Peace is often lost after being won by war. This was the case in our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; it must not be so in Iran. President Trump’s and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s brave and resolute actions must presage a lasting and secure peace for the Middle East. This can only be so if many nations, led by the United States, conceive and entrench elements of stability.
Maritime power consists of a spectrum of capacities that permit and protect commerce across the world’s oceans and through its straits. No conduit for energy is more important than the Strait of Hormuz. The sanctity of this artery, where 25-to-30 percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade and 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) transit, is now at stake as is the future of what was the globe’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.
Iran cannot be allowed to be what it was. An architecture of peace that couples maritime security with economic leverage must instate concord and constancy. The aftermath of the present conflict must be integrated into a broad structure that supports regional and economic security.
A strategic pause in the decades that followed the First World War empowered our creation of decisive carrier and submarine tactics. Victory in Iran will permit the realization of a new strategic pause. We will attain the time necessary to modernize our Navy. Once a new Iranian government is in power, it may be possible to reposition up to 25 percent of the portion of our Navy that is forward deployed. This would be decisive in arresting Chinese predations.
Iran’s non-belligerence will enable our reconstitution of shipbuilding skills and infrastructure, to support future American naval dominance. The People’s Liberation Army Navy now outnumbers ours. Breathing space is thus required to support overmatching American industrial transformation during the next ten years. As an example, more Zumwalt-class hulls could be built, for the last ship of this class will be commissioned next year.
Four elements must presage a post-war epoch so that a new Iran may thrive while its neighbors, including Israel and the Gulf Arab states, realize comity. First, Kharg Island should be governed for an interim period by a special administrative body; second, an additional currency, in the form of deferred redemption instruments (DRIs), should be issued to Iranian citizens charged with maintaining fossil fuel production and transfer; third, the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz must be patrolled by a new multinational naval force; fourth, mobilization preparedness must become a central pillar of American power.
Kharg Island
Kharg Island is situated approximately thirty-four miles from the port city of Bushehr on the Iranian mainland. Its strategic importance cannot be overstated, for its terminals, which feed supertankers, control 90-to-96 percent of Iran’s oil exports. It is the key to both Iran’s economy and its future.
Sitting at the center of the Persian Gulf, Kharg is 250 miles from Manama, Bahrain; 270 miles from Doha, Qatar; and 420 miles from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Approximately 33 percent of oil destined for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is processed through this island’s terminals. Its military centers are being attacked by our forces, but its energy infrastructure has been spared. Targets, to date, include mine and missile storage bunkers, air-defense sites, and naval and airport infrastructure.
Kharg Island must be taken, and it must be held. This may be accomplished by the use of special forces or by invitation after the end of the present conflict. This intent should not be viewed as a play to dilute Iran’s sovereignty but as a necessity to establish that nation’s future international legitimacy.
For a period of not less than five years from the end of hostilities, Kharg Island should be administered by a multinational administrative entity composed of free Iranians, Americans, and members of the Arab States of the Gulf. Not only is this necessary to ease a transition to economic freedom and political representation for the people of Iran, it is necessary to thwart Chinese predations in the region. American involvement in the administration of this gateway also conveys useful leverage, should the PRC attempt encroachments in the Middle East, Taiwan, the South China Sea, or elsewhere.
Deferred Redemption Instruments (DRIs)
The safe transit of the Persian Gulf is a function of naval protection and stable liberty within Iran. In the wake of the occupation of Iraq, beginning in 2003, fundamental mistakes were made by the Coalition Provisional Authority. The premature dissolution of the Iraqi Army, which deprived hundreds of thousands of soldiers of their livelihoods; the de-Ba’athification of the organs of government, which included many professions tethered to Saddam Hussein’s rule, without compensatory planning; and the de facto toleration of profligate looting and institutional collapse, created a whirlwind that destroyed what had been held as victory. Such mistakes must not be repeated.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur’s administration of post-war Japan offers an alternative model, for his far-sighted efforts transformed that nation. Although America should not seek to install anyone drawn from our country to administer Iran, it is advantageous to recall that General MacArthur demilitarized Japan without traducing its traditions or rendering it open to encroachments. MacArthur instituted agricultural reform through the removal of baronial landlords; he created unions, emancipated women, and instituted their suffrage. Japanese industrial reform was enabled through the elimination of existing oligopolies. Education was remade by the obliteration of militarist ideology.
An analogue for each of MacArthur’s reforms exists for Iran. The conditions and individual actions are different from those that confronted America’s general; the instantiation must be the same. MacArthur understood that power, when overly concentrated, is corrosive to liberty. His actions stemmed from his understanding of Lord Acton’s timeless injunction: “Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
America and our Gulf allies must seek mechanisms to ensure that victory is not beaten into defeat in Iran. The United States needs a means to help orchestrate events in that country and to entrench the permanent ouster of its despotic and theocratic leadership. We must do this with alacrity and without pronounced cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
To aid Iran’s transition into a stable and productive nation, America should evoke an example from our past. To fund the North and its rapid industrialization in the Civil War, President Lincoln created a parallel, paper currency. Other nations have used similar financial tools to promote rapid economic growth. Two examples are Colonial Scrip, which was a secondary form of currency consisting of government-issued bills of credit, and the modern WIR system, which is a complementary currency system that is independent and serves Swiss businesses in construction, manufacturing, and other fields. (Colonial Scrip was used as a means of exchange if specie currency (gold or silver) was unavailable.)
The creation of a ‘Special U.S.-Iran Corporation,’ headed by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, should use the following process to accomplish American objectives:
Have the U.S. intelligence community identify senior cadres of Iranians who hold crucial positions in its government, military, and industry.
After ascertaining that such individuals are not central agents of terrorism, aggression, repression, or blight, the aforementioned Special Corporation should issue Deferred Redemption Instruments (DRIs) to these persons in the form of digital wallets.
Digital wallets would be loaded with DRIs that could be redeemed sequentially as the Iranian energy economy is rebuilt and becomes increasingly profitable ─ free from Chinese, Russian, or extremist manipulation.
At the sole discretion of American officials designated by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, the digital wallets could be stripped of some or all of the DRIs if such officials, officers, or administrators act contrary to U.S. directives, consort with adversarial states or non-state actors (including any elements of transnational criminal organizations or terrorist groups), perpetrate crimes, trade DRIs on black markets, promote communism or radical theocratic positions, or take any other action contrary to America’s interests.
Digital wallets filled with DRIs are the means for America to orchestrate important events in Iran, to return the nation to greatness; it is the mechanism to avoid the mistakes our nation made in Iraq.
The wallets could be redeemed when the Special Corporation would channel energy-related profits to the benefit of those in receipt of the DRIs.
Key Design Features of the DRI include: a) Redemption through future maturity (beginning three-to-four years from issuance); b) Regional and multinational credibility; c) Strictly limited issuance tied to Iran’s energy and distribution sectors; d) Active digital monitoring of bearer compliance and activity; e) Termination (through cryptocurrency means) of any black-market activity or trade; f) Parallel, non-competitive circulation to Iran’s fiat currency. The anchor of future values for the wallets will be the proven potential of Iran’s energy economy.
Supply of DRIs would be controlled by the Special Corporation. Undisciplined or unconstrained issuance must be avoided to inhibit inflationary effects. The provision of the wallets would focus Iran’s managerial elites on wealth creation, not regional destabilization. DRIs, properly administered, would rebuild Iran’s governance and help establish the template of market economics that is infused with liberty and promise.
Redemption timing must be linked to the reconstitution of Iran’s energy sector. Such redemptions should come after the United States has been compensated for our direct losses, which resulted from acts perpetrated by Iran’s prior leader, Ali Hosseini Khamenei. Medium-term maturities and staggered redemptions are thus optimal.
DRIs should not be construed as legal tender and must not be commingled with Iran’s fiat currency. Strict accounting standards for DRI issuance and redemption terms and schedules must be enforced. Further, digital wallets will have to be designed to meet exceedingly high cryptocurrency standards.
Naval Force
As with Japan after World War II, Iran, post conflict, must be demilitarized, but it must not be deprived of any armed forces. Iran’s military must be reimagined and integrated into a multinational regional force that enhances stability and the unencumbered transit of the Strait of Hormuz.
The United States Navy has procured 35 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) of two types, the Freedom class, and the trimaran Independence class. In addition, the Royal Saudi Navy has ordered four enhanced vessels of the Freedom type. Beginning with the HMS Saud, the first ship of its class, launched in Wisconsin in 2025, the Saudi ships will feature vertical launch cells, not present in the U.S. vessels, as well as an array of advanced radars and weapons, including anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine warfare systems. The LCS ships have limited warfighting potential in the context of the U.S. Navy’s global operations. A number of Independence-class ships are being refitted to accomplish anti-mine operations (detection, clearance, or neutralization) and are being deployed with mine countermeasure packages; these ships include the USS Santa Barbara (LCS-32) and USS Canberra (LCS-30).
These vessels and the enhanced Saudi type, with moderate modifications, could, however, perfectly fill the role of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) protection in the Persian Gulf ─ once Iran becomes an allied nation.
Operated with international crews, including Iranian officers and seamen that would be complemented by Gulf-state sailors and Americans on naval exchange programs, a fleet of 18 or more LCS vessels would accomplish many goals simultaneously. Multinational crews that include Iranian officers and seaman would recast Iran’s future navy as a force for peace; best practices would be developed in concert with crews from other nations; a fleet of modern vessels would be put to their best purpose; the U.S. Navy’s worldwide operations would be enhanced because our duties in the Persian Gulf would be reduced markedly.
The initiation of the LCS-based, multinational, naval program would be a template for the appropriate rebuilding of Iran’s other military services. Integration with regional peacekeeping efforts would thus be promoted. This, in turn, would aid Iran’s future as a force to suppress radical or terrorist elements in the region.
Mobilization Preparedness
President Trump has astutely articulated the urgent need for America to increase its capacity to build ships and ordnance at levels far above our current capacities. Mobilization policy that is structured and entrenched throughout government and industry supports deterrence; it is a necessity in fighting any war of appreciable duration. It can only be operationalized, however, if America retains a decisive measure of naval superiority and an intact and vibrant alliance structure.
The United States will be outgunned by the People’s Republic of China if we do not take bold actions now. In the 1970s, large commercial vessel production in the United States fell to approximately 5 percent of global production; today that number stands at 0.2 percent for commercial vessels capable of transoceanic operations. In recent years, China produced over one hundred times the number of large commercial ships as did the United States.
China has passed the Republic of Korea and Japan to become the dominant force in the production of large commercial vessels; this attainment conveys massive economies of scale and workforce resilience to China’s construction of naval vessels and support ships. Across other industries, China’s export-based economy delivers appreciable advantages to its ability to transition to war-related production. The PRC enjoys many advantages in industrial capacity. Vision is necessary to overmatch this potential enemy.
Strategy is the formulation of plans to influence the outcome of events. Strategy must evolve from a comprehensive understanding of purposes, objectives, and means. A resolute posture to quell Chinese belligerency must be far-reaching in its structure and analogous to the multimodal strategy the Reagan administration employed against the USSR. Such a strategy should include enhanced industrial mobilization planning and actions.
Mobilization preparedness is a force multiplier in war and in peace. It is a condition for deterrence; it is a necessity in fighting any protracted war. Its need is patent given the extreme expenditures of materiel in America’s action against Iran.
The Defense Production Act (DPA) was enacted by President Truman at the onset of the Korean War. Title VII of the act defines national defense as a broad continuum of effort, establishes antitrust protections under relevant conditions, grants the President authority to block foreign investments in America, and facilitates presidential consultations with industry. DPA, today, pertains to security involving semiconductor investment, artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure, quantum computing, biotechnology, energy grid security, and supply chain resilience.
Title VII is central to national economic security, public health, infrastructure protection, and defense production in geopolitical crises. Included is the authority for the President to glean corporate information to support the act (§ 4552); to establish a senior interagency committee (§ 4555); and to administer the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (§ 4556), among other abilities.
The power to mobilize must be understood in terms of capacity and history. In wartime, growth in production does not increase linearly; instead, growth may be exponential, feeding upon itself to outstrip common expectations. In the context of wartime mobilization, the application of Euler’s number is important. Euler’s number, e, is an aperture that permits the conceptualization of how to surge industrial capacity through continuous growth, although various limits emerge.
An early start in the production of materiel, which includes shipping and ordinance, does convey crucial advantages; also of prime importance is the size of a combatant’s existent economy and infrastructure, its trained workforce, its transportation networks and SLOCs, its access to strategic inputs and minerals, and its ability to enact and to sustain a decisive degree of mobilization. In the Second World War, Germany began rearmament in the mid-1930s; America began the core of its mobilization efforts in 1940, years later.
Although Germany began its mobilization earlier than the United States, Germany did so indifferently, allowing the production of civilian, luxury goods until its defeat at Stalingrad. America, after Pearl Harbor, immediately curtailed all unnecessary civilian goods production. Such commitment is imperative.
Once U.S. mobilization commenced, our immense, if underutilized, industrial base, fed by ample natural resources and labor, and protected by oceans, fostered an extraordinary rate of growth in wartime production. The United States surpassed Germany, in part, because our initial industrial base was greater and much more easily protected and supplied; thus, America’s exponential curve started from a higher base, which conveyed an implacable advantage.
Initial conditions matter enormously; this is why the PRC’s gigantic advantage in shipyard capacity is deeply troubling. Such an advantage may alter the course of a future long war ─ if offsetting American industrial and alliance-wide actions are not begun in earnest.
Skilled machinists, mechanical technicians, welders, and automotive specialists are vital to any mobilization effort as are professionals in many other trades. America’s high schools must develop vocational educational tracks, beginning in the ninth grade, which will lead to apprenticeships after high-school graduation. New executive orders should link U.S. company participation in federal contracts to corporate support for educational initiatives that back vital trades.
The United States today has a window to use technology to link together vast numbers of businesses throughout the free nations of the world to build supply chains that do not contain companies that are resident in adversarial states. Unalterable, digital ledgers, such as blockchain, may provide one means of creating resilient vertical supply chains that do not involve Chinese companies. Complex products can contain hundreds or thousands of components; only by harnessing the power of technology can we ensure that such finished goods are not subverted by state-controlled entities that could withhold or compromise components made in adversarial countries.
Inducements to erect such new supply chains should be a priority of a global trade compact composed of free nations that appreciate the imperative of economic security. America must determine which industrial components and materials are strategic so that we may ensure dependable avenues of supply; new mechanisms, including blockchain, should be employed.
Access to strategic minerals and advanced integrated circuits, produced in great quantity in Taiwan by TSMC, (TSMC controls at least 70% of the global semiconductor foundry market; TSMC manufactures chips designed by others, including NVIDIA, Apple, and AMD.) and fabricated with machines built by a single Dutch company, ASML, is critical to mobilization preparedness. ASML has built a virtual monopoly in the production of the world’s most advanced chipmaking machines. ASML’s extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography systems, which enable the creation of ultra-fine patterns, are essential for producing cutting-edge processors used in AI, smartphones, and high-performance computing.
Leading-edge AI accelerators rely on high-bandwidth memory (HBM) because large language models (LLMs) are often constrained by memory bandwidth and compute requirements. Though HBM is produced by different vendors, TSMC leads the world in the production of the advanced logic chips used in such accelerators and in the integrative packaging that couples these devices to HBM; this is accomplished with industry-leading scale and yields. TSMC’s fabrication and integration capabilities give this Taiwanese company a leading role in the production of the hardware required by frontier AIs, which employ massive training protocols.
Taiwan is the principal supplier of advanced semiconductors to the U.S. economy; the U.S. military presently consumes a relatively small but critical percent of such imports. (Taiwan dominates advanced logic and foundry production and supplies large portions of chips ultimately imported into the U.S. through global supply chains.) If these supplies be interrupted by war or by conquest, America’s economy will falter, which will make the United States paradoxically more dependent on China.
To support Taiwan, America’s control of SLOCs is determinative. Without an adequate shipyard base and the maintenance of a myriad of correlated domestic industries, American naval supremacy is certain to be challenged. The present evisceration of America’s commercial shipbuilding industry makes the dire situation of warship production worse.
Essential shipyard skills, which migrate readily between Chinese commercial vessel and naval construction, are evaporating in our country. The vicious cycle of naval warship delays and inadequacies that is apparent in the cancellation of what was to be a fleet of Constellation-class frigates, may soon reach an apex that could doom America’s ability to exert command of the seas at times and places of our choosing. Therefore, expanded production of semiconductors in America ─ if coupled with strengthened alliances with Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Australia ─ is crucial in providing a safety net for our economy and the world, should China attack Taiwan.
Mobilization preparedness requires that America’s enunciation of policies be defined. Strategic clarity is the means to impart critical advantages through the clear articulation of national objectives with regard to potential adversaries or enemies. Strategic clarity helps to preclude conflicts and aids in deconfliction by clearly delineating stakes. Such a policy rests on the certitude of actions that uphold declarations.
The creation of avenues for information and decision-making in industrial mobilization preparedness is a complex task, for the duplication of existing bureaucratic elements can be worse than no action at all. Therefore, President Trump should consider engaging a special taskforce to map existing, relevant governmental structures and to recommend a new system, which would be robust, anticipatory, investigative, and responsive to a spectrum of future threats and opportunities in this sphere. The solution should involve the creation of interagency groups to speed intelligence and threat assessments to senior officials, in order to promote rapid and preventative actions concerning mobilization activities.
Conclusion
President Trump’s profound global vision includes the restoration of liberty to the Iranian people, so that they may flourish in this century. The four actions noted arise from the challenges and opportunities presented by President Trump’s bold and necessary military operation.
By coupling post-conflict acts to stabilize Iran, fossil-fuel production, and transit of the Persian Gulf with enhanced mobilization preparedness at home, President Trump will vest America and the Free World with a degree of geopolitical stability not experienced since the end of the Second World War. The four actions each address different problems; the solutions proposed, however, converge to a single vector that could shape American and global security for decades to come.
Richard B. Levine served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy in charge of the Department of the Navy’s technology transfer and security assistance organization during the Reagan administration; in that capacity, he directed the Saudi Naval Support Program. Richard also served on the National Security Council staff, in the White House, as Director, International Economic Affairs, and as Director, Policy Development. Richard formulated and directed the largest study on America’s industrial mobilization capacity and strategic mineral use since the Korean war (The 1984 National Security Council Stockpile/Industrial Mobilization Planning Study) and also presented two Section 232 cases to the President and Cabinet. Richard played a leading role in the formation of naval policy during the Reagan administration: He wrote Ronald Reagan’s speech for the recommissioning of the USS New Jersey and the President’s National Maritime Day Proclamation of 1985. Richard created the Department of the Navy’s Technology Transfer and Security Assistance Review Board (TTSARB), which has served our nation for decades. Richard holds an MBA from the Harvard Business School, and a baccalaureate, in philosophy, with honors, from the Johns Hopkins University. Richard is the recipient of two Presidential letters of commendation and the Department of the Navy’s highest honor given to a civilian employee, the Distinguished Civilian Service Award. Richard has served as a principal advisor to former senior officials on matters involving national security, government, and economic issues. Richard is the author of the recent book, Pillars for Freedom (2023). He is the principal coauthor of America’s #1 Adversary (2020). Richard is presently completing a series of books on intelligence.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Richard B. Levine
Objectives
Peace is often lost after being won by war. This was the case in our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; it must not be so in Iran. President Trump’s and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s brave and resolute actions must presage a lasting and secure peace for the Middle East. This can only be so if many nations, led by the United States, conceive and entrench elements of stability.
Maritime power consists of a spectrum of capacities that permit and protect commerce across the world’s oceans and through its straits. No conduit for energy is more important than the Strait of Hormuz. The sanctity of this artery, where 25-to-30 percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade and 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) transit, is now at stake as is the future of what was the globe’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.
Iran cannot be allowed to be what it was. An architecture of peace that couples maritime security with economic leverage must instate concord and constancy. The aftermath of the present conflict must be integrated into a broad structure that supports regional and economic security.
A strategic pause in the decades that followed the First World War empowered our creation of decisive carrier and submarine tactics. Victory in Iran will permit the realization of a new strategic pause. We will attain the time necessary to modernize our Navy. Once a new Iranian government is in power, it may be possible to reposition up to 25 percent of the portion of our Navy that is forward deployed. This would be decisive in arresting Chinese predations.
Iran’s non-belligerence will enable our reconstitution of shipbuilding skills and infrastructure, to support future American naval dominance. The People’s Liberation Army Navy now outnumbers ours. Breathing space is thus required to support overmatching American industrial transformation during the next ten years. As an example, more Zumwalt-class hulls could be built, for the last ship of this class will be commissioned next year.
Four elements must presage a post-war epoch so that a new Iran may thrive while its neighbors, including Israel and the Gulf Arab states, realize comity. First, Kharg Island should be governed for an interim period by a special administrative body; second, an additional currency, in the form of deferred redemption instruments (DRIs), should be issued to Iranian citizens charged with maintaining fossil fuel production and transfer; third, the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz must be patrolled by a new multinational naval force; fourth, mobilization preparedness must become a central pillar of American power.
Kharg Island
Kharg Island is situated approximately thirty-four miles from the port city of Bushehr on the Iranian mainland. Its strategic importance cannot be overstated, for its terminals, which feed supertankers, control 90-to-96 percent of Iran’s oil exports. It is the key to both Iran’s economy and its future.
Sitting at the center of the Persian Gulf, Kharg is 250 miles from Manama, Bahrain; 270 miles from Doha, Qatar; and 420 miles from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Approximately 33 percent of oil destined for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is processed through this island’s terminals. Its military centers are being attacked by our forces, but its energy infrastructure has been spared. Targets, to date, include mine and missile storage bunkers, air-defense sites, and naval and airport infrastructure.
Kharg Island must be taken, and it must be held. This may be accomplished by the use of special forces or by invitation after the end of the present conflict. This intent should not be viewed as a play to dilute Iran’s sovereignty but as a necessity to establish that nation’s future international legitimacy.
For a period of not less than five years from the end of hostilities, Kharg Island should be administered by a multinational administrative entity composed of free Iranians, Americans, and members of the Arab States of the Gulf. Not only is this necessary to ease a transition to economic freedom and political representation for the people of Iran, it is necessary to thwart Chinese predations in the region. American involvement in the administration of this gateway also conveys useful leverage, should the PRC attempt encroachments in the Middle East, Taiwan, the South China Sea, or elsewhere.
Deferred Redemption Instruments (DRIs)
The safe transit of the Persian Gulf is a function of naval protection and stable liberty within Iran. In the wake of the occupation of Iraq, beginning in 2003, fundamental mistakes were made by the Coalition Provisional Authority. The premature dissolution of the Iraqi Army, which deprived hundreds of thousands of soldiers of their livelihoods; the de-Ba’athification of the organs of government, which included many professions tethered to Saddam Hussein’s rule, without compensatory planning; and the de facto toleration of profligate looting and institutional collapse, created a whirlwind that destroyed what had been held as victory. Such mistakes must not be repeated.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur’s administration of post-war Japan offers an alternative model, for his far-sighted efforts transformed that nation. Although America should not seek to install anyone drawn from our country to administer Iran, it is advantageous to recall that General MacArthur demilitarized Japan without traducing its traditions or rendering it open to encroachments. MacArthur instituted agricultural reform through the removal of baronial landlords; he created unions, emancipated women, and instituted their suffrage. Japanese industrial reform was enabled through the elimination of existing oligopolies. Education was remade by the obliteration of militarist ideology.
An analogue for each of MacArthur’s reforms exists for Iran. The conditions and individual actions are different from those that confronted America’s general; the instantiation must be the same. MacArthur understood that power, when overly concentrated, is corrosive to liberty. His actions stemmed from his understanding of Lord Acton’s timeless injunction: “Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
America and our Gulf allies must seek mechanisms to ensure that victory is not beaten into defeat in Iran. The United States needs a means to help orchestrate events in that country and to entrench the permanent ouster of its despotic and theocratic leadership. We must do this with alacrity and without pronounced cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
To aid Iran’s transition into a stable and productive nation, America should evoke an example from our past. To fund the North and its rapid industrialization in the Civil War, President Lincoln created a parallel, paper currency. Other nations have used similar financial tools to promote rapid economic growth. Two examples are Colonial Scrip, which was a secondary form of currency consisting of government-issued bills of credit, and the modern WIR system, which is a complementary currency system that is independent and serves Swiss businesses in construction, manufacturing, and other fields. (Colonial Scrip was used as a means of exchange if specie currency (gold or silver) was unavailable.)
The creation of a ‘Special U.S.-Iran Corporation,’ headed by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, should use the following process to accomplish American objectives:
Key Design Features of the DRI include: a) Redemption through future maturity (beginning three-to-four years from issuance); b) Regional and multinational credibility; c) Strictly limited issuance tied to Iran’s energy and distribution sectors; d) Active digital monitoring of bearer compliance and activity; e) Termination (through cryptocurrency means) of any black-market activity or trade; f) Parallel, non-competitive circulation to Iran’s fiat currency. The anchor of future values for the wallets will be the proven potential of Iran’s energy economy.
Supply of DRIs would be controlled by the Special Corporation. Undisciplined or unconstrained issuance must be avoided to inhibit inflationary effects. The provision of the wallets would focus Iran’s managerial elites on wealth creation, not regional destabilization. DRIs, properly administered, would rebuild Iran’s governance and help establish the template of market economics that is infused with liberty and promise.
Redemption timing must be linked to the reconstitution of Iran’s energy sector. Such redemptions should come after the United States has been compensated for our direct losses, which resulted from acts perpetrated by Iran’s prior leader, Ali Hosseini Khamenei. Medium-term maturities and staggered redemptions are thus optimal.
DRIs should not be construed as legal tender and must not be commingled with Iran’s fiat currency. Strict accounting standards for DRI issuance and redemption terms and schedules must be enforced. Further, digital wallets will have to be designed to meet exceedingly high cryptocurrency standards.
Naval Force
As with Japan after World War II, Iran, post conflict, must be demilitarized, but it must not be deprived of any armed forces. Iran’s military must be reimagined and integrated into a multinational regional force that enhances stability and the unencumbered transit of the Strait of Hormuz.
The United States Navy has procured 35 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) of two types, the Freedom class, and the trimaran Independence class. In addition, the Royal Saudi Navy has ordered four enhanced vessels of the Freedom type. Beginning with the HMS Saud, the first ship of its class, launched in Wisconsin in 2025, the Saudi ships will feature vertical launch cells, not present in the U.S. vessels, as well as an array of advanced radars and weapons, including anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine warfare systems. The LCS ships have limited warfighting potential in the context of the U.S. Navy’s global operations. A number of Independence-class ships are being refitted to accomplish anti-mine operations (detection, clearance, or neutralization) and are being deployed with mine countermeasure packages; these ships include the USS Santa Barbara (LCS-32) and USS Canberra (LCS-30).
These vessels and the enhanced Saudi type, with moderate modifications, could, however, perfectly fill the role of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) protection in the Persian Gulf ─ once Iran becomes an allied nation.
Operated with international crews, including Iranian officers and seamen that would be complemented by Gulf-state sailors and Americans on naval exchange programs, a fleet of 18 or more LCS vessels would accomplish many goals simultaneously. Multinational crews that include Iranian officers and seaman would recast Iran’s future navy as a force for peace; best practices would be developed in concert with crews from other nations; a fleet of modern vessels would be put to their best purpose; the U.S. Navy’s worldwide operations would be enhanced because our duties in the Persian Gulf would be reduced markedly.
The initiation of the LCS-based, multinational, naval program would be a template for the appropriate rebuilding of Iran’s other military services. Integration with regional peacekeeping efforts would thus be promoted. This, in turn, would aid Iran’s future as a force to suppress radical or terrorist elements in the region.
Mobilization Preparedness
President Trump has astutely articulated the urgent need for America to increase its capacity to build ships and ordnance at levels far above our current capacities. Mobilization policy that is structured and entrenched throughout government and industry supports deterrence; it is a necessity in fighting any war of appreciable duration. It can only be operationalized, however, if America retains a decisive measure of naval superiority and an intact and vibrant alliance structure.
The United States will be outgunned by the People’s Republic of China if we do not take bold actions now. In the 1970s, large commercial vessel production in the United States fell to approximately 5 percent of global production; today that number stands at 0.2 percent for commercial vessels capable of transoceanic operations. In recent years, China produced over one hundred times the number of large commercial ships as did the United States.
China has passed the Republic of Korea and Japan to become the dominant force in the production of large commercial vessels; this attainment conveys massive economies of scale and workforce resilience to China’s construction of naval vessels and support ships. Across other industries, China’s export-based economy delivers appreciable advantages to its ability to transition to war-related production. The PRC enjoys many advantages in industrial capacity. Vision is necessary to overmatch this potential enemy.
Strategy is the formulation of plans to influence the outcome of events. Strategy must evolve from a comprehensive understanding of purposes, objectives, and means. A resolute posture to quell Chinese belligerency must be far-reaching in its structure and analogous to the multimodal strategy the Reagan administration employed against the USSR. Such a strategy should include enhanced industrial mobilization planning and actions.
Mobilization preparedness is a force multiplier in war and in peace. It is a condition for deterrence; it is a necessity in fighting any protracted war. Its need is patent given the extreme expenditures of materiel in America’s action against Iran.
The Defense Production Act (DPA) was enacted by President Truman at the onset of the Korean War. Title VII of the act defines national defense as a broad continuum of effort, establishes antitrust protections under relevant conditions, grants the President authority to block foreign investments in America, and facilitates presidential consultations with industry. DPA, today, pertains to security involving semiconductor investment, artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure, quantum computing, biotechnology, energy grid security, and supply chain resilience.
Title VII is central to national economic security, public health, infrastructure protection, and defense production in geopolitical crises. Included is the authority for the President to glean corporate information to support the act (§ 4552); to establish a senior interagency committee (§ 4555); and to administer the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (§ 4556), among other abilities.
The power to mobilize must be understood in terms of capacity and history. In wartime, growth in production does not increase linearly; instead, growth may be exponential, feeding upon itself to outstrip common expectations. In the context of wartime mobilization, the application of Euler’s number is important. Euler’s number, e, is an aperture that permits the conceptualization of how to surge industrial capacity through continuous growth, although various limits emerge.
An early start in the production of materiel, which includes shipping and ordinance, does convey crucial advantages; also of prime importance is the size of a combatant’s existent economy and infrastructure, its trained workforce, its transportation networks and SLOCs, its access to strategic inputs and minerals, and its ability to enact and to sustain a decisive degree of mobilization. In the Second World War, Germany began rearmament in the mid-1930s; America began the core of its mobilization efforts in 1940, years later.
Although Germany began its mobilization earlier than the United States, Germany did so indifferently, allowing the production of civilian, luxury goods until its defeat at Stalingrad. America, after Pearl Harbor, immediately curtailed all unnecessary civilian goods production. Such commitment is imperative.
Once U.S. mobilization commenced, our immense, if underutilized, industrial base, fed by ample natural resources and labor, and protected by oceans, fostered an extraordinary rate of growth in wartime production. The United States surpassed Germany, in part, because our initial industrial base was greater and much more easily protected and supplied; thus, America’s exponential curve started from a higher base, which conveyed an implacable advantage.
Initial conditions matter enormously; this is why the PRC’s gigantic advantage in shipyard capacity is deeply troubling. Such an advantage may alter the course of a future long war ─ if offsetting American industrial and alliance-wide actions are not begun in earnest.
Skilled machinists, mechanical technicians, welders, and automotive specialists are vital to any mobilization effort as are professionals in many other trades. America’s high schools must develop vocational educational tracks, beginning in the ninth grade, which will lead to apprenticeships after high-school graduation. New executive orders should link U.S. company participation in federal contracts to corporate support for educational initiatives that back vital trades.
The United States today has a window to use technology to link together vast numbers of businesses throughout the free nations of the world to build supply chains that do not contain companies that are resident in adversarial states. Unalterable, digital ledgers, such as blockchain, may provide one means of creating resilient vertical supply chains that do not involve Chinese companies. Complex products can contain hundreds or thousands of components; only by harnessing the power of technology can we ensure that such finished goods are not subverted by state-controlled entities that could withhold or compromise components made in adversarial countries.
Inducements to erect such new supply chains should be a priority of a global trade compact composed of free nations that appreciate the imperative of economic security. America must determine which industrial components and materials are strategic so that we may ensure dependable avenues of supply; new mechanisms, including blockchain, should be employed.
Access to strategic minerals and advanced integrated circuits, produced in great quantity in Taiwan by TSMC, (TSMC controls at least 70% of the global semiconductor foundry market; TSMC manufactures chips designed by others, including NVIDIA, Apple, and AMD.) and fabricated with machines built by a single Dutch company, ASML, is critical to mobilization preparedness. ASML has built a virtual monopoly in the production of the world’s most advanced chipmaking machines. ASML’s extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography systems, which enable the creation of ultra-fine patterns, are essential for producing cutting-edge processors used in AI, smartphones, and high-performance computing.
Leading-edge AI accelerators rely on high-bandwidth memory (HBM) because large language models (LLMs) are often constrained by memory bandwidth and compute requirements. Though HBM is produced by different vendors, TSMC leads the world in the production of the advanced logic chips used in such accelerators and in the integrative packaging that couples these devices to HBM; this is accomplished with industry-leading scale and yields. TSMC’s fabrication and integration capabilities give this Taiwanese company a leading role in the production of the hardware required by frontier AIs, which employ massive training protocols.
Taiwan is the principal supplier of advanced semiconductors to the U.S. economy; the U.S. military presently consumes a relatively small but critical percent of such imports. (Taiwan dominates advanced logic and foundry production and supplies large portions of chips ultimately imported into the U.S. through global supply chains.) If these supplies be interrupted by war or by conquest, America’s economy will falter, which will make the United States paradoxically more dependent on China.
To support Taiwan, America’s control of SLOCs is determinative. Without an adequate shipyard base and the maintenance of a myriad of correlated domestic industries, American naval supremacy is certain to be challenged. The present evisceration of America’s commercial shipbuilding industry makes the dire situation of warship production worse.
Essential shipyard skills, which migrate readily between Chinese commercial vessel and naval construction, are evaporating in our country. The vicious cycle of naval warship delays and inadequacies that is apparent in the cancellation of what was to be a fleet of Constellation-class frigates, may soon reach an apex that could doom America’s ability to exert command of the seas at times and places of our choosing. Therefore, expanded production of semiconductors in America ─ if coupled with strengthened alliances with Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Australia ─ is crucial in providing a safety net for our economy and the world, should China attack Taiwan.
Mobilization preparedness requires that America’s enunciation of policies be defined. Strategic clarity is the means to impart critical advantages through the clear articulation of national objectives with regard to potential adversaries or enemies. Strategic clarity helps to preclude conflicts and aids in deconfliction by clearly delineating stakes. Such a policy rests on the certitude of actions that uphold declarations.
The creation of avenues for information and decision-making in industrial mobilization preparedness is a complex task, for the duplication of existing bureaucratic elements can be worse than no action at all. Therefore, President Trump should consider engaging a special taskforce to map existing, relevant governmental structures and to recommend a new system, which would be robust, anticipatory, investigative, and responsive to a spectrum of future threats and opportunities in this sphere. The solution should involve the creation of interagency groups to speed intelligence and threat assessments to senior officials, in order to promote rapid and preventative actions concerning mobilization activities.
Conclusion
President Trump’s profound global vision includes the restoration of liberty to the Iranian people, so that they may flourish in this century. The four actions noted arise from the challenges and opportunities presented by President Trump’s bold and necessary military operation.
By coupling post-conflict acts to stabilize Iran, fossil-fuel production, and transit of the Persian Gulf with enhanced mobilization preparedness at home, President Trump will vest America and the Free World with a degree of geopolitical stability not experienced since the end of the Second World War. The four actions each address different problems; the solutions proposed, however, converge to a single vector that could shape American and global security for decades to come.
Richard B. Levine served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy in charge of the Department of the Navy’s technology transfer and security assistance organization during the Reagan administration; in that capacity, he directed the Saudi Naval Support Program. Richard also served on the National Security Council staff, in the White House, as Director, International Economic Affairs, and as Director, Policy Development. Richard formulated and directed the largest study on America’s industrial mobilization capacity and strategic mineral use since the Korean war (The 1984 National Security Council Stockpile/Industrial Mobilization Planning Study) and also presented two Section 232 cases to the President and Cabinet. Richard played a leading role in the formation of naval policy during the Reagan administration: He wrote Ronald Reagan’s speech for the recommissioning of the USS New Jersey and the President’s National Maritime Day Proclamation of 1985. Richard created the Department of the Navy’s Technology Transfer and Security Assistance Review Board (TTSARB), which has served our nation for decades. Richard holds an MBA from the Harvard Business School, and a baccalaureate, in philosophy, with honors, from the Johns Hopkins University. Richard is the recipient of two Presidential letters of commendation and the Department of the Navy’s highest honor given to a civilian employee, the Distinguished Civilian Service Award. Richard has served as a principal advisor to former senior officials on matters involving national security, government, and economic issues. Richard is the author of the recent book, Pillars for Freedom (2023). He is the principal coauthor of America’s #1 Adversary (2020). Richard is presently completing a series of books on intelligence.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.