What the Disasters of Dieppe and Slapton Sands Can Tell Us About a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan​

By Dr. Steven Wills

Amphibious operations are among the most complex of military endeavors and those conducted against determined resistance often result in heavy casualties and tactical or operational failure. Many present commenters on the potential for a Chinese military (PLA) assault on Taiwan to reunify the island with the mainland Communist government seem to overlook the challenges involved in moving hundreds of thousands of troops across 81-140 miles under fire, sustaining and promoting combat operations there, and securing almost 12500 square miles of territory.

The fact that Chinese military forces have not engaged in combat operations since 1979, and that operation, an overland invasion of Vietnam, was poorly executed further suggests caution in assessing whether today’s PLA could easily execute an amphibious invasion. The recent mediocre performance of Russian air and ground forces, services that have had significant combat experience since the failed Afghanistan invasion of the 1980s, further encourages caution in appraising the PLA’s capability for a complex amphibious operation.

Two amphibious disasters from the European theater of the Second World War in the run up to the ultimately successful invasion of Normandy reveal that amphibious operations can be deadly for the unexperienced force, such as the PLA is now. Moreover, they can indicate just how many Chinese soldiers and sailors could be lost in combat before even setting foot on Taiwan.

Combined Operations Failure of Dieppe

The Allied amphibious raid on the Channel port or Dieppe on 19 August 1942, was designed to test what would be required to capture a port as part of the eventual Allied return invasion of Europe. German coast defenses were to be destroyed and intelligence gathered on German army dispositions facing the Channel. The operation was, however, poorly planned and badly executed by the over ten thousand British, Commonwealth (primarily Canadian), and U.S. forces involved.

Allied forces landed successfully with surprise, but air and sea support were not properly coordinated. The troops, especially their tanks that should have provided additional support, were trapped on the beach by obstacles and well-coordinated German resistance. Finally, the German Luftwaffe bested the Royal Air Force, forcing a rapid Allied withdraw. Allied losses were heavy, including over three thousand Canadian troops with over nine hundred of those killed in action. The Germans captured the Allied plan for the invasion on the beach – a senior commander had foolishly brought it with him on the raid – and pronounced it poorly developed and more an advocacy paper then a legitimate evaluation of courses of actions. The idea that, “An assault against a heavily defended coast could be carried out on the basis of securing tactical surprise and without dependence on overwhelming fire support in the critical phase of closing with and overrunning beach defenses” was dispelled as a result.

Friendly Fire and Schnellbootes at Slapton Sands

The events of 27 and 28 April 1944, during preparation for the 6 June D-day invasion of Normandy to begin the liberation of Nazi-held Western Europe, showed that realistic training was dangerous enough and that small numbers of distributive, but well-armed combatants could inflict major damage on poorly protected seaborne invasion forces. Realistic rehearsal of the Normandy invasion was a major part of Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower’s training program for the operation. Ike wanted to make sure troops trained under realistic conditions and arranged for some of the forces engaged in training in the British Devon region beaches, Slapton Sands, to be exposed to live fire from naval units to become accustomed to its visual and auditory effects. Due to a miscommunication between U.S. Navy admiral, British naval, and U.S. Army forces engaged in training on 27 September 1944, a British warship fired its practice rounds into U.S. forces on the beach killing upwards of 450 soldiers.

Early morning the next day, another exercise group, codenamed Exercise Tiger, embarked in eight landing ship tank vessels off the coast of Slapton Sands was attacked by a German Navy motor torpedo boat, Schnellboot flotilla, 5th E-Boat flotilla. German intelligence and aerial reconnaissance carefully monitored channel activity and amphibious exercises attracted enough attention for the Germans to launch an intercept mission on 28 April. Only one Allied escort ship was available as the second had been in a collision. Coordination between British and American leadership of the exercise was again poor, as the U.S. did not know that one escort was missing. British shore batteries saw the E-boats but had an order to not engage surface targets and did not inform anyone of the sighting. As a result, the German craft were able to attack and torpedoed and sank two LSTs full of U.S. soldiers in heavy gear, and severely damaged two other landing vessels.

Over 850 Americans were killed, and the German E-boats escaped without damage. The Allied Sea Component Commander Vice Admiral Alan Kirk said afterward, “The only successful defense against the E-boat is to sink it before it can reach an attack position.” The German E-boat bases on the Channel were belatedly destroyed six weeks later, and after the 6 June D-day invasion, but the damage had been done.

What Can Dieppe and Slapton Sands Say About a PRC Invasion of Taiwan?

Dieppe and Slapton Sands both illustrate the perils of amphibious operations that might also befall a PLA invasion of Taiwan. The Canadian troops at Dieppe and many U.S. troops lost in the Slapton Sands attack were inexperienced in combat on land and in the perils of seaborne transit. The Chinese military, equally inexperienced in combat operations, could see comparable results. Similarly, inexperience is often a contributor to friendly fire incidents, such as that seen on 27 April 1944.

Finally, a small number of well-armed, distributive combatants like the German E-boats can inflict severe losses on amphibious shipping and specifically on heavily laden embarked troops. If opposed, a PLA amphibious assault on Taiwan is likely to suffer heavy losses in ships, sailors, and soldiers before getting close to their landing objectives. Such casualties could exceed those suffered already by Russian forces in their Ukraine campaign. The Chinese military is a capable force and not one to be lightly dismissed under any circumstances. China can, of course, blockade Taiwan or launch potentially devastating missile bombardments of the island’s military bases and cities. Amphibious operations, however, are a major step beyond bombardment. The real question is whether the PLA is prepared to suffer the loss of potentially hundreds of ships and thousands of troops in a cross-strait, opposed, amphibious assault on Taiwan.

Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.