Renewed Security Relationship with the Philippines presents An Opportunity to Washington​

By Andrew I. Park

Washington must build on the momentum generated during Philippine President Bongbong Marco Jr.’s visit to expand its strategic interest in the Indo-Pacific region. Following a productive week characterized by the cordial reception of South Korean President Yoon and the successful prevention of potential nuclear proliferation through strategic reassurance, the Biden administration has solidified the Philippines’ alliance with Washington during Philippine President Bongbong Marcos Jr.’s Official Working Visit this week. This highly anticipated visit occurred subsequent to the announcement made by Washington and Manila regarding their intention to expedite the complete implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in February 2023. In alignment with the EDCA’s stipulations , the two allied nations disclosed four new Philippine military bases to which the U.S. military will be granted access. Since three of these bases are situated in northern Luzon, a mere 400 kilometers from Taiwan, the evolving security cooperation between the U.S. and the Philippines is proving to be of increasing strategic importance for Washington.

Marking the first visit by a Philippine President to the White House in a decade, Marcos Jr.’s meeting with Biden carries considerable significance for Washington-Manila relations. In a joint effort, both presidents reaffirmed their nations’ longstanding security alliance by establishing new defense guidelines aimed at enhancing military cooperation and expanding economic collaboration. Of particular note, during their meeting in the Oval Office, Biden conveyed to Marcos Jr. that “the U.S. remains steadfast in our commitment to the defense of the Philippines, encompassing the South China Sea.”

Over the past decade, the Philippines has been embroiled in a territorial dispute with China, originating in 2012 when the People’s Liberation Army positioned assets on several contested areas within the Spratly archipelago in the South China Sea. Despite the 2016 unanimous ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal, which rejected China’s territorial claims in the region, China has persisted in its harassment of Philippine commercial and governmental activities within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In May 2021, China deployed nearly 300 maritime militia vessels to the Philippine EEZ, effectively undermining and threatening the island nation’s commercial endeavors. To this day, Chinese vessels continue to amass in Philippine maritime territories, with the Chinese PLA Navy confronting significantly smaller Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) cutters, nearly colliding and imperiling the guardsmen. In this context, Biden’s statement not only serves to reassure the Philippine government of Washington’s commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty but also establishes a higher threshold for China to breach the Philippines’ sovereignty and interests within its maritime domain.

Furthermore, Marcos Jr. engaged in discussions with Defense Secretary Austin, culminating in the establishment of Bilateral Defense Guidelines aimed at modernizing the alliance and addressing the evolving strategic and security landscape in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S.-Philippines alliance will seek to upgrade the Philippines’ defense capabilities by emphasizing the acquisition of interoperable defense platforms. Consequently, the administration has declared its intention to transfer three C-130H military transport aircrafts, as well as two Island-class and two Protector-class patrol vessels, to bolster the Philippine military’s preparedness in the face of potential Chinese threats. Moreover, it is anticipated that the Philippine military will pursue the procurement of F-16 Vipers for its small multi-role fighter program.

Washington-Manila relations experienced setbacks during former Philippine President Duterte’s tenure, when he unsuccessfully sought Chinese investment. In contrast, the Biden administration’s fruitful rapprochement with Manila offers significant opportunities that Washington must proactively seize. First, Congress should approve the transfer of the four patrol boats and C-130H, as well as expedite future transfers and sales of defense capabilities. Presently, the PCG operates merely three vessels capable of long-distance patrol, of which only two are deployable. Given the PCG’s limited capacity to cover its expansive EEZ in the West Philippine Sea against the world’s largest navy and maritime militia vessels, Manila is in urgent need of enhanced maritime capabilities.

Additionally, as Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Paparo has suggested, Washington ought to explore the establishment of a multilateral framework in collaboration with regional allies to ensure stability in the South China Sea. By joining forces with allies such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard can effectively deter illegal and gray-zone activities perpetrated by the PLAN and maritime militia flotillas within the Philippines’ EEZ.

Moreover, Washington must endeavor to fortify its economic connections, not only with the Philippines, but also with other partner nations in the region. Despite the optimistic prospects of the U.S.-Philippines alliance, the broader Southeast Asian region appears to be “increasingly tilting toward China,” primarily due to China’s economic incentives and influence. Among the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), only Singapore and the Philippines still perceive Washington as exerting greater influence in the region than Beijing, while Hanoi is anticipated to “resist” Washington’s efforts to enhance its ties with Vietnam. Consequently, while deepening defense and security ties with Manila, Washington must also strive to prevent China’s erosion of its influence in Southeast Asia by deepening economic ties with the broader Southeast Asia region.

Andrew Park is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy and Non-resident James A. Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum. He previously served as a translator/interpreter at the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command / U.S. Forces Korea (CFC/USFK) and holds M.A. in Asian Studies from the Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.