The potential U.S. plan to build a port facility with causewayfrom the sea to transport humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza caught in the Israel-Hamas war crossfire is a risky proposition. People in the region have long memories and the idea that the U.S. military is again placing itself between Israel and those that wish to destroy it will generate significant terrorist interest in the project. The region’s geography is poor for the construction of a maritime port, and the U.S. would have to expend significant resources to create such a facility. While advertised as not needing U.S. “boots on the ground” (BOG) to operate, it remains to be seen what organization would distribute the U.S. aid once on the beach to ensure it did not fall into the hands of Hamas. A better course to provide aid to the Palestinians would be use a sea basecomprised of U.S. amphibious and hospital ships to fly aid supplies to the Egyptian border with Gaza. From there third-party organizations would need to distribute them inside the embattled region. Putting a U.S. military beachhead into the middle of the region’s worst war in a generation will only make U.S. forces the #1 target for terrorists in the region, and without a U.S.-led distribution plan, it is unlikely that aid will reach those in need.
The Long Shadow of Beirut 1983
The last time the U.S. tried to position itself during an Arab/Israeli conflict with military forces was the early 1980’s. In June 1982, the Israeli armed forces invaded Lebanon to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO,) after a long series of terrorists’ attacks on Israel. Following a settlement, U.S. and French peacekeepers deployed to Beirut with the mission of keeping the fragile peace among Israeli, Syrian, Lebanese, and other factions in place.
In October 1983, despite intelligence warnings of possible Iranian-backed terrorist actions against U.S. and French forces, a suicide bomber penetrated the gates of the U.S. Marine Corps 1st Battalion, 8th Marines barracks at the Beirut airport and exploded a bomb that killed 241 U.S. military personnel. Other bombs directed at French armed forces bases killed 58 French soldiers bringing the death toll to 307, including the bombers. All U.S. and Allied peacekeepers were withdrawn by July 1984. The attack damaged U.S. policy in the region for more than a decade, and the investigation commission headed by retired Admiral and former Pacific Commander Robert (Bob) Long detailed numerous failings in command, control, and intelligence. While U.S. military command and control has significantly improved since the 1980’s, complex operations in an urban environment in the presence of civilians are some of the most complex the U.S. military attempts.
Figure 2: US Navy Landing Craft, Air Cushion Vehicle LCAC Connector.
Causeways Can Be a Challenge
U.S. forces engaged in the delivery of aid to Gaza along a “floating metal road” (causeway,) from ships close to the beach, as well as those ashore handling supplies could be significant terrorist targets. Another waterborne method of moving supplies with greater speed and less risk is the use of connectors; vehicles that move people and supplies from ships to shore. These include the Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) vehicle and conventional small landing craft that resemble their World War 2 predecessors. LCAC’s and landing craft can move larger amounts of supplies and land in austere locations not requiring a port facility. Their destination can be as simple as a beach.
Robust U.S. military force will be needed to safeguard those personnel and their equipment. Terrorist action against U.S. forces could provoke a U.S. military response that results in the death of Palestinian civilians in the same way the United States government has accused the Israeli military of causing civilian casualties.
Terrible Geography for a Port
The Levantine coast has been noted for its poor natural harbors for millennia. The Judean king Herod the First and his Roman supporters had to construct the port of Caesarea in what is today Northern Israel due to the complete lack of natural harbors in the region. A U.S. military “harbor” would need to bed supplied from ships close to shore. Those vessels would be in rocket and mortar range and some kind of local air and missile defense system would be needed to protect operations. A metallic causeway could also be the target of drone attacks like those conducted by Ukrainian forces against the Kerch bridge.
Boots on the Ground Required at the Water’s Edge or More?
Any close-in port facility would have to be manned by U.S. “boots on the ground,” both in terms of operating the port and for the distribution of aid supplies into the interior of Gaza. No third-party organization like the United Nations is presently in the war zone of Gaza, and transport of aid supplies in Gaza could be be left to U.S. military forces. These shipments could easily be the target of direct terrorist action, or just accidental losses due to the ongoing Israeli military operation against Hamas.
Better Solutions Exist
Figure 3: An MV-22 Osprey aircraft engaged in relief delivery in the Philippines in 2013.
The United States has much better options than an artificial harbor from which to rapidly move aid to Gaza. One of the best would be to mount aid transfers from a “sea base” of U.S. amphibious warships located at a safe distance offshore from Gaza and flown into the region by MV-22 Osprey aircraft, soon to be cleared from a recently grounding due to an accident. The ruined Yasser Arafat Airport in Gaza close to the Egyptian border might be the best location to set up a defendable, advanced base where aid supplies can be landed. Such a facility would still be open to missile and mortar attack, but the expanse of the airport could allow a defense in depth of the facility not possible with a floating causeway.
One of the Most Difficult Missions for the U.S. Joint Force
Setting up and delivering humanitarian aid amid an ongoing Israeli-Hamas war would be a significant challenge, even if a cease-fire could be established to allow for the start of such an operation. An artificial harbor or amphibious causeway would be under constant threat of attack and could be disabled with greater ease than would a more conventional base at an airfield. Even the ruined Arafat airport offers a better location for aid supply than would a maritime causeway. Such an operation is risky on many levels and could again damage U.S. credibility in the region as a fair supplier of aid. The U.S. must also find a third-party organization to run the aid distribution inside Gaza, or it risks sinking the U.S. military into another endless Middle East military muddle, with U.S. casualties a likely outcome.
Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
The potential U.S. plan to build a port facility with causeway from the sea to transport humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza caught in the Israel-Hamas war crossfire is a risky proposition. People in the region have long memories and the idea that the U.S. military is again placing itself between Israel and those that wish to destroy it will generate significant terrorist interest in the project. The region’s geography is poor for the construction of a maritime port, and the U.S. would have to expend significant resources to create such a facility. While advertised as not needing U.S. “boots on the ground” (BOG) to operate, it remains to be seen what organization would distribute the U.S. aid once on the beach to ensure it did not fall into the hands of Hamas. A better course to provide aid to the Palestinians would be use a sea base comprised of U.S. amphibious and hospital ships to fly aid supplies to the Egyptian border with Gaza. From there third-party organizations would need to distribute them inside the embattled region. Putting a U.S. military beachhead into the middle of the region’s worst war in a generation will only make U.S. forces the #1 target for terrorists in the region, and without a U.S.-led distribution plan, it is unlikely that aid will reach those in need.
The Long Shadow of Beirut 1983
The last time the U.S. tried to position itself during an Arab/Israeli conflict with military forces was the early 1980’s. In June 1982, the Israeli armed forces invaded Lebanon to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO,) after a long series of terrorists’ attacks on Israel. Following a settlement, U.S. and French peacekeepers deployed to Beirut with the mission of keeping the fragile peace among Israeli, Syrian, Lebanese, and other factions in place.
In October 1983, despite intelligence warnings of possible Iranian-backed terrorist actions against U.S. and French forces, a suicide bomber penetrated the gates of the U.S. Marine Corps 1st Battalion, 8th Marines barracks at the Beirut airport and exploded a bomb that killed 241 U.S. military personnel. Other bombs directed at French armed forces bases killed 58 French soldiers bringing the death toll to 307, including the bombers. All U.S. and Allied peacekeepers were withdrawn by July 1984. The attack damaged U.S. policy in the region for more than a decade, and the investigation commission headed by retired Admiral and former Pacific Commander Robert (Bob) Long detailed numerous failings in command, control, and intelligence. While U.S. military command and control has significantly improved since the 1980’s, complex operations in an urban environment in the presence of civilians are some of the most complex the U.S. military attempts.
Figure 2: US Navy Landing Craft, Air Cushion Vehicle LCAC Connector.
Causeways Can Be a Challenge
U.S. forces engaged in the delivery of aid to Gaza along a “floating metal road” (causeway,) from ships close to the beach, as well as those ashore handling supplies could be significant terrorist targets. Another waterborne method of moving supplies with greater speed and less risk is the use of connectors; vehicles that move people and supplies from ships to shore. These include the Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) vehicle and conventional small landing craft that resemble their World War 2 predecessors. LCAC’s and landing craft can move larger amounts of supplies and land in austere locations not requiring a port facility. Their destination can be as simple as a beach.
Robust U.S. military force will be needed to safeguard those personnel and their equipment. Terrorist action against U.S. forces could provoke a U.S. military response that results in the death of Palestinian civilians in the same way the United States government has accused the Israeli military of causing civilian casualties.
Terrible Geography for a Port
The Levantine coast has been noted for its poor natural harbors for millennia. The Judean king Herod the First and his Roman supporters had to construct the port of Caesarea in what is today Northern Israel due to the complete lack of natural harbors in the region. A U.S. military “harbor” would need to bed supplied from ships close to shore. Those vessels would be in rocket and mortar range and some kind of local air and missile defense system would be needed to protect operations. A metallic causeway could also be the target of drone attacks like those conducted by Ukrainian forces against the Kerch bridge.
Boots on the Ground Required at the Water’s Edge or More?
Any close-in port facility would have to be manned by U.S. “boots on the ground,” both in terms of operating the port and for the distribution of aid supplies into the interior of Gaza. No third-party organization like the United Nations is presently in the war zone of Gaza, and transport of aid supplies in Gaza could be be left to U.S. military forces. These shipments could easily be the target of direct terrorist action, or just accidental losses due to the ongoing Israeli military operation against Hamas.
Better Solutions Exist
Figure 3: An MV-22 Osprey aircraft engaged in relief delivery in the Philippines in 2013.
The United States has much better options than an artificial harbor from which to rapidly move aid to Gaza. One of the best would be to mount aid transfers from a “sea base” of U.S. amphibious warships located at a safe distance offshore from Gaza and flown into the region by MV-22 Osprey aircraft, soon to be cleared from a recently grounding due to an accident. The ruined Yasser Arafat Airport in Gaza close to the Egyptian border might be the best location to set up a defendable, advanced base where aid supplies can be landed. Such a facility would still be open to missile and mortar attack, but the expanse of the airport could allow a defense in depth of the facility not possible with a floating causeway.
One of the Most Difficult Missions for the U.S. Joint Force
Setting up and delivering humanitarian aid amid an ongoing Israeli-Hamas war would be a significant challenge, even if a cease-fire could be established to allow for the start of such an operation. An artificial harbor or amphibious causeway would be under constant threat of attack and could be disabled with greater ease than would a more conventional base at an airfield. Even the ruined Arafat airport offers a better location for aid supply than would a maritime causeway. Such an operation is risky on many levels and could again damage U.S. credibility in the region as a fair supplier of aid. The U.S. must also find a third-party organization to run the aid distribution inside Gaza, or it risks sinking the U.S. military into another endless Middle East military muddle, with U.S. casualties a likely outcome.
Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.