Why BALTOPS Matters in a NATO Lake​

By Dr. Steven Wills

The U.S. Naval Forces Europe Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) exercise kicked off its 52nd year of operation on June 4, 2023 with 20 nations, 50 ships, more than 45 aircraft, and approximately 6,000 personnel participating. What began as practice for a desperate NATO defense of the Baltic Sea from the Soviet Union’s Baltic Fleet and Warsaw Pact countries’ navies evolved into a post-Cold War partnership exercise that included Russia for a time, and then returned to a defense practice against potential Russian aggression.

The current situation is very different from the Cold War era. The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact are long defunct, and former members that border the Baltic like Germany, Poland, and the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are now NATO members. While perhaps now a NATO lake, BALTOPS remains more important than ever due to rising Russian capability in the region, the Kaliningrad fortress city, and the continuing possibility of Russian aggression in the region, both above and below the level of armed conflict.

BALTOPS History

Figure 1. BALTOPS 1985 with battleship USS Iowa

BALTOPS began in the 1980s because of, according to NATO expert and CMS Senior Fellow Jim Bergeron the “US willingness to brave the Baltic Sea (a Red or neutral lake at the time) and connect with its allies,” and it saw a crescendo with the Lehman Maritime Strategy. In BALTOPS 1985, U.S. Destroyer Squadron 14 put on a major show of strength in the Baltic, including a six ship Surface Action Group with the battleship USS Iowa BB-61 and the cruiser USS Ticonderoga CG-47. BALTOPS 1990 rounded out the decade with a victory lap over the collapsing Warsaw Pact alliance and the first U.S. Navy visit to Poland since 1927.

Following the end of the Cold War, BALTOPS became an integration exercise for new NATO members, including former Soviet Republics like Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and former Warsaw Pact members including the now-united Germany and Poland. Russian forces participated in the late 1990s through 2007 but were excluded after their invasion of Georgia in 2008. BALTOPS 2014 and 2015 grew in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea and, since that time, the exercise has taken on greater importance in the face of Russian aggression. U.S. leaders emphasize BALTOPS is not about the Russians but rather the development of coordination among the Allied and partner nations. Recent changes in the Baltic region, notably the application of Finland and Sweden to join the alliance however suggest that Russian aggression, as exemplified by its war on Ukraine, remains the driving force behind the alliance cohesion that underlays the BALTOPS exercise.

Why Russia Remains a Challenge in the Baltic

Figure 2. Russian Baltic Sea Fleet Mine Warfare Ships 2016

While many may dismiss the Russian threat in the Baltic region due to poor planning and execution of the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and subsequent Russian casualties in that war, Russian forces in the Baltic region remain active. In parallel with BALTOPS 2023, the Russian Baltic Fleet commenced its own exercise on June 5, 2023 with 40 ships and boats, 25 aircraft and 3,500 personnel scheduled to last through June 15, 2023. Further, Russian aircraft based in the Kaliningrad Oblast conduct regular intercepts of NATO aircraft, and the naval, air and missile forces based there remain a threat. The Russian Baltic Fleet maintains a significant stockpile of mines that could be used in both active war and gray zone operations. Mines can be deployed from a variety of platforms (ships, submarines, and aircraft,) and are difficult to locate and remove. NATO has long practiced mine countermeasures in the Baltic Sea, but mining even in small numbers could delay NATO resupply of more isolated members including Finland, and the Baltic states. While it has been reported that the Russian 11th Army Corps that had been based in Kaliningrad, was committed to the Ukraine front with heavy casualties, Russian S-400 missile batteries combat aircraft, naval infantry, potential new submarines, and other forces remain garrisoned with the oblast. While the Baltic is clearly a very “NATO lake” – and more so now with the accession of Finland to the alliance and hopefully imminent entry of Sweden to NATO – Kaliningrad remains a formidable, if isolated, fortress on the Baltic whose arsenal is assessed to include nuclear weapons.

The Importance of BALTOPS as a Joint Exercise

Figure 3. USS Mount Whitney and USS Paul Ignatius in Tallinn, Estonia prior to BALTOPS 23

Aptly described by many naval analysts as a “flooded meadow,” the Baltic Sea region remains an important challenge for NATO on a joint scale. Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are physically separate from other NATO nations, other than for the narrow Suwalki gap between Poland and Lithuania. The Baltic Sea represents a vital resupply link to those NATO states. The joint cooperation required to conduct BALTOPS is vital to keeping open that important resupply lifeline. Russian warships regularly shadow BALTOPS indicating their continuing interest in the exercise. The exercise remains what its 2015 and 2016 commander Admiral James Foggo called “a battle of the narrative” given NATO’s continuing message that it will defend all members from aggression, including the most physically isolated ones. That strategic communications messaging remains perhaps the most enduring impact of one of Europe’s most long-running military exercises.

Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.