NATO’s Contribution to Critical Maritime Infrastructure Protection
The MOC
By
Christian Bueger
January 19, 2024
As one of the key maritime security providers, NATO has a major role in critical maritime infrastructure protection. The Nord Stream pipeline attacks of 2022 brought the need of infrastructure protection at sea into the public security debate. Yet, NATO representatives had alerted to such vulnerabilities well ahead this incident.
With warnings by senior military leaders about the lack of security of underwater data cables and foreign naval activities close to infrastructure locations, the alliance was well aware about security risks since at least 2015.
Yet, the Nord Stream attacks were an important catalyst for stepping up activities in the alliance and the 2023 sabotage of the Baltic Connector pipeline reconfirmed the need for action. With critical maritime infrastructure protection now a political priority in the capitals, the alliance has developed a significant portfolio of responses.
The majority of these were announced at the 2023 Vilnius Summit with its communique for the first time including a strong commitment to “identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies with respect to our critical infrastructure, and to prepare for, deter and defend against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors.”
NATO’s portfolio of activities
As an immediate response to the Nord Stream attacks, NATO forces enhanced their military presence in critical infrastructure locations in the Baltic and North Sea. Patrols by surface and aerial systems further intensified after the incidents with the Baltic Connector pipeline in 2023.
In February 2023 a new Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell was installed in the Brussels headquarters. The cell was given two central tasks: the identification of vulnerabilities, and to improve information sharing and exchange best practice among military and civilian authorities as well as with industry. Developing this ‘community of trust’ has been a key focus and the cell has been convening meetings with leaders in the infrastructure industry. As the Secretary General explained this work: “Because most of these critical undersea infrastructure is owned by private companies, operated by private companies and they have access to and control important capabilities that can help us with surveillance and also gathering information.”
At the Vilnius summit it was announced to establish NATO’s Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure within NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM). While in November 2023 still seen as an ongoing process, plans have matured. The center is expected to have a similar spectrum of tasks as the NATO Shipping Center (NSC), which, for instance, played a crucial role as industry liaison body in NATO’s counter-piracy operations. NSC and the new center are expected to be under a shared director, which raises the possibility of effectively merging this work under a joined maritime infrastructure protection agenda. The new center will also take over the responsibility from the headquarters’ Coordination Cell to facilitate the community of trust.
Recognizing that critical maritime infrastructure protection requires better monitoring and surveillance, known as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), NATO launched together with Sweden in October 2023 a new technology initiative. The Digital Ocean initiative aims at better integrating capabilities and explore how new technologies, ranging from floating sensors, autonomous systems, satellites and algorithms can enhance MDA. A roadmap is under development and a technology competition is scheduled for April 2024.
Also, the diverse range of NATO related centers of excellence have developed a flurry of activities. Among these, Türkiye’s Maritime Security Center of Excellence published a study on the issue, and also made it the theme of its annual conference in June 2024. Lithuania’s Energy Security Center of Excellence held table top exercises and published a study on underwater power cables. Germany’s Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters is planning exercises, Italy’s Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation has made efforts to improve the detection of suspicious vessels which might be involved in acts of sabotage. Portugal’s Maritime Geospatial, Meteorological, and Oceanographic Centre of Excellence is active in developing uncrewed vehicles for MDA, while the U.S.’ Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOAS COE) leads on developing a new strategic seabed concept. At a November 2023 naval forum in Spain, Italy moreover announced its plans for a new NATO center of excellence on seabed infrastructure.
The October 2023 resolution by the Plenary Assembly underscores NATO’s commitment to strengthening and expanding these activities. The alliance prioritizes developing deterrence solutions, improving attribution through surveillance and information sharing with industry, and coordinating incident response. Identifying vulnerable infrastructure and assessing the risk of attacks is a crucial aspect. In the challenging subsea domain, alliance structures will play a vital role, considering the technical demands and military capabilities in submarine warfare, mine hunting, and special forces.
The role of military forces is limited
Critical maritime infrastructure protection, however, differs from other security tasks and the role that military forces can play is limited. The spectrum of threats stretches from natural disasters and accidents to blue crimes, terrorism and the type of state-sponsored threats likely behind the acts of sabotage in the Baltic Sea that are often framed in the debate as ‘greyzone’ activities. Not all of these threats necessarily call for military response but depend on civilian resilience measures.
In the majority of NATO member states the security and safety of maritime infrastructure in territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones is in the hand of civil authorities. Maritime authorities, fishery agencies, energy and digital regulators are in charge, with protective services provided by coastguard and police. For example, in Germany the Bundespolizei See, and in Sweden Kustbevakningen have the primary responsibility for maritime infrastructure protection. Moreover, the legal situation in many member states is often diffuse, specifically concerning rights and obligations in the EEZ. Interfering with infrastructure is often not criminalized in national laws, limiting what state agencies can do.
Given the cross-national character of infrastructures, for instance, pipelines and cables connecting more than one country, NATO member states are well aware of the need to collaborate closely in surveillance response and investigation. In addition to NATOs work, a series of initiatives, partially based on regional seas conventions, is underway to enhance this collaboration.
In the North Sea, for example, Belgium has negotiated a comprehensive information sharing agreement between regional states that will enter into force in 2024. The European Union and it’s three sea agencies (European Maritime Safety Agency, European Fishery Control Agency, and European Border and Coast Guard Agency) likewise aim at strengthening cooperation through its new maritime security strategy, the European Coast Guard Functions Forum, and tools such as the Common Information Sharing Environment. While the relation of these activities to NATO is discussed in the EU-NATO dialogue, they raise questions of compatibility and overlap.
Critical Maritime Infrastructure Protection is a major new security agenda of growing importance considering the expansion of green offshore energy, but also digital infrastructures. As a spectrum of tasks in which civil -military, but also state-industry coordination is of essence, NATO leadership will have to make further efforts in specifying its operational and strategic role and what force levels it wants to commit to the tasks. A strong focus on deterrence, infrastructures in international waters, and on the seabed, where high end solutions are required, can guide NATO in formulating its tasks.
Christian Bueger is professor of international relations at the University of Copenhagen where he leads a research group on ocean infrastructures. He is also one of the directors of SafeSeas – the network for maritime security research, and author of Understanding Maritime Security, to be released by Oxford University Press in May 2024 (with Tim Edmunds). Further information is available at www.bueger.info .
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Christian Bueger
As one of the key maritime security providers, NATO has a major role in critical maritime infrastructure protection. The Nord Stream pipeline attacks of 2022 brought the need of infrastructure protection at sea into the public security debate. Yet, NATO representatives had alerted to such vulnerabilities well ahead this incident.
With warnings by senior military leaders about the lack of security of underwater data cables and foreign naval activities close to infrastructure locations, the alliance was well aware about security risks since at least 2015.
Yet, the Nord Stream attacks were an important catalyst for stepping up activities in the alliance and the 2023 sabotage of the Baltic Connector pipeline reconfirmed the need for action. With critical maritime infrastructure protection now a political priority in the capitals, the alliance has developed a significant portfolio of responses.
The majority of these were announced at the 2023 Vilnius Summit with its communique for the first time including a strong commitment to “identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies with respect to our critical infrastructure, and to prepare for, deter and defend against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors.”
NATO’s portfolio of activities
As an immediate response to the Nord Stream attacks, NATO forces enhanced their military presence in critical infrastructure locations in the Baltic and North Sea. Patrols by surface and aerial systems further intensified after the incidents with the Baltic Connector pipeline in 2023.
In February 2023 a new Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell was installed in the Brussels headquarters. The cell was given two central tasks: the identification of vulnerabilities, and to improve information sharing and exchange best practice among military and civilian authorities as well as with industry. Developing this ‘community of trust’ has been a key focus and the cell has been convening meetings with leaders in the infrastructure industry. As the Secretary General explained this work: “Because most of these critical undersea infrastructure is owned by private companies, operated by private companies and they have access to and control important capabilities that can help us with surveillance and also gathering information.”
At the Vilnius summit it was announced to establish NATO’s Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure within NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM). While in November 2023 still seen as an ongoing process, plans have matured. The center is expected to have a similar spectrum of tasks as the NATO Shipping Center (NSC), which, for instance, played a crucial role as industry liaison body in NATO’s counter-piracy operations. NSC and the new center are expected to be under a shared director, which raises the possibility of effectively merging this work under a joined maritime infrastructure protection agenda. The new center will also take over the responsibility from the headquarters’ Coordination Cell to facilitate the community of trust.
Recognizing that critical maritime infrastructure protection requires better monitoring and surveillance, known as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), NATO launched together with Sweden in October 2023 a new technology initiative. The Digital Ocean initiative aims at better integrating capabilities and explore how new technologies, ranging from floating sensors, autonomous systems, satellites and algorithms can enhance MDA. A roadmap is under development and a technology competition is scheduled for April 2024.
Also, the diverse range of NATO related centers of excellence have developed a flurry of activities. Among these, Türkiye’s Maritime Security Center of Excellence published a study on the issue, and also made it the theme of its annual conference in June 2024. Lithuania’s Energy Security Center of Excellence held table top exercises and published a study on underwater power cables. Germany’s Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters is planning exercises, Italy’s Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation has made efforts to improve the detection of suspicious vessels which might be involved in acts of sabotage. Portugal’s Maritime Geospatial, Meteorological, and Oceanographic Centre of Excellence is active in developing uncrewed vehicles for MDA, while the U.S.’ Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOAS COE) leads on developing a new strategic seabed concept. At a November 2023 naval forum in Spain, Italy moreover announced its plans for a new NATO center of excellence on seabed infrastructure.
The October 2023 resolution by the Plenary Assembly underscores NATO’s commitment to strengthening and expanding these activities. The alliance prioritizes developing deterrence solutions, improving attribution through surveillance and information sharing with industry, and coordinating incident response. Identifying vulnerable infrastructure and assessing the risk of attacks is a crucial aspect. In the challenging subsea domain, alliance structures will play a vital role, considering the technical demands and military capabilities in submarine warfare, mine hunting, and special forces.
The role of military forces is limited
Critical maritime infrastructure protection, however, differs from other security tasks and the role that military forces can play is limited. The spectrum of threats stretches from natural disasters and accidents to blue crimes, terrorism and the type of state-sponsored threats likely behind the acts of sabotage in the Baltic Sea that are often framed in the debate as ‘greyzone’ activities. Not all of these threats necessarily call for military response but depend on civilian resilience measures.
In the majority of NATO member states the security and safety of maritime infrastructure in territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones is in the hand of civil authorities. Maritime authorities, fishery agencies, energy and digital regulators are in charge, with protective services provided by coastguard and police. For example, in Germany the Bundespolizei See, and in Sweden Kustbevakningen have the primary responsibility for maritime infrastructure protection. Moreover, the legal situation in many member states is often diffuse, specifically concerning rights and obligations in the EEZ. Interfering with infrastructure is often not criminalized in national laws, limiting what state agencies can do.
Given the cross-national character of infrastructures, for instance, pipelines and cables connecting more than one country, NATO member states are well aware of the need to collaborate closely in surveillance response and investigation. In addition to NATOs work, a series of initiatives, partially based on regional seas conventions, is underway to enhance this collaboration.
In the North Sea, for example, Belgium has negotiated a comprehensive information sharing agreement between regional states that will enter into force in 2024. The European Union and it’s three sea agencies (European Maritime Safety Agency, European Fishery Control Agency, and European Border and Coast Guard Agency) likewise aim at strengthening cooperation through its new maritime security strategy, the European Coast Guard Functions Forum, and tools such as the Common Information Sharing Environment. While the relation of these activities to NATO is discussed in the EU-NATO dialogue, they raise questions of compatibility and overlap.
Critical Maritime Infrastructure Protection is a major new security agenda of growing importance considering the expansion of green offshore energy, but also digital infrastructures. As a spectrum of tasks in which civil -military, but also state-industry coordination is of essence, NATO leadership will have to make further efforts in specifying its operational and strategic role and what force levels it wants to commit to the tasks. A strong focus on deterrence, infrastructures in international waters, and on the seabed, where high end solutions are required, can guide NATO in formulating its tasks.
Christian Bueger is professor of international relations at the University of Copenhagen where he leads a research group on ocean infrastructures. He is also one of the directors of SafeSeas – the network for maritime security research, and author of Understanding Maritime Security, to be released by Oxford University Press in May 2024 (with Tim Edmunds). Further information is available at www.bueger.info .
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.