World War II’s Coral Sea and Midway Battles say the Modern U.S. Navy needs more Tactical Aircraft​

By Dr. Steven Wills

The last approved National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2023 appropriated for naval aircraft in low double digits. For example, in FY2023 the navy purchased a total of 96 aircraft of which 13 were F-35C Lightning II strike fighters (9 for the Navy, 4 for the Marine Corps,) and 15 were F-35B Lightning II strike fighters just for the Marine Corps. That is 28 total sea-based strike aircraft. Major carrier air battles in the Second World War caused aircraft losses approaching that number. Modern combat in contested zones with carrier-based strike aircraft will not be like that of World War II, where the respective combatants had to get very close to use their weapon systems, but the geography of the Indo-Pacific and the need for robust carrier air wings has not changed from the 1940s. If World War II losses are a guide to air combat at sea, then the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are going to need a lot more strike aircraft prior to and during combat in the Indo-Pacific region.

Carrier Aircraft Losses at Coral Sea

In 1942, World War II carrier aircraft losses were severe and often not the focus of historians who have been more interested in how many carriers and other warships were sunk. Consider the battle of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Guadalcanal campaign — all considered U.S. victories. During the Coral Sea battle, the U.S. lost the carrier USS Lexington, the fleet oiler USS Neosho, and the destroyer USS Sims. The carrier USS Yorktown received serious bomb damage. Carrier aircraft losses, however, were much worse with Lexington losing 50 strike aircraft (dive bombers, torpedo bombers, and fighters.) Thirty-five Lexington aircraft sank with the ship. Eighteen Lexington air wing aircraft were able to land on Yorktown. Yorktown lost 16 strike aircraft in the battle. 21 Lexington and 14 Yorktown pilots and aircrew were also killed. The Japanese military lost a light carrier (the Shoho,) and all her aircraft (18 total,) and suffered severe damage to a fleet carrier (Shokaku). Japan lost 91 pilots and aircrew along with 87 carrier aircraft lost.

Battle operations also significantly reduced the number of aircraft available for operations as combat continued over two days. By the end of the battle, Yorktown had only 12 dive bomber and 8 torpedo planes left operational and only seven remaining torpedoes with which to arm the latter. Even before the loss of Lexington due to bomb and torpedo damage she received in the battle, U.S. commander Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher had decided to withdraw U.S. forces as the loss of his fleet replenishment tanker Neosho would limit additional air and ship operations. The losses to the airwing of Zuikaku were so severe that she was excluded from the forthcoming Midway operation, as she left the Coral Sea battle with only 9 operational aircraft.

Carrier Aircraft Losses at Midway

Figure 1. Photo of USS Hornet’s Torpedo Squadron 8 before the Battle of Midway. squadron Leader LCDR John Waldron is circled. Only one pilot survived the battle. Photo courtesy U.S. Navy History and Heritage Command

The subsequent Battle of Midway would see even greater losses. The U.S. again lost a carrier (Yorktown) and a destroyer (Hanaman). The U.S. aircraft (carrier and land-based) engaged in the fighting. Of those losses, 109 were carrier aircraft and of those 35 were the slow, Devastator torpedo bombers. Only 6 of 41 Devastators returned to their carriers, and in the wake of the Midway battle the navy accelerated plans to decommission the slow, vulnerable Devastator aircraft. Yorktown lost 9 fighters, 10 dive bombers and 12 torpedo bombers. Hornet lost 32 aircraft including its entire torpedo bomber squadron with just one surviving pilot from a total of 30 pilots and air crew.) Enterprise lost 31 aircraft including 20 dive bombers, 10 torpedo bombers and 1 fighter. 86 U.S. carrier aviators and flight crew were killed in total in the battle. Even the surviving carriers lost the equivalent of three strike fighter squadrons in what is considered a decisive victory.

On the Japanese side, four carriers (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu) were lost, as well as all their aircraft (292 aircraft.) The Japanese lost 110 aviators in addition to thousands of highly skilled carrier aircraft mechanics and technicians. These losses, and those suffered later in 1942 and early 1943 in the Guadalcanal campaign, effectively ground Japanese carrier aviation operations to a halt. Time was needed to train new pilots, air crews, and flight deck personnel for the few new carriers produced by Japan in 1943-1944.

Non-carrier naval aircraft suffered equally high losses early in the war. The iconic U.S. Navy Catalina PBY (Patrol Bomber seaplane) suffered losses in the Pacific War as well, especially when used in their intended combat bombing role. The U.S. Asiatic Fleet lost 41 of 44 PBY’s in just 90 days of combat. In one example, six Catalina aircraft from Patrol Squadron VP-101 attempted to attack Japanese shipping at Jolo in the Philippine Islands on December 27, 1941. Four of six aircraft were lost.

What Do World War Two Carrier Battles say about Aircraft Losses in a Potential Sino-American War in the Indo-Pacific?

Figure 2. A U.S. Navy F-35C prepares to launch from USS Carl Vinson, 2022. Photo courtesy U.S. Navy.

Some wargame results have suggested that the U.S. might lose two fleet carriers and upwards of 20 other ships in the initial stages of a war with China in the Indo-Pacific, especially if U.S forces are engaged in defending Taiwan from a Chinese attack. That could mean upwards of 160 aircraft (assuming 70-80 aircraft per carrier, and no land bases to which airborne aircraft could divert if their carrier is lost). That means nearly 70 F/A-18 E/F aircraft, 20+ F-35C strike fighters, 14-18 E/A-18G electronic warfare aircraft, 10+ E-2D airborne early warning aircraft, not to mention the rotary wing (helicopters) also based on each carrier.

Losses in naval aircraft of all types from just one engagement could seriously weaken U.S. naval aviation’s ability to continue operations in the Indo-Pacific, given the current, relatively low production rate of Navy carrier aircraft. The Navy has stopped taking delivery of the F/A-18 E/F and the E/A-18G, and the F-35C is being built a rate of 19 per year for FY2024. That is barely enough to replace two operational F-35C squadrons. Carrier losses themselves would be disastrous, but a carrier could still be rendered impotent and useless for operations if its strike squadrons were decimated, as occurred at both the Coral Sea on board Zuikaku.

Non-carrier aircraft have an equally slow production rate. The U.S. navy currently plans to field just 128 P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). The U.S. Navy possessed roughly the same number of PBY aircraft (12 squadrons of 12 aircraft each) in late 1941. Over 3000 PBY aircraft were built across the war, with over 350 losses of all types.

Carrier aircraft losses at Coral Sea and Midway were significant, and translated into today’s carrier airwing means losing 75% of combat capability resident on one flattop –even in a successful fight. The Navy needs to build a lot more carrier aircraft (crewed or uncrewed) and train a lot more pilots and operators in preparation for potential conflict. That means ramping up F-35C construction for carrier aircraft and increasing the land-based P-8A Poseidon aircraft numbers above 128 aircraft. It means buying a lot more MQ-25A than the 72 aircraft currently planned. The Senate Armed Services Committee markup of the 2024 defense budget cuts the number of carrier airwings to nine, two less than the current number of carriers. The Navy should have at least two more air wings above the number of carriers in order to replace losses early in a conflict. If the U.S. believes there is an immediate threat in the Indo-Pacific then more and not less naval aircraft will be required. If the early days of World War II in the Indo-Pacific are a guide, then the U.S. navy needs a lot more aircraft.

Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.