Grading Goldwater-Nichols at Forty Years; Has it Worked?
The MOC
By
Dr. Steven Wills
November 7, 2024
Figure 1: Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn; Primary Architects of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986
The Goldwater-Nichols Act (GWN) of 1986 is now nearly 40 years old. As such, it ought now to be a subject of historical evaluation. In the decade following its passage, GWN was credited with the successes of the First Gulf War and the implementation of “jointness” at both the operational and administrative levels. Opponents were cast as evil “service parochialists” who elevated their individual services over the nation’s national security.
However, since 9/11, this “sunlit uplands” depiction of the U.S. joint force and its civilian leadership has become dark and clouded. Goldwater-Nichols promised to end conditions that were seen as the cause for the failed outcome of the Vietnam War, the capture of the USS Pueblo, and service communication failures seen in the 1983 terrorist bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, and the invasion of Grenada. The legislation was supposed to reinvigorate “civilian control of the military that was threatened” (by what at that time, was never really made clear) and stamp out service parochialism. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) became the President’s principal military advisor, and the other joint chiefs were distanced from direct interaction with the chief executive. The CJCS was also intended to get control of the individual service budgets and direct them toward the good of all as opposed to narrow, parochial interests.
Have any of these reforms really occurred? Senate Armed Services Committee staffer and Goldwater-Nichols advocate James Locher employed a grading rubric of nine points to evaluate the effectiveness of the Goldwater Nichols legislation at ages 10, 20, and 30 years. How do the legislation’s key provisions hold up today?
Strengthen Civilian Control of the Military: The Constitution clearly says that Congress provides civilian control of the armed forces. Civilian control of the military in that respect was never in doubt. GWN advocates sought to elevate the role of Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) civilian bureaucrats and analysts over the individual services. However, failure to successfully prosecute the Afghan and Iraq conflicts, massive defense budgets produce lagging numbers of ships, aircraft, armored vehicles, and weapons suggests that Congress should re-assert its control of these aspects of military administration.
Improve Military Advice to the President: At the time of Goldwater-Nichols, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger firmly stated that the advice he received from the Joint Chiefs was uniformly good. In 1986, CJCS, General John Vessey stated: “As in the case of all advisors who perform their duties well, the [Joint Chiefs of Staff] from time to time have to give Secretaries of Defense advice they may not like to hear. But to be honest to the oath that they have sworn to serve the country they must do so.” Since it is difficult to separate bad advice from unpopular advice, it remains unclear if and how GWN has improved the quality of military advice. Privileging the advice of a single principle military advisor also limits the President’s access to the full spectrum of perspectives offered by the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Place Clear Responsibilities on the Unified Combatant Commanders: Operational level of war command has arguably improved since GWN’s passage. However, the act did not empowered the United States to win non-traditional conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are now as arguably lost as was the Vietnam War.
Ensure that a Unified Commander’s Authority is Commensurate with Their Responsibilities: A focus on regional commanders makes sense to counter regional threats. However, great power rivalry crosses the Unified Command Plan boundaries, suggesting that the United States needs to return to a more centralized, Cold War-style command system. Unified Commanders can no longer be left to act as regional, Roman proconsular-like authorities and must better coordinate with their counterparts under national-level leadership.
Increase Attention to Strategy Formulation and Contingency Planning: Operational level of war contingency planning has worked in some cases, but the 2024 Gaza pier operation, the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the failed mission to stop Houthi missile attacks in the Red Sea offer strong examples of failure. Earlier missteps in prosecuting counterinsurgency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that despite decades of joint professional military education, a combination of poor operational level of war planning and civilian interference produced poor military outcomes.
Provide for the More Efficient Use of Resources: Ongoing problems with an ever-increasing defense budget with longer timelines to fielding new equipment in smaller numbers suggest real problems remain in the defense acquisition system that Goldwater-Nichols did not solve and may have made worse over the last four decades.
Improve Joint Officer Management: While more officers have “joint” experience, there are arguably fewer opportunities in an officer’s career to lead at the company and field grade levels before the potential for making flag officer. That loss of experience has been judged by some experts as a loss of training and experience within the operational navy.
Enhance the Effectiveness of Joint Military Operations: Limited operations with short-term tactical success have been achieved due in part to the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Legislation. U.S. Cold War strategy, technology and tactics overcome Saddam Hussein in 1991, and U.S. weapon systems have been effective for periods of time against Russian forces in Ukraine since 2022. There has yet however been a corresponding test of U.S. joint operations theory against a peer opponent.
Improve Defense Management and Administration: Attempts to stamp out sole-service and even bilaterial efforts like Air-Sea Battle have made the joint force weaker and less flexible than its Cold War counterpart. The extensive joint bureaucratic superstructure added to the Pentagon since 1986 has not made defense acquisition any more affordable or easier to accomplish. The superlative weapon systems created during the Cold War were the product of intense service competition, and while messy and sometimes costly they generally produced effective combat platforms. Trying to force services into buying things they did not want—such as the F-111 as a Navy carrier aircraft—resulted in less capable equipment.
The Department of Defense needs a massive overhaul to reduce the civilian bureaucracy in favor of a much smaller, military-led structure directly responsible to Congress that allows the services to compete before the legislature to determine what programs and policies are best for the nation. Civilian control of the military must rest with Congress, and not Pentagon bureaucrats as the Founders intended in the Constitution. Defense consolidation and reform since the Second World War has instantiated multiple layers of civilian bureaucrats between the military and the Congress and President. Civilian control of the military is fundamentally a question of political control which can only be exercised by the elected leaders of the country and not career bureaucrats.
The positive changes in the U.S. military operational command structure begat by Goldwater-Nichols have proven effective and should remain, but the bloated civilian OSD structure that has been a growing parasite on military readiness and combat execution must be reduced. Such reforms are vital to preparing the U.S. military for potential combat against the People’s Republic of China. Come January there will be a new president in the White House. Now is a good time to start the reform process.
Dr. Steve Wills is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
The Goldwater-Nichols Act (GWN) of 1986 is now nearly 40 years old. As such, it ought now to be a subject of historical evaluation. In the decade following its passage, GWN was credited with the successes of the First Gulf War and the implementation of “jointness” at both the operational and administrative levels. Opponents were cast as evil “service parochialists” who elevated their individual services over the nation’s national security.
However, since 9/11, this “sunlit uplands” depiction of the U.S. joint force and its civilian leadership has become dark and clouded. Goldwater-Nichols promised to end conditions that were seen as the cause for the failed outcome of the Vietnam War, the capture of the USS Pueblo, and service communication failures seen in the 1983 terrorist bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, and the invasion of Grenada. The legislation was supposed to reinvigorate “civilian control of the military that was threatened” (by what at that time, was never really made clear) and stamp out service parochialism. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) became the President’s principal military advisor, and the other joint chiefs were distanced from direct interaction with the chief executive. The CJCS was also intended to get control of the individual service budgets and direct them toward the good of all as opposed to narrow, parochial interests.
Have any of these reforms really occurred? Senate Armed Services Committee staffer and Goldwater-Nichols advocate James Locher employed a grading rubric of nine points to evaluate the effectiveness of the Goldwater Nichols legislation at ages 10, 20, and 30 years. How do the legislation’s key provisions hold up today?
The Department of Defense needs a massive overhaul to reduce the civilian bureaucracy in favor of a much smaller, military-led structure directly responsible to Congress that allows the services to compete before the legislature to determine what programs and policies are best for the nation. Civilian control of the military must rest with Congress, and not Pentagon bureaucrats as the Founders intended in the Constitution. Defense consolidation and reform since the Second World War has instantiated multiple layers of civilian bureaucrats between the military and the Congress and President. Civilian control of the military is fundamentally a question of political control which can only be exercised by the elected leaders of the country and not career bureaucrats.
The positive changes in the U.S. military operational command structure begat by Goldwater-Nichols have proven effective and should remain, but the bloated civilian OSD structure that has been a growing parasite on military readiness and combat execution must be reduced. Such reforms are vital to preparing the U.S. military for potential combat against the People’s Republic of China. Come January there will be a new president in the White House. Now is a good time to start the reform process.
Dr. Steve Wills is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.