A New Mississippi Squadron: The Navy’s Need for a Brown-Water Fleet
The MOC
By
Connor Ronka
October 28, 2025
Amidst the Navy’s transition from its Great War on Terror-era strategy with the return of great power competition and the rise of China, its riverine capabilities have taken a secondary place in its operational design. Once a central feature of the Navy’s supporting role in the early twenty-first century and seeing heavy use in Iraq, the former Coastal Riverine Force (dedicated to riverine, littoral, and harbor security operations) has been renamed as the Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces (MESF) to reflect the Navy’s vision of its increasing blue-water integration. One of the Navy’s main vessels dedicated to riverine and littoral warfare, the Mark VI patrol boat, has been deemed as “not really needed” by Major General Tracy King of the Marine Corps when conducting a wargaming scenario against peer competitors. This strategic posture has left the U.S. with only a handful truly riverine capable units and little strategic direction for their future.
Abandoning the riverine realm to neglect would be a mistake. U.S. history has proven the utility of operations on inland waters in a variety of wars and environments. Additionally, current developments in U.S. pressure on state and non-state actors in Latin America points to a possible future where riverine-capable forces could be a central element in interdicting the operations of cartels and drug-runners close to home. The U.S. Navy must invest in the creation of a long-term riverine strategy capable of fighting both conventional and asymmetric threats, as well as the organization needed to sustain potential large-scale operations going into the future.
Brown-water fleets have served a number of strategic roles in their history with the U.S. Navy. Riverine warfare played a critical role in the American Civil War, where Union forces utilized the Mississippi River and its tributaries as highways to propel massive invading armies into the heart of the western Confederacy. While roads could be washed out with rain and railroads torn up by Southern guerillas, rivers proved to be consistently reliable lines of communication relatively secure from inclement weather or Confederate raids. Even the series of fortresses built by the South to stop Northern movements fell to the gunboats of the Mississippi Squadron and the troops they ferried.
Although the mechanization of modern warfare made river transportation second to trains or automobiles, inland waterways still played a major role in Vietnam and Iraq as a means of fighting against irregular warfare. In Vietnam, the Navy’s brown-water fleet was a key tool in interdicting the movement of the Viet Cong’s supplies and troops, conducting regular patrols along the nation’s extensive network of deltas. Beyond this, it also participated in nation-building exercises and helped relief aid reach isolated communities. Similarly in the Second Iraq War, riverine forces conducted patrols, moved troops, and provided fire support for units operating on land. Despite the important role the brown-water fleet played in these modern conflicts, as well as studies recommending a 3,000 personnel joint Marine-Navy riverine force, it has always been of secondary importance to other elements of the fleet.
What these historical examples show is that there are two aspects of riverine warfare which can inform the creation of a modern brown-water naval strategy. First, its use to maneuver troops into regions of difficult terrain to fight either conventional or unconventional forces; and second, its ability to continually sustain this presence and project authority to establish permanent control over an area. Despite being used decades ago, or longer in some cases, these operations can be adapted to serve new roles in the twenty-first century. Even now, riverine tactics are being utilized by both sides in the Russo-Ukraine War in a variety of ways.
In the immediate future, political control and logistics would be two crucial aspects of any campaign launched in Latin America to combat drug cartels that operate beyond coastal regions. In a record-setting year for drug production, a large portion of narcotics like cocaine have been transported by river, either within their country of origin or to neighboring nations for distribution. The Amazon River and its tributaries form a significant part of this network, encompassing thousands of miles of navigable waters. Colombia already boasts a large brown-water navy because of the high volume of drugs that have been trafficked using inland waterways.
For the United States to effectively operate against the cartels in this region, it would have to base its strategy around maintaining a robust presence on the waterways. Riverine forces could propel U.S. forces deep into the heart of jungles where reliable roads do not reach and provide them with a consistent source of supplies, engage in fire support for land-based troops, perform reconnaissance in areas where dense forest cover prevents aircraft from operating, and interdict the waterborne movements of the drug trade. Beyond the military applications of the riverine units, they would also play an important role in creating a stable political environment by “showing the flag” and distributing resources to local communities.
While the size of the MESF in peacetime may seem adequate – or even oversized, given the disuse of many Mark VI patrol boats – the rapid expansion of its capabilities would be required to accomplish the duties described above. There are currently two groups which make up the MESF: one based in San Diego and the other in Virginia Beach, which are described by Marine Corps Officer Walker Mills as “chronically underfunded” and now largely focused on port security and littoral operations. To put this in perspective, in Vietnam over 500 craft and 7000 sailors were used on its rivers alone to support U.S. campaigns. Although an operation in Latin America would likely not face the intensity that American troops in Vietnam encountered against the Viet Cong, the geographic size of the region would demand a large presence. If the Navy wanted to utilize its own forces and not just those of partner nations like Colombia (which was recently decertified as a drug control partner for the first time since 1997), it would have to undergo a major expansion of its riverine capabilities. Not only this, but it must also find a way to sustain this strategic capability in the long term.
One way a riverine-focused force could be maintained when not in use is by locating the home port of part of the MESF, either an already existing group or a newly created one, on the Mississippi River in a city such as St. Louis. Access to the Mississippi would ground the group’s daily operations, training, and identity in a riverine environment. This force would not have to start at the size of a peak-Vietnam operations brown-water fleet but simply consist of a large enough core to rapidly deploy to conflict zones and train new elements in riverine warfare as needed.
A base on the largest river in the U.S. would also open the possibility of working with a hidden maritime industrial base already operating on its inland waterways. Despite the prominence of transportation by road and rail for domestic shipping, large volumes of goods are still sent by the Mississippi River in the present day. Supporting this operation is a large network of tugs, barges, and other vessels, themselves supplied by harbors and drydocks along the length of the river and its tributaries. These services could be used to help maintain the brown-water navy and, with some minor infrastructural improvements, even construct new vessels. A riverine industrial base and a new brown-water squadron based on the Mississippi could also serve a unique role for the Navy beyond its military applications. Creating naval jobs in the heartland of the United States would extend the traditional influence of the Navy away from the coasts and into regions typically isolated from the impacts of maritime policy, bringing with it potential support from inland Congressional representatives for further pro-navy policies. In addition, new jobs from a riverine industrial base would tie in with wider efforts to reindustrialize the American heartland.
While the Navy could locate elements of the MESF onto the Mississippi River and even build ships on the nation’s inland waterways, this would not guarantee the survival of this capability during periods of focus on alternative means of warfighting. It is crucial for the navy to recognize the potential of riverine warfare beyond an intervention in Latin America in the immediate future and develop its strategy around the permanent ability to field a brown-water navy in a wide range of global environments. As Commander Kevin Rowlands of the Royal Navy notes, inland waters are, and will remain, centers of human settlement, and thus focal points of conflict and instability. The U.S. has the resources for a new brown-water navy. What it lacks is a consistent strategy to utilize it moving forward in the twenty-first century.
Connor Ronka is a Nimitz intern at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Connor Ronka
Amidst the Navy’s transition from its Great War on Terror-era strategy with the return of great power competition and the rise of China, its riverine capabilities have taken a secondary place in its operational design. Once a central feature of the Navy’s supporting role in the early twenty-first century and seeing heavy use in Iraq, the former Coastal Riverine Force (dedicated to riverine, littoral, and harbor security operations) has been renamed as the Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces (MESF) to reflect the Navy’s vision of its increasing blue-water integration. One of the Navy’s main vessels dedicated to riverine and littoral warfare, the Mark VI patrol boat, has been deemed as “not really needed” by Major General Tracy King of the Marine Corps when conducting a wargaming scenario against peer competitors. This strategic posture has left the U.S. with only a handful truly riverine capable units and little strategic direction for their future.
Abandoning the riverine realm to neglect would be a mistake. U.S. history has proven the utility of operations on inland waters in a variety of wars and environments. Additionally, current developments in U.S. pressure on state and non-state actors in Latin America points to a possible future where riverine-capable forces could be a central element in interdicting the operations of cartels and drug-runners close to home. The U.S. Navy must invest in the creation of a long-term riverine strategy capable of fighting both conventional and asymmetric threats, as well as the organization needed to sustain potential large-scale operations going into the future.
Brown-water fleets have served a number of strategic roles in their history with the U.S. Navy. Riverine warfare played a critical role in the American Civil War, where Union forces utilized the Mississippi River and its tributaries as highways to propel massive invading armies into the heart of the western Confederacy. While roads could be washed out with rain and railroads torn up by Southern guerillas, rivers proved to be consistently reliable lines of communication relatively secure from inclement weather or Confederate raids. Even the series of fortresses built by the South to stop Northern movements fell to the gunboats of the Mississippi Squadron and the troops they ferried.
Although the mechanization of modern warfare made river transportation second to trains or automobiles, inland waterways still played a major role in Vietnam and Iraq as a means of fighting against irregular warfare. In Vietnam, the Navy’s brown-water fleet was a key tool in interdicting the movement of the Viet Cong’s supplies and troops, conducting regular patrols along the nation’s extensive network of deltas. Beyond this, it also participated in nation-building exercises and helped relief aid reach isolated communities. Similarly in the Second Iraq War, riverine forces conducted patrols, moved troops, and provided fire support for units operating on land. Despite the important role the brown-water fleet played in these modern conflicts, as well as studies recommending a 3,000 personnel joint Marine-Navy riverine force, it has always been of secondary importance to other elements of the fleet.
What these historical examples show is that there are two aspects of riverine warfare which can inform the creation of a modern brown-water naval strategy. First, its use to maneuver troops into regions of difficult terrain to fight either conventional or unconventional forces; and second, its ability to continually sustain this presence and project authority to establish permanent control over an area. Despite being used decades ago, or longer in some cases, these operations can be adapted to serve new roles in the twenty-first century. Even now, riverine tactics are being utilized by both sides in the Russo-Ukraine War in a variety of ways.
In the immediate future, political control and logistics would be two crucial aspects of any campaign launched in Latin America to combat drug cartels that operate beyond coastal regions. In a record-setting year for drug production, a large portion of narcotics like cocaine have been transported by river, either within their country of origin or to neighboring nations for distribution. The Amazon River and its tributaries form a significant part of this network, encompassing thousands of miles of navigable waters. Colombia already boasts a large brown-water navy because of the high volume of drugs that have been trafficked using inland waterways.
For the United States to effectively operate against the cartels in this region, it would have to base its strategy around maintaining a robust presence on the waterways. Riverine forces could propel U.S. forces deep into the heart of jungles where reliable roads do not reach and provide them with a consistent source of supplies, engage in fire support for land-based troops, perform reconnaissance in areas where dense forest cover prevents aircraft from operating, and interdict the waterborne movements of the drug trade. Beyond the military applications of the riverine units, they would also play an important role in creating a stable political environment by “showing the flag” and distributing resources to local communities.
While the size of the MESF in peacetime may seem adequate – or even oversized, given the disuse of many Mark VI patrol boats – the rapid expansion of its capabilities would be required to accomplish the duties described above. There are currently two groups which make up the MESF: one based in San Diego and the other in Virginia Beach, which are described by Marine Corps Officer Walker Mills as “chronically underfunded” and now largely focused on port security and littoral operations. To put this in perspective, in Vietnam over 500 craft and 7000 sailors were used on its rivers alone to support U.S. campaigns. Although an operation in Latin America would likely not face the intensity that American troops in Vietnam encountered against the Viet Cong, the geographic size of the region would demand a large presence. If the Navy wanted to utilize its own forces and not just those of partner nations like Colombia (which was recently decertified as a drug control partner for the first time since 1997), it would have to undergo a major expansion of its riverine capabilities. Not only this, but it must also find a way to sustain this strategic capability in the long term.
One way a riverine-focused force could be maintained when not in use is by locating the home port of part of the MESF, either an already existing group or a newly created one, on the Mississippi River in a city such as St. Louis. Access to the Mississippi would ground the group’s daily operations, training, and identity in a riverine environment. This force would not have to start at the size of a peak-Vietnam operations brown-water fleet but simply consist of a large enough core to rapidly deploy to conflict zones and train new elements in riverine warfare as needed.
A base on the largest river in the U.S. would also open the possibility of working with a hidden maritime industrial base already operating on its inland waterways. Despite the prominence of transportation by road and rail for domestic shipping, large volumes of goods are still sent by the Mississippi River in the present day. Supporting this operation is a large network of tugs, barges, and other vessels, themselves supplied by harbors and drydocks along the length of the river and its tributaries. These services could be used to help maintain the brown-water navy and, with some minor infrastructural improvements, even construct new vessels. A riverine industrial base and a new brown-water squadron based on the Mississippi could also serve a unique role for the Navy beyond its military applications. Creating naval jobs in the heartland of the United States would extend the traditional influence of the Navy away from the coasts and into regions typically isolated from the impacts of maritime policy, bringing with it potential support from inland Congressional representatives for further pro-navy policies. In addition, new jobs from a riverine industrial base would tie in with wider efforts to reindustrialize the American heartland.
While the Navy could locate elements of the MESF onto the Mississippi River and even build ships on the nation’s inland waterways, this would not guarantee the survival of this capability during periods of focus on alternative means of warfighting. It is crucial for the navy to recognize the potential of riverine warfare beyond an intervention in Latin America in the immediate future and develop its strategy around the permanent ability to field a brown-water navy in a wide range of global environments. As Commander Kevin Rowlands of the Royal Navy notes, inland waters are, and will remain, centers of human settlement, and thus focal points of conflict and instability. The U.S. has the resources for a new brown-water navy. What it lacks is a consistent strategy to utilize it moving forward in the twenty-first century.
Connor Ronka is a Nimitz intern at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.