Drone Revolution, or Prudent Military Action? It’s Important Not to Overstate the Effects of New Technology
The MOC
By
Dr. Steven Wills
June 26, 2025
The recent mass drone attack on Russian strategic aircraft bases far from the border of Ukraine, Israel’s drone attacks on the Iranian air defense systems, also conducted from inside the opponent nation, and the Russian surface navy’s disappearance from the Black Sea littorals near Ukraine have excited the advocates of small drone weapons. Some commentors compared the Ukraine raid to the Pearl Harbor attack of 7 December 1941, and said these attacks on strategic weapons don’t mean an increased risk of Russian nuclear escalation. Information is still limited on the recent Israeli drone attack, but it appears to have played a key role in disabling Iran’s air defense network ahead of a sustained air campaign. Drone advocates also cheer the apparent departure of the Russian Black Sea surface fleet from the Ukrainian littorals, claiming this too as the death nell of larger ships and a major “naval” victory for a nation without an actual navy. Ukraine has made remarkable, rapid advancements in the tactical employment of both naval and airborne drones, with operational and strategic effects. Russian warships now appear to avoid Ukrainian waters—including around occupied Crimea—and Russian strategic aircraft far from the battlefront appear vulnerable to attack.
However, one should not draw too many deep conclusions yet from these drone campaigns. The Russian Black Sea Fleet has a long history of favoring defensive rather than offensive operations, especially when it does not have a clear offensive mission. The drone attack on the Russian airbases was as inspired tactically as was the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor, but it seems to be more a product of Russian intelligence failure rather than a unique capability afforded by unmanned systems. Reviewing some history on both topics helps to explain why neither outcome is revolutionary.
The Defensive Russian Navy Mindset
The Russian Navy has a long history of falling back on defense in depth when challenged in wartime. When not charged with a specific mission, Russian fleet units are not exposed to danger and are protected by a layers of minefields, physical barriers, and shore-based weapon systems.
The Black Sea Fleet suffered heavy losses in the 1850’s Crimean War when much of it was trapped in Sevastopol. It was then stripped of its sailors and guns to provide for the city’s land defenses and later scuttled. The Russian and later Soviet navies learned a lesson from that disaster and withdrew from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk in both World War One and World War Two in the face of threats to Crimea. In the absence of a direct mission the Russians have historically sought to preserve as much of their fleet as possible; their current withdrawal of the Black Sea surface force is in keeping with that tradition. This is perhaps a product of a land power mindset that sees sea power through the lens of supporting terrestrial operations.
There is no operational mission for the Russian Black Sea fleet surface force now in mid-2025. There appear to be no plans to deploy troops to Ukrainian littoral areas using the additional amphibious warships Russia dispatched to the Black Sea in late 2021 just before the invasion of Ukraine . It is a risk to deploy Russia’s few Kaliber land attack cruise missile surface ships (two frigates and a few coastal missile boats) to attack Ukraine, so these vessels, better suited to conventional war with Western navies, have logically been withdrawn eastward to ports like Novorossiysk rather than expose them to drone or cruise missile assaults in Sevastopol. Some of these ships, however, still operate near Crimea. The Black Sea Fleet’s submarine force however remains undetectable by Ukrainian forces, other than when in port. By all accounts, these units remain active as Kaliber cruise missile shooters, except for the Rostov-on-Don, a Kilo-class submarine twice damaged in Ukrainian cruise missile attacks on Sevastopol. Despite these missile threats, Russian cruise missile submarines continue to use Sevastopol as a base. They have even sought to refit fortified Cold War-era submarine bases built into a cliff as a way of staying operational from a forward base.
There has certainly been a withdrawal of Russian surface warships from Sevastopol, but there is a historical precedent for Moscow to do that in the face of the current threat to the city and any ships there. This decision reflects longstanding Russian strategic culture more than any novel threat posed by drones.
Ukrainian attack on Russian Strategic Bombers
The Ukrainian drone attack on Russian strategic bombers deep in the Russian heartland, far from the from the front line was indeed an innovative use of drones to damage Russian strategic airpower. As of 2024, Russia is estimated to have deployed over five hundred nuclear warheads on its 65-67 strategic bomber aircraft. Some estimates suggest as many as thirteen to seventeen of these aircraft were destroyed by Ukraine’ attack and an unspecified number damaged, meaning somewhere in the neighborhood of 20-30 percent of their aircraft are out of action. This attack was a major blow to Russian flexibility in the delivery of nuclear and conventional munitions.
The attack, however, is not so much about the use of drones as the primary weapon vehicle, but rather poor Russian border security, lack of good intelligence, and the century-old challenge in protecting large numbers of aircraft from sabotage and surprise attack. How was it possible for multiple trucks carrying hundreds of small attack drones to deploy across the vast expanse of Russia to areas near Murmansk and the remote area of Irkutsk without being discovered by the Russian security services? Intelligence collection is a double-edged sword in this conflict as well, where both sides know much about the other already from their shared culture and experience of being part of the Soviet Union.
Aircraft security on the ground has always been both an intelligence and tactical challenge. U.S. aircraft on the Hawaiian islands on 7 December 1941 were arranged in neat rows on airstrips, rather than dispersed to avoid air attack as commanders believed the primary threat was from sabotage. Sabotage inside enemy nations is also common in great power wars. Allied forces destroyed a German heavy water plant essential to nuclear weapons development in Norway in 1943, and British naval commanders crashed an old U.S. destroyer, renamed HMS Campbeltown into the only large drydock in France capable of repairing the German battleship Tirpitz, rendering that facility useless for the rest of the war. In World War One German saboteurs placed explosives in the New Jersey Black Tom island munitions facility. They detonated their bombs, destroying over two million pounds of explosives, killing at least seven civilians, and inflicting damage around New York, including to the torch of the Statue of Liberty, making it unsafe for visits until its 1984-1986 restoration.
Sabotage and deep strike—whether by people, destroyers, or drones—will remain an integral part of national war efforts. In an interesting twist, Iran had invested heavily in missiles and in drones, but due to an innovative drone strike, conventional Israeli airpower now appears to dominate Iranian airspace. There is no “wonder weapon” as the German found out late in World War Two that obviates the need for conventional weapon systems.
No doubt security in Russia will be tightened and personnel movement near Russian bases much restricted. The United States can do the same around its own Air Force bases, as well as deploy mobile drone countermeasures. Other nations may follow suit. Given the drone weapons smuggled into both Russia and Iran, border security will probably be tightened in many nations.
Final Observations
There is much to learn from the use of drones in the Russo-Ukraine war, but Russian naval history and the enduring need to strike deep behind opponent lines better explain both the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet, Israel’s drone operations in Iran, and the Ukrainian drone attack on Russian air bases rather than just the emergence of drones as a weapon system. Fleets that fall back on the defense lose initiative and invite attack rather than deter it. Covert operations behind the lines will expand in current and future conflicts, much like those unfolding in Iran. Improved technology can make defense against these attacks more challenging, but the pattern of operations like these is very old. The technology of war changes, but historical undercurrents for present day operations run deep.
Dr. Steve Wills is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
The recent mass drone attack on Russian strategic aircraft bases far from the border of Ukraine, Israel’s drone attacks on the Iranian air defense systems, also conducted from inside the opponent nation, and the Russian surface navy’s disappearance from the Black Sea littorals near Ukraine have excited the advocates of small drone weapons. Some commentors compared the Ukraine raid to the Pearl Harbor attack of 7 December 1941, and said these attacks on strategic weapons don’t mean an increased risk of Russian nuclear escalation. Information is still limited on the recent Israeli drone attack, but it appears to have played a key role in disabling Iran’s air defense network ahead of a sustained air campaign. Drone advocates also cheer the apparent departure of the Russian Black Sea surface fleet from the Ukrainian littorals, claiming this too as the death nell of larger ships and a major “naval” victory for a nation without an actual navy. Ukraine has made remarkable, rapid advancements in the tactical employment of both naval and airborne drones, with operational and strategic effects. Russian warships now appear to avoid Ukrainian waters—including around occupied Crimea—and Russian strategic aircraft far from the battlefront appear vulnerable to attack.
However, one should not draw too many deep conclusions yet from these drone campaigns. The Russian Black Sea Fleet has a long history of favoring defensive rather than offensive operations, especially when it does not have a clear offensive mission. The drone attack on the Russian airbases was as inspired tactically as was the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor, but it seems to be more a product of Russian intelligence failure rather than a unique capability afforded by unmanned systems. Reviewing some history on both topics helps to explain why neither outcome is revolutionary.
The Defensive Russian Navy Mindset
The Russian Navy has a long history of falling back on defense in depth when challenged in wartime. When not charged with a specific mission, Russian fleet units are not exposed to danger and are protected by a layers of minefields, physical barriers, and shore-based weapon systems.
The Black Sea Fleet suffered heavy losses in the 1850’s Crimean War when much of it was trapped in Sevastopol. It was then stripped of its sailors and guns to provide for the city’s land defenses and later scuttled. The Russian and later Soviet navies learned a lesson from that disaster and withdrew from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk in both World War One and World War Two in the face of threats to Crimea. In the absence of a direct mission the Russians have historically sought to preserve as much of their fleet as possible; their current withdrawal of the Black Sea surface force is in keeping with that tradition. This is perhaps a product of a land power mindset that sees sea power through the lens of supporting terrestrial operations.
There is no operational mission for the Russian Black Sea fleet surface force now in mid-2025. There appear to be no plans to deploy troops to Ukrainian littoral areas using the additional amphibious warships Russia dispatched to the Black Sea in late 2021 just before the invasion of Ukraine . It is a risk to deploy Russia’s few Kaliber land attack cruise missile surface ships (two frigates and a few coastal missile boats) to attack Ukraine, so these vessels, better suited to conventional war with Western navies, have logically been withdrawn eastward to ports like Novorossiysk rather than expose them to drone or cruise missile assaults in Sevastopol. Some of these ships, however, still operate near Crimea. The Black Sea Fleet’s submarine force however remains undetectable by Ukrainian forces, other than when in port. By all accounts, these units remain active as Kaliber cruise missile shooters, except for the Rostov-on-Don, a Kilo-class submarine twice damaged in Ukrainian cruise missile attacks on Sevastopol. Despite these missile threats, Russian cruise missile submarines continue to use Sevastopol as a base. They have even sought to refit fortified Cold War-era submarine bases built into a cliff as a way of staying operational from a forward base.
There has certainly been a withdrawal of Russian surface warships from Sevastopol, but there is a historical precedent for Moscow to do that in the face of the current threat to the city and any ships there. This decision reflects longstanding Russian strategic culture more than any novel threat posed by drones.
Ukrainian attack on Russian Strategic Bombers
The Ukrainian drone attack on Russian strategic bombers deep in the Russian heartland, far from the from the front line was indeed an innovative use of drones to damage Russian strategic airpower. As of 2024, Russia is estimated to have deployed over five hundred nuclear warheads on its 65-67 strategic bomber aircraft. Some estimates suggest as many as thirteen to seventeen of these aircraft were destroyed by Ukraine’ attack and an unspecified number damaged, meaning somewhere in the neighborhood of 20-30 percent of their aircraft are out of action. This attack was a major blow to Russian flexibility in the delivery of nuclear and conventional munitions.
The attack, however, is not so much about the use of drones as the primary weapon vehicle, but rather poor Russian border security, lack of good intelligence, and the century-old challenge in protecting large numbers of aircraft from sabotage and surprise attack. How was it possible for multiple trucks carrying hundreds of small attack drones to deploy across the vast expanse of Russia to areas near Murmansk and the remote area of Irkutsk without being discovered by the Russian security services? Intelligence collection is a double-edged sword in this conflict as well, where both sides know much about the other already from their shared culture and experience of being part of the Soviet Union.
Aircraft security on the ground has always been both an intelligence and tactical challenge. U.S. aircraft on the Hawaiian islands on 7 December 1941 were arranged in neat rows on airstrips, rather than dispersed to avoid air attack as commanders believed the primary threat was from sabotage. Sabotage inside enemy nations is also common in great power wars. Allied forces destroyed a German heavy water plant essential to nuclear weapons development in Norway in 1943, and British naval commanders crashed an old U.S. destroyer, renamed HMS Campbeltown into the only large drydock in France capable of repairing the German battleship Tirpitz, rendering that facility useless for the rest of the war. In World War One German saboteurs placed explosives in the New Jersey Black Tom island munitions facility. They detonated their bombs, destroying over two million pounds of explosives, killing at least seven civilians, and inflicting damage around New York, including to the torch of the Statue of Liberty, making it unsafe for visits until its 1984-1986 restoration.
Sabotage and deep strike—whether by people, destroyers, or drones—will remain an integral part of national war efforts. In an interesting twist, Iran had invested heavily in missiles and in drones, but due to an innovative drone strike, conventional Israeli airpower now appears to dominate Iranian airspace. There is no “wonder weapon” as the German found out late in World War Two that obviates the need for conventional weapon systems.
No doubt security in Russia will be tightened and personnel movement near Russian bases much restricted. The United States can do the same around its own Air Force bases, as well as deploy mobile drone countermeasures. Other nations may follow suit. Given the drone weapons smuggled into both Russia and Iran, border security will probably be tightened in many nations.
Final Observations
There is much to learn from the use of drones in the Russo-Ukraine war, but Russian naval history and the enduring need to strike deep behind opponent lines better explain both the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet, Israel’s drone operations in Iran, and the Ukrainian drone attack on Russian air bases rather than just the emergence of drones as a weapon system. Fleets that fall back on the defense lose initiative and invite attack rather than deter it. Covert operations behind the lines will expand in current and future conflicts, much like those unfolding in Iran. Improved technology can make defense against these attacks more challenging, but the pattern of operations like these is very old. The technology of war changes, but historical undercurrents for present day operations run deep.
Dr. Steve Wills is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.