second Thomas Shoal inside Manila’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Philippines defense chief, General Romeo Brawner, lambasted the CCG as “pirates” operating with “no legal authority to hijack our operations and destroy Philippine vessels”. The incident is the latest in a series of one-sided escalations and provocations as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) attempts to bully its smaller neighbor out of its own waters in pursuit of Beijing’s illegitimate “nine-dash line” territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Though this confrontation occurred on the far side of the world, Washington cannot afford to ignore the PRC’s escalating provocations. The Republic of the Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States and a critical bulwark against PRC aggression in the Western Pacific. Our mutual defense agreement—which dates to 1952—recognizes that “an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the parties would be dangerous” to the peace and safety of both countries; President Ferdinand Marcos has stated that he would consider the death of Philippine servicemembers sufficient to trigger the treaty’s mutual defense clause. Nor is the Second Thomas Shoal the only maritime feature in the region whose control Beijing disputes with Manilla—or China’s other neighbors. If PRC aggression is not arrested here, it will continue to escalate.
Washington should immediately partner with Manila to stage an overwhelming show of force in the waters around Second Thomas Shoal to ward off Chinese interference in efforts to resupply the Sierra Madre garrison. Doing so would send a clear message to Beijing that its smaller neighbors do not stand alone in the face of China’s maritime aggression.
Operation Paul Bunyan
A similarly intractable conflict on land provides a model for how the United States and the Philippines can call China’s bluff in the South China Sea. Forty-eight years ago, North Korean troops killed two Americans—U.S. Army officers Arthur Boniface and Mark Barrett—who were part of a small work detail dispatched into the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to prune a tree which was obscuring the line of sight from a United Nations observation post. Much like PRC government talking heads today, North Korea was quick to project blame for the incident on the U.S. and South Korea.
Washington decided that the United States would not be intimidated. Three days later, a combined U.S.-South Korean force numbering over 800 men returned to the DMZ “in order to peacefully finish the work left unfinished” by the killing of Boniface and Barrett. In addition to a regiment-sized ground force, the engineers dispatched to fell the obstructive tree were backed up by massive firepower: helicopter gunships, B-52s flown in from Guam, South Korean and U.S. Air Force fighters, and a carrier battle group in the Sea of Japan.
The overwhelming show of force was successful in forcing North Korean troops to stand down and let the tree be felled. A single tree may seem to be a small thing—much like an old warship beached on a reef—but the White House understood the need to underscore American resolve. The operation sent a clear message that the United States and its allies could not be intimidated by acts of violence against their servicemen.
Second Thomas Shoal
The PRC’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea pose a similar test today. Like the U.S. and South Korea did 48 years ago, Washington and Manila should work together to plan and execute an overwhelming show of force in the vicinity of the Second Thomas Shoal. The next Philippine vessel to resupply the garrison on the Sierra Madra should be escorted by a joint task force of U.S. and Philippine warships and overflown by a carrier air wing. CCG cutters may be brazen enough to bully lone Philippine vessels in the South China Sea—tangling with an American carrier strike group is a different game entirely.
The point of Operation Paul Bunyan was not to fell an overgrown tree or avenge the deaths of two American soldiers; it was to remind Pyongyang of the sheer firepower backing each and every U.S. servicemember stationed on the DMZ. Likewise, the Sierra Madre today is just a single piece on a larger game board. The message Washington needs to send to Beijing is simple: you may send a coast guard cutter, but we will send a carrier strike group. The goal is not to provoke a confrontation with the CCG or the People’s Liberation Army Navy, but rather to raise the ante so high at a time of our choosing that Beijing is unwilling to match our bet and backs down. Doing so will undermine the PRC’s unfounded claims to the South China Sea and send a clear message to America’s allies both far and near that the United States will always back its friends against aggression.
Like the Korean DMZ 50 years ago, China’s expansive territorial claims within the “nine-dash line” are a critical fault line between the United States and its allies and the forces of an authoritarian, communist government on the other. Authoritarian leaders understand power—and they are more often swayed by displays of force and resolve than by supplication. As Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin supposedly said: “You probe with bayonets: if you find mush, you push. If you find steel, you withdraw”. This mindset is endemic to Marxist-Leninist regimes; the only way to force them to back down is to meet their bayonets with steel. The Second Thomas Shoal is but a single flashpoint in the PRC’s long-running gray zone campaign to dominate the South China Sea—if the United States does not back its treaty ally here, where is the next place China will probe?
Conclusion
Those who worry that a U.S.-led show of force would needlessly inflame the situation around Second Thomas Shoal would do well to consider China’s years-long track record of escalating aggressive behavior towards the Philippines and other South China Sea states. Planting a flag here and forcing the PRC to back down would buy leeway for Manila to maneuver going forward while simultaneously bolstering the confidence of other states in the region to stand up to Beijing’s bullying.
The current Secretary of the Navy, Carlos Del Toro, frequently invokes the concept of maritime statecraft to describe “not only naval diplomacy but a national, whole-of-government effort to build comprehensive U.S. and allied maritime power”. An overwhelming display of U.S. and Philippine naval power in defense of our ally’s maritime interests would serve as an excellent demonstration case for the value of America’s maritime partnerships in the ongoing competition with the Chinese Communist Party.
Samuel Byers, Senior National Security Advisor
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.