Fleets verses Forts, A Perennial Challenge​

By Dr. Steven Wills

Littoral spaces have always been more dangerous for naval forces. Since the mid-19th century, the ranges at which terrestrial fortifications can attack and seriously damage fleets have steadily increased. Even well-armed warships struggle to silence well-protected land-based weapons, especially when those weapons become mobile. As the old saying goes: “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort”.  

Much has been written about the potential dangers of operating near the People’s Republic of China’s massive missile-armed “fort” on the Asian mainland in a war over Taiwan. A similar situation has been allowed to persist at small scale in the Red Sea as U.S. warships try to keep trade flowing through the Bab al Mandeb strait and Red Sea. The Navy remains in a defensive crouch against a much weaker, but still threatening Houthi drone and missile “fort”. Historically, fleets have been successful against land-based fortifications when they can partner with a joint force of its own in attacking forts in the littoral. Today, that may mean expeditionary, land-based missile and drone formations that give a fleet more firepower to find mobile missile and drone launchers and wear down fortifications. That may mean some “boots on the ground” to support the fleet, but usually this is temporary. The alternative of sending the fleet in alone will only risk naval losses and casualties. 

The Poor Historical Record of Fleets versus Forts  

Since the mid-nineteenth century, fleets have been at a disadvantage against land-based combat power. Even advanced naval forces fighting out of date forts and weapons risk major losses: 

1. The 1863 attack of the ironclad fleet on Charleston Harbor: Union monitors with heavily armored, rotating gun turrets and steam propulsion spent several hours fighting multiple Confederate fortifications including the powerful Fort Sumter. While the armored Union ships emerged relatively unscathed from dozens of hits each, they fired less than 140 shots against forts that fired over 2300 rounds in return. Union accuracy was about 50 percent while Confederate guns struck home about 19 percent of the time. Even technologically advanced fleets risk failure against forts if they do not possess the mass of firepower needed to destroy land-based weapons. 

1. The 1882 Royal Navy Bombardment of Alexandria: As a prelude to its takeover of Egypt and the Suez canal in 1882, the British bombarded the fortifications protecting the city. British warships fired over 1700 rounds of heavy gun ammunition, and while damage to the city’s civilian buildings was heavy and the protecting forts ultimately surrendered, few of the defenders’ guns were actually destroyed. The Egyptians hit British ships over 70 times and might have held out longer and inflicted more damage on Royal Navy ships had they been better trained and more resilient under fire.  

1. The 1915 Anglo-French Bombardment of the Dardanelles forts: The infamous Gallipoli campaign was never supposed to be a land battle, rather the British and French fleets were to fight their way past Ottoman batteries defending the approaches to the Dardanelles strait. However, once allied warships were into the narrow strait both fixed and mobile Ottoman guns began to score multiple hits on the battleship fleet. Mines eventually caused the loss of three allied battleships on one day, and later destroyer and submarine attacks sank two others, demonstrating the power of even modestly resourced littoral forces. The British were ultimately forced to withdraw, suggesting that naval forces alone could no longer overpower complex littoral defenses. 

Today in the Red Sea, the U.S. Navy is fighting a land-based distributive fortification in the shape of missile and drone armed Houthi rebels. Like the British at Alexandria, they have been able to “silence” individual missile batteries and drone bases ashore, but new ones take their place and fight continues.  

Iconoclast British Admiral Sir John Fisher, who commanded a battleship at Alexandria, is often cited as the source of the observation that “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort”. That aphorism remains true today. While ships can indeed silence individual weapon systems, they lack the overall firepower (like the Union ironclad fleet at Charleston) to silence a network of missile and drone batteries at the same time. Then as now, forts with interior lines of communication are easier to replenish and resource than warships whose replacement weapons must come from across the sea. Other than the aircraft carrier, these weapons cannot yet be reloaded at sea and surface warships must seek distant friendly ports where they can re-arm.  

Naval forces operating in a defensive force posture are always at risk that the eventual missile will get through defenses and damage, or sink a warship, In the Red Sea that would rapidly escalate the situation and change to mission from “protection” to “revenge”.  

How Warship Can Fight Modern Distributed Forts 

The Union campaign against Charleston perhaps offers a solution to how a modern fleet can fight a fort, albeit with joint force assistance. Union commanders eventually conquered some of the islands on the periphery of Charleston harbor and there installed guns larger than those on their warships. Together the land- and sea-based weapons silenced most of the Confederate batteries (including Fort Sumter) over the course of 18 months. While ground forces eventually captured Charleston from the landward side, the combination of Union Army and Navy gunnery bombardment neutralized Charleston’s sea-facing forts and made them useless in attacking Union navy ships. The absence of a joint command in the Charleston siege—unlike in the Mississippi, Mobile, and Fort Fisher campaigns—hindered the prospects for full success, but the right weapons combinations were in place.  

The Red Sea presents a similar situation where limited “boots on the ground” can help to silence the wider Houthi rebel distributed missile and drone network. Islands in the Gulf of Aden including Perim (Mayyun) and Socotra could serve as bases for missiles, aircraft and drones supporting the wider allied effort to keep free trade flowing unimpeded through the Bab al Mandeb. While not an attempt to join the Yemen Civil War on the ground, such a deployment would still be a major commitment in the region to the defense of shipping and would require a great deal of diplomatic legerdemain to achieve. Those islands might become Houthi targets themselves and require missile defense.  

Despite these risks, it’s arguable that the disruption to shipping through the Bab al Mandeb demands more offensive action to stop Houthi attacks. While some have suggested abandoning the defense of shipping in the Red Sea altogether, such a choice would only embolden other non-state actors to also attack shipping in other areas of the globe. 

The defense of free trade is an American tradition dating back to the Barbary pirates campaign. The Pentagon cannot abandon the Navy to secure the Red Sea alone. A ship is indeed to fight a fort—alone! But as part of a joint team, the ship can fight and win against even a capable land-based enemy.  

Dr. Steve Wills, Navalist

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.