Washington Must Break China’s New Normal in the Taiwan Strait
The MOC
April 25, 2023
Photo from The Financial Times.
Center for Maritime Strategy
Center for Maritime Strategy
Andrew I. Park
Washington’s response to Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait was not enough. China recently concluded a three-day series of military exercises near Taiwan, culminating in a simulated air and maritime blockade. These exercises, designated “Joint Sword,” involved a significant number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) warplanes and warships. 91 PLA warplanes entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), featuring nuclear-capable H-6K bombers, accompanied by fighter jets, early warning, and electronic jamming aircraft. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry reported that 54 of these warplanes crossed the unofficial “median line” of the Taiwan Strait, conducting multiple simulated precision strikes on critical Taiwanese targets. Concurrently, 12 PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels, led by the Type 002 aircraft carrier Shandong, were observed in the waters surrounding Taiwan. These exercises, conducted in response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s visit to the U.S. and meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, were perceived as a “serious warning” from Beijing. This was not the first instance where Beijing conducted extensive military exercises simulating a blockade around Taiwan. Less than a year prior, China executed a four-day series of live-fire exercises near Taiwan, following then U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taipei.
Responding to operation Joint Sword, the U.S. Navy dispatched the USS Milius (DDG-69) to conduct a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP). However, it was only on the final day of the PLA exercise that the destroyer sailed through the South China Sea near the Spratly Islands, located 850 nautical miles away from Taiwan. The destroyer did not traverse through the Taiwan Strait until almost a week after the exercise. This level of response by the U.S. government appears insufficient to address Beijing’s aims, since China continues to engage in a risky gambit in the Taiwan Strait.
China is Gaining More from the Exercises than You Think
In 2022, the PLA deployed a remarkable total of 1,727 warplanes into Taiwan’s ADIZ, significantly more than previous years. Through these exercises and intrusions, the PLA is refining its ability to isolate Taiwan and is perfecting its advancing capabilities. Beijing is using high-level government official meetings between the U.S. and Taiwan as pretexts to test its military capability and accumulate operational and tactical experience on a massive scale.
After being commissioned in December 2019 as China’s first indigenously-built aircraft carrier, Shandong participated in its first major training in the Western Pacific, where carrier-based J-15 fighters executed up to 80 simulated strike missions. Furthermore, the PLA is acquiring knowledge about Taiwanese defenses while winning the “war of attrition” against the island nation. And by conducting frequent intrusions into Taiwan’s ADIZ, the PLA has compelled the Taiwanese Air Force to expend 24.24 million US dollars on spare parts and maintenance.
The New Normal
Beijing prioritizes making political gains. This development suggests that Beijing is fostering a “new normal” of intensified aggression in the Taiwan Strait which echoes the belligerent posture adopted by North Korea. Since its first nuclear test in 2006, Pyongyang has conducted five additional nuclear tests, accompanied by an array of missile launches, totaling over 90 instances involving various types of missiles and rockets. Consequently, well before the 68 tests in 2022, the South Korean public had grown acclimated to the “new normal” wherein ballistic missiles routinely flew overhead. Paradoxically, under the nuclear umbrella provided by Washington, the South Korean public developed a desensitization to Pyongyang’s military threat, prioritizing domestic over security challenges.
The recent November 2022 Taiwanese local elections exhibit a comparable phenomenon. In spite of China’s heightened military threat, President Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which advocated for a strong position on Beijing, was outperformed by the opposition party, Kuomintang (KMT). Although local election outcomes in Taiwan do not necessarily reflect the public’s attitude towards China, the 2022 local election unveiled the Taiwanese public’s electoral resistance against the DPP’s incorporation of China into political discourse. As Taiwan’s presidential election is slated for January 2024, it is likely that Beijing will sustain momentum in the Strait, where it can embrace the new normal by refining its capabilities without concern for political repercussions from the Taiwanese political landscape.
Coercion: Winning Without a War
In line with Sun Tzu’s dictum that the ultimate form of warfare vanquishes the enemy without engaging in battle, China’s strategic use of intimidation could lead to victory. A recent CSIS wargame posits that, should China invade Taiwan, China would likely be unsuccessful. Even if the PLA attained advanced military capabilities, the coalition of liberal democratic nations plus the PLA’s limited combat experience would hinder China from achieving an optimal outcome.
As a result, Beijing may opt for coercive reunification with Taiwan, circumventing direct military engagement. Admiral (ret.) Davidson and CIA Director Burns indicate the PLA will persist in enhancing its capabilities and accruing experience through provocations and exercises, possibly to the point where Beijing feels sufficiently confident to initiate an invasion. Nonetheless, this need not necessarily culminate in an actual military confrontation. Demonstrating political resolve and the PLA’s capacity to the Taiwanese populace may be enough to induce reunification through “peaceful integration.”
It is worth noting that Beijing’s arsenal is not only limited to conventional military capabilities. Before the PLA’s planned Joint Sword exercise, China’s Fujian Maritime Safety Administration initiated a three-day special patrol in the central and northern parts of the Taiwan Strait, with the intention to board and inspect civilian vessels in the area. This maneuver represents a novel form of grey-zone tactics employed by Beijing to coerce not only Taiwan but also the international shipping industry. Also, by sponsoring sporadic yet persistent disinformation and cyberwarfare, which exposes the vulnerabilities of Taiwan’s public sector, Beijing seeks to underscore the possibility of isolating Taiwan from the international community. In addition to cyberattacks on Taiwanese government agencies, an entire chain of 7-Eleven stores on the island was compromised by displaying the message, “Get out of Taiwan.” Moreover, in March 2023, Chinese vessels severed two underwater internet cables linking Taiwan to the global internet network. The gradual accumulation of minor disruptions and inconveniences resulting from Chinese attacks on public infrastructure may undermine the Taiwanese public’s confidence in their national defense and government.
Recommendations
Pelosi and McCarthy’s meetings with Tsai, along with continued bipartisan delegations to Taipei, signify Washington’s dedication to Taiwan’s democracy. Washington must not be intimidated by the Chinese aggression and continue its high-level engagement with Taipei. Further, to reassure the Taiwanese public of its steadfast commitment, Washington must fully implement the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA) enacted as part of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act which authorized up to 10 billion US dollars in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants and loans for Taiwan through 2027. As a result, Washington and Taipei can participate in joint long-term planning for the procurement, deployment, and maintenance of essential capabilities. Importantly, TERA conveys support for incorporating Taiwan in the Rim of the Pacific exercise, from which China has been excluded since 2018. The U.S. must also augment the FMF budget allocation to broaden assistance and training for Taiwan. Lastly, Washington must also collaborate with its allies and partners to amplify FONOPs in the Taiwan Strait, countering any future endeavors by Beijing to escalate its illicit activities that undermine the principle of the law of the sea.
Andrew Park is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy and Non-resident James A. Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum. He previously served as a translator/interpreter at the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command / U.S. Forces Korea (CFC/USFK) and holds M.A. in Asian Studies from the Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.
Andrew I. Park, Senior Analyst