Could Musandam’s Fjords Reduce Dependence on the Strait of Hormuz?
The MOC
By
Dr. Thomas K. Wong
June 29, 2026
Every time tension rises in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz becomes the center of focus. About 25% of the world’s seaborne oil trade and 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG), as well as other critical assets pass through this narrow passage between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. As a single maritime chokepoint, the threat of closure creates significant ramifications to the energy, shipping, and insurance markets, creating geopolitical tension and threatens the stability of many global economies.
For decades, policymakers and analysts have explored other alternatives to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Most proposals fall into two categories: pipelines that bypass the Persian Gulf or canal projects across Oman’s Musandam Peninsula. Both options reserve their challenges.
Pipelines are expensive and serve only specific export routes. Currently, there are two routes found through the Saudi Arabia (from the Gulf coast across the Arabian Peninsula to the Red Sea) and the UAE (from Habshan to Fujairah, which sits on the Gulf of Oman outside the Strait of Hormuz). Countries like Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar would need routes through neighboring countries or difficult terrain to fully bypass the Strait of Hormuz, making projects more politically complex.
Large canal projects across Oman’s Musandam Peninsula are economically impractical, as this would require cutting through the topography of rugged limestone mountains which may rise up to 2,000 meters. Therefore, a 90 km canal in this area would be far more difficult to build than one elongated through flat terrain.
Given these limitations, it is worth exploring other maritime corridors. This will provide routing redundancy, a contingency path during periods of crisis, and more flexibility for naval traffic management. This will also complicate the assailing force’s military strategy and increase the holding force’s options.
The northern Musandam Peninsula is comprised of deep fjord-like inlets that penetrate far inland, creating a maze of natural waterways. Looking at publicly available satellite imagery and topographic maps, it is apparent that in a couple of locations, these waterways appear to be separated by relatively narrow land barriers measured in hundreds of meters.
As shown in the map below, one location appears to require roughly 700 meters of excavation, while another may require less than 250 meters. Whether these locations are actually feasible is yet to be determined. Elevation, geology, bathymetry, and navigational constraints would ultimately affect viability for success. Hence, a formal study should be conducted to evaluate these options.
Critics may immediately point out that such a route would not eliminate the strategic threat posed by Iran. That is true. Ships transiting an alternative route would still be operating in the same region, subject to the same threats of long-range missiles, drones, and military action. Moreover, this route may only be able to accommodate a fragment of the current commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
However, the possibility of having an alternative route might reduce dependence on existing shipping lanes and provide routing flexibility during periods of crisis. Importantly, a route located entirely within Omani territorial waters could offer operational advantages. Traffic management, surveillance, security coordination, and maritime governance could potentially serve simpler relative to the routes that go through existing geopolitical flashpoints. This alternative corridor could be easier to defend with radar coverage, coastal surveillance, patrol craft, anti-drone systems, and mine-detection systems.
Likewise, there are substantial counterarguments. A canal creates its own chokepoint through the risk of grounded vessels, accidents, or deliberate attacks that can disrupt traffic. A wider canal and/or additional canal crossings may be needed to reduce risks. In addition, environmental impacts are currently ambiguous and must be considered. Excavation costs may remain prohibitively high even if the canal segments are rather short. The natural waterways may prove too narrow or convoluted for large commercial vessels. The route may only be suitable for certain classes of ships while remaining impractical for the largest oil tankers. Still, the fjord-canal concept may naturally make mine-laying an arduous task and will serve to be an easier route to protect from military threats compared to the open waters of the Strait of Hormuz. As a minor consideration, the fjord-canal corridor will also shorten the route distance between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
Many questions cannot be answered conclusively without first examining the underlying geography in detail, which includes in-depth elevation models, bathymetric data, geological surveys, and vessel navigation analysis. If the analysis were to show that the concept has merit, policymakers would gain a potentially valuable option for an additional maritime corridor in one of the world’s most strategically important maritime regions.
The fjord-canal concept is fundamentally different from traditional Musandam canal proposals. A vast portion of this maritime corridor already exists as navigable waterways, and issues regarding engineering and construction may be substantially lesser concern than commonly perceived.
The objective is not to conclude with a perfect solution to the challenges regarding the Strait of Hormuz as it appears non-existent. With modern military capabilities, entirely eliminating all threats to shipping is likely unachievable. However, a more attainable goal that can be achieved is greater resilience. From this initiative, the potential value of a fjord-canal route becomes far more attractive, and a much smaller canal project can become easier to justify as an investment for maritime resilience.
The main question is whether the unique geography of Musandam contains a potentially overlooked opportunity that deserves closer examination. Assuming feasibility remains favorable, the bottom-line issue is whether costs, benefits, and risks are justified.
Thomas K. Wong is a civil engineer with a PhD from MIT.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Thomas K. Wong
Every time tension rises in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz becomes the center of focus. About 25% of the world’s seaborne oil trade and 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG), as well as other critical assets pass through this narrow passage between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. As a single maritime chokepoint, the threat of closure creates significant ramifications to the energy, shipping, and insurance markets, creating geopolitical tension and threatens the stability of many global economies.
For decades, policymakers and analysts have explored other alternatives to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Most proposals fall into two categories: pipelines that bypass the Persian Gulf or canal projects across Oman’s Musandam Peninsula. Both options reserve their challenges.
Pipelines are expensive and serve only specific export routes. Currently, there are two routes found through the Saudi Arabia (from the Gulf coast across the Arabian Peninsula to the Red Sea) and the UAE (from Habshan to Fujairah, which sits on the Gulf of Oman outside the Strait of Hormuz). Countries like Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar would need routes through neighboring countries or difficult terrain to fully bypass the Strait of Hormuz, making projects more politically complex.
Large canal projects across Oman’s Musandam Peninsula are economically impractical, as this would require cutting through the topography of rugged limestone mountains which may rise up to 2,000 meters. Therefore, a 90 km canal in this area would be far more difficult to build than one elongated through flat terrain.
Given these limitations, it is worth exploring other maritime corridors. This will provide routing redundancy, a contingency path during periods of crisis, and more flexibility for naval traffic management. This will also complicate the assailing force’s military strategy and increase the holding force’s options.
The northern Musandam Peninsula is comprised of deep fjord-like inlets that penetrate far inland, creating a maze of natural waterways. Looking at publicly available satellite imagery and topographic maps, it is apparent that in a couple of locations, these waterways appear to be separated by relatively narrow land barriers measured in hundreds of meters.
As shown in the map below, one location appears to require roughly 700 meters of excavation, while another may require less than 250 meters. Whether these locations are actually feasible is yet to be determined. Elevation, geology, bathymetry, and navigational constraints would ultimately affect viability for success. Hence, a formal study should be conducted to evaluate these options.
Critics may immediately point out that such a route would not eliminate the strategic threat posed by Iran. That is true. Ships transiting an alternative route would still be operating in the same region, subject to the same threats of long-range missiles, drones, and military action. Moreover, this route may only be able to accommodate a fragment of the current commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
However, the possibility of having an alternative route might reduce dependence on existing shipping lanes and provide routing flexibility during periods of crisis. Importantly, a route located entirely within Omani territorial waters could offer operational advantages. Traffic management, surveillance, security coordination, and maritime governance could potentially serve simpler relative to the routes that go through existing geopolitical flashpoints. This alternative corridor could be easier to defend with radar coverage, coastal surveillance, patrol craft, anti-drone systems, and mine-detection systems.
Likewise, there are substantial counterarguments. A canal creates its own chokepoint through the risk of grounded vessels, accidents, or deliberate attacks that can disrupt traffic. A wider canal and/or additional canal crossings may be needed to reduce risks. In addition, environmental impacts are currently ambiguous and must be considered. Excavation costs may remain prohibitively high even if the canal segments are rather short. The natural waterways may prove too narrow or convoluted for large commercial vessels. The route may only be suitable for certain classes of ships while remaining impractical for the largest oil tankers. Still, the fjord-canal concept may naturally make mine-laying an arduous task and will serve to be an easier route to protect from military threats compared to the open waters of the Strait of Hormuz. As a minor consideration, the fjord-canal corridor will also shorten the route distance between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
Many questions cannot be answered conclusively without first examining the underlying geography in detail, which includes in-depth elevation models, bathymetric data, geological surveys, and vessel navigation analysis. If the analysis were to show that the concept has merit, policymakers would gain a potentially valuable option for an additional maritime corridor in one of the world’s most strategically important maritime regions.
The fjord-canal concept is fundamentally different from traditional Musandam canal proposals. A vast portion of this maritime corridor already exists as navigable waterways, and issues regarding engineering and construction may be substantially lesser concern than commonly perceived.
The objective is not to conclude with a perfect solution to the challenges regarding the Strait of Hormuz as it appears non-existent. With modern military capabilities, entirely eliminating all threats to shipping is likely unachievable. However, a more attainable goal that can be achieved is greater resilience. From this initiative, the potential value of a fjord-canal route becomes far more attractive, and a much smaller canal project can become easier to justify as an investment for maritime resilience.
The main question is whether the unique geography of Musandam contains a potentially overlooked opportunity that deserves closer examination. Assuming feasibility remains favorable, the bottom-line issue is whether costs, benefits, and risks are justified.
Thomas K. Wong is a civil engineer with a PhD from MIT.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.