To succeed against China, Washington and Its Allies must be in the South China Sea
The MOC
Photo from War on the Rocks.
By
Gonzalo Vázquez
September 28, 2023
In a recent piece for the U.S. Naval Institute’s publication, Proceedings, U.S. Coast Guard Commander Steve Hulse makes a compelling case for using Fast Response Cutters (“FRCs”) to build a fleet of missile patrol craft for the South China Sea (“SCS”). “The fast response cutter is outperforming initial expectations and meeting demand for a global Coast Guard presence,” he argues. “The platform’s reliability, proven performance, and hot production line also make it an outstanding option for the next Navy missile patrol craft,” he continues.
Hulse’s suggestion provides an innovative and affordable alternative which could help Washington strengthen its deterrent posture in the region. It also highlights a pivotal idea that has been subject to extensive discussions and which is worth highlighting yet again: to succeed against Beijing, the U.S. and its allies must be present in the SCS and remain there with a large fleet – for as long as it takes.
Recent evolution in the region
In August 2023, Washington and Manila announced their intention to conduct joint maritime patrols around the West Philippine Sea, starting before the end of the year. Shortly after, Australia and the Philippines made a similar announcement for the SCS amid rising tensions with China. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, said this decision marked “a watershed moment for relations between Australia and the Philippines.”
Beijing has been gradually increasing its hostile behavior against Filipino and Vietnamese vessels operating in contested waters, evidenced by the August 2023 encounter at Ayungin Shoal. The Philippine Coast Guard (“PCG”) published a video showing a Chinese Coast Guard vessel, CCGV 5305, firing a water cannon at several PCG vessels conducting a resupply mission. The incident, like countless others over these past years, offers important insights into China’s hybrid tactics in the region. The announcements made by Canberra, Washington, and Manila represent a positive step in the fight against Chinese assertiveness. It is an especially important decision for Australia which will lead to increased presence in a region its 2023 Defense Strategic Review (“DSR) defines as “the most important geostrategic region in the world”. Like them, Japan, and Vietnam have also voiced their intentions to boost their capabilities to face China in the SCS.
Japan has been keen to support Manila in fighting the CCG and Beijing’s maritime militia. They recently provided a grant for a Satellite Data Communications System to be installed onboard the PCG’s multi-role response vessels, enhancing their maritime domain awareness capabilities. Tokyo has also embarked on a major effort to modernize its naval capabilities with a staggering increase in their defense budget and what its most recent Defense White Paper describes as “strengthening the defense architecture in the southwestern region.” This will include equipping their Air and Ground Defense Forces along the Ryukyu islands with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile units, in an attempt to transform them into a defensive barrier.
Vietnam will play an important role, as well. Regarded as “a frontline facing China’s growing ambitions in the South China Sea,” Hanoi has expressed its concerns over Beijing’s behavior in the region and the potential consequences for Vietnam. Even without a strong naval force, having them all on the same page is good news. The recent defense cooperation agreement signed with Washington could potentially have a strong impact in the region’s security dynamics. But they will also need a strong fleet of patrol vessels to stand firm against Chinese aggressions.
The main reason behind the low defense posture of Washington and its allies has been a collective action problem. According to USAWC professor Stephen Burgess, Washington has been unable to provide sufficient and appropriate security goods in the SCS due to its divergent interests as a global power and the traditionally disparate foreign policies among these countries, including the lack of previous Philippine presidents’ assertiveness against Chinese growing territorial ambitions. Now that these countries have finally aligned their political posture against China, a stronger commitment with their naval presence should follow.
Be there to confront your adversary
In his proposal, Hulse ascertains how the Sentinel-class cutter “offers significant upgrades in size, communications, sensors, weapon systems, and crew habitability.” Their endurance and capabilities have yielded “successful deployments” for the Coast Guard. And most importantly, their “still-hot production line” offers Washington the chance to keep more units coming out of Bollinger Shipyards. Plus it is an affordable option. With each Sentinel unit currently coming at $65 million, Washington could have two dozen of these for less than the price of a single Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.
Japan is rapidly adding more units to its naval forces, with programs such as the Mogami-class frigate, equipped with facilities to deploy uncrewed vessels and a variable-depth sonar and towed array sonar for ASW mission or the six Hayabusa-class guided missile patrol boats. In addition, the Japanese Coast Guard, currently fielding more than 60 vessels which is an important asset to be used by allies, especially around the Senkaku/Diaoyudao islands region. Most recently, Tokyo announced its intentions of supplying “free patrol boats” to “six like-minded nations” which include Vietnam, Indonesia, and Djibouti through its Official Security Assistance (“OSA”) program.
Manila, strongly supported by South Korea, is undertaking a significant modernization of its naval forces and is expected to receive up to a dozen new vessels by 2028 – including corvettes, OPVs, and frigates. These will complement the two Cyclone-class patrol vessels recently transferred by the U.S, and the four Acero-class patrol boats already commissioned (of which Manila intends to acquire up to fifteen units). Knit all these together, and Washington and its allies will be able to put an increased number of ships and sailors in the South China Sea.
This is exactly what is needed to face Beijing: more ships and sailors. These constitute what ADM J.C. Wylie and Professor James Holmes identify as the decisive element for success in any competition. “The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with a gun,” defended Wylie. He is the one who will determine who wins and who loses. If allies do not show up in the region, China’s home court advantage will remain unchallenged. As Wylie, Professor Holmes insists: “you must be on the scene to control something. Or you have to leave no doubt in the minds of important audiences […] that you will inevitably show up to take control should the antagonist buck your will.”
The determination shown by all these countries is a good starting point. Building a cohesive coalition is the next step. Hulse’s proposal for a fleet of missile patrol boats offers a balanced analysis with both their strengths and drawbacks, ultimately proving their outperformance of initial expectations and potential for improvement make them an option worthy of careful consideration. They could contribute to the existing and future units held by Washington and its allies, ultimately accumulating a serious joint naval force in the SCS.
Until now, a collective action problem has prevented a strong deterrent posture against China, due to the divergent positions of each country. With a common collective position against Beijing’s assertiveness and a commitment to face it, Washington, Manila, and their allies must integrate the advice that Hulse, Wylie and Holmes provide: show up in the contested regions. Be there to deter Chinese aggression, making the point that Beijing will not succeed in its quest to claim the SCS for itself. And then remain there with strong determination, mounting a strong defensive posture around the island chain, for as long as it takes.
Gonzalo Vázquezholds a BA in International Relations from the University of Navarre. He has contributed with the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, the Australian Naval Review, and the Council on Geostrategy. Views expressed are his own.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Gonzalo Vázquez
In a recent piece for the U.S. Naval Institute’s publication, Proceedings, U.S. Coast Guard Commander Steve Hulse makes a compelling case for using Fast Response Cutters (“FRCs”) to build a fleet of missile patrol craft for the South China Sea (“SCS”). “The fast response cutter is outperforming initial expectations and meeting demand for a global Coast Guard presence,” he argues. “The platform’s reliability, proven performance, and hot production line also make it an outstanding option for the next Navy missile patrol craft,” he continues.
Hulse’s suggestion provides an innovative and affordable alternative which could help Washington strengthen its deterrent posture in the region. It also highlights a pivotal idea that has been subject to extensive discussions and which is worth highlighting yet again: to succeed against Beijing, the U.S. and its allies must be present in the SCS and remain there with a large fleet – for as long as it takes.
Recent evolution in the region
In August 2023, Washington and Manila announced their intention to conduct joint maritime patrols around the West Philippine Sea, starting before the end of the year. Shortly after, Australia and the Philippines made a similar announcement for the SCS amid rising tensions with China. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, said this decision marked “a watershed moment for relations between Australia and the Philippines.”
Beijing has been gradually increasing its hostile behavior against Filipino and Vietnamese vessels operating in contested waters, evidenced by the August 2023 encounter at Ayungin Shoal. The Philippine Coast Guard (“PCG”) published a video showing a Chinese Coast Guard vessel, CCGV 5305, firing a water cannon at several PCG vessels conducting a resupply mission. The incident, like countless others over these past years, offers important insights into China’s hybrid tactics in the region. The announcements made by Canberra, Washington, and Manila represent a positive step in the fight against Chinese assertiveness. It is an especially important decision for Australia which will lead to increased presence in a region its 2023 Defense Strategic Review (“DSR) defines as “the most important geostrategic region in the world”. Like them, Japan, and Vietnam have also voiced their intentions to boost their capabilities to face China in the SCS.
Japan has been keen to support Manila in fighting the CCG and Beijing’s maritime militia. They recently provided a grant for a Satellite Data Communications System to be installed onboard the PCG’s multi-role response vessels, enhancing their maritime domain awareness capabilities. Tokyo has also embarked on a major effort to modernize its naval capabilities with a staggering increase in their defense budget and what its most recent Defense White Paper describes as “strengthening the defense architecture in the southwestern region.” This will include equipping their Air and Ground Defense Forces along the Ryukyu islands with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile units, in an attempt to transform them into a defensive barrier.
Vietnam will play an important role, as well. Regarded as “a frontline facing China’s growing ambitions in the South China Sea,” Hanoi has expressed its concerns over Beijing’s behavior in the region and the potential consequences for Vietnam. Even without a strong naval force, having them all on the same page is good news. The recent defense cooperation agreement signed with Washington could potentially have a strong impact in the region’s security dynamics. But they will also need a strong fleet of patrol vessels to stand firm against Chinese aggressions.
The main reason behind the low defense posture of Washington and its allies has been a collective action problem. According to USAWC professor Stephen Burgess, Washington has been unable to provide sufficient and appropriate security goods in the SCS due to its divergent interests as a global power and the traditionally disparate foreign policies among these countries, including the lack of previous Philippine presidents’ assertiveness against Chinese growing territorial ambitions. Now that these countries have finally aligned their political posture against China, a stronger commitment with their naval presence should follow.
Be there to confront your adversary
In his proposal, Hulse ascertains how the Sentinel-class cutter “offers significant upgrades in size, communications, sensors, weapon systems, and crew habitability.” Their endurance and capabilities have yielded “successful deployments” for the Coast Guard. And most importantly, their “still-hot production line” offers Washington the chance to keep more units coming out of Bollinger Shipyards. Plus it is an affordable option. With each Sentinel unit currently coming at $65 million, Washington could have two dozen of these for less than the price of a single Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.
Japan is rapidly adding more units to its naval forces, with programs such as the Mogami-class frigate, equipped with facilities to deploy uncrewed vessels and a variable-depth sonar and towed array sonar for ASW mission or the six Hayabusa-class guided missile patrol boats. In addition, the Japanese Coast Guard, currently fielding more than 60 vessels which is an important asset to be used by allies, especially around the Senkaku/Diaoyudao islands region. Most recently, Tokyo announced its intentions of supplying “free patrol boats” to “six like-minded nations” which include Vietnam, Indonesia, and Djibouti through its Official Security Assistance (“OSA”) program.
Manila, strongly supported by South Korea, is undertaking a significant modernization of its naval forces and is expected to receive up to a dozen new vessels by 2028 – including corvettes, OPVs, and frigates. These will complement the two Cyclone-class patrol vessels recently transferred by the U.S, and the four Acero-class patrol boats already commissioned (of which Manila intends to acquire up to fifteen units). Knit all these together, and Washington and its allies will be able to put an increased number of ships and sailors in the South China Sea.
This is exactly what is needed to face Beijing: more ships and sailors. These constitute what ADM J.C. Wylie and Professor James Holmes identify as the decisive element for success in any competition. “The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with a gun,” defended Wylie. He is the one who will determine who wins and who loses. If allies do not show up in the region, China’s home court advantage will remain unchallenged. As Wylie, Professor Holmes insists: “you must be on the scene to control something. Or you have to leave no doubt in the minds of important audiences […] that you will inevitably show up to take control should the antagonist buck your will.”
The determination shown by all these countries is a good starting point. Building a cohesive coalition is the next step. Hulse’s proposal for a fleet of missile patrol boats offers a balanced analysis with both their strengths and drawbacks, ultimately proving their outperformance of initial expectations and potential for improvement make them an option worthy of careful consideration. They could contribute to the existing and future units held by Washington and its allies, ultimately accumulating a serious joint naval force in the SCS.
Until now, a collective action problem has prevented a strong deterrent posture against China, due to the divergent positions of each country. With a common collective position against Beijing’s assertiveness and a commitment to face it, Washington, Manila, and their allies must integrate the advice that Hulse, Wylie and Holmes provide: show up in the contested regions. Be there to deter Chinese aggression, making the point that Beijing will not succeed in its quest to claim the SCS for itself. And then remain there with strong determination, mounting a strong defensive posture around the island chain, for as long as it takes.
Gonzalo Vázquez holds a BA in International Relations from the University of Navarre. He has contributed with the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, the Australian Naval Review, and the Council on Geostrategy. Views expressed are his own.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.