The Northwest Passage and the Limits of U.S. Maritime Leadership Part 2
The MOC
By
Celia Lawlor
October 24, 2025
The U.S. Dilemma: Strong Tools, Weak Posture
U.S. Strengths include immediate geographic access through Alaska, naval power, energy, and tech. The U.S., unlike the People’s Republic of China, has direct access to the Arctic, allowing it more of a footing when it comes to making decisions regarding the region. Additionally, as of April 30, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security approved full production of the first U.S. Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC). The U.S. has realized the limits of its icebreaking fleet, with complete reliance on Coast Guard cutters Healy and Polar Star for all pathfinding needed to ensure safe transit. As of February 2023, the U.S. Navy stated that the Office of Naval Research and Naval Research Laboratory is working on projects “across the fleet… to address the need for advanced data assimilation to improve high-latitude environmental models for weather and conditions forecasting and predictions.” The U.S. National Ice Center (USNIC) also harnesses its abilities to obtain tactical-scale ice and snow information, ice forecasting, and environmental intelligence services. The 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the 2024 Arctic Strategy demonstrate the Department of Defense’s recognition of the importance of addressing potential Arctic pursuits and threats.
However, the U.S. possesses weaknesses that leave it vulnerable and occasionally powerless in a crucial region. The U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, meaning it cannot submit continental shelf claims or contest others’ via the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). This indicates that they cannot declare sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil beyond their 200 nautical mile EEZ. However, more importantly, they cannot refute other nations’ claims to seabeds by using UNCLOS, as stated under articles 76-82. The U.S. can still act under customary law, but it has no binding voice in formal proceedings.
The U.S.’s seemingly unclear Arctic vision allows U.S. Arctic oil and gas potential (especially in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas) to remain untapped due to legal/permit bottlenecks. Military capabilities like submarines and surveillance capabilities, although strong, remain disconnected from legal legitimacy.
Finally, the U.S. has auctioned off the right to drill for oil and gas in places like the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. But companies haven’t fully used these leases because of things like legal uncertainty (UNCLOS), permitting delays, and lack of ports and support infrastructure. Meanwhile, countries like Russia are drilling actively, strengthening their claims and economic power. The U.S. has resources but isn’t extracting or leveraging them due to policy delays and legal gray zones.
NWP Paradox: Alliance Loyalty vs. Global Navigation Strategy
Since 1985, Canada has drawn straight baselines around the outer edges of its arctic archipelago, a cluster of thousands of islands north of the mainland. This method treats the , similar to how an archipelagic state might claim waters between its islands.25 This is controversial as UNCLOS dictates archipelagic states can use this method, but Canada is not officially recognized as an archipelagic state. The NWP runs through Canada’s arctic archipelago. Therefore, Canada asserts full sovereignty over the waters within, including the NWP. They also claim that because historically, Canada has exercised continuous, effective, and recognized sovereignty over the passage. There has been little to no protest until recently, especially before the route became navigable due to climate change. If this claim was accepted, it would give Canada the right to fully control transit, deny passage, and regulate foreign vessels in the NWP.
The U.S. insists the NWP is an international strait. While the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, it accepts many of its provisions as customary international law, including the definition of international straits. According to UNCLOS Article 37, a waterway is an international strait if it connects two parts of the high seas or EEZs and is used for international navigation. The U.S. argues the NWP satisfies both criteria: it connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans via the Arctic, linking Baffin Bay and the Beaufort Sea, both of which are international waters. And although historically limited by ice, international shipping and interest are increasing due to climate change, making the passage increasingly viable for international navigation. Also, the U.S. applies a “functional use” test for international straits, which examines whether the waterway is currently used or is capable of being used for international navigation, not whether it has been used extensively in the past. As arctic ice recedes, more commercial, scientific, and exploratory vessels are transiting the NWP. The U.S. contends that this emerging pattern of use supports its legal status as an international strait.
Ultimately, the U.S. defers power to the Canadians in the 1988 Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. This treaty dictates that the U.S. and Canada will work together to mutually benefit in the Arctic, and that the U.S. government will conduct “all navigation by U.S. icebreakers…with the consent of the Government of Canada.”27 U.S. FONOPs through the NWP risk destabilizing U.S.-Canada cooperation, and would erode the many years of Arctic partnership between the two nations. Nevertheless, by agreeing to yield to the Canadian government when sailing in the NWP, the U.S. loses credibility when it comes to making decisions about the route. This undermines U.S. effort to lead on rules-based maritime order, and sets an unwanted precedent for other parts of the world.
Why the NWP Dispute Matters Beyond the Arctic
Typically, the U.S. sends ships through a disputed route without asking for a state’s permission. These are Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) meant to challenge claims of internal waters. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard conduct deliberate trips through contested waters to assert navigation rights. The U.S. has not and does not administer FONOPs in the NWP, but they do in other parts of the world (i.e. the South China Sea). This discrepancy shows the U.S. attempt to defend global navigation rights, but only when it lines up with its strategic interests. There are many similarities between the two contested water claims: China’s South China Sea island-building is often justified through similar interpretations of sovereignty. China justifies its claims through the “Nine-Dash Line,” arguing historical usage and discovery of islands and maritime features, arguing these are not new claims but enforcement of long-held sovereignty. Both states frame their actions as historical enforcement, not expansionism. China also rejects the idea that its artificial islands or adjacent waters are part of the international commons and pushes back against U.S. “freedom of navigation” operations in what China considers its territory. Canada also rejects the U.S. and EU view that the NWP is an international strait, and opposes foreign passage without Canadian consent or regulation.
However, the U.S. opposes Chinese “internal water” claims but supports Canada’s. Although intuitively, this makes sense, as one is an ally and one is a strategic competitor with the U.S., a selective navigation policy weakens U.S. legal arguments globally and adds a credibility gap. There is a significant geopolitical cost associated with using more relaxed rules in Canada to set a precedent with China. China and Russia could, and will, exploit ambiguity to contest maritime rules. The U.S.’s behavior with Canada also leaves allies uncertain where the U.S. stands on legal consistency. If the U.S. upholds Canada’s NWP claim as it is doing now, it undermines its own high-seas freedoms elsewhere (e.g., South China Sea), leaving a gap for an interpretation that China can claim the SCS as internal waters.
The Ice Is Melting, So Is the Lead
Arctic oil and gas claims are not just about who drills, but who defines where the drilling can happen. Without joining UNCLOS, the U.S. can still compete, but only if it acts with creativity, coordination, and clarity. The longer the U.S. delays a clear Arctic legal and strategic framework, the more it risks losing influence over how key maritime rules evolve, undermining alliances that depend on coherent legal principles, and empowering rivals to fill the void. This especially affects the U.S.’s messaging towards China, which mimics American ambiguity to justify its maritime gray-zone tactics. Obscurity may offer short-term maneuverability, but it creates long-term vulnerability in maritime governance.
More than just resources are at stake: it’s also about energy resilience in a volatile geopolitical climate and the projection of soft power through leadership. Disputes in the Arctic will only continue to get more complicated as nations begin to harness seabed cables enabling secure data networks, autonomous research and surveillance vehicles navigating polar conditions, and other defense-science hybrid platforms. The Arctic is a test of future power projection, and if the U.S. won’t define the Arctic future, others will.
Celia Lawlor is a student at Duke University pursuing International Relations, Computer Science, and Russian. Her research focuses on Arctic governance, maritime law, and U.S. foreign policy, examining the intersection of legal frameworks and strategic competition in global security.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Celia Lawlor
The U.S. Dilemma: Strong Tools, Weak Posture
U.S. Strengths include immediate geographic access through Alaska, naval power, energy, and tech. The U.S., unlike the People’s Republic of China, has direct access to the Arctic, allowing it more of a footing when it comes to making decisions regarding the region. Additionally, as of April 30, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security approved full production of the first U.S. Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC). The U.S. has realized the limits of its icebreaking fleet, with complete reliance on Coast Guard cutters Healy and Polar Star for all pathfinding needed to ensure safe transit. As of February 2023, the U.S. Navy stated that the Office of Naval Research and Naval Research Laboratory is working on projects “across the fleet… to address the need for advanced data assimilation to improve high-latitude environmental models for weather and conditions forecasting and predictions.” The U.S. National Ice Center (USNIC) also harnesses its abilities to obtain tactical-scale ice and snow information, ice forecasting, and environmental intelligence services. The 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the 2024 Arctic Strategy demonstrate the Department of Defense’s recognition of the importance of addressing potential Arctic pursuits and threats.
However, the U.S. possesses weaknesses that leave it vulnerable and occasionally powerless in a crucial region. The U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, meaning it cannot submit continental shelf claims or contest others’ via the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). This indicates that they cannot declare sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil beyond their 200 nautical mile EEZ. However, more importantly, they cannot refute other nations’ claims to seabeds by using UNCLOS, as stated under articles 76-82. The U.S. can still act under customary law, but it has no binding voice in formal proceedings.
The U.S.’s seemingly unclear Arctic vision allows U.S. Arctic oil and gas potential (especially in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas) to remain untapped due to legal/permit bottlenecks. Military capabilities like submarines and surveillance capabilities, although strong, remain disconnected from legal legitimacy.
Finally, the U.S. has auctioned off the right to drill for oil and gas in places like the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. But companies haven’t fully used these leases because of things like legal uncertainty (UNCLOS), permitting delays, and lack of ports and support infrastructure. Meanwhile, countries like Russia are drilling actively, strengthening their claims and economic power. The U.S. has resources but isn’t extracting or leveraging them due to policy delays and legal gray zones.
NWP Paradox: Alliance Loyalty vs. Global Navigation Strategy
Since 1985, Canada has drawn straight baselines around the outer edges of its arctic archipelago, a cluster of thousands of islands north of the mainland. This method treats the , similar to how an archipelagic state might claim waters between its islands.25 This is controversial as UNCLOS dictates archipelagic states can use this method, but Canada is not officially recognized as an archipelagic state. The NWP runs through Canada’s arctic archipelago. Therefore, Canada asserts full sovereignty over the waters within, including the NWP. They also claim that because historically, Canada has exercised continuous, effective, and recognized sovereignty over the passage. There has been little to no protest until recently, especially before the route became navigable due to climate change. If this claim was accepted, it would give Canada the right to fully control transit, deny passage, and regulate foreign vessels in the NWP.
The U.S. insists the NWP is an international strait. While the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, it accepts many of its provisions as customary international law, including the definition of international straits. According to UNCLOS Article 37, a waterway is an international strait if it connects two parts of the high seas or EEZs and is used for international navigation. The U.S. argues the NWP satisfies both criteria: it connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans via the Arctic, linking Baffin Bay and the Beaufort Sea, both of which are international waters. And although historically limited by ice, international shipping and interest are increasing due to climate change, making the passage increasingly viable for international navigation. Also, the U.S. applies a “functional use” test for international straits, which examines whether the waterway is currently used or is capable of being used for international navigation, not whether it has been used extensively in the past. As arctic ice recedes, more commercial, scientific, and exploratory vessels are transiting the NWP. The U.S. contends that this emerging pattern of use supports its legal status as an international strait.
Ultimately, the U.S. defers power to the Canadians in the 1988 Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. This treaty dictates that the U.S. and Canada will work together to mutually benefit in the Arctic, and that the U.S. government will conduct “all navigation by U.S. icebreakers…with the consent of the Government of Canada.”27 U.S. FONOPs through the NWP risk destabilizing U.S.-Canada cooperation, and would erode the many years of Arctic partnership between the two nations. Nevertheless, by agreeing to yield to the Canadian government when sailing in the NWP, the U.S. loses credibility when it comes to making decisions about the route. This undermines U.S. effort to lead on rules-based maritime order, and sets an unwanted precedent for other parts of the world.
Why the NWP Dispute Matters Beyond the Arctic
Typically, the U.S. sends ships through a disputed route without asking for a state’s permission. These are Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) meant to challenge claims of internal waters. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard conduct deliberate trips through contested waters to assert navigation rights. The U.S. has not and does not administer FONOPs in the NWP, but they do in other parts of the world (i.e. the South China Sea). This discrepancy shows the U.S. attempt to defend global navigation rights, but only when it lines up with its strategic interests. There are many similarities between the two contested water claims: China’s South China Sea island-building is often justified through similar interpretations of sovereignty. China justifies its claims through the “Nine-Dash Line,” arguing historical usage and discovery of islands and maritime features, arguing these are not new claims but enforcement of long-held sovereignty. Both states frame their actions as historical enforcement, not expansionism. China also rejects the idea that its artificial islands or adjacent waters are part of the international commons and pushes back against U.S. “freedom of navigation” operations in what China considers its territory. Canada also rejects the U.S. and EU view that the NWP is an international strait, and opposes foreign passage without Canadian consent or regulation.
However, the U.S. opposes Chinese “internal water” claims but supports Canada’s. Although intuitively, this makes sense, as one is an ally and one is a strategic competitor with the U.S., a selective navigation policy weakens U.S. legal arguments globally and adds a credibility gap. There is a significant geopolitical cost associated with using more relaxed rules in Canada to set a precedent with China. China and Russia could, and will, exploit ambiguity to contest maritime rules. The U.S.’s behavior with Canada also leaves allies uncertain where the U.S. stands on legal consistency. If the U.S. upholds Canada’s NWP claim as it is doing now, it undermines its own high-seas freedoms elsewhere (e.g., South China Sea), leaving a gap for an interpretation that China can claim the SCS as internal waters.
The Ice Is Melting, So Is the Lead
Arctic oil and gas claims are not just about who drills, but who defines where the drilling can happen. Without joining UNCLOS, the U.S. can still compete, but only if it acts with creativity, coordination, and clarity. The longer the U.S. delays a clear Arctic legal and strategic framework, the more it risks losing influence over how key maritime rules evolve, undermining alliances that depend on coherent legal principles, and empowering rivals to fill the void. This especially affects the U.S.’s messaging towards China, which mimics American ambiguity to justify its maritime gray-zone tactics. Obscurity may offer short-term maneuverability, but it creates long-term vulnerability in maritime governance.
More than just resources are at stake: it’s also about energy resilience in a volatile geopolitical climate and the projection of soft power through leadership. Disputes in the Arctic will only continue to get more complicated as nations begin to harness seabed cables enabling secure data networks, autonomous research and surveillance vehicles navigating polar conditions, and other defense-science hybrid platforms. The Arctic is a test of future power projection, and if the U.S. won’t define the Arctic future, others will.
Celia Lawlor is a student at Duke University pursuing International Relations, Computer Science, and Russian. Her research focuses on Arctic governance, maritime law, and U.S. foreign policy, examining the intersection of legal frameworks and strategic competition in global security.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.