Going Asymmetric: How Ukraine is Keeping Russia at Bay in the Black Sea
The MOC
Photo from Pravda.
By
Charles Rahr
May 25, 2023
In its war with Russia, one thing is certain: Ukraine has defied the odds. While Western intelligence expected Kyiv to fall to Russia within days of its invasion, the country’s leadership is very much alive and well. This is a testimony to the determination of the Ukrainian people and what can be done when top-notch Western military hardware is put in capable hands.
Ukraine has also defied the odds in the waters of the Black Sea, where its military has denied Russia uninhibited access to the Ukrainian coast, despite possessing relatively few ships. Ukraine’s employment of asymmetric capabilities in the Black Sea holds lessons for countries seeking to defend against larger naval powers, despite lacking the budgetary capacity or political will to build a large navy.
Although it has made strides to rebuild, including by striking a deal with Turkey to purchase two Ada-class corvettes, the Ukrainian Navy is not nearly the force that it once was. Ukraine’s loss of naval power, specifically in surface ships, stems from its loss of Crimea following Russia’s illegal seizure of the peninsula in 2014. With much of Ukraine’s naval vessels concentrated in Crimean ports, the country saw its fleet shrink by approximately 70% following the Russian invasion.
Once these ships were lost, the sailors that manned them were lost as well. Ukraine’s navy fell from 17,000 to 5,000 sailors. And among those who defected or were dismissed was Ukraine’s former head who defected to Russia. And, to add insult to injury, Ukraine has been left without a flagship in its fleet since it scuttled the frigate Hetman Sahaidachny in March 2022, to prevent it from falling into Russian hands. Yet, despite the odds, Ukraine has overcome each these setbacks and kept Russian ships largely locked up in their ports in Sevastopol and Novorossiysk.
Employing a mix of asymmetric capabilities like sea mines, anti-ship missiles, and unmanned surface vessels, Ukraine has helped make the Black Sea far from the conflict’s primary theater. Ukraine notably employed such capabilities by sinking the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, Moskva, using land-based anti-ship missiles. It also sank a Russian support ship, the Vasily Bekh, near the now-famous Snake Island using Western-supplied Harpoon missiles. Its the continued threatening of Harpoons, and other foreign and indigenously-made anti-ship missiles in Ukraine’s possession, that have helped to deter Russia from taking a more offensive role in the Black Sea.
Also playing a significant role in keeping the Russian surface fleet at bay are armed unmanned surface vessels. While there is debate over whether these weapons are ushering in a new age of warfare, there is no questioning their utility. Ukraine made use of these drones last October when it attacked Russian ships docked at their port of Sevastopol. And, although no ships were sunk, the Ukrainians still likely managed to damage two Russian ships, including the Admiral Makarov which replaced the Moskva as the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship. Given their usefulness, the Ukrainians have also been reportedly developing an unmanned underwater vehicle that may be armed.
Ukraine’s success at keeping the Russian Navy at bay should serve as an example for other countries which may lack budgetary resources or political will to build up more significant presences at sea but nevertheless need a naval defense. These capabilities can provide real firepower on the cheap, with Ukraine’s armed unmanned surface vessel pegged at roughly $274,000, a far cry from the huge sums of money needed to build modern warships (even Ukraine’s new Ada-class corvettes have a combined cost of over $236 million).
Ukraine’s work in deterring the Russian surface fleet should be of special consideration to countries along the Baltic Sea and in the Indo-Pacific that may need to mount stronger defense against great power competitors such as Russia and China. To do so, countries in each of these regions, such as Estonia and Latvia in the Baltics, should consider accelerating purchases of land-based anti-ship missiles while also considering the purchase of other asymmetric capabilities like armed unmanned surface vessels.
With a planned Ukrainian offensive on the horizon, the war is likely far from over. That means there is still plenty of time for the Russians to use the Black Sea for much more than a space from which to launch depraved missile attacks at civilians, especially as its navy could shut down the Ukraine-Russia grain deal.
But, despite uncertainty around the Black Sea’s future role in the conflict, the Ukrainians have proved thus far to be a formidable presence in its waters, despite lacking much of a navy themselves. The country’s employment of asymmetric capabilities has been crucial in providing that presence, and such capabilities should be viewed by other nations as a way to provide naval power in times of competing security priorities and limited resources. Should Ukraine continue to keep the Russian Navy at bay until the conflict’s conclusion, the utility of those capabilities will be proven even stronger.
Charles Rahr is a Research Assistant at the American Enterprise Institute focusing on defense budgets and grand strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
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Center for Maritime Strategy
By Charles Rahr
In its war with Russia, one thing is certain: Ukraine has defied the odds. While Western intelligence expected Kyiv to fall to Russia within days of its invasion, the country’s leadership is very much alive and well. This is a testimony to the determination of the Ukrainian people and what can be done when top-notch Western military hardware is put in capable hands.
Ukraine has also defied the odds in the waters of the Black Sea, where its military has denied Russia uninhibited access to the Ukrainian coast, despite possessing relatively few ships. Ukraine’s employment of asymmetric capabilities in the Black Sea holds lessons for countries seeking to defend against larger naval powers, despite lacking the budgetary capacity or political will to build a large navy.
Although it has made strides to rebuild, including by striking a deal with Turkey to purchase two Ada-class corvettes, the Ukrainian Navy is not nearly the force that it once was. Ukraine’s loss of naval power, specifically in surface ships, stems from its loss of Crimea following Russia’s illegal seizure of the peninsula in 2014. With much of Ukraine’s naval vessels concentrated in Crimean ports, the country saw its fleet shrink by approximately 70% following the Russian invasion.
Once these ships were lost, the sailors that manned them were lost as well. Ukraine’s navy fell from 17,000 to 5,000 sailors. And among those who defected or were dismissed was Ukraine’s former head who defected to Russia. And, to add insult to injury, Ukraine has been left without a flagship in its fleet since it scuttled the frigate Hetman Sahaidachny in March 2022, to prevent it from falling into Russian hands. Yet, despite the odds, Ukraine has overcome each these setbacks and kept Russian ships largely locked up in their ports in Sevastopol and Novorossiysk.
Employing a mix of asymmetric capabilities like sea mines, anti-ship missiles, and unmanned surface vessels, Ukraine has helped make the Black Sea far from the conflict’s primary theater. Ukraine notably employed such capabilities by sinking the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, Moskva, using land-based anti-ship missiles. It also sank a Russian support ship, the Vasily Bekh, near the now-famous Snake Island using Western-supplied Harpoon missiles. Its the continued threatening of Harpoons, and other foreign and indigenously-made anti-ship missiles in Ukraine’s possession, that have helped to deter Russia from taking a more offensive role in the Black Sea.
Also playing a significant role in keeping the Russian surface fleet at bay are armed unmanned surface vessels. While there is debate over whether these weapons are ushering in a new age of warfare, there is no questioning their utility. Ukraine made use of these drones last October when it attacked Russian ships docked at their port of Sevastopol. And, although no ships were sunk, the Ukrainians still likely managed to damage two Russian ships, including the Admiral Makarov which replaced the Moskva as the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship. Given their usefulness, the Ukrainians have also been reportedly developing an unmanned underwater vehicle that may be armed.
Ukraine’s success at keeping the Russian Navy at bay should serve as an example for other countries which may lack budgetary resources or political will to build up more significant presences at sea but nevertheless need a naval defense. These capabilities can provide real firepower on the cheap, with Ukraine’s armed unmanned surface vessel pegged at roughly $274,000, a far cry from the huge sums of money needed to build modern warships (even Ukraine’s new Ada-class corvettes have a combined cost of over $236 million).
Ukraine’s work in deterring the Russian surface fleet should be of special consideration to countries along the Baltic Sea and in the Indo-Pacific that may need to mount stronger defense against great power competitors such as Russia and China. To do so, countries in each of these regions, such as Estonia and Latvia in the Baltics, should consider accelerating purchases of land-based anti-ship missiles while also considering the purchase of other asymmetric capabilities like armed unmanned surface vessels.
With a planned Ukrainian offensive on the horizon, the war is likely far from over. That means there is still plenty of time for the Russians to use the Black Sea for much more than a space from which to launch depraved missile attacks at civilians, especially as its navy could shut down the Ukraine-Russia grain deal.
But, despite uncertainty around the Black Sea’s future role in the conflict, the Ukrainians have proved thus far to be a formidable presence in its waters, despite lacking much of a navy themselves. The country’s employment of asymmetric capabilities has been crucial in providing that presence, and such capabilities should be viewed by other nations as a way to provide naval power in times of competing security priorities and limited resources. Should Ukraine continue to keep the Russian Navy at bay until the conflict’s conclusion, the utility of those capabilities will be proven even stronger.
Charles Rahr is a Research Assistant at the American Enterprise Institute focusing on defense budgets and grand strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.