Responding to the Russia-UN Ukrainian Grain Export Plan
The MOC
Photo by Khalil Hamra/AP Photo.
By
Bradford Dismukes, CAPT, USNR (ret.)
August 8, 2022
On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine and blockades it ports.
On February 27, Turkey declared the Black Sea region to be a war zone and invoked the Montreux Convention so that naval ships of non-riparian states could not enter – turning an international sea to a lake dominated by Russia and, to a lesser extent, Turkey; though some have questioned the legality of Turkey’s move, it has been and will remain a NATO “no-go” zone for at least as long as the war in Ukraine lasts.
These developments require immediate response by the US, NATO, and the EU. Outlined here are proposals for the shape of that response and the ideas that underlie them. Our thinking at the strategic level must be as agile as it traditionally has been at the tactical. In considering the American and allied courses of action, several key questions help to illuminate us of the risks and opportunities at hand.
Question 1: What form should a Western response take?
Multiple political, diplomatic, economic, international legal, and military actions are required, to be taken by the United States and those of allies and the international institutions of the West. All elements must be addressed simultaneously. This complex mission will likely call for a coordinating authority from the highest levels of the United States government.
On the political-diplomatic side, the U.S. State Department and EU spokesmen, who welcomed the UN-endorsed deal to bring out Ukrainian grain to alleviate world famine, must redouble condemnation of Russia’s attack on Odesa and across Ukraine’s grain belt. They likewise must state that the US and its allies find unacceptable the barring of Western naval ships from the Black Sea, where they are urgently needed for the humanitarian purpose of guaranteeing the continued export of grain from Ukraine, and are developing alternative plans to ship grain that do not depend on Russia’s continued acquiescence.
Ukraine has called for immediate implementation of the UN-sponsored deal. At the time of this writing, the first shipment of grain has reached Turkey; it remains to be seen if and when others will follow. In any case, Ukraine should now announce that, because Russia’s attacks on its ports show Russia obviously cannot be trusted, it regards the UN deal as a temporary, stopgap measure (it expires in 120 days).
Ukraine should urgently appeal to Turkey to allow Western naval ships to enter the Black Sea for humanitarian purpose as provided by Article 18 (d) of the Montreux Convention.
The US and NATO should respond with an offer to join with Ukraine to establish a peaceful, but defended, near-shore humanitarian corridor from Odesa to the Bosporus and prepare to implement it. Military and political events will determine when and how the NATO-Ukraine corridor should be put into operation.
Question 2: Would NATO-Ukraine action to break Russia’s blockade be escalatory? Would it make NATO-Russia combat likely?
No. So long as clear political steps accompany any military action, it is not escalatory. It carries very little probability of combat between NATO forces and Russia.
Beginning with non-military, humanitarian actions:
The European Union and NATO send barges to Ukraine to store this year’s grain crop and move it southward; The US, the EU, and others buy some or all of last year’s and the new crop for donation to famine-threatened nations. This grain could be exported even under the Russia-UN agreement.
The West’s cash must flow to Ukraine farmers, shippers, and government if the nation is to continue fighting. This action gains it the humanitarian mantel for paying an unavoidable bill.
These actions are mandatory to relieve domestic pressure on Zelensky to remain in the Russia UN plan. All concerned (especially Russia) will understand that these moves indicate the seriousness of NATO’s commitment to help Ukraine break the blockade.
Militarily, blockade-breaking actions require strict planning and mission assignments as well as several key considerations:
All NATO actions must take place in the territory and territorial waters of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Russia has carefully avoided attacks on NATO territory and would not cross such an obvious escalatory threshold. Doing so would be a direct provocation for wider war with NATO – a conflict which would decisively unite NATO, contrary to the designs of Russia’s current strategy which seemingly seeks to fracture the Alliance over its support for Ukraine.
No US or other NATO forces can be present in Ukrainian waters. Western supplied mine sweepers, patrol boats, and coastal riverine craft would be Ukrainian flagged and manned; they would operate near shore, strongly defended against possible Russian attempts to seize Ukraine ships and crews.
It would be politically impossible for Russia to interdict grain-carrying ships themselves. It has already officially ruled itself out of naval action. Its declaration of support for a “humanitarian corridor” means that attacking ships in the corridor, regardless of its political aegis, would do irrecoverable damage to the Kremlin’s diplomatic and propaganda narrative. It would demonstrate that, despite its words, Russia does not actually care about world famine relief – it prefers the contrary.
There is reason to doubt whether Russia has the means to effectively attack guarded convoys. Its submarines cannot be used in shallow, near-shore waters; its surface ships have been pulled back because of Ukrainian, and potentially NATO, land-based anti-ship missiles (ASM); its own ASMs, however launched, may lack the necessary ISR targeting information and may not work well near land.
For these reasons, and because Russia likely expects its ground forces to capture Odesa in due course, Russia is highly unlikely to attempt interdiction at sea. Instead, Russia will continue or intensify attacks to hinder the production, movement, and storage of grain within Ukraine itself.
Question 3: The US and EU immediately expressed approval when the Russia-UN deal was signed on humanitarian grounds; this has been interpreted as unconditional approval of the deal. Will it remain acceptable to the US and its allies in the long term?
Certainly, as it holds key negative, long-term strategic consequences.
The plan leaves in place Turkey’s prohibition, under the Montreux Convention, of moving NATO naval ships from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Turkey remains able to checkmate the use of NATO’s superior naval power and negate the American commitment to freedom of navigation in international waters.
The plan is a lopsided strategic and narrative victory for Russia. It reduces Ukraine’s sovereignty and legitimizes Russia’s blockade, keeping it in place but now with UN approval in exchange for the costless “concessions” on its end.
The world will witness a historic sham: Russia will bask in UN praise for lifting its own blockade and bringing relief from famine in the Mideast and Africa that it alone caused. Russia may use UN endorsement as a political weapon to condemn any possible NATO moves in the Black Sea – charges that would be loudly supported by China, (possibly) by India, and other international anti-American voices.
The maintenance of the blockade likewise strengthens Russia’s strategic leverage in negotiations for pausing or ending its war against Ukraine for which Kyiv and the West have no answer.
Geopolitically, the Black Sea could become a Russo-Turkish point d’appui, anchoring an axis of strength versus Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria in the West and, hypothetically, joined by Iran, in the Caucasus, Caspian Sea, and Central Asia to the East. The US and its allies will have been outthought and defeated by an adversary who has never fired a shot.
Question 4: Could Turkey veto NATO action? Would it?
Hypothetically, yes. More likely, no.
When Ukraine eventually withdraws from the UN agreement in favor of a NATO-defended humanitarian corridor, the previous agreement will evaporate.
Turkey will be left with few options. It will find it impossible to veto NATO action in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as doing so would mean Turkey ignores Ukraine’s understandable distrust of Russia and prefers to side with Russia, ending the strategic balancing policy it has long maintained. In effect, a Turkish veto would defend Russia’s attacks on Odesa and across Ukraine’s grain belt.
Turkey is more likely to accept a defended corridor plan, perhaps becoming a participant. It is politically untenable for Ankara to reject NATO’s request to send shallow-draft naval ships with no offensive capabilities into the Black Sea solely for humanitarian purposes. It cannot refuse passage of grain-laden ships moving south through its territorial waters without becoming a blockader itself. If, however, it chooses to play a prominent role in the NATO operation and command structure, Turkey will receive international recognition for its humanitarian contribution.
Conceivably, a UN-sponsored “cooperation center” established in Istanbul could – with NATO in some form replacing Russia – guarantee the corridor’s north-bound traffic is not being used for any military purpose and therefore be unconstrained by Montreux.
Conclusion
Ultimately, Russia’s hunger blockade of Ukraine, the global food insecurity it has caused, and Turkey’s prohibition of NATO ships’ entry into the Black Sea require immediate action by American and allied governments. Utilizing carefully coordinated political as well as military tools, it is possible these essential desiderata without escalating NATO’s role in the Russia-Ukraine War.
Bradford Dismukes, CAPT, USNR (ret.), is a political scientist whose work at the Center for Naval Analyses supported and critiqued ONI and Navy Staff planners in what was then OP-06. His service in the US Naval Reserve centered on naval intelligence. Further details of the actions proposed here are provided in: NATO Action to Counter Russia’s Plan to Legitimize and Make Permanent Its Naval Blockade of Ukraine.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Bradford Dismukes, CAPT, USNR (ret.)
On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine and blockades it ports.
On February 27, Turkey declared the Black Sea region to be a war zone and invoked the Montreux Convention so that naval ships of non-riparian states could not enter – turning an international sea to a lake dominated by Russia and, to a lesser extent, Turkey; though some have questioned the legality of Turkey’s move, it has been and will remain a NATO “no-go” zone for at least as long as the war in Ukraine lasts.
On July 22, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Nations signed agreements to move Ukrainian grain through the blockade to world markets. The following day, Russia launched a cruise missile attack on Odesa’s port despite its commitment not to do so, agreed to just hours before.
These developments require immediate response by the US, NATO, and the EU. Outlined here are proposals for the shape of that response and the ideas that underlie them. Our thinking at the strategic level must be as agile as it traditionally has been at the tactical. In considering the American and allied courses of action, several key questions help to illuminate us of the risks and opportunities at hand.
Question 1: What form should a Western response take?
Multiple political, diplomatic, economic, international legal, and military actions are required, to be taken by the United States and those of allies and the international institutions of the West. All elements must be addressed simultaneously. This complex mission will likely call for a coordinating authority from the highest levels of the United States government.
On the political-diplomatic side, the U.S. State Department and EU spokesmen, who welcomed the UN-endorsed deal to bring out Ukrainian grain to alleviate world famine, must redouble condemnation of Russia’s attack on Odesa and across Ukraine’s grain belt. They likewise must state that the US and its allies find unacceptable the barring of Western naval ships from the Black Sea, where they are urgently needed for the humanitarian purpose of guaranteeing the continued export of grain from Ukraine, and are developing alternative plans to ship grain that do not depend on Russia’s continued acquiescence.
Ukraine has called for immediate implementation of the UN-sponsored deal. At the time of this writing, the first shipment of grain has reached Turkey; it remains to be seen if and when others will follow. In any case, Ukraine should now announce that, because Russia’s attacks on its ports show Russia obviously cannot be trusted, it regards the UN deal as a temporary, stopgap measure (it expires in 120 days).
Ukraine should urgently appeal to Turkey to allow Western naval ships to enter the Black Sea for humanitarian purpose as provided by Article 18 (d) of the Montreux Convention.
The US and NATO should respond with an offer to join with Ukraine to establish a peaceful, but defended, near-shore humanitarian corridor from Odesa to the Bosporus and prepare to implement it. Military and political events will determine when and how the NATO-Ukraine corridor should be put into operation.
Question 2: Would NATO-Ukraine action to break Russia’s blockade be escalatory? Would it make NATO-Russia combat likely?
No. So long as clear political steps accompany any military action, it is not escalatory. It carries very little probability of combat between NATO forces and Russia.
Beginning with non-military, humanitarian actions:
These actions are mandatory to relieve domestic pressure on Zelensky to remain in the Russia UN plan. All concerned (especially Russia) will understand that these moves indicate the seriousness of NATO’s commitment to help Ukraine break the blockade.
Militarily, blockade-breaking actions require strict planning and mission assignments as well as several key considerations:
For these reasons, and because Russia likely expects its ground forces to capture Odesa in due course, Russia is highly unlikely to attempt interdiction at sea. Instead, Russia will continue or intensify attacks to hinder the production, movement, and storage of grain within Ukraine itself.
Question 3: The US and EU immediately expressed approval when the Russia-UN deal was signed on humanitarian grounds; this has been interpreted as unconditional approval of the deal. Will it remain acceptable to the US and its allies in the long term?
Certainly, as it holds key negative, long-term strategic consequences.
The plan leaves in place Turkey’s prohibition, under the Montreux Convention, of moving NATO naval ships from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Turkey remains able to checkmate the use of NATO’s superior naval power and negate the American commitment to freedom of navigation in international waters.
The plan is a lopsided strategic and narrative victory for Russia. It reduces Ukraine’s sovereignty and legitimizes Russia’s blockade, keeping it in place but now with UN approval in exchange for the costless “concessions” on its end.
The world will witness a historic sham: Russia will bask in UN praise for lifting its own blockade and bringing relief from famine in the Mideast and Africa that it alone caused. Russia may use UN endorsement as a political weapon to condemn any possible NATO moves in the Black Sea – charges that would be loudly supported by China, (possibly) by India, and other international anti-American voices.
The maintenance of the blockade likewise strengthens Russia’s strategic leverage in negotiations for pausing or ending its war against Ukraine for which Kyiv and the West have no answer.
Geopolitically, the Black Sea could become a Russo-Turkish point d’appui, anchoring an axis of strength versus Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria in the West and, hypothetically, joined by Iran, in the Caucasus, Caspian Sea, and Central Asia to the East. The US and its allies will have been outthought and defeated by an adversary who has never fired a shot.
Question 4: Could Turkey veto NATO action? Would it?
Hypothetically, yes. More likely, no.
When Ukraine eventually withdraws from the UN agreement in favor of a NATO-defended humanitarian corridor, the previous agreement will evaporate.
Turkey will be left with few options. It will find it impossible to veto NATO action in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as doing so would mean Turkey ignores Ukraine’s understandable distrust of Russia and prefers to side with Russia, ending the strategic balancing policy it has long maintained. In effect, a Turkish veto would defend Russia’s attacks on Odesa and across Ukraine’s grain belt.
Turkey is more likely to accept a defended corridor plan, perhaps becoming a participant. It is politically untenable for Ankara to reject NATO’s request to send shallow-draft naval ships with no offensive capabilities into the Black Sea solely for humanitarian purposes. It cannot refuse passage of grain-laden ships moving south through its territorial waters without becoming a blockader itself. If, however, it chooses to play a prominent role in the NATO operation and command structure, Turkey will receive international recognition for its humanitarian contribution.
Conceivably, a UN-sponsored “cooperation center” established in Istanbul could – with NATO in some form replacing Russia – guarantee the corridor’s north-bound traffic is not being used for any military purpose and therefore be unconstrained by Montreux.
Conclusion
Ultimately, Russia’s hunger blockade of Ukraine, the global food insecurity it has caused, and Turkey’s prohibition of NATO ships’ entry into the Black Sea require immediate action by American and allied governments. Utilizing carefully coordinated political as well as military tools, it is possible these essential desiderata without escalating NATO’s role in the Russia-Ukraine War.
Bradford Dismukes, CAPT, USNR (ret.), is a political scientist whose work at the Center for Naval Analyses supported and critiqued ONI and Navy Staff planners in what was then OP-06. His service in the US Naval Reserve centered on naval intelligence. Further details of the actions proposed here are provided in: NATO Action to Counter Russia’s Plan to Legitimize and Make Permanent Its Naval Blockade of Ukraine.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.