BALTOPS 24 in a Contested NATO Lake​

By Dr. Steven Wills

The accession of Finland and Sweden to the NATO ranks has not banished the potential for Russian aggression in the Baltic region. Northern Europe’s “flooded meadow” is a potential joint battlespace, across which flows critical Russian as well as NATO commerce and undersea communication lines. Air and sea control in the Baltic is absolutely essential to NATO for maintaining supply and communication lines with Finland, and especially the NATO Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. These nations are virtual islands surrounded by the Baltic and Russia. NATO maritime Baltic naval forces are essential to both the maintenance of sea lines of communication to these potential embattled member nations, as well as the severing of Russian supply lines to St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad in the event of conflict. As NATO’s premier Baltic exercise, the BALTOPS exercise series, underway since 1971 are essential to the further integration of NATO’s newest members and to the continued practice for sea control, air superiority and logistics operations essential to holding the line on NATO’s northern flank in the event of war with Russia. This year twenty NATO nations will send fifty ships, eighty five aircraft and over nine thousand personnel to participate in BALTOPS 2024.  

NATO Must be Ready to Reduce Russian Threats in the Region

 Russian forces have been aggressive in the Baltic since NATO dropped them from the exercise program in 2013 in response to Russian aggression. In 2014 Russia deployed its Baltic “First Strike Force” in exercises in Kaliningrad assessed by some as a prelude to an invasion of the Baltic states.  In 2020 Russian air units flew exercise missions throughout the region at the same time as BALTOPS. Russian efforts at sabotage of undersea infrastructure are well known, and the relatively shallow Baltic Sea offers them more opportunities to affect those critical lifelines. In March 2024 Russian surface ships and helicopters conducted an aggressive antisubmarine warfare exercise with a newer, quiet Russian KILO class submarine serving as the adversary. Russian grey zone (mischief below the level of war) also continues. Aging and possibly leaking Russian “ghost fleet” tankers seeking to avoid Ukraine war sanctions have been sighted in Swedish waters and are a potential environmental threat. Russia had also recently embarked on a scheme to change the maritime borders between itself and Estonia and Finland, but dropped the effort last month.  

NATO Baltic Options Much Improved Since the Mid 2010’s

The Baltic may still be a contested NATO lake, but the Alliance’s positions and options are much better than just a decade in the past. In the mid-2010’s the sea route to resupply of the Baltic states was much more tenuous. BALTOPS now provides an excellent opportunity to exercise air superiority and sea control in the Baltic needed to cut off the flow of Russian commerce to and from St. Petersburg, and to provide and sustain the Allied re-supply mission for Finland and the Baltic states. New NATO members and a weakened Russian ground force posture in the Baltic make NATO’s position in the region better than a decade ago. Four amphibious groups are participating in this year’s BALTOPS as well, highlighting the ability to act quickly against Russian expeditionary operations in the Baltic, or reinforcing NATO allies, and reducing the threat posed by Kaliningrad. A number of antisubmarine warfare exercises are on the BALTOPS 24 schedule of events, as Russia plans to add additional submarines to its Baltic Fleet later in the decade. NATO has also assembled its largest mine countermeasures force in decades for this year’s BALTOPS; not surprising given a century-long affinity of the Russian Baltic Fleet for minelaying operations. Russian forces Kaliningrad especially remain a threat, but NATO’s force posture continues to improve.  

Finland and Sweden add new Capabilities

This year’s BALTOPS represents the first with a complete Nordic alliance component now that both Finland and Sweden are both active, NATO members. Together the two newest NATO members bring substantive military capabilities and greatly improve NATO’s strategic geography in both the Baltic region and the High North. The Finns brought hundreds of soldiers, fast attack, and mine warfare units. The Swedes bring their own substantial joint force with submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and Marines. Both new members also improve the geography of NATO’s northern flank by increasing coverage of the Baltic Sea by alliance nations and by increasing the amount of territory Russia must directly defend. The Swedish port of Gothenburg provides the alliance a vital transfer point for supply around the Baltic region and the island of Gotland the ideal amphibious exercise location. Russia has been forced to re-orient its own forces to respond to Finnish and Swedish NATO accession. Earlier this year Russia created two new military districts in in Northern Russia in response to the new Nordic NATO members. While appearing aggressive, this change also spreads Russian forces depleted by war in Ukraine over a wider, nationwide front. 

BALTOPS and the Russian War Against Ukraine

The geography of Russian military deployment has wider implications beyond new military districts facing NATO’s northern flank. Since the days of the Crimean War in the 1850’s when Great Britain and France fought to forestall Russian imperialism in the Balkans and against the Ottoman Empire, Russia has been forced to spread its forces over widely separated regions to include the Baltic, Central Europe, the Black Sea Region, and the Pacific area of the Russian state. Historically, and in the absence of assistance as was the case in World War 2, Russian defeats, or revolution in one or more of these geographically disparate regions has resulted in Russia being unable to continue conflict. The Crimean and Russo-Japanese wars, as well as World War 1 all saw Russia knocked out of war due to this strategic condition. A strong NATO joint force in the Baltic region, trained through successive iterations of BALTOPS and other exercises should remind the Russians that there is always the possibility of defeat if they seek a military engagement with NATO as the Alliance now borders multiple Russian geographic fronts including the Black Sea, Central Europe and now Baltic in force.  

BALTOPS is Critical to NATO Deterrence of Russia

Few NATO exercises take place so directly on Russia’s doorstep and have greater impact on Russian maritime operations than does BALTOPS. Its continued conduct sends a strong message of alliance solidarity and deterrence, as well as providing a unique joint and combined operating environment for exercise. The addition of Finland and Sweden to the alliance provides a quantum leap forward in overall NATO capability. The Baltic may not be a NATO lake, but NATO’s ability to deter Russian aggressive action there grows more robust with each BALTOPS exercise.  

Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.