Why America is at War with Iran and Where the Conflict Might Go From Here
The MOC
By
Matthew Reisener
March 9, 2026
Since February 28, the US military has been engaged in a military conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Dubbed “Operation Epic Fury,” the US and its ally Israel have struck thousands of military targets in Iran, with Israel also attacking Iranian proxies in Beirut. Thus far, these attacks have produced over 1,000 casualties, including Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini. The Trump administration has outlined four goals of the campaign: destroying Iran’s missile infrastructure, annihilating Iranian naval power, eroding Iran’s regional terrorist network, and permanently ending Iran’s nuclear program. The US and Israel cited the dangers posed by Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs as the motivation for their campaign, though many experts have questioned the legitimacy of those threats.
While the White House’s justifications for this war may be subject to debate, the performance of America’s military in the early days of this conflict is not. America’s sea services have particularly displayed their impressive martial prowess, launching successful attacks against the Iranian mainland and helping sink more than 30 Iranian vessels as of March 5. Perhaps most impressively, an American submarine sank the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena on March 4, marking the first sinking of an enemy vessel by an American submarine since World War II. America’s Navy may be poised to play an even bigger role in the conflict, with Trump floating the idea of naval vessels escorting commercial ships through the Strait of Hormuz in response to Iranian efforts to close the vital economic corridor.
Yet despite America’s impressive military showing, the outcome of the war remains uncertain. Even if one agrees with the military objectives outlined by the White House, wars started with the best intentions can nonetheless produce unforeseen and often disastrous consequences. While the Iran War has countless possible outcomes, there are four potential scenarios for how this conflict might end which warrant particular consideration.
1. Regime change and democratization. While the White House left regime change off its official list of war aims, this scenario is most likely the administration’s preferred outcome. Regime change is difficult to achieve, particularly without deploying combat troops on the ground. Given that airpower alone has never successfully toppled a regime and considering the Trump administration’s demonstrated preference for waging military campaigns using sea-and-airpower rather than putting boots on the ground, this outcome seems unlikely, albeit not impossible.
Notably, Iran does have a democratic tradition that can be traced at least as far back as the 1905 Constitutional Revolution, and the country has the trappings of a democracy even if its elections have historically been far from free and fair. The Iranian people have also mobilized mass protests against the regime, and public opinion polling from 2024 suggests that 70% of Iranians oppose the continuation of the Islamic Republic, with 89% in favor of democracy. It not inconceivable that these protests, combined with the regime’s preoccupation with the US and Israel, could create an opportunity to topple the government just as Iranian revolutionaries did in 1979.
However, there are several reasons to be skeptical that this war will produce an Iranian democracy. First, there is no unified opposition movement in Iran, nor is there a clear alternative to replace the existing power structure should the protests succeed in ousting Iran’s religious leadership. While Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as a unifying figure during the 1979 revolution, the closest equivalent the contemporary protests have is Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s former Shah who is in no way prepared to govern a country he has not set foot in since 1979. Additionally, the American and Israeli attacks may actually weaken the protest movement by disrupting communications within the country and making protestors feel less safe taking to the streets.
These attacks could similarly trigger a “rally around the flag” effect, engendering nationalist sentiments among Iranians while giving credence to the regime’s longstanding narrative that it serves as the vanguard protecting the Iranian people from hostile American and Israeli forces—which is exactly what occurred after the Twelve-Day War in 2025. America’s outreach efforts to mobilize Iran’s Kurdish minority to fight against the regime could similarly rally nationalist sentiments if viewed as an attempt to sow internal divisions which threaten the long term composition of the Iranian nation. While a free and democratic Iran is a desirable endpoint, President Trump may have a better chance of being involved in picking Iran’s next leader than the Iranian people.
2. Regime survival through bargaining. This is the most probable scenario for ending the conflict and is likely what the Trump administration expects to occur. This scenario would involve the US and Israel using their military might to significantly weaken Iran and forcing its leadership to the negotiating table in hopes of extracting concessions in exchange for ending the war. For Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, such concessions would ideally include Iran’s abandonment of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the ending of Iran’s support for its “Axis of Resistance” of armed Islamist groups, and possibly the dismantling of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.
Iran’s military strategy could complicate American efforts to force these concessions. Iran is attempting to prolong the conflict and inflict significant costs on the US and its regional partners, including by attacking military and civilian targets in the territory of American allies. Iranian attacks against Arab partners such as the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait are particularly important, as successful strikes on these countries undermine the credibility of America’s security umbrella and could result in them pressing the US to expedite an end to the conflict. Iran hopes to weaken the resolve of America’s Arab partners, disrupt the global economy by blockading the Strait of Hormuz (through which 20% of all global oil passes), or kill enough American soldiers to cause the American public (of which only 27% approve of Operation Epic Fury) to strongly turn against this war. This could force the White House’s hand and result in an armistice agreement which the Trump administration could publicly sell as a victory, but which may also be more palatable to Iran. As Richard Fontaine recently argued in Foreign Affairs, “By claiming multiple and often vague objectives, the president retains the ability to stop the fighting without admitting defeat.”
Additional complications could further disrupt efforts to reach a compromise. While Trump may be willing to accept a negotiated peace, it is unclear whether Netanyahu, who has long described Iran as an “existential threat” to Israel’s existence, would agree to a deal that leaves any of Israel’s war aims unaccomplished. Similarly, Iran may be reluctant to negotiate with the US if it believes America will not uphold any agreement reached, particularly since Trump previously withdrew the US from a nuclear deal negotiated with Iran by his predecessor. Accordingly, it is worth considering other potential scenarios under which this conflict could end.
3. Regime survival through attrition. Under this scenario, the Iranian regime would successfully absorb the damage inflicted by the US and Israel while also eliminating internal opposition, either through a rally around the flag effect or through the suppression of popular will. The Iranian regime has shown remarkable instincts for self-preservation and a willingness to use state violence to repress protests and may believe it can outlast the Americans and Israelis if it can keep a lid on domestic dissent. If America and Israel assess that they have successfully destroyed Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and eliminated the threat posed by Iran’s military and proxies, they could declare victory and end the conflict while leaving Iran’s leadership structure intact. Even if Iran’s government falls, groups like the Revolutionary Guard could functionally reconstitute the regime under a new coat of paint. For example, the Revolutionary Guard could use its considerable resources and political influence to impose military rule, perhaps creating a less secular version of the governance model imposed by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt.
Iran can pursue a strategy of ending the conflict on these terms, but doing so carries considerable risks. A lengthy bombing campaign could produce mass casualties, the destruction of essential economic infrastructure, and the total dismantling of Iranian military power. Even if the regime survived the conflict under this scenario, it would encounter significant difficulties governing in its aftermath. The regime’s prospects for surviving a war of attrition also hinge on whether it receives a financial lifeline from countries like China and Russia (the latter of which is allegedly providing Iran with intelligence on American targets) to allow Iran to continue feeding its people and funding its war efforts. Iran’s economy is extremely isolated due to international sanctions, and its military may be running out of offensive capabilities—as of March 5, Iranian drone and ballistic missile attacks have decreased respectively by 83% and 90% since the first day of the conflict. At this stage, it is unclear whether China wants to keep its hands clean in this conflict and whether Russia, already facing military overstretch in Ukraine and significant economic turmoil, has the capacity to assist Iran any more than it did the Assad regime when it was facing collapse in Syria in 2024.
Finally, Iran’s strategy of widening the conflict by attacking American allies could backfire if these attacks cause more countries to join the American-led campaign. This is particularly true in the case of Saudi Arabia, which thus far has not retaliated against Iranian attacks and has denied America the use of its airspace to strike Iran, and Turkey, whose defense ministry said it intercepted a missile that had been launched from Iran (which Iranian officials have denied). Iran may not be able to withstand a broader offensive for very long, particularly if an attack against Turkey triggered NATO’s Article Five provisions and prompted a collective military response from the alliance. While the fall of Iran’s government could trigger Scenario #1, it could also result in another far worse outcome
4. Regime collapse and power vacuum. This is the nightmare scenario for the United States, Iran, and every other country in the region. If the Iranian regime collapses without an internal or external authority in place to help facilitate a transition of power, the country could quickly devolve into chaos and internal conflict. The Islamic Republic’s collapse could easily resemble Libya’s, producing a state divided by warlords and former regime and IRGC leaders who stockpile as many weapons as they can and establish their own fiefdoms. Armed Kurdish and Balochi militias could similarly push for independence and attempt to carve out separatist states of their own. Iran could be politically and militarily divided for generations and devolve into a massive humanitarian crisis.
However, the impact of Iran’s collapse would not be contained within its borders. Former Revolutionary Guard soldiers could take their weapons and extensive training and either join or form Shia militias throughout the Middle East, creating a ripple effect of instability. Whatever remnants of Iran’s missile and nuclear programs survive the American and Israeli attacks could be sold off to the highest bidder, including other state or non-state actors. A push for Kurdish independence in Iran could spill over into neighboring Iraq and Turkey, while civil unrest could easily cascade across Iran’s eastern border with nuclear-armed Pakistan. Iran could become a black hole of regional instability, ultimately undermining America’s efforts to bring order to the region.
America’s military might has been on full display in the early days of the Iran War, but military strength alone may not be enough to guarantee a desirable outcome in this conflict. While America’s campaign against Iran could certainly produce a democratic transition, the diminishment of Iranian power, or favorable concessions from the Islamic Republic, it also carries significant risks of either a destabilizing government collapse or of regime survival through the infliction of significant punishment on American troops, its allies, or the Iranian people. The legacy of “Operation Epic Fury” will not be determined by the number of Iranian ships sunk or targets destroyed, but by the impact this campaign has on the future of Iran and the region as a whole.
Matthew Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Matthew Reisener
Since February 28, the US military has been engaged in a military conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Dubbed “Operation Epic Fury,” the US and its ally Israel have struck thousands of military targets in Iran, with Israel also attacking Iranian proxies in Beirut. Thus far, these attacks have produced over 1,000 casualties, including Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini. The Trump administration has outlined four goals of the campaign: destroying Iran’s missile infrastructure, annihilating Iranian naval power, eroding Iran’s regional terrorist network, and permanently ending Iran’s nuclear program. The US and Israel cited the dangers posed by Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs as the motivation for their campaign, though many experts have questioned the legitimacy of those threats.
While the White House’s justifications for this war may be subject to debate, the performance of America’s military in the early days of this conflict is not. America’s sea services have particularly displayed their impressive martial prowess, launching successful attacks against the Iranian mainland and helping sink more than 30 Iranian vessels as of March 5. Perhaps most impressively, an American submarine sank the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena on March 4, marking the first sinking of an enemy vessel by an American submarine since World War II. America’s Navy may be poised to play an even bigger role in the conflict, with Trump floating the idea of naval vessels escorting commercial ships through the Strait of Hormuz in response to Iranian efforts to close the vital economic corridor.
Yet despite America’s impressive military showing, the outcome of the war remains uncertain. Even if one agrees with the military objectives outlined by the White House, wars started with the best intentions can nonetheless produce unforeseen and often disastrous consequences. While the Iran War has countless possible outcomes, there are four potential scenarios for how this conflict might end which warrant particular consideration.
1. Regime change and democratization. While the White House left regime change off its official list of war aims, this scenario is most likely the administration’s preferred outcome. Regime change is difficult to achieve, particularly without deploying combat troops on the ground. Given that airpower alone has never successfully toppled a regime and considering the Trump administration’s demonstrated preference for waging military campaigns using sea-and-airpower rather than putting boots on the ground, this outcome seems unlikely, albeit not impossible.
Notably, Iran does have a democratic tradition that can be traced at least as far back as the 1905 Constitutional Revolution, and the country has the trappings of a democracy even if its elections have historically been far from free and fair. The Iranian people have also mobilized mass protests against the regime, and public opinion polling from 2024 suggests that 70% of Iranians oppose the continuation of the Islamic Republic, with 89% in favor of democracy. It not inconceivable that these protests, combined with the regime’s preoccupation with the US and Israel, could create an opportunity to topple the government just as Iranian revolutionaries did in 1979.
However, there are several reasons to be skeptical that this war will produce an Iranian democracy. First, there is no unified opposition movement in Iran, nor is there a clear alternative to replace the existing power structure should the protests succeed in ousting Iran’s religious leadership. While Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as a unifying figure during the 1979 revolution, the closest equivalent the contemporary protests have is Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s former Shah who is in no way prepared to govern a country he has not set foot in since 1979. Additionally, the American and Israeli attacks may actually weaken the protest movement by disrupting communications within the country and making protestors feel less safe taking to the streets.
These attacks could similarly trigger a “rally around the flag” effect, engendering nationalist sentiments among Iranians while giving credence to the regime’s longstanding narrative that it serves as the vanguard protecting the Iranian people from hostile American and Israeli forces—which is exactly what occurred after the Twelve-Day War in 2025. America’s outreach efforts to mobilize Iran’s Kurdish minority to fight against the regime could similarly rally nationalist sentiments if viewed as an attempt to sow internal divisions which threaten the long term composition of the Iranian nation. While a free and democratic Iran is a desirable endpoint, President Trump may have a better chance of being involved in picking Iran’s next leader than the Iranian people.
2. Regime survival through bargaining. This is the most probable scenario for ending the conflict and is likely what the Trump administration expects to occur. This scenario would involve the US and Israel using their military might to significantly weaken Iran and forcing its leadership to the negotiating table in hopes of extracting concessions in exchange for ending the war. For Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, such concessions would ideally include Iran’s abandonment of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the ending of Iran’s support for its “Axis of Resistance” of armed Islamist groups, and possibly the dismantling of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.
Iran’s military strategy could complicate American efforts to force these concessions. Iran is attempting to prolong the conflict and inflict significant costs on the US and its regional partners, including by attacking military and civilian targets in the territory of American allies. Iranian attacks against Arab partners such as the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait are particularly important, as successful strikes on these countries undermine the credibility of America’s security umbrella and could result in them pressing the US to expedite an end to the conflict. Iran hopes to weaken the resolve of America’s Arab partners, disrupt the global economy by blockading the Strait of Hormuz (through which 20% of all global oil passes), or kill enough American soldiers to cause the American public (of which only 27% approve of Operation Epic Fury) to strongly turn against this war. This could force the White House’s hand and result in an armistice agreement which the Trump administration could publicly sell as a victory, but which may also be more palatable to Iran. As Richard Fontaine recently argued in Foreign Affairs, “By claiming multiple and often vague objectives, the president retains the ability to stop the fighting without admitting defeat.”
Additional complications could further disrupt efforts to reach a compromise. While Trump may be willing to accept a negotiated peace, it is unclear whether Netanyahu, who has long described Iran as an “existential threat” to Israel’s existence, would agree to a deal that leaves any of Israel’s war aims unaccomplished. Similarly, Iran may be reluctant to negotiate with the US if it believes America will not uphold any agreement reached, particularly since Trump previously withdrew the US from a nuclear deal negotiated with Iran by his predecessor. Accordingly, it is worth considering other potential scenarios under which this conflict could end.
3. Regime survival through attrition. Under this scenario, the Iranian regime would successfully absorb the damage inflicted by the US and Israel while also eliminating internal opposition, either through a rally around the flag effect or through the suppression of popular will. The Iranian regime has shown remarkable instincts for self-preservation and a willingness to use state violence to repress protests and may believe it can outlast the Americans and Israelis if it can keep a lid on domestic dissent. If America and Israel assess that they have successfully destroyed Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and eliminated the threat posed by Iran’s military and proxies, they could declare victory and end the conflict while leaving Iran’s leadership structure intact. Even if Iran’s government falls, groups like the Revolutionary Guard could functionally reconstitute the regime under a new coat of paint. For example, the Revolutionary Guard could use its considerable resources and political influence to impose military rule, perhaps creating a less secular version of the governance model imposed by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt.
Iran can pursue a strategy of ending the conflict on these terms, but doing so carries considerable risks. A lengthy bombing campaign could produce mass casualties, the destruction of essential economic infrastructure, and the total dismantling of Iranian military power. Even if the regime survived the conflict under this scenario, it would encounter significant difficulties governing in its aftermath. The regime’s prospects for surviving a war of attrition also hinge on whether it receives a financial lifeline from countries like China and Russia (the latter of which is allegedly providing Iran with intelligence on American targets) to allow Iran to continue feeding its people and funding its war efforts. Iran’s economy is extremely isolated due to international sanctions, and its military may be running out of offensive capabilities—as of March 5, Iranian drone and ballistic missile attacks have decreased respectively by 83% and 90% since the first day of the conflict. At this stage, it is unclear whether China wants to keep its hands clean in this conflict and whether Russia, already facing military overstretch in Ukraine and significant economic turmoil, has the capacity to assist Iran any more than it did the Assad regime when it was facing collapse in Syria in 2024.
Finally, Iran’s strategy of widening the conflict by attacking American allies could backfire if these attacks cause more countries to join the American-led campaign. This is particularly true in the case of Saudi Arabia, which thus far has not retaliated against Iranian attacks and has denied America the use of its airspace to strike Iran, and Turkey, whose defense ministry said it intercepted a missile that had been launched from Iran (which Iranian officials have denied). Iran may not be able to withstand a broader offensive for very long, particularly if an attack against Turkey triggered NATO’s Article Five provisions and prompted a collective military response from the alliance. While the fall of Iran’s government could trigger Scenario #1, it could also result in another far worse outcome
4. Regime collapse and power vacuum. This is the nightmare scenario for the United States, Iran, and every other country in the region. If the Iranian regime collapses without an internal or external authority in place to help facilitate a transition of power, the country could quickly devolve into chaos and internal conflict. The Islamic Republic’s collapse could easily resemble Libya’s, producing a state divided by warlords and former regime and IRGC leaders who stockpile as many weapons as they can and establish their own fiefdoms. Armed Kurdish and Balochi militias could similarly push for independence and attempt to carve out separatist states of their own. Iran could be politically and militarily divided for generations and devolve into a massive humanitarian crisis.
However, the impact of Iran’s collapse would not be contained within its borders. Former Revolutionary Guard soldiers could take their weapons and extensive training and either join or form Shia militias throughout the Middle East, creating a ripple effect of instability. Whatever remnants of Iran’s missile and nuclear programs survive the American and Israeli attacks could be sold off to the highest bidder, including other state or non-state actors. A push for Kurdish independence in Iran could spill over into neighboring Iraq and Turkey, while civil unrest could easily cascade across Iran’s eastern border with nuclear-armed Pakistan. Iran could become a black hole of regional instability, ultimately undermining America’s efforts to bring order to the region.
America’s military might has been on full display in the early days of the Iran War, but military strength alone may not be enough to guarantee a desirable outcome in this conflict. While America’s campaign against Iran could certainly produce a democratic transition, the diminishment of Iranian power, or favorable concessions from the Islamic Republic, it also carries significant risks of either a destabilizing government collapse or of regime survival through the infliction of significant punishment on American troops, its allies, or the Iranian people. The legacy of “Operation Epic Fury” will not be determined by the number of Iranian ships sunk or targets destroyed, but by the impact this campaign has on the future of Iran and the region as a whole.
Matthew Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.