What a NATO-Skeptic U.S. means for NATO Maritime Security
The MOC
By
Nicholas Weising
December 17, 2024
President-elect Trump has in the past described the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as “obsolete” and questioned its relevance in the twenty-first century; however, the United States will not be leaving the alliance. Trump’s criticisms are aimed primarily at the disparity in defense spending between the United States and other members of the alliance, rather than at the strategic value of the alliance itself. Futhermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 includes language barring the president from unilaterally exiting NATO without Senate approval.
None of this means that the dynamics of NATO will not drastically shift after January 20th. European policymakers are already bristling at the prospect of U.S. demands. Much has been written on the incoming administration’s push to end the war in Ukraine. Little attention has been paid, however, to the impact this will have on the maritime domain. A touch-and-go relationship between the United States and NATO will force the European states to refocus on seapower to maintain power projection. America’s military and nuclear commitments to NATO have largely been successful in deterring Russian aggression against Europe since the Cold War. However, Moscow has turned to gray zone activities to press its interests in Europe below the threshold of armed conflict, including at sea. In November, the Russian spy ship Yantar was spotted in Irish waters patrolling an area containing critical energy and internet pipelines. While Ireland is not a NATO country, this breach of sovereignty is illustrative of Russia’s typical activities in Europe. Moscow also has not been afraid to squeeze Europe economically. Russia blocked Ukraine’s access to Black Sea trading routes at the outbreak of the current war, which threatened European food security. Before 2022, the European Union was a top importer of Ukrainian corn, sunflower oil, and rapeseed. In addition to disrupting world trade routes, Russian maritime gray zone activities target load-bearing world economic infrastructure. Days after the Irish Sea incident, two Baltic Sea undersea cables were severed—one connecting Germany to Finland and another connecting Lithuania to Sweden. It appears this was done by the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 under the watch of an escorting Russian warship. Increased maritime gray zone cooperation among the Axis of Upheaval means that the nuclear umbrella may no longer be able to keep everyone underneath it entirely dry.
NATO states rely on the U.S. Navy to provide for their maritime security. For much of the alliance’s history, the United States has kept permanent forward-deployed naval forces in European waters. Additionally, due to its size and combat experience, the U.S. Navy has supplied, and continues to supply, NATO with much of its senior naval leadership. European seapower has withered due to its reliance on the United States. The post-Cold War peace dividend followed by the Global War on Terror also led to systematic cuts in European naval budgets. This made sense for European lawmakers under the assumption that the United States would provide for their defense needs, particularly in the maritime domain. From 1999 to 2018, European navies lost 32 percent of their main surface combatants. The decline of European seapower has impacted national decision-making and constrained Europe’s options. The German Navy diverted two warships en route to Germany around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. That is a damning admission of impotence from one of the most powerful European states, but it should not be surprising. European navies have not been exposed to real combat in decades. The exposure they have accrued is only in support roles for the United States. If the actions of Ireland and Germany are any indicator, many U.S. allies are not invested in exercising naval power nor promoting maritime security.
NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) serves primarily as a coastal defense force operating in the Mediterranean, which is insufficient to take on modern European maritime security. MARCOM is the central command of all NATO maritime forces and is the headquarters responsible for maritime operations, but those operations are limited by what its fleet is composed of. MARCOM leads four standing NATO maritime groups, which are multinational, integrated maritime forces made up of NATO member vessels. These groups are composed of two frigate groups and two mine countermeasures groups, which makes sense given that MARCOM’s operations have mainly been composed of patrolling the Mediterranean in Operation Sea Guardian. In instances where MARCOM has left the Mediterranean such as Operation Ocean Shield, European fleets once again played second fiddle to the U.S. Navy. Simply put, frigates and minesweepers are not enough to counter the Axis of Upheaval. MARCOM’s emphasis on the Mediterranean is largely a relic of the Cold War and War on Terror but this regional focus is not as relevant in twenty-first century great power competition. The geopolitically important waters that surround Europe—such as the Baltic and Black Seas—are also the ones upon which NATO is losing its grasp.
NATO member states’ maritime ambitions must go beyond the littoral. In their reliance on U.S. naval supremacy, important NATO member states including Germany, Turkey, Canada and the Netherlands maintain only green-water navies which are inadequate to deter Russian gray zone aggression, much less full-on warfare. The blue-water navy NATO states, meanwhile, are looking to downsize. The United Kingdom’s persistent austerity has left their aircraft carrier strike group lacking a complete air wing. In the event of the U.S. not engaging with NATO or even rolling back its forward-deployed forces, the other NATO states are not currently prepared to take its place. Some have argued that the second Trump presidency will lead to increased European defense spending, as happened during his first term. But even if this increase transpires, there is no guarantee that the money will go to where it is needed most. If European militaries want to keep being globally deployable, then a refocus on seapower in particular is necessary.
NATO must project power to continue to deter its great power adversaries. European maritime security will depend on NATO states’ ability and willingness to invest in the naval assets necessary to project power, such as aircraft carriers, submarines, and large surface combatants. The tension perceived by NATO defense planners between maritime and continental strategic priorities is an illusion. Decreased reliance on the United States can even be beneficial for the future of the alliance. The two newest entrants into NATO—Sweden and Finland—offer unique capabilities to expand NATO’s reach into the Arctic, which will only become more important as time goes on. Likewise, the Portuguese Navy has increasingly directed R&D money to drone technology in hopes of augmenting its relatively small naval force. The future of NATO is murky and bound to change, but this does not mean that European security should be in question.
Nicholas Weising, Program Associate
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Nicholas Weising
President-elect Trump has in the past described the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as “obsolete” and questioned its relevance in the twenty-first century; however, the United States will not be leaving the alliance. Trump’s criticisms are aimed primarily at the disparity in defense spending between the United States and other members of the alliance, rather than at the strategic value of the alliance itself. Futhermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 includes language barring the president from unilaterally exiting NATO without Senate approval.
None of this means that the dynamics of NATO will not drastically shift after January 20th. European policymakers are already bristling at the prospect of U.S. demands. Much has been written on the incoming administration’s push to end the war in Ukraine. Little attention has been paid, however, to the impact this will have on the maritime domain. A touch-and-go relationship between the United States and NATO will force the European states to refocus on seapower to maintain power projection. America’s military and nuclear commitments to NATO have largely been successful in deterring Russian aggression against Europe since the Cold War. However, Moscow has turned to gray zone activities to press its interests in Europe below the threshold of armed conflict, including at sea. In November, the Russian spy ship Yantar was spotted in Irish waters patrolling an area containing critical energy and internet pipelines. While Ireland is not a NATO country, this breach of sovereignty is illustrative of Russia’s typical activities in Europe. Moscow also has not been afraid to squeeze Europe economically. Russia blocked Ukraine’s access to Black Sea trading routes at the outbreak of the current war, which threatened European food security. Before 2022, the European Union was a top importer of Ukrainian corn, sunflower oil, and rapeseed. In addition to disrupting world trade routes, Russian maritime gray zone activities target load-bearing world economic infrastructure. Days after the Irish Sea incident, two Baltic Sea undersea cables were severed—one connecting Germany to Finland and another connecting Lithuania to Sweden. It appears this was done by the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 under the watch of an escorting Russian warship. Increased maritime gray zone cooperation among the Axis of Upheaval means that the nuclear umbrella may no longer be able to keep everyone underneath it entirely dry.
NATO states rely on the U.S. Navy to provide for their maritime security. For much of the alliance’s history, the United States has kept permanent forward-deployed naval forces in European waters. Additionally, due to its size and combat experience, the U.S. Navy has supplied, and continues to supply, NATO with much of its senior naval leadership. European seapower has withered due to its reliance on the United States. The post-Cold War peace dividend followed by the Global War on Terror also led to systematic cuts in European naval budgets. This made sense for European lawmakers under the assumption that the United States would provide for their defense needs, particularly in the maritime domain. From 1999 to 2018, European navies lost 32 percent of their main surface combatants. The decline of European seapower has impacted national decision-making and constrained Europe’s options. The German Navy diverted two warships en route to Germany around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. That is a damning admission of impotence from one of the most powerful European states, but it should not be surprising. European navies have not been exposed to real combat in decades. The exposure they have accrued is only in support roles for the United States. If the actions of Ireland and Germany are any indicator, many U.S. allies are not invested in exercising naval power nor promoting maritime security.
NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) serves primarily as a coastal defense force operating in the Mediterranean, which is insufficient to take on modern European maritime security. MARCOM is the central command of all NATO maritime forces and is the headquarters responsible for maritime operations, but those operations are limited by what its fleet is composed of. MARCOM leads four standing NATO maritime groups, which are multinational, integrated maritime forces made up of NATO member vessels. These groups are composed of two frigate groups and two mine countermeasures groups, which makes sense given that MARCOM’s operations have mainly been composed of patrolling the Mediterranean in Operation Sea Guardian. In instances where MARCOM has left the Mediterranean such as Operation Ocean Shield, European fleets once again played second fiddle to the U.S. Navy. Simply put, frigates and minesweepers are not enough to counter the Axis of Upheaval. MARCOM’s emphasis on the Mediterranean is largely a relic of the Cold War and War on Terror but this regional focus is not as relevant in twenty-first century great power competition. The geopolitically important waters that surround Europe—such as the Baltic and Black Seas—are also the ones upon which NATO is losing its grasp.
NATO member states’ maritime ambitions must go beyond the littoral. In their reliance on U.S. naval supremacy, important NATO member states including Germany, Turkey, Canada and the Netherlands maintain only green-water navies which are inadequate to deter Russian gray zone aggression, much less full-on warfare. The blue-water navy NATO states, meanwhile, are looking to downsize. The United Kingdom’s persistent austerity has left their aircraft carrier strike group lacking a complete air wing. In the event of the U.S. not engaging with NATO or even rolling back its forward-deployed forces, the other NATO states are not currently prepared to take its place. Some have argued that the second Trump presidency will lead to increased European defense spending, as happened during his first term. But even if this increase transpires, there is no guarantee that the money will go to where it is needed most. If European militaries want to keep being globally deployable, then a refocus on seapower in particular is necessary.
NATO must project power to continue to deter its great power adversaries. European maritime security will depend on NATO states’ ability and willingness to invest in the naval assets necessary to project power, such as aircraft carriers, submarines, and large surface combatants. The tension perceived by NATO defense planners between maritime and continental strategic priorities is an illusion. Decreased reliance on the United States can even be beneficial for the future of the alliance. The two newest entrants into NATO—Sweden and Finland—offer unique capabilities to expand NATO’s reach into the Arctic, which will only become more important as time goes on. Likewise, the Portuguese Navy has increasingly directed R&D money to drone technology in hopes of augmenting its relatively small naval force. The future of NATO is murky and bound to change, but this does not mean that European security should be in question.
Nicholas Weising, Program Associate
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.