Every service retains a military working dog capability. We’ve had a formal canine program since the Dogs for Defense Program, established in 1943. The program accepted 10,000 donated canines for service domestically and in the European and Pacific Theaters of Operation. Their service as sentry, scout and messenger dogs, contributed to the protection of our domestic war industry, and saving countless lives in both the European and Pacific theaters of war.
Dog teams were extensively used by the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force during the Viet Nam War. During that period both the Army and Air Force ran separate canine schools. The Navy and Coast Guard sent their dogs to regional Army Scout Dog schools, and Coast Guard Hadler’s handlers attended the Air Force sentry dog course at Lackland Air Force Base.
In 1973, the Department of Defense appointed the Air Force as the Executive Agent for canine training. All dogs attended the DoD Air Force Basic Handlers Course, until 2003, when the Coast Guard transferred under the Department of Homeland Security in 2003.
But in 2003 there was a transition of the United States Coast Guard to the Department of Homeland Security. Remaining one of the five military services, whose mission over the course of the past 25 years has not changed. Maintaining the safety of our domestic waterways, environmental protection, but their most challenging mission remains counter narcotics. The Coast Guard continues to interdict cartel’s from moving deadly drugs from reaching the shores of the United States. Undermanned, they continue to use all force multipliers at their disposal to meet this critical national security mission. The one key force multiplier that is utilized by the other services to support counter drug operations are military patrol narcotics detector dogs of PNDD’s. Tasked by US Northern Command to support Customs Border Protection (CBP) along the southern border. Most recently supporting the global war on terror, supporting the Drug Enforcement Agency in their attempts to eradicate poppy fields in Afghanistan, a main stay for the heroin trade in central asia.
Across the breath of the military working dog program, there has never been a force design assessment in over fifty years. The military services retain approximately 1800 explosive and narcotics dogs. The Coast Guard retains…18 explosive detection dogs. Eighteen to support not security of coast guard installations but providing VIP protective support when tasked by the US Secret Service for National Security Special Events. These four legged, living detection systems are irreplaceable. They are mobile, agile, and once they lock onto the scent, trained to locate the threat. With a simple passive response…they sit.
Yet within the canine force structure, especially in the naval service, it is apparent that their importance is not supported by resources, mission analysis, or within the planning for future domestic and contingency operations. At the height of Operation Iraqi and Enduring Freedom, US Central Command yearly canine force structure was approximately 1200 explosive and narcotics detection dogs. I had the distinct pleasure as the Chief of Law Enforcement to have oversight for theater canine rotations and utilization.
In 2006 as we expanded counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s) became the priority threat, the theater demand placed a severe strain on the supply. We quickly realized that the shortfall required a Joint Service sourcing solution. CENTCOM assessed the DoD canine force structure, based on the types of dogs needed, not how they were aligned to each service. By the 2007 CENTCOM force rotation, we were cross leveling Navy and Air Force Teams to support Army maneuver units. And by 2008 the Navy and Air Force were not only supporting conventional Army maneuver units, but were being tasked to support CJSOTF (Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force).
The Marine Corps embedded their military working dog force structure, providing continuity of operations. The Coast Guard was requested and provided specialty units, but no dog teams were requested. The mission called for unity of effort. A unity of effort, that led to a single working dog pre-deployment training site at Yuma Proving Grounds. The threat hasn’t faded, its become dormant to the extent where we are strategically looking at the volume of dog teams necessary to support a major contingency operation.
Dog teams were invaluable, and saved countless lives. “The capability they (MWDs) bring to the fight cannot be replicated by man or machine. By all measures of performance their yield outperforms any asset we have in our inventory. Our Army (and military) would be remiss if we failed to invest more in this incredibly valuable resource.” …
In 2020 the Commandant of the Marine Corps reduced explosive detection dogs from 210 to 150 over the next two years. The program’s human staff will also be downsized, he said, from 260 to about 210. This “right-sizing” is designed to find efficiencies and acquire more dogs trained for multiple skill sets, he added. The Navy has remained at a canine force structure of 284. Not conducting a force laydown, considering the lessons learned from the joint strategy of cross leveling assets to meet mission requirements. A gap that remains across global theaters of operations. Neither has the DoD looked at or planned strategically for canine surge requirements to meet theater demands.
Nor has the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, services re-evaluated, or for that matter ever looked at a strategic plan for canine force management…domestically or for in foreign theaters of war. The realization that there are no canine experts assigned at the Joint Staff or Combatant Commands. Planning for working dogs…non-existent. This includes the imbalance of Army veterinarians, whose veterinary detachments were reduced by 20% as the war on terror concluded.
What will be the employment strategy, what will be canine rules of engagement to deter and defeat domestic terrorism and support law enforcement. Will their utilization overstep the legal restrictions of posse comitatus? One thing is sure, with the limited numbers of trained working teams…canine will a mission essential force multiplier under DSCA (Defense Support to Civil Authorities).
That leads to the expanded role of canine missions in the of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is sourced with 18 explosive detection dogs. A huge slice of their at sea mission is counter-narco operations at sea. Dogs capable of easily navigating in confined spaces, quickly honing onto scent, going directly to source.
Not a remote concept. Discussed between the Coast Guard and DoD in 2019. A joint service agreement for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine to cross level drug dogs to support counter narcotics force multipliers. Eliminating extensive human searches, while attempting to restrain suspects. Unity of effort, economy of force, providing an effective resource specially trained to mitigate narcotic detection.
There is a two phased shortfall. Dogs are not a priority, either in operational design, nor within the funding chain. The DoD is the only agency that does not have a budget line item for working dogs. Relying on funding hand me downs from the Air Force. Our naval forces face a dilemma, to apply lessons from the past to project their canine platform to meet current and projected missions. The demand signal and limited canine force structure will again require joint service canine contributions. Our naval forces will be challenged to meet the multiple mission requirements.
Hopefully as Congress has established a Congressional Working Dog Caucus, the military, law enforcement, FEMA will be provided a platform where Congressional leaders can be made aware and take necessary actions to provide policy and resources to support the “forgotten” force multiplier.
LTC (ret.) Richard Vargus, PhD served in the United States Marine Corps and United States Army for almost forty years. In 2002, he assumed duties at the US Merchant Marine Academy, Global Maritime Transportation School (GMATS). Serving as the lead instructor and development of maritime security and maritime counter-terrorism/piracy courses. In his role as the theater customs program oversight, he was engaged with port security, and planning retrograde sealift movements with MSC, CBP and USDA. Col. Vargus holds a doctorate in Public Administration. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff and Air War College, and was awarded the Bronze Star. Active in the Navy League, he continues to serve as an adjunct instructor at the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By LTC (ret.) Richard Vargus, PhD
Every service retains a military working dog capability. We’ve had a formal canine program since the Dogs for Defense Program, established in 1943. The program accepted 10,000 donated canines for service domestically and in the European and Pacific Theaters of Operation. Their service as sentry, scout and messenger dogs, contributed to the protection of our domestic war industry, and saving countless lives in both the European and Pacific theaters of war.
Dog teams were extensively used by the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force during the Viet Nam War. During that period both the Army and Air Force ran separate canine schools. The Navy and Coast Guard sent their dogs to regional Army Scout Dog schools, and Coast Guard Hadler’s handlers attended the Air Force sentry dog course at Lackland Air Force Base.
In 1973, the Department of Defense appointed the Air Force as the Executive Agent for canine training. All dogs attended the DoD Air Force Basic Handlers Course, until 2003, when the Coast Guard transferred under the Department of Homeland Security in 2003.
But in 2003 there was a transition of the United States Coast Guard to the Department of Homeland Security. Remaining one of the five military services, whose mission over the course of the past 25 years has not changed. Maintaining the safety of our domestic waterways, environmental protection, but their most challenging mission remains counter narcotics. The Coast Guard continues to interdict cartel’s from moving deadly drugs from reaching the shores of the United States. Undermanned, they continue to use all force multipliers at their disposal to meet this critical national security mission. The one key force multiplier that is utilized by the other services to support counter drug operations are military patrol narcotics detector dogs of PNDD’s. Tasked by US Northern Command to support Customs Border Protection (CBP) along the southern border. Most recently supporting the global war on terror, supporting the Drug Enforcement Agency in their attempts to eradicate poppy fields in Afghanistan, a main stay for the heroin trade in central asia.
Across the breath of the military working dog program, there has never been a force design assessment in over fifty years. The military services retain approximately 1800 explosive and narcotics dogs. The Coast Guard retains…18 explosive detection dogs. Eighteen to support not security of coast guard installations but providing VIP protective support when tasked by the US Secret Service for National Security Special Events. These four legged, living detection systems are irreplaceable. They are mobile, agile, and once they lock onto the scent, trained to locate the threat. With a simple passive response…they sit.
Yet within the canine force structure, especially in the naval service, it is apparent that their importance is not supported by resources, mission analysis, or within the planning for future domestic and contingency operations. At the height of Operation Iraqi and Enduring Freedom, US Central Command yearly canine force structure was approximately 1200 explosive and narcotics detection dogs. I had the distinct pleasure as the Chief of Law Enforcement to have oversight for theater canine rotations and utilization.
In 2006 as we expanded counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s) became the priority threat, the theater demand placed a severe strain on the supply. We quickly realized that the shortfall required a Joint Service sourcing solution. CENTCOM assessed the DoD canine force structure, based on the types of dogs needed, not how they were aligned to each service. By the 2007 CENTCOM force rotation, we were cross leveling Navy and Air Force Teams to support Army maneuver units. And by 2008 the Navy and Air Force were not only supporting conventional Army maneuver units, but were being tasked to support CJSOTF (Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force).
The Marine Corps embedded their military working dog force structure, providing continuity of operations. The Coast Guard was requested and provided specialty units, but no dog teams were requested. The mission called for unity of effort. A unity of effort, that led to a single working dog pre-deployment training site at Yuma Proving Grounds. The threat hasn’t faded, its become dormant to the extent where we are strategically looking at the volume of dog teams necessary to support a major contingency operation.
Dog teams were invaluable, and saved countless lives. “The capability they (MWDs) bring to the fight cannot be replicated by man or machine. By all measures of performance their yield outperforms any asset we have in our inventory. Our Army (and military) would be remiss if we failed to invest more in this incredibly valuable resource.” …
In 2020 the Commandant of the Marine Corps reduced explosive detection dogs from 210 to 150 over the next two years. The program’s human staff will also be downsized, he said, from 260 to about 210. This “right-sizing” is designed to find efficiencies and acquire more dogs trained for multiple skill sets, he added. The Navy has remained at a canine force structure of 284. Not conducting a force laydown, considering the lessons learned from the joint strategy of cross leveling assets to meet mission requirements. A gap that remains across global theaters of operations. Neither has the DoD looked at or planned strategically for canine surge requirements to meet theater demands.
Nor has the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, services re-evaluated, or for that matter ever looked at a strategic plan for canine force management…domestically or for in foreign theaters of war. The realization that there are no canine experts assigned at the Joint Staff or Combatant Commands. Planning for working dogs…non-existent. This includes the imbalance of Army veterinarians, whose veterinary detachments were reduced by 20% as the war on terror concluded.
What will be the employment strategy, what will be canine rules of engagement to deter and defeat domestic terrorism and support law enforcement. Will their utilization overstep the legal restrictions of posse comitatus? One thing is sure, with the limited numbers of trained working teams…canine will a mission essential force multiplier under DSCA (Defense Support to Civil Authorities).
That leads to the expanded role of canine missions in the of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is sourced with 18 explosive detection dogs. A huge slice of their at sea mission is counter-narco operations at sea. Dogs capable of easily navigating in confined spaces, quickly honing onto scent, going directly to source.
Not a remote concept. Discussed between the Coast Guard and DoD in 2019. A joint service agreement for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine to cross level drug dogs to support counter narcotics force multipliers. Eliminating extensive human searches, while attempting to restrain suspects. Unity of effort, economy of force, providing an effective resource specially trained to mitigate narcotic detection.
There is a two phased shortfall. Dogs are not a priority, either in operational design, nor within the funding chain. The DoD is the only agency that does not have a budget line item for working dogs. Relying on funding hand me downs from the Air Force. Our naval forces face a dilemma, to apply lessons from the past to project their canine platform to meet current and projected missions. The demand signal and limited canine force structure will again require joint service canine contributions. Our naval forces will be challenged to meet the multiple mission requirements.
Hopefully as Congress has established a Congressional Working Dog Caucus, the military, law enforcement, FEMA will be provided a platform where Congressional leaders can be made aware and take necessary actions to provide policy and resources to support the “forgotten” force multiplier.
LTC (ret.) Richard Vargus, PhD served in the United States Marine Corps and United States Army for almost forty years. In 2002, he assumed duties at the US Merchant Marine Academy, Global Maritime Transportation School (GMATS). Serving as the lead instructor and development of maritime security and maritime counter-terrorism/piracy courses. In his role as the theater customs program oversight, he was engaged with port security, and planning retrograde sealift movements with MSC, CBP and USDA. Col. Vargus holds a doctorate in Public Administration. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff and Air War College, and was awarded the Bronze Star. Active in the Navy League, he continues to serve as an adjunct instructor at the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.