Why Defending Taiwan is Difficult: American Credibility and Taiwan’s Military Value
The MOC
By
Zachary Turinsky
August 19, 2025
The debate over Taiwan’s fall is too often marked by hyperbole instead of sober strategic thinking. One recent report on the supposed consequences of a fall predicts that “a novel variant of the bird flu kills over a million civilians… [and] the United Nations headquarters is shuttered.” This is the author’s positive scenario, where the United States unsuccessfully intervenes in Taiwan’s defense. The negative one, where the United States leaves Taiwan to its fate, causes “Mexico… [to] begin to host PLA Navy ship visits and PLA Air Force jets.” Few reports reach this hyperbolic extreme. Yet these disproportionate projections are sustained due to the lack of in-depth analyses of the operational consequences of Taiwan’s fall. Mostlimit themselves to the geostrategic consequences of the puncturing of the first island chain, with perhaps a reference to MacArthur’s outdated and contested 1950 warning over losing Taiwan. In reality, Taiwan’s military value is much greater for China than the United States, and therefore the United States will increasingly find it difficult to decide to defend the island.
Going beyond the reports that only briefly touch on Taiwan’s military value are two recent articles that add much needed depth to the debate. Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge’s article ‘Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan’ presents an in-depth assessment of Taiwan’s military value. In it, Green and Talmadge argue in detail that “basing Chinese submarine warfare assets on Taiwan… [and] placing hydrophone arrays off Taiwan’s coasts for ocean surveillance” enable Chinese sea denial far into the Pacific, shifting the military balance. By contrast, Jonathan Caverley’s article ‘So What? Reassessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan,’ argues that these consequences are overstated, and that there is little operational cost to Chinese control of Taiwan. These two articles offer a chance to approach this debate more seriously. While not making American power projection in the region untenable, Taiwan’s fall increases its difficulty. Analyzed from this American military perspective, the three important consequences of a Chinese takeover of Taiwan are increased submarine access for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the possibility of expanded Chinese power projection and, unmentioned in the two articles, the effects of semiconductor shortages on the U.S. defense industry. For China, however, the island has significant military value. This divergence in military value will make it increasingly difficult for American policymakers to deter China from invading Taiwan and reassure its allies.
The first important military consequence of the fall of Taiwan would be Chinese submarine basing. Today, Chinese submarines traverse through the Luzon Strait to reach the Philippine Sea and the wider Pacific Ocean. In the Luzon Strait, they can be detected by U.S. hydrophones and followed into the Pacific. If China controlled Taiwan, PLAN submarines could more easily disappear into the Pacific. While a currently established American hydrophone system east of Taiwan could still track Chinese submarines, its location close to the coast of Taiwan makes it more susceptible to Chinese disruptions. In addition, relying solely on those trackers will remove the redundancy provided by trackers in the Luzon Strait and South China Sea. American submarines could loiter off the coast of Taiwan, but Chinese anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities would likely push submarines too far off the coast to be successful in detecting Chinese submarines. Caverley argues that this advantage will be minimal, but that assessment rests upon the current under-developed state of China’s submarine fleet.
If China developed its submarine fleet, currently one of the less developed elements of the PLAN, the potential impact expands. Taiwan’s impact on China’s force structure and power projection capabilities, the second important military consequence, could cause this. One of the reasons China has not invested in nuclear-powered submarines is likely their assessment of the limited value of nuclear-powered submarines in a potential Taiwan contingency. Given the United States’ presence in the first island chain, it makes little sense to heavily invest in submarines optimized for blue water power projection. Instead, it makes more sense to invest in missiles to achieve sea denial and a surface fleet for littoral or regional sea control. If China regained Taiwan, however, the strategic calculus changes. Instead of a force structure largely organized around sea denial and a potential invasion of Taiwan, Caverley argues that China’s military could organize around more ambitious missions. These may include fighting for sea control, power projection, or coercion against Japan and the Philippines. The defense of Japan and the Philippines by no means becomes untenable. However, a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would be a necessary prelude to a blockade or invasion of their mainland or offshore islands, both because of simple geography and this possible shift in China’s force structure.
One important military element left unconsidered by the two articles, however, is semiconductor access. While primarily an economic vulnerability, Chinese control of semiconductors will have significant temporary military consequences. The U.S. military depends on Taiwanese semiconductors, the most advanced in the world, for producing F-35s and other advanced military technology. Semiconductor manufacturing cannot be stood up quickly, meaning potentially years of chip shortages necessary for advanced systems if the U.S. is caught unawares. Thus, there is a real cost to American military production that will harm the short-term military balance if Taiwan falls.
Other claimed military costs of losing Taiwan either do not hold up to scrutiny or are less important. Firstly, Green and Talmadge argue that a Chinese Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) system in the Luzon Strait would be able to track American surface ships across the Pacific. However, as Caverley points out, this rests upon an implausible assumption regarding China’s space capabilities. At best (and this is not guaranteed), a SOSUS system will only be able to determine an approximate location, requiring space-based capabilities for targeting. It is improbable that China would have enough space capabilities to fix precise locations while not being able to determine approximate locations as well. Therefore, either the Chinese SOSUS system becomes useless (if China’s space capability is destroyed) or superfluous (if it is not). Secondly, Taiwan will shift China’s anti-access/area denial systems and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities eastwards marginally, a relatively minor threat in a time of effective long-range precision strike weapons.
For the United States, the military costs of losing Taiwan are real but not existential. For China, however, Taiwan has a far greater military importance, as Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes argue in Red Star over the Pacific. As China sees it, Taiwan is a danger pointed at the economic heart of the country: the sea. China’s port infrastructure and merchant marine — important parts of its national defense — are all vulnerable to coercion from Taiwan-based missiles. From the Chinese perspective, the Taiwan Strait is a chokepoint that divides the Chinese coast into two, preventing the PLAN from easily transiting from the East to the South China Sea and rendering it vulnerable to attack. For Chinese strategists, breaking the first island chain through a conquest of Taiwan would increase China’s security by removing these threats, enabling to it embark on blue-water ambitions, and securing access to the global commons.
China’s assessment of Taiwan’s military value does not mean it is of equal value to the United States. To a degree, China’s fear is exaggerated. China’s coasts are susceptible to missiles launched from Japan and the Philippines with or without Taiwan. And while Taiwan abuts some of the most economically important regions of China, a farther off-blockade of China’s ports is well within the U.S. Navy’s capability. In addition, what is vital to China may only be somewhat advantageous for the United States. China’s inability to unite its fleet without transiting the Taiwan Strait may be advantageous for the United States, but the loss of that point of interdiction is hardly fatal. Geography means that China’s security is far more dependent on control of the Taiwan Strait than America’s. In addition, for political reasons, the United States does not station significant forces in Taiwan, further diminishing the strategic benefit the United States receives while not diminishing China’s assessment of Taiwan’s potential threat. None of this is to say that Taiwan does not possess military value for the United States. As described above, there are three key reasons why Taiwan possesses military value. It explains, however, why Chinese and American assessments of that value differ.
Taiwan, then, is not an especially acute case of the security dilemma. Operationally, Taiwan in China’s control would only somewhat harm American security while significantly improving China’s. Much like West Berlin in the Cold War, the primary significance of Taiwan is as a demonstration of uncompromising American resolve to deter an adversary and prevent allied bandwagoning. With a favorable military balance, that demonstration is easy. The United States’ military advantage in East Asia is eroding, however, and it is safe to assume that China will become increasingly assertive towards the island. Soon, American policymakers will have to make choices with no easy answers. Their decisions will be aided by an informed public that approaches the debate with the sobriety and humility that it deserves.
Zachary Turinsky is a research intern at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Zachary Turinsky
The debate over Taiwan’s fall is too often marked by hyperbole instead of sober strategic thinking. One recent report on the supposed consequences of a fall predicts that “a novel variant of the bird flu kills over a million civilians… [and] the United Nations headquarters is shuttered.” This is the author’s positive scenario, where the United States unsuccessfully intervenes in Taiwan’s defense. The negative one, where the United States leaves Taiwan to its fate, causes “Mexico… [to] begin to host PLA Navy ship visits and PLA Air Force jets.” Few reports reach this hyperbolic extreme. Yet these disproportionate projections are sustained due to the lack of in-depth analyses of the operational consequences of Taiwan’s fall. Most limit themselves to the geostrategic consequences of the puncturing of the first island chain, with perhaps a reference to MacArthur’s outdated and contested 1950 warning over losing Taiwan. In reality, Taiwan’s military value is much greater for China than the United States, and therefore the United States will increasingly find it difficult to decide to defend the island.
Going beyond the reports that only briefly touch on Taiwan’s military value are two recent articles that add much needed depth to the debate. Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge’s article ‘Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan’ presents an in-depth assessment of Taiwan’s military value. In it, Green and Talmadge argue in detail that “basing Chinese submarine warfare assets on Taiwan… [and] placing hydrophone arrays off Taiwan’s coasts for ocean surveillance” enable Chinese sea denial far into the Pacific, shifting the military balance. By contrast, Jonathan Caverley’s article ‘So What? Reassessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan,’ argues that these consequences are overstated, and that there is little operational cost to Chinese control of Taiwan. These two articles offer a chance to approach this debate more seriously. While not making American power projection in the region untenable, Taiwan’s fall increases its difficulty. Analyzed from this American military perspective, the three important consequences of a Chinese takeover of Taiwan are increased submarine access for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the possibility of expanded Chinese power projection and, unmentioned in the two articles, the effects of semiconductor shortages on the U.S. defense industry. For China, however, the island has significant military value. This divergence in military value will make it increasingly difficult for American policymakers to deter China from invading Taiwan and reassure its allies.
The first important military consequence of the fall of Taiwan would be Chinese submarine basing. Today, Chinese submarines traverse through the Luzon Strait to reach the Philippine Sea and the wider Pacific Ocean. In the Luzon Strait, they can be detected by U.S. hydrophones and followed into the Pacific. If China controlled Taiwan, PLAN submarines could more easily disappear into the Pacific. While a currently established American hydrophone system east of Taiwan could still track Chinese submarines, its location close to the coast of Taiwan makes it more susceptible to Chinese disruptions. In addition, relying solely on those trackers will remove the redundancy provided by trackers in the Luzon Strait and South China Sea. American submarines could loiter off the coast of Taiwan, but Chinese anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities would likely push submarines too far off the coast to be successful in detecting Chinese submarines. Caverley argues that this advantage will be minimal, but that assessment rests upon the current under-developed state of China’s submarine fleet.
If China developed its submarine fleet, currently one of the less developed elements of the PLAN, the potential impact expands. Taiwan’s impact on China’s force structure and power projection capabilities, the second important military consequence, could cause this. One of the reasons China has not invested in nuclear-powered submarines is likely their assessment of the limited value of nuclear-powered submarines in a potential Taiwan contingency. Given the United States’ presence in the first island chain, it makes little sense to heavily invest in submarines optimized for blue water power projection. Instead, it makes more sense to invest in missiles to achieve sea denial and a surface fleet for littoral or regional sea control. If China regained Taiwan, however, the strategic calculus changes. Instead of a force structure largely organized around sea denial and a potential invasion of Taiwan, Caverley argues that China’s military could organize around more ambitious missions. These may include fighting for sea control, power projection, or coercion against Japan and the Philippines. The defense of Japan and the Philippines by no means becomes untenable. However, a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would be a necessary prelude to a blockade or invasion of their mainland or offshore islands, both because of simple geography and this possible shift in China’s force structure.
One important military element left unconsidered by the two articles, however, is semiconductor access. While primarily an economic vulnerability, Chinese control of semiconductors will have significant temporary military consequences. The U.S. military depends on Taiwanese semiconductors, the most advanced in the world, for producing F-35s and other advanced military technology. Semiconductor manufacturing cannot be stood up quickly, meaning potentially years of chip shortages necessary for advanced systems if the U.S. is caught unawares. Thus, there is a real cost to American military production that will harm the short-term military balance if Taiwan falls.
Other claimed military costs of losing Taiwan either do not hold up to scrutiny or are less important. Firstly, Green and Talmadge argue that a Chinese Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) system in the Luzon Strait would be able to track American surface ships across the Pacific. However, as Caverley points out, this rests upon an implausible assumption regarding China’s space capabilities. At best (and this is not guaranteed), a SOSUS system will only be able to determine an approximate location, requiring space-based capabilities for targeting. It is improbable that China would have enough space capabilities to fix precise locations while not being able to determine approximate locations as well. Therefore, either the Chinese SOSUS system becomes useless (if China’s space capability is destroyed) or superfluous (if it is not). Secondly, Taiwan will shift China’s anti-access/area denial systems and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities eastwards marginally, a relatively minor threat in a time of effective long-range precision strike weapons.
For the United States, the military costs of losing Taiwan are real but not existential. For China, however, Taiwan has a far greater military importance, as Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes argue in Red Star over the Pacific. As China sees it, Taiwan is a danger pointed at the economic heart of the country: the sea. China’s port infrastructure and merchant marine — important parts of its national defense — are all vulnerable to coercion from Taiwan-based missiles. From the Chinese perspective, the Taiwan Strait is a chokepoint that divides the Chinese coast into two, preventing the PLAN from easily transiting from the East to the South China Sea and rendering it vulnerable to attack. For Chinese strategists, breaking the first island chain through a conquest of Taiwan would increase China’s security by removing these threats, enabling to it embark on blue-water ambitions, and securing access to the global commons.
China’s assessment of Taiwan’s military value does not mean it is of equal value to the United States. To a degree, China’s fear is exaggerated. China’s coasts are susceptible to missiles launched from Japan and the Philippines with or without Taiwan. And while Taiwan abuts some of the most economically important regions of China, a farther off-blockade of China’s ports is well within the U.S. Navy’s capability. In addition, what is vital to China may only be somewhat advantageous for the United States. China’s inability to unite its fleet without transiting the Taiwan Strait may be advantageous for the United States, but the loss of that point of interdiction is hardly fatal. Geography means that China’s security is far more dependent on control of the Taiwan Strait than America’s. In addition, for political reasons, the United States does not station significant forces in Taiwan, further diminishing the strategic benefit the United States receives while not diminishing China’s assessment of Taiwan’s potential threat. None of this is to say that Taiwan does not possess military value for the United States. As described above, there are three key reasons why Taiwan possesses military value. It explains, however, why Chinese and American assessments of that value differ.
Taiwan, then, is not an especially acute case of the security dilemma. Operationally, Taiwan in China’s control would only somewhat harm American security while significantly improving China’s. Much like West Berlin in the Cold War, the primary significance of Taiwan is as a demonstration of uncompromising American resolve to deter an adversary and prevent allied bandwagoning. With a favorable military balance, that demonstration is easy. The United States’ military advantage in East Asia is eroding, however, and it is safe to assume that China will become increasingly assertive towards the island. Soon, American policymakers will have to make choices with no easy answers. Their decisions will be aided by an informed public that approaches the debate with the sobriety and humility that it deserves.
Zachary Turinsky is a research intern at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.